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ARISTOTLE
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
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In the first place he is the hardest author by far I ever meddled with. Then he has a dry conciseness that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents rather than a book; it tastes for all the world like chopped hay, or rather like chopped logic; for he has a violent affection to that art, being in some sort his own invention; so that he often loses himself in little trifling distinctions and verbal niceties, and what is worse, leaves you to extricate yourself as you can. Thirdly, he has suffered vastly by his transcribers, as all authors of great brevity necessarily must. Fourthly and lastly, he has abundance of fine, uncommon things, which make him well worth the pains he gives one. You see what you have to expect.

Thomas Gray's Letters.
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

This book was first published in 1926. In the second edition some corrections have been made in the translation, and a few alterations and additions elsewhere.

I may be allowed to record that my text has received unexpected support from the theory of clausulae in Greek prose set out by W. H. Shewring in the Classical Quarterly, xxv. 12. Besides more oratorical writings, Aristotle's Ethics comes under Mr Shewring's purview, and he tabulates the forms of sentence-endings most frequently used in it (employing the textus receptus). An application of Mr Shewring's rules to my text (see Classical Quarterly, xxv. 211) shows that all but one or two of my conjectural emendations conform to these rules, and substitute either a good clausula for a bad one or one good one for another, although I was thinking not of rhythm but solely of grammar, sense and style. An examination of the places where I have accepted the conjectures of others or preferred one ms. reading to another gives similarly satisfactory results.

I find it necessary to explain that the translation was designed to serve as an assistance to readers of the Greek; it is therefore as interpretative as I was able to make it without its becoming a mere para-
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phrase. Had I been working for those desirous of studying Aristotle without reading Greek, my method would have been different: I should have aimed at an entirely non-committal version, reproducing the Greek as closely as possible, keeping the abbreviations, omissions, ambiguities and obscurities that seem to be observable in some of its sentences, and so providing an English text to accompany the study of the valuable commentaries on the treatise that are available.

H. R.

15th December 1933.
INTRODUCTION

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle's life is known to us in some detail from various sources, the chief being the *Lives of the Philosophers* by Diogenes of Laertes. He was born in 384 B.C. at Stageirus on the Gulf of the Strymon, and though he lived half his life at Athens he remained a citizen of that little colony in the North. His father was an hereditary member of the medical profession, and physician to King Amyntas II. of Macedon. At the age of seventeen Aristotle went for higher education to Athens. There this 'young son of a doctor from the colonies' became a pupil of Plato; and he was a member of the Academy for twenty years, till the founder's death. Plato called him 'the mind of the School.' Aristotle's debt to his master was very great; although in natural science he went far beyond him—his interest in biology he may have inherited from his father,—in philosophy he built on Plato's foundations. He assumes in his readers a knowledge of Plato's writings; and if he only mentions him to differ from
him, the spirit in which he differs can be seen in a well-known passage in the *Ethics*.\textsuperscript{a}

When Speusippus succeeded Plato as head of the Academy, Aristotle left Athens. For three years he lived with his friend and former fellow-student, Hermeias, once a slave, then a banker, and now 'tyrant' of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia; whose niece he married. Hermeias falling into the hands of the Persians, Aristotle took refuge in the neighbouring island of Lesbos, but was afterwards invited by King Philip to return to Macedon and undertake the education of the crown-prince, now thirteen years old. According to Plutarch, Alexander revered his tutor no less than his father, declaring (in Aristotelian phrase) that 'to the one he owed life, to the other the good life.' Aristotle's influence may be traced in the conqueror's respect for Greece and his love of Hellenic culture, though not in his design to fuse Greek and barbarian as equals under his empire. Both Philip and Alexander supplied the philosopher with endowment; and Alexander placed the hunters, fowlers, fishermen, and stock-keepers of the empire under his orders to assist his zoological studies, though it must be said that Aristotle's works show little acquaintance with the fauna of the East.

Alexander became regent of Macedon at the age of sixteen, when Philip was making war on Byzan-

\textsuperscript{a} 1. vi. 1. The sentence, itself copied from Plato, became proverbial, and in the form *Amicus Plato sed magis amica (or sed maior) veritas* floated down the ages to Don Quixote, Mr. Shandy and Mr. Micawber. Bacon misrepresented the position when he wrote 'Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren.'
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tium. Stageirus had been destroyed by Philip in the Olynthian war, but Aristotle had been permitted to restore it, and there he now retired. But when Alexander succeeded to his father's throne in 336 B.C., Aristotle again settled at Athens. He now definitely broke away from the Academy, of which Xenocrates had become head, and set up as a teacher in the Lyceum. This was a precinct with colonnades and shrines, sacred to Apollo and the Muses, just outside the city; its walks, in which the master taught his pupils, gave the new school its name of Peripatetic. Here he instituted a sort of collegiate life, besides forming a large library and a museum of natural history.

This fourth and culminating period of Aristotle's life, his professorship at Athens, lasted twelve years. In 322 B.C. the sudden death of Alexander was followed by a Greek revolt, in which Athens took the lead. Aristotle, an alien, a protégé of the court, a friend of the viceroy Antipater, and a critic of democracy, was marked out to be a victim of anti-Macedonian feeling. The attack, like that against Socrates before, took the form of a prosecution for impiety. Declaring that he would not let Athens 'sin twice against philosophy,' Aristotle withdrew to the Macedonian stronghold of Chalcis, where he had property; and there within a year he died. His will, preserved by Diogenes, names Antipater as chief executor, and makes minute provision for his family and his slaves, some of whom are to be rewarded with freedom.
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ARISTOTLE’S WORKS

Aristotle’s writings fell into two groups. One consisted of more or less popular works on philosophical subjects, many of them in dialogue form, which were published (εκδεδομένωι λόγοι; the other of scientific treatises (άκροατικοί λόγοι), recording for his students his oral teaching, and kept in the library of the school. The former group is entirely lost, unless the treatise on the Constitution of Athens, rediscovered in 1890, be held to belong to it; but it is to these books that Cicero and Quintilian must be referring when they speak of the charm and flow of Aristotle’s style, since those qualities are for the most part not to be found in his extant works. These are not books at all; each is a collection of separate discourses on different parts of some subject, loosely put together to form a treatise on the whole. The transitional passages, summing up what has been said or outlining what is to come, are often inaccurate, and some of the cross references are hard to trace. The style is uneven; some chapters may consist of little more than outlines of the argument, in others it is completely but baldly set out; while other passages again are written in a copious and even eloquent form. Cicero refers to Aristotle’s writings as commentarii, notes; and their nature is best explained by supposing that they are drafts of his courses of lectures, put together by himself or more

a These are doubtless to be reckoned among the εξωτερικοί λόγοι referred to in Aristotle’s extant works, though that term seems to include the discourses of other philosophers as well. See note on i. xiii. 9.

b De finibus v. 12.
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probably by his pupils to form treatises on the various departments of philosophy and science, and preserved in his school as an encyclopaedia for the use of students. Not only the style but occasional illustrations and allusions suggest the lecturer; indeed, they enabled Henry Jackson, in an entertaining paper,\(^a\) to reconstruct for us Aristotle’s lecture-room, with its pupils, furniture and apparatus, and even the busts and pictures that adorned it.

HIS ETHICAL TREATISES

The Aristotelian Corpus contains three complete treatises on moral science, the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia. Nicomachus was Aristotle’s son, and is mentioned as a minor in his will; he fell in battle while still young. Eudemus was the pupil who adhered most closely to the master’s teaching. They may have been the editors of the works that bear their names; though the early commentator Porphyry speaks of these as ‘dedicated to’ Nicomachus and Eudemus.\(^b\) In any case, no one questions that the Nicomachean Ethics is the authoritative statement of Aristotle’s system. The Eudemian may perhaps be regarded as an earlier course of lectures, giving his views in a less mature form.\(^c\) The Great Ethics is a shorter course, probably

\(^a\) *Journal of Philology*, No. 70.

\(^b\) Cicero *l.c.* says that the Nicomachean is attributed to Aristotle himself, but may well be by his son.

\(^c\) Burnet, *Essays and Addresses*, p. 294, thinks that this has now been conclusively proved by Jaeger. The same order of the three treatises is upheld by A. Manslon (*Rev. Néo-Scol. de Philosophie*, 1931), but Stocks in the *Oxford Translation of Aristotle*, vol. ix., argues that the Eudemian is the later, and after Aristotle.
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compiled by a Peripatetic of the next generation, and based partly on the Nicomachean but chiefly on the Eudemian. a

THE NICOMACHEAN-EUDEMIAN BOOKS

A curious problem is raised by the fact that Books V.-VII. of the Nicomachean Ethics belong also to the Eudemian; or so it is stated in the mss. of the latter, which omit this part of the treatise and refer the reader to the other work. The natural inference is that Aristotle left only one course of lectures on these portions of the subject. It is true that the amphibious Books fit somewhat loosely into the general argument of the Nicomachean Ethics, and it has been held that they really belong to the Eudemian, the corresponding parts of the Nicomachean having been lost. Recent opinion on the other hand has inclined to assign them to the Nicomachean, and to suppose the loss of three Books of the Eudemian; some passages in the other Eudemian Books seem to point to a different treatment of the topics of the doubtful Books, and so does the handling of these topics in the Magna Moralia. But the uncertainty of arguments of this nature is shown by what has been said above about the loose construction of the Aristotelian treatises in general. We have no option but to accept Books V.-VII. as Aristotle’s considered doctrine on the topics of which they treat, except in so far as they are modified by other parts of the work.

a Von Arnim, Eudemische Ethik und Metaphysik, puts the Great Ethics first.

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CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES

Aristotle's conception of Ethics is based on a technicality that he inherits from Plato, the division of Science into Theoretic and Practical. Theoretic Science is prompted by intellectual curiosity, and aims at knowledge for its own sake; Practical Science is pursued for the guidance of life, and seeks knowledge only as a means to action. Theoretic Science studies that part of the universe of things which is unchanging—the Deity, the fixed stars, the fundamental principles of being, the laws of mathematics—together with such mutable things as 'have their source of change within them,' in so far as that change is necessary, and obeys a natural law of growth and decay. Practical Science studies things that 'have their source of change in something else,' that 'can be otherwise'; and it aims at 'devising rules for successful intervention in the course of events, to produce results which but for our intervention would not have come about' (Taylor).

ETHICS AND PRACTICAL SCIENCE

Within this latter field, the place of ethical science is partly indicated in the opening chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics. The Practical Sciences or Arts are themselves subdivided into the Sciences of making and the Sciences of doing. The former aim at some product or result; of the latter their own exercise is the End. The former, the 'Poietic' or Productive Sciences, include the professions and handicrafts; on
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two of the most important of these sciences Aristotle wrote treatises, the Rhetoric and the Poetics. Those of the latter group, called Practical Sciences in a narrower sense of the term, comprise such arts as dancing, which are pursued for their own sake.

Now there is one supreme Practical Science, the Science of man's Good or Happiness. It is 'practical' both in the wider and the narrower sense; for (a) it studies not merely what Happiness is, but how it is to be achieved, and (b) Happiness is not a product of action, but itself consists in activity of a certain sort: it is a mode of life. This master-science includes within itself, or controls for its own uses, all the other and special Practical Sciences, both those that do things and those that make things; for all the arts, crafts, professions, and studies aim in some subsidiary or departmental way at the welfare of man.

ETHICS A DEPARTMENT OF POLITIKÉ

But man, in Aristotle's zoology, is the political animal; the human race is a gregarious species that lives in communities designed for the sake not of life alone but of the good life—the communities which, in their highest form then known, the Greeks entitled Cities. This supreme Practical Science therefore, the Science of human affairs (N.E. x. ix. 22), is styled in the introductory chapters of the work the Science of Politics; for if man's Happiness is a certain mode of life, his mode of life is shaped for him by his

a It must be noted, however, that in Bk. VI. c. iv. the term 'art' or craft is confined to the former group, the Productive Sciences.

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social environment, by the laws, customs and institutions of the community to which he belongs. A social being can only achieve his good in society, and in a society rightly organized for his welfare. The Science of Politics therefore has to discover, first, in what mode of life man’s happiness consists, next, by what form of government and social institutions that mode of life can be secured for him. The first question is to be decided by a study of man’s ethos or character; this occupies the Nicomachean Ethics. The second requires an investigation of the right constitution of the State; this is carried out in the Politics, which purports to be a sequel to the Ethics, or the second half of a single treatise, although it bears the title which in the introduction has been given to the subject as a whole.

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: OUTLINE OF CONTENTS

A brief outline of the contents of the Ethics will show it to be, like most of Aristotle’s extant works, a compilation of several separate logai or discourses, somewhat loosely worked up into a complete treatise.

Book I. defines the subject as the study of human welfare or Happiness, which is the supreme End or aim of conduct. This is found to consist in the active exercise of the various excellences or virtues of man’s nature, or rather of the highest one among them. A review of the Virtues is led up to by a brief excursus on Psychology (1. xiii.); the human Soul is shown to include two parts beside the purely animal vital faculties: these are the Rational Intellect and the Character, which experiences the
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passions and appetites, but which is capable of obedience to reason. The human virtues thus fall into two classes, Intellectual and Moral.

Book II. defines Moral Virtue as a certain ‘habit’ or state of the will; it is a fixed disposition to observe the mean—to feel or do not too much and not too little—in the various departments of conduct. A list (c. vii.) of the separate Moral Virtues, and of the Vices of excess and defect corresponding to each, serves as a table of contents to Books III. and IV., in which each of the Virtues and graces of character is examined in detail, and shown to be a form of moderation in conduct. This detailed treatment of the Virtues is prefaced (iii. i.-v.) by an excursus on the Freedom of the Will; it is ascertained what constitutes a voluntary act, for which the agent is morally responsible.

So far the treatise hangs together well enough. But the three following books, the ones which belong also to the Eudemian Ethics, are more disconnected. Book V. consists of an independent essay on Justice, which clearly could not be omitted in a review of the Moral Virtues, but which was not included in the list of Book II, c. vii., and which is with difficulty accommodated to the formula of the Mean.

Book VI. passes to the Intellectual Virtues. Here the fullest treatment is given to Prudence or Practical Wisdom, which as determining the Mean supplies an essential factor to the Moral Virtues. The higher mental excellence of Theoretic or Speculative Wisdom is more scantily described, and is not explicitly shown to be the highest of the Virtues, as the general argument of the treatise requires.

Book VII. is a disconnected appendix to the section
on Moral Virtue. It deals with Weakness of Will, as a state of character intermediate between the virtue of Temperance and the vice of Profligacy. The subject is treated without reference to the related passages, those on Voluntariness and on Temperance as a virtue lying between two vices, in Book III. Failure of will being due to the temptation of pleasure, Book VII. ends with an excursus on Pleasure, refuting the view that it is essentially evil, and defining it as the ‘unimpeded activity’ of a natural faculty.

Books VIII. and IX., a fifth of the whole work, form an essay on Friendship (Friendliness or Amiability having figured in Book II. c. vii. and Book IV. c. vi. as one of the minor graces of character). The term is extended to include the mutual regard accompanying any social relationship. This section of the treatise serves to correct the mainly egoistic or self-regarding nature of the remainder; it is related to the general theme by showing both that friends are a necessary means to some virtuous activities, and that friendship forms a part of the End, since it enlarges the life of the individual by his sympathetic consciousness of the virtuous activities of his friends.

Book X. begins with a second and unconnected excursus on Pleasure; this is now more accurately analysed as a concomitant and completion of activity, thus being brought into relation (though by no means clearly) with the End.

Then follows the conclusion of the whole argument: as Speculative Wisdom is the highest of the Virtues, Happiness ex definitione consists in the activity in which it is manifested, and this activity is Theoria, the
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disinterested contemplation of truth. Of this activity man is capable in virtue of something divine in his nature; and in the brief periods when he can attain to it he approximates to the life of the Deity. Because of his humanity, he must also engage in the life of moral action among his fellow-men; but this affords Happiness only in a secondary degree. Thought is the highest form of Action; and man's End and aim is to rise as often and as long as he can to the activity of Thought. We may infer that it is the business of Politics (though this is nowhere stated) so to organize the State that as many of the citizens as possible may be fitted by nature and education, and enabled by circumstances, to attain this End.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL METHOD

That Ethics differs from pure Science in introducing the consideration of values, or in studying what ought to be and not merely what is, will be admitted. How far this difference is adequately conveyed by Aristotle's conception of a Practical Science, and whether that conception is entirely free from confusion of thought, this is not the place to enquire. It may however be pointed out that this conception of the subject has a great influence on the method of its investigation. Ethics, Aristotle holds, dealing as it does with the contingent, with 'things which may be otherwise,' is not an exact science. Its conclusions will have only a general and not a universal validity; for its reasonings cannot achieve rigid demonstration. He insists more than once that the method of Ethics is inductive, and his actual procedure consists
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largely in an appeal to common sense; his favourite mode of approach is to propound the chief opinions current among philosophers and men in general on the topics in hand, to ascertain the degree in which they are inconsistent with one another, to prune away this inconsistent fringe, and to leave standing that residuum of truth which is found to be common to the opinions examined; and he constantly tests his results by the general moral judgement of his age and country, as evidenced by proverbs and quotations, by the forms of language, and by the accepted terms of praise and censure. The work is addressed to the educated layman, and not to professed philosophers only; it is not ostensibly based on the fundamental principles of Aristotle's philosophy—for example, at the end of Book I. he is content with the crude psychology of the Academy, and ignores the more scientific teaching of his own De anima: and considerable parts of the treatise, such as chapters x. and xi. of the same Book, are popular in form and inconclusive in result.

But it would be wrong to imply either that his work consisted simply in reducing to a system the common moral code of his age and race, or that he regarded his results as merely tentative. The salient points and main conclusions of his argument—the formal definition of Happiness, the quasi-mathematical analysis of Moral Virtue as an observance of the Mean, the identification of that highest activity in which Happiness by definition consists with the exercise of pure thought—are undoubtedly put forward as truths of absolute validity; and the trains of reasoning by which they are led up to are largely a priori. Nor is Aristotle's Ethic in reality detached
from his general system of philosophy. To mention important instances, the content of *Theoria* or the contemplative activity, the nature of the divine life to which that activity approximates, and the relation of man to the Deity which that approximation involves, are all matters which bring morals into relation with metaphysics, and upon which his views can only be fully discovered by the study of his other writings. And the general procedure of this treatise is not unaffected by the technicalities of his scientific thought. In particular, the whole texture is coloured by the philosopher's teleological view of nature and of life. It is this that prompts him to base his theory of human conduct on the conception of the *Telos* or End; and the various implications of that conception, related but distinguishable yet not distinguished, do much to guide him to his conclusions. *Telos* means not only nor primarily aim or purpose, but completion or perfection: the aim of a living organism, the final cause of its being, is to realize the potentiality of its nature, to grow into a perfect specimen of its species. Hence comes the assumption that not only can conduct or purposive action be centred on a single aim, from which the entire ethical system can be deduced, but also that this aim consists in the full development and exercise in action of man's natural faculties. But again *Telos* also connotes End in the sense of ultimate point, the last term of a series, the summit and crown of a process. Hence the tendency to think of the End not as a sum of Goods, but as one Good which is the Best. Man's welfare thus is ultimately found to consist, not in the employment of all his faculties in due proportion, but only in the activity of the highest
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faculty, the 'theoretic' intellect. Not that the lower activities can be dispensed with; for the philosopher is a man, and must live in the world of men, exercising the Moral Virtues, and the intellectual excellence of Prudence or Practical Wisdom which the Moral Virtues involve. But, strictly speaking, the Life of Action has no absolute value; it is not a part of, but only a means to, the End, which is the Life of Thought.

Yet in the section of the Ethics devoted to the Moral Virtues they are described with an enthusiasm that seems to invest them with a substantive value of their own; and this especially where the formula of the mean is felt to be inadequate, and is supplemented by the proviso that virtuous actions, to spring from a true habit of virtue, must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα, for the sake of the moral beauty and rightness of the act itself; as if moral conduct were not merely a means or an indispensable pre-requisite, but a constituent part, of the Good Life. And the same is true of some places in the essay of Friendship, which is clearly felt not only to facilitate, but to augment and to enhance, the attainment of the End by the individual.

There is here an ambiguity in Aristotle’s ethical doctrine which is nowhere cleared up.

Among all the relics of Greek antiquity, Aristotle’s Ethics is one of those that retain their interest most freshly. To many readers, new to this kind of study, its application of rigorous logical analysis to the problem of conduct comes as a revelation.¹ It is

¹ Henry Jackson wrote (Memoir, p. 158): ‘It is an apérent book, if I may use the phrase. I have never forgotten the effect it produced on me when I was an undergraduate.’
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true that a moral system which so exalts the life of the intellect is in many ways alien to modern thought and practice; but in so far as Aristotle's End can be interpreted less exclusively, and taken to include complete self-development and self-expression, the full realization in healthy activity of all the potentialities of human nature, his teaching has not lost its appeal. His review of the virtues and graces of character that the Greeks admired stands in such striking contrast with Christian Ethics that this section of the work is a document of primary importance for the student of the Pagan world. But it has more than a historic value. Both in its likeness and in its difference it is a touchstone for that modern idea of a gentleman, which supplies or used to supply an important part of the English race with its working religion.

Text

The text of this edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is based on that of Bekker (1831), the foundation of all subsequent work on Aristotle. I have however revised Bekker's text with the aid of the editions of Susemihl (1860), Bywater (1891), and Apelt (1902), and the published notes of other scholars. In occasionally preferring other readings or conjectures to those accepted by Bekker,¹ I have been partly guided by the assumptions that Aristotle was, with certain fairly well-defined qualifications, a thinker and writer of extreme precision, and that his text has undergone, in the ms. tradition, at least an average

¹ I have published notes on some of these places in the *Classical Review*, xxxix. 157, xl. 189, xlii. 6, and in the *Classical Quarterly*, xxii. 37.
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amount of corruption of the usual kinds: among others, the replacement of a word by another occurring in or suggested by the context (see H. Richards, Aristotelica, p. 74), and the misplacement of a clause omitted in its proper position and inserted a little lower down. On the other hand I have ignored such far-reaching reconstructions, based on theories of 'duplicate passages' and the 'dislocation' of whole paragraphs, as have been attempted by Cook Wilson and by Henry Jackson; the very nature of Aristotle’s writings, as described above, seems to preclude the attainment of trustworthy results on these lines.

Where I have departed from Bekker (except in trifles), I have given the rejected reading in the footnotes. These also contain a selection of such ms. variants and conjectural emendations as seem to be of interest for sense or style; but they make no attempt to give a complete view of the state of the mss.

MSS.

A valuable examination of the chief sources for the text is made in Bywater's Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (1892), and other information will be found in Susemihl's preface.

Bekker bases his text on the following six mss.: 

Kb Laurentianus lxxxi. 11: 10th c.
Lb Parisiensis 1854: 12th c.
Mb Marcianus 213: about 14th c.
Ob Riccardianus 46: " " "
Ha Marcianus 214: " " "
Nb Marcianus Append. iv. 53: " " "
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Of these the oldest, $K^b$, is the best; and though not without many ordinary errors, it is comparatively free from emendation. The next oldest, $L^b$, is not quite so good, but its variants must be weighed on their merits. The four more recent mss. are of little value. $H^a$ and $N^b$ are usually ignored by Bekker, as their unique readings are idle variants or corruptions. $M^b$ and $O^b$ are rather better, but their variants when not worthless are mostly due to emendation. In the present edition these four mss. are only quoted when preferred to both $K^b$ and $L^b$.

Other mss. have been collated by other scholars, but none has any authority; now and then their readings are preferable on their merits, and a few of these have been quoted here from Susenohl.

Another witness, ranking in importance next to the two best mss., is the thirteenth-century Latin translation (T) attributed to William of Moerbeke, which is the basis of the commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas. This version follows the Greek as closely as Latin idiom permits, and is almost equivalent to another Greek ms.; it occasionally shows an independent tradition of the text.

Some textual value attaches to the commentary of Aspasius (Asp.), second century A.D. (edited by Heylbut 1889), but only where we can be sure that he is quoting and not merely paraphrasing Aristotle, and that his quotations have not been assimilated by copyists to their mss. of Aristotle. His text differed little from our mss., and constantly confirms the antiquity of their questionable readings; it generally supports $K^b$, sometimes $L^b$, and rarely gives a new variant. A similar use can be made
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of the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, c. 200 A.D.

A few variants of interest have been gleaned by the industry of scholars from the Greek paraphrase of Heliodorus (Hel.), 1367, the Latin translations of Arctins (Ar.), 1473, Argyropylus, 1473, and Felicianus, 1542, and the Aldine editio princeps (Ald.) of the whole of Aristotle, 1495-1498.\(^a\)

BOOKS OF REFERENCE

A full bibliography to the Nicomachean Ethics will be found in the Teubner edition of Apelt.

Of English commentaries the most recent and most important are those of J. A. Stewart (1892) and J. Burnet (1900). Professor Stewart's two volumes contain an admirable paraphrase of the treatise and an invaluable collection of material for its interpretation and illustration. Professor Burnet's work, though most illuminating, hardly professes to give a complete commentary\(^b\); it is a stimulating essay in defence of the theses (1) that the Nicomachean Ethics is 'a dialectical and not a demonstrative work' throughout, so that Aristotle 'is not committed to all or any of the solutions he gives' of the various questions raised; and (2) that the Eudemian Ethics (except the three disputed Books,

\(^a\) An earlier folio edition of the Ethica ad Nicomachum is undated. Another edition appeared at Louvain 1513, and the whole of Aristotle edited by Erasmus was published at Bâle 1531.

\(^b\) The index of this book and that of Bywater's text are indispensable supplements, for the Ethics, to Bonitz's Index Aristotelicus (1870) in vol. v. of the Berlin Aristotle.
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which belong to the *Nicomachean*) was written by Eudemus as a record of his master’s doctrine to supplement the *Nicomachean*, on which it therefore constitutes ‘the most authoritative commentary’; the *Nicomachean* being substantially the work of Aristotle himself, Nicomachus having died too young to write though not perhaps to edit it.*

Valuable studies of parts of the treatise are Henry Jackson’s edition of Book V. (1879) and L. H. Greenwood’s of Book VI. (1909).

Aristotle’s Theory of Conduct by Thomas Marshall (1905), though not always correct in details, is a useful presentation of the contents of the *Ethics* for English readers.

Among English translations, that of F. H. Peters, first published in 1881 and several times revised by the author (15th edition 1925), seems to have won recognition as the best. It is marked by terseness and felicity, but appears to me not entirely free from the defect that I have noticed in other versions, a failure to exhibit the logical sequence of the argument. Mr Ross’s translation (1925) appeared while my work was in the press, and I have not had the advantage of consulting it.

For Aristotle’s philosophy as a whole the reader may be referred to two brilliant little books, A. E. Taylor’s *Aristotle* and J. L. Stocks’s *Aristotelianism*, to W. D. Ross’s *Aristotle* (1923), a masterpiece of compressed exposition, and to T. Case’s article ‘Aristotle’ in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1911.; and for a full treatment with quotations and references,

* See further Stocks’s Introduction to *Magna Moralia, etc.*, in *Works of Aristotle Translated*, vol. ix. Burnet, however, afterwards changed his views, see p. xiii note c.

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INTRODUCTION

to Zeller's Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (English translation 1897).

The above Introduction was written for the first edition of this book in 1926.

In preparing a new edition I have made a few additions to it and a good many alterations in the text, translation and notes. Some I have discussed in the journals to which references are given in the footnote on p. xxiv above. I have had the advantage of consulting Mr Ross's brief notes in his translation (re-issued 1931).

H. R.

xxix
ARISTOTLE'S
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΤΣ ΗΘΙΚΩΝ
ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ Α

1 Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξεις 1094α
τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθῶν τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ·
διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήμαντο τάγαθον Ὡς πάντω εὕρεσιν.
2 (διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ αὐτὰς ἔργα μιᾶ· ὅπως δὲ
εἰσὶν τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω
3 πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα.) πολλῶν δὲ πρά-
ξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ
gίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἡαρμακῆς μὲν ἅρμαν αἰγίλεια,
ναυτηρικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη,
4 οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλούτος. δοσις δὲ οἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων 10
ὑπὸ μίαν τυνα δύναμιν—καθάπερ ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς
ἡ χαλινοποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλω τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσὶν,
αὐτῇ δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πράξεις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικῆν,
tὸν τοῦ αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον

1 κατὰ τῶν ΚβΜβ; καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δὴ ἦν ed.
2 δὲ Αλδ.: δὴ.

Ἀριστοτέλης παρασκεύαζε τοὺς θείους χάρακες ως καθολικὸν τέχνην καὶ μέθοδον. Πράξεις, δηλαδή, ἐφίστηκεν τις καλώς, ὡς πάντω ἐφίνταντο τάγαθον. Τα τελή των τελών ήταν τα ἔργα, ὡς δὲ τα παρά τας πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τα ἐνεργεία τα ἔργα. Πολλὰ πολλῶν ἔργα πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνονται καὶ τα τέλη: ἡ αρμακῆς μὲν ἅρμαν αἰγίλεια, ναυτηρικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλούτος. Κατὰ τὰν τοὐτοῦν ὑπὸ μίαν τύτανα δύναμιν—καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικήν, ἡ χαλινοποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλω τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσὶν, αὐτῇ δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πράξεις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν, τὸν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον.
ARISTOTLE'S
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

BOOK I

1 Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the

2 Good is That at which all things aim. (It is true that a certain variety is to be observed among the ends at which the arts and sciences aim: in some cases the activity of practising the art is itself the end,a whereas in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in the arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these products are essentially superior in value to the activities.) But as there are numerous pursuits and arts and sciences, it follows that their ends are correspondingly numerous: for instance, the end of the science of medicine is health, that of the art of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy

3 victory, that of domestic economy wealth. Now in cases where several such pursuits are subordinate to some single faculty—as bridle-making and the other trades concerned with horses' harness are subordinate to horsemanship, and this and every other military pursuit to the science of strategy, and

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ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ

ἀλλαὶ ὑφ’ ἐτέρας—ἐν ἀπάσαις δὴ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετῶτερα τῶν ὑπ’ 15 ἄντα. τοῦτων γὰρ χάριν κάκεινα διώκεται. (διαφέρει δ’ οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὕτας εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἡ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.)

2 Ἐι δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν δ’ δὶ’ αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τάλλα δὲ διὰ τούτῳ, καὶ μὴ πάντα δὶ’ 20 ἔτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ’ εἰς ἀπειρον, ὥστε εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαιὰν τὴν ὀρέξιν), δὴ λον 2 ὡς τοῦτ’ ἂν εἰη τάγαθον καὶ τὸ ἀριστον. ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνώσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἐχει βοηθήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοποῦν ἐχοντες, 3 μᾶλλον ἂν τυχεχάνομεν τοῦ δεόντος; εἰ δ’ οὕτω, 25 πειρατέου τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ 4 καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ δυνάμεων. Δὸξειε δ’ ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς.

5,6 τοιαύτη δ’ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται· τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ πολίς 1091 b ἐκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει· ὰρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὕτως, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονο- 1 δὴ ΓΜβ; δὲ
similarly other arts to different arts again—in all these cases, I say, the ends of the master arts are things more to be desired than all those of the arts subordinate to them; since the latter ends are only pursued for the sake of the former. (And it makes no difference whether the ends of the pursuits are the activities themselves or some other thing beside these, as in the case of the sciences mentioned.)

If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we wish for its own sake, while we wish the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain what is fitting, like archers having a target to aim at? If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the theoretical or practical sciences it is the object.

Now it would be agreed that it must be the object of the most authoritative of the sciences—some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft. But such is manifestly the science of Politics; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences are to exist in states, and what branches of knowledge the different classes of the citizens are to learn, and up to what point; and we observe that even the most highly esteemed of the faculties, such as strategy, domestic economy, oratory, are subordinate to the
μικὴν ῥητορικὴν. χρωμένης δὴ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικάς] 2 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετοῦσα τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἢν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστε τούτ’ ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώπων ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταύτον ἔστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μειζὸν γε καὶ τελείοτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν. ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν μόνῳ, κάλλιον 10 δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφέσται, πολιτική τις οὖσα.

Δέχοντο δ’ ἂν ἰκανῶς εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὑλὴν διασαφηθεῖν τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπασι τῶν λόγων ἐπιζητητέον, ὥστε οὐδ’ ἐν 2 τοῖς δημιουργομένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ δὲν ἢ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν 3 ἔχει δια-15 φορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμων μόνων εἶναι, 3 φύσιν δὲ μὴ. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τάγαθα, διὰ τὸ πολλοὶς συμβαίνεις βλάβας ἀπ’ αὐτῶν· ἢ δὴ γὰρ τινα ἀπώλειον διὰ πλοῦτον, 4 ἔτεροι δὲ δὲν ἀνδρεῖαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπω 20 τάληθες ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ

1 δὴ ed.: δὲ. 2 Bywater. 3 πολλὴν Ασρ.: τοσαύτην.

* Or perhaps ‘both to ascertain and to secure.’

5 καλόν is a term of admiration applied to what is correct, especially (1) bodies well shaped and works of art or handicraft well made, and (2) actions well done (see π. vii. 6); it thus means (1) beautiful, (2) morally right. For the analogy between material and moral correctness see π. vi. 9.
political science. Inasmuch then as the rest of the sciences are employed by this one, and as it moreover lays down laws as to what people shall do and what things they shall refrain from doing, the end of this science must include the ends of all the others. Therefore, the Good of man must be the end of the science of Politics. For even though it be the case that the Good is the same for the individual and for the state, nevertheless, the good of the state is manifestly a greater and more perfect good, both to attain and to preserve. To secure the good of one person only is better than nothing; but to secure the good of a nation or a state is a nobler and more divine achievement.

This then being its aim, our investigation is in a sense the study of Politics.

Now our treatment of this science will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and crafts. The subjects studied by political science are Moral Nobility and Justice; but these conceptions involve much difference of opinion and uncertainty, so that they are sometimes believed to be mere conventions and to have no real existence in the nature of things. And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the Good, because it frequently occurs that good things have harmful consequences: people have before now been ruined by wealth, and in other cases courage has cost men their lives. We must therefore be content if, in dealing with subjects and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a
πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαύτα καὶ συμπεραινεθθεῖν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρείαν ἐκαστὸν τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοιούτων τάκριβες ἐπιζητεὶν καὶ ἐκαστὸν γένος ἐφ’ ὁσὸν ή τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται. 25 παραπλῆσιν γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικὸν τε πιθανο- λογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικοῦ ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

6 Ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἡ γυνῶσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἁρα ἐκαστὸν πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ’ ὁ περὶ πάν τε πεπαιδευμένοις. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶν οἰκείος ἀκροατής ὁ νέος· ἀπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ 6 λόγοι δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸν οὐ ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωψήλως, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γυνώσις ἀλλὰ

7 πράξεις. διαφέρει δ’ οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἄθος νεαρός, οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἐλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἐκαστὰ· τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γυνώσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατεῖσι. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένους καὶ πρά ττους πολυωψήλας ἃν 8 εἰσὶν τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκρατοῦ,

1 δ’ Ὀβ.  

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*a* Quoted in *Troilus and Cressida*, ii. ii. 165:

Young men, whom Aristotle thought
Unfit to hear moral philosophy.

*b* The argument is, that even if the young could gain a knowledge of Ethics (which they cannot, because it requires experience of life), they would not use it as a guide to conduct, because they are led by their passions and appetites; and therefore the study is of no value for them, since Ethics,
broad outline of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions. Accordingly we may ask the student also to accept the various views we put forward in the same spirit; for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.

8 Again, each man judges correctly those matters with which he is acquainted; it is of these that he is a competent critic. To criticize a particular subject, therefore, a man must have been trained in that subject: to be a good critic generally, he must have had an all-round education. Hence the young are not fit to be students of Political Science.\(^a\) For they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is these that supply the premises and subject matter of this branch of philosophy. And moreover they are led by their feelings; so that they will study the subject to no purpose or advantage, since the end of this science is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether they are young in years or immature in character: the defect is not a question of time, it is because their life and its various aims are guided by feeling; for to such persons their knowledge is of no use, any more than it is to persons of defective self-restraint.\(^b\) But Moral Science may be of great value to those who guide their desires and actions by principle.

8 Let so much suffice by way of introduction as to being a practical science, is only pursued for the sake of its practical application.
καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφρομασθὼ τοσαύτα.

4 ν. Δέγωμεν δ’ ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πάσα γνώσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἁγαθοῦ τινὸς ἤρεγεται, τί ἔστων οὐ 15 λέγομεν τὴν πολλυκήν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκροτατοῦ τῶν πρακτῶν ἁγαθῶν. ὁνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ἀμολογεῖται τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ’ εὖ ζην καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦταν ὑπολαμβάνοντες τῷ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τὶ ἔστων, ἀμφίβολον, καὶ οὐχ ἤμοιως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόσαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐγαργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οὐδὲν ἠδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο -πολλάκις δὲ καὶ δ’ αὐτὸς ἐτέροις, νοσῆσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον. 25 συνειδότες δὲ ἐμπροσθός ἠγνοοῦν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγεται θαυμάζουσιν ἐνιοῦν δ’ ὄντος παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἁγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δ’ καὶ τούτων πάσων αἰτίων ἔστι τοῦ εἶναι ἁγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξατακτῶν τὰς δόγας πρακτικότερον ἰσωτοὺς ἔστιν, ἦκανον δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιστολαξούσας ἢ δικαιολογεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνοι τινὰ λόγον. 30

5 Μὴ λανθανεῖτο δ’ ἡμῖν δ’ ὑμῖν, ὅτι διαφέρουν οἱ ἀπὸ

1 b’ : γὰρ Σπένγκελ.

This translation of εὐδαιμονία can hardly be avoided, but it would perhaps be more accurately rendered by ‘Well-being’ or ‘Prosperity’; and it will be found that the writer does not interpret it as a state of feeling but as a kind of activity.

The English phrase preserves the ambiguity of the Greek, which in its ordinary acceptance rather means ‘faring well’ than ‘acting well,’ though in the sequel Aristotle diverts it to the active sense.

Viz. Plato and the Academy; see c. vi.

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the student of the subject, the spirit in which our conclusions are to be received, and the object that we set before us.

iv To resume, as much as all studies and undertakings are directed to the attainment of some good, let us discuss what it is that we pronounce to be the aim of Politics, that is, what is the highest of all the goods that action can achieve. As far as the name goes, we may almost say that the great majority of mankind are agreed about this; for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of it as Happiness, and conceive ‘the good life’ or ‘doing well’ to be the same thing as ‘being happy.’ But what constitutes happiness is a matter of dispute; and the popular account of it is not the same as that given by the philosophers. Ordinary people identify it with some obvious and visible good, such as pleasure or wealth or honour—some say one thing and some another, indeed very often the same man says different things at different times: when he falls sick he thinks health is happiness, when he is poor, wealth. At other times, feeling conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who propound something grand and above their heads; and it has been held by some thinkers that beside the many good things we have mentioned, there exists another Good, that is good in itself, and stands to all those goods as the cause of their being good.

Now perhaps it would be a somewhat fruitless task to review all the different opinions that are held. It will suffice to examine those that are most widely prevalent, or that seem to have some argument in their favour.

And we must not overlook the distinction between


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tōn ārχῶn lógoi kai oi ēpi tās ārχās. ev γάρ καὶ
Plátowh ēpōrei toúto, kai ēζητεῖ pōteron āpō
tōn ārχῶn h ēpi tās ārχās ēstw h ōdōs, ὦστερ
ēn tō stadiw āpō tōn āthlothetaw ēpī tō peras h ānápaLw.
āriKteōn mēn oūn āpō tōn ēnωrīmōn.
tauta dē dittōs, tā mēn γάρ ēmīn tā dē ēpλōs:
īsos oūn ēmīn ge āriKteōn āpō tōn ēmīn ēnωrīmōn.
6 dīo dē tōs ēthesos hēθai kalwos tōn perī kalwos kai 5
dikalwos kai olwos tōn politikwv ēkousoMēvov
7 ikanwos. ārkh γάρ tō oni kai ei toütō faiōwto
ārokōuntos, oudēn prosdehēsei tōu diūtī. dē
toiōtōs h ēxei h lábou ān ārχas rhdwos. w dē
μηdēteron ὑπάρχει toūtwv, ēkousoπātw tōn
.Html

ōvtose mēn pānrīstos dē autōs pānta noήSē.
9 ēsthlos dē kākeiνos dē ev ēipōnti πιθηtai:
ōs dē ke mūt autōs noē mūt ἀllwv ēkouwv
ēn thumw βάλλetai, dē dē autē ēchrīwos αnép.

11 tē Morse dē lēgwmēn ōthein pαρεξέβημεν. tō gār
āγαθον kai tīn eudaimoniav ouk ēlōγwv ēsīkαs
ēk tōn blōw ὑπολαμβάνειν oĩ mēν polloī kai
2 fοrτικωτατοι tīn hōdovēn. dīo kai tōn blōw āgαπwsw
tōn ēpolaumvstikwv—tēpēs gār ēisī múλiSta oĩ prōv-

a In contrast apparently with the school of Plato.
b Works and Days, 293 ff.
0 a 30.
arguments that start from first principles and those that lead to first principles. It was a good practice of Plato to raise this question, and to enquire whether the right procedure was to start from or to lead up to the first principles, as in a race-course one may run from the judges to the far end of the track or reversely. Now no doubt it is proper to start from the known. But 'the known' has two meanings—'what is known to us,' which is one thing, and 'what is knowable in itself;' which is another. Perhaps then for us a at all events it is proper to start from what is known to us. This is why in order to be a competent student of the Right and Just, and in short of the topics of Politics in general, the pupil is bound to have been well trained in his habits. For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so; if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know the reason why it is so. And the man of good moral training knows first principles already, or can easily acquire them. As for the person who neither knows nor can learn, let him hear the words of Hesiod b:

Best is the man who can himself advise;
He too is good who hearkens to the wise;
But who, himself being witless, will not heed
Another's wisdom, is worthless indeed.

But let us continue from the point c where we digressed. To judge from men's lives, the more or less reasoned conceptions of the Good or Happiness that seem to prevail among them are the following. On the one hand the generality of men and the most vulgar identify the Good with pleasure, and accordingly are content with the Life of Enjoyment—for there are three specially prominent
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χοντες, ο τε νυν ειρημενος και δ πολιτικος και

3 τρτος δ θεωρητικος. οι μεν ουν πολλοι παντελως

ανθρωποδωδεις φανονται βοσκηματων βιων προ-

αιρουμενοι, τυγχανουσι δε λογου δια το πολλους

των εν ταις εξουσιαις ομοιοπαθειν Σαρδαναπάλλω.

4 οι δε χαριεντες και πρακτικοι τιμην του γαρ πο-

λιτικοι βιου σχεδον τοιτο τελος. φανεται δ' επιπολαιστερον ειναι του ζητουμενου. δοκει γαρ

εν τοις τιμωσι μαλλον ειναι η εν τω τιμωμενω, 26

tαγαθον δε οικειον τι και δυσαφαιρετον ειναι

5 μαντευμεθα. έτι δ' εσικασε την τιμην διωκειν

ινα πιστευσων εαυτους άγαθους ειναι ζητουμε

νοιν υπω των φρονιμων τιμασθαι και παρ' οίς

γυγνωσκονται, και έπ' αρετη. δηλον ουν δη κατα

6 γε τουτους η αρετη κρειττων ταχα δε και μαλλον 80

δι των τελος του πολιτικου βιου ταυτην υπολαβοι.

φανεται δε άτελεστερα και αυτη. δοκει γαρ

ενδεχεσθαι και καθεuding εξουτα την αρετην η

απρακτειν δια βιου, και προς τουτους κακοπαθειν 1096

και απυχειν τα μεγιστα. τον δ' ουτω ζωντα ουδεις

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\footnote{a}{The doctrine of the three Lives goes back to Pythagoras, who compared the three kinds of men to the three classes of strangers who went to the Games, traders, competitors, and spectators (Iamblichus, \textit{Vit. Pythag.} 58). This apologue brings out the metaphor underlying the phrase \textit{θεωρητικος bios}, lit. 'the life of the spectator' (Burnet).}

\footnote{b}{The last two words of the Greek look like a verse passage loosely quoted. Sardanapallus was a mythical Assyrian king; two versions of his epitaph are recorded by Athenaeus (336, 530), one containing the words \textit{εσθιε, τινε, παιξε} ως \textit{ταλλα τοισου} ουδ' \textit{άξια τον} \textit{απυκροτηματος}, 'Eat, drink, play, since all else is not worth that the fingers'; the other ends \textit{κειν' εχω} \textit{δοσ' έφαγον και έφυβρισα και μετ' έρωτος} \textit{τερτν' καθαυν';} \textit{τα} \textit{δε πολλα} και \textit{δλβία πάντα} λειψαι, 'I}
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. v. 2–6

Lives, the one just mentioned, the Life of Politics, and thirdly, the Life of Contemplation. The generality of mankind then show themselves to be utterly slavish, by preferring what is only a life for cattle; but they get a hearing for their view as reasonable because many persons of high position share the feelings of Sardanapallus.

4 Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the Good is honour—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics. But honour after all seems too superficial to be the Good for which we are seeking; since it appears to depend on those who confer it more than on him upon whom it is conferred, whereas we instinctively feel that the Good must be something proper to its possessor and not easy to be taken away from him.

5 Moreover men's motive in pursuing honour seems to be to assure themselves of their own merit; at least they seek to be honoured by men of judgement and by people who know them, that is, they desire to be honoured on the ground of virtue. It is clear therefore that in the opinion at all events of men of action, virtue is a greater good than honour; and one might perhaps accordingly suppose that virtue rather than honour is the end of the Political Life. But even virtue proves on examination to be too incomplete to be the End; since it appears possible to possess it while you are asleep, or without putting it into practice throughout the whole of your life; and also for the virtuous man to suffer the greatest misery and misfortune—though no one would pronounce a man living a life of misery to be happy, unless for have what I ate; and the delightful deeds of wantonness and love which I did and suffered; whereas all my wealth is vanished.'

15
ARISTOTLE

ἀν εὐδαιμονίσειν, εἰ μὴ θέσων διαφύλάττων. καὶ
περὶ μὲν τοῖτων ἀλίς· ἵκανός γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
7 ἐγκυκλίως εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ
θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ1 οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπο-5
8 μὲνοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βιαῖος2 τίς
ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον
ἀγαθὸν· χρησίμων γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάρων. διὸ μᾶλλον
tὰ πρῶτον λέγεται τέλη τις ἀν ὑπολάβοι. δὲ
αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα. καὶ τοι[o]
πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβεβληνται· ταῦτα μὲν 10
οὖν ἀφείσθω.

vii Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἵσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ
diαπορήσαι πῶς λέγεται, καὶ περὶ προσαντοῦ τῆς
τουαύτης ζήτησεως γνωμένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας
eἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἰδή. δόξειε δ' ἀν ἵσως βέλτιον
eῖναι, καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ
15 οἰκεία ἀναρεῖν, ἀλλως τε καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσι οὕτως·
ἀμφότερον γὰρ ὄντων φιλικόν ὅσον προτιμᾶτι
tὴν ἀλῆ-
2θειαν. οὔ δὴ3 κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ
ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ υἱότερον

1 τερι Bekker. 2 βιαῖος Asp.
3 δὴ codd. Morellii: δὲ. 4 τὸ υἱότερον M b.

a It is not certain whether this phrase refers to written
treatises (whether Aristotle's own dialogues and other
popular works, now lost, or those of other philosophers), or
to philosophical debates like those which Plato's dialogues
purport to report (as did doubtless those of Aristotle). Cf.
De caelo 279 α 30 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίως φιλοσοφήμαι, 'in the
ordinary philosophical discussions,' and De anâma 407 b 29
τοῖς ἐν καὶψ γνωμένοις λόγοις, 'the discussions that go on
in public'; and see c. xiii. § 9 note for similar references to
'true discussions.'

b Literally 'violent'; the adjective is applied to the strict
diet and laborious exercises of athletes, and to physical
16
the sake of maintaining a paradox. But we need
not pursue this subject, since it has been sufficiently
treated in the ordinary discussions.a

7 The third type of life is the Life of Contemplation,
which we shall consider in the sequel.

8 The Life of Money-making is a constrained b kind
of life, and clearly wealth is not the Good we are in
search of, for it is only good as being useful, a means
to something else. On this score indeed one might
conceive the ends before mentioned to have a better
claim, for they are approved for their own sakes.
But even they do not really seem to be the Supreme
Good; however, many arguments have been laid
down in regard to them, so we may dismiss them.

vi But perhaps it is desirable that we should examine
the notion of a Universal Good, and review the diffi-
culties that it involves, although such an enquiry goes
against the grain because of our friendship for the
authors of the Theory of Ideas. a Still perhaps it would
appear desirable, and indeed it would seem to be obli-
gatory, especially for a philosopher, to sacrifice even
one's closest personal ties in defence of the truth. Both
are dear to us, yet 'tis our duty to prefer the truth.d

2 The originators e of this theory, then, used not to
postulate Ideas of groups of things in which they
posited f an order of priority and posteriority g (for
phenomena such as motion, in the sense of 'constrained,'
'not natural.' The text here has been suspected.

a The translation 'Forms' is perhaps less misleading:
eidos is not a psychological term.

d Probably a verse quotation.

* Or perhaps 'importers' from the Pythagoreans of
S. Italy. f Perhaps 'we posit': see p. 18 crtt. n.1

* A is 'prior in nature' (though not necessarily in time)
to B, when A can exist without B but not B without A; and
they cannot then be on a par as members of one class.
ARISTOTLE

ἐλεγον' (διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἱδέαν κατ- 
εσκεύαζον). τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἔστι 20 
καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι· τὸ δὲ καθ' 
αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι 
(παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ 
ὁντος, ὡστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὴ τις ἐπὶ τούτοις3 ἱδέα.

3 ἐτὶ ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἵσαχὼς λέγεται τῷ ὀντὶ (καὶ γὰρ 
ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, ὅλων ὁ θέσι καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ 25 
ποιῶ αἱ ἁρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν 
τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ 
ἐν τόπῳ δίαυτα, καὶ ἑτερα τοιαῦτα), δήλου ὡς οὐκ 
ἀν εἴῃ κοινὸν τι καθόλου καὶ ἐν· οὗ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' 
ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

4 ἐτὶ δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἱδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, 
καὶ τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἢν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμης 30 
νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαί καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, 
ὅλων καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ3 στρατηγικῇ ἐν 
νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικῇ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν 
5 ἰατρικῇ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστικῇ. ἀπορὴσεις ἰδ' 
ἀν τὶς τῷ ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγεις αὐτοεκαστον, 
ἐπερ ἐν τῷ αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ αὐθρώπῳ εἰς καὶ ὁ 1096b

1 ἐλέγομεν Kᵇ: fort. λέγομεν ed.
2 τούτων Lᵇ.
3 γὰρ om. Lᵇ.

ᵃ Lit. 'that which is by itself.'
ᵇ diātērēma is used of the habitat of a species of animals, De 
mundo 395 b 32; though it has been taken here to mean 'a 
114 It may mean 'a lodging,' and later it denotes an apart-
18
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. vi. 2–5

which reason they did not construct an Idea of numbers in general). But Good is predicated alike in the Categories of Substance, of Quality, and of Relation; yet the Absolute, a or Substance, is prior in nature to the Relative, which seems to be a sort of offshoot or 'accident' of Substance; so that there cannot be a common Idea corresponding to the absolutely good and the relatively good.

3 Again, the word 'good' is used in as many senses as the word 'is'; for we may predicate good in the Category of Substance, for instance of God or intelligence; in that of Quality—the excellences; in that of Quantity—moderate in amount; in that of Relation—useful; in that of Time—a favourable opportunity; in that of Place—a suitable 'habitat' b; and so on. So clearly good cannot be a single and universal general notion; if it were, it would not be predicable in all the Categories, but only in one.

4 Again, things that come under a single Idea must be objects of a single science; hence there ought to be a single science dealing with all good things. But as a matter of fact there are a number of sciences even for the goods in one Category: for example, opportunity, for opportunity in war comes under the science of strategy, in disease under that of medicine; and the due amount in diet comes under medicine, in bodily exercise under gymnastics.

5 One might also raise the question what precisely they mean by their expression 'the Ideal so-and-so,' c seeing that one and the same definition of man applies both to 'the Ideal man' and to

relation to another thing; but the last notion is secondary, and cannot beclassed with the first under one Idea.

(a) 'Good may mean 'a good thing,' 'excellent,' 'enough,' 'useful,' 'opportunity,' 'healthy,' etc.; but these are not a single notion.

(b) Good even in one category is the object of several sciences.

(c) Literally 'so-and-so itself.'
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕΣ

αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἦ γὰρ ἀνθρωπός, οὐδὲν διοίκουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδὲν ἂγαθόν. ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἄνδρῳ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἄγαθον ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου.

7 Πυθαγόρευοι δ' ἔσκασαν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄγαθῶν συντοχίᾳ τὸ ἐν· οίς δὲ καὶ Σπεύδουσι τὸ ἐπακολούθησαι δοκεῖ. ἄλλα περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος.

8 Τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἄγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρήθαι, ὡς λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἴδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἄγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικὰ πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταύτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπων ἄλλοι. δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι διατώς λέγουτ' ἂν τάγαθα, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ, θάτερα ἄλλα ταύτα· χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑφελώμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεφτόμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν

1 οὖδὲ <τὰγαθων> Bury. 2 ποιεῖσθαι Κβ.

a ἢδε 'the ordinary notion of man'—the concept of man in general which we form from our experience of particular men, but do not regard as a thing existing independently of them—; or perhaps 'a particular man,' but this seems to require ἀνθρώπω ὑπὸ τῷ τὺδε.

b This parenthetical note might come better after § 4 (Burnet. Cl. Rev. iii. 198). The Pythagoreans, instead of (like Plato) saying the Good was one, more wisely said the One was good (or akin to the good). Some of them (Met. A, 986 a 22) taught that there were ten pairs of opposing principles, which they ranged in two columns—limit and the unlimited, odd and even, unity and plurality, right and left, male and female, resting and moving, straight and crooked, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong. They also held (Met. A, 1072 b 32) that good and beauty were not original, but appeared in the course of the evolu-
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. vi. 5–9

‘man,’ for in so far as both are man, there will be no difference between them; and if so, no more will there be any difference between ‘the Ideal Good’ and ‘Good’ in so far as both are good.

Nor yet will the Ideal Good be any more good because it is eternal, seeing that a white thing that lasts a long time is no whiter than one that lasts only a day.

The Pythagoreans seem to give a more probable doctrine on the subject of the Good when they place Unity in their column of goods; and indeed Speusippus appears to have followed them. But this subject must be left for another discussion.

We can descry an objection that may be raised against our arguments on the ground that the theory in question was not intended to apply to every sort of good, and that only things pursued and accepted for their own sake are pronounced good as belonging to a single species, while things productive or preservative of these in any way, or preventive of their opposites, are said to be good as a means to these, and in a different sense. Clearly then the term ‘goods’ would have two meanings, (1) things good in themselves and (2) things good as a means to these; let us then separate things good in themselves from things useful as means, and consider whether the former are called good because they

tion of the world; hence perhaps the late position of good in the list of opposites. The phrase ‘column of goods’ (cf. Met. N, 1093 b 12 ‘column of the beautiful’) is inexact, as good was only one of the things in the column—unless it means the column to which good things among others belong; but doubtless all the positive principles were regarded as akin.

Speusippus was Plato’s nephew, and succeeded him as head of the Academy.
ARISTOTLE

10 ἰδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποία θεία τις ἂν; ἡ ὡσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὅραν καὶ ἴδοναι τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τὶ διώκομεν, ὡμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἁγαθῶν θεία τις ἂν. ἡ οὔδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλῆν τῆς ἰδεάς; ὡστε 20 μάταιον ἐσται τὸ εἴδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τάγαθον λόγον ἐν ἁπασὶν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφανεσθαι δεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψυμφύω τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρο- νήσεως καὶ ἴδονῆς ἑτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἁγαθά. οὐκ ἐστὶν ᾧ τὸ ἁγάθον κοινὸν 25 τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδεάν.

12 Ἄλλα πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τόχης ὀμονύμοις. ἀλλ' ἀρά γε τῷ ἄφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι; ἡ πρὸς ἐν ἁπασὶν συνελεῖν; ἡ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀνα- λογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ 30 ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἤσωσ ταύτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν. ἐξαιρεῖτον γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἰς φιλοσοφίας οἰκείοτερον. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδεάς: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐστιν ἐν τὶ τῷ 1 κοινῇ κατηγοροῦ- μενον ἁγαθὸν ἡ χωριστὸν αὐτὸ τῷ 2 καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον 1 τῷ: καὶ Κβ. 2 τῷ αὐτῷ Iβ.

a i.e., the species or class of things good in themselves will be a class to which nothing belongs (for the Idea is not in the class).

b The writer's own solution: when different things are called good, it means they each bear the same relation to (viz. contribute to the welfare of) certain other things, not all to the same thing.

c i.e., First Philosophy or Metaphysics.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. vi. 10–13

10 fall under a single Idea. But what sort of things is one to class as good in themselves? Are they not those things which are sought after even without any accessory advantage, such as wisdom, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? for even if we also pursue these things as means to something else, still one would class them among things good in themselves. Or is there nothing else good in itself except the Idea? If so, the species will be of no use.\(^a\) If on the contrary the class of things good in themselves includes these objects, the same notion of good ought to be manifested in all of them, just as the same notion of white is manifested in snow and in white paint. But as a matter of fact the notions of honour and wisdom and pleasure, as being good, are different and distinct. Therefore, good is not a general term corresponding to a single Idea.

11 But in what sense then are different things called good? For they do not seem to be a case of things that bear the same name merely by chance. Possibly things are called good in virtue of being derived from one good; or because they all contribute to one good. Or perhaps it is rather by way of a proportion:\(^b\): that is, as sight is good in the body, so intelligence is good in the soul, and similarly another thing in something else.

12 Perhaps however this question must be dismissed for the present, since a detailed investigation of it belongs more properly to another branch of philosophy.\(^c\) And likewise with the Idea of the Good; for even if the goodness predicated of various things in common really is a unity or something existing separately and absolute, it clearly will not be practi-

\(^{iv}\) The idea of Good not relevant to Ethics, since a transcendent good is unattainable,
ARISTOTLE

όσ οὔκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὔδε κτητὸν ἀνθρώπων· νῦν
dὲ τοιοῦτον τι ζητεῖται. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειν ἂν
βέλτιον εἰναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ
πρακτὰ τῶν ἁγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τούτῳ
ἕχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἁγαθά, καὶ
εἰδὼμεν, ἑπιτενξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν
οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἑπιστήμαις
dιαφωνεῖν· πάσαι γὰρ ἁγαθὰ τῶν ἐφιέμεναι καὶ
tὸ ἐνδεές ἑπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνώσιν
αὐτῶν· καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνιτας
ἀπαντᾶς ἁγνοεῖν καὶ μηδὲ ἑπιζητεῖν οὖκ εὐλογον.

ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὡφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων
πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ ποίητο
[ἀγαθὸν], ἡ πῶς ἰατρικῶτερος ἡ στρατηγικῶτερος
ἐσται ο τὴν ἱδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται
μὲν γὰρ οὔδε τὴν ὑγείαν οὕτως ἑπισκοπεῖν ὁ
ἰατρὸς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ ἵσως τὴν
τούτω· καθ’ ἐκαστον γὰρ ἱατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν
τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

vii Πάλιν δ’ ἐπανέλθομεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητοῦμεν ἁγαθὸν,
tὶ ποτ’ ἄν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ
πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρα-
τηγικῇ, καὶ ταῖς λοιπὰς ὅμοιωσ. τὶ οὖν ἑκάστης
τάγαθόν; ἡ οὖ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο

1 sic Xb; secl. ed.: αὐτὸ τὰ ἁγαθόν Lb, τὸ αὐτοαγαθὸν Ἄριν.
2 καὶ ? ed.

* Or perhaps 'to supply what is lacking of it' (the good at which they aim); cf. c. vii. 17.
* i.e., the particular good which is the end of his own science.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. vi. 13—vii. 1

cable or attainable by man; but the Good which we are now seeking is a good within human reach. But possibly someone may think that to know the Ideal Good may be desirable as an aid to achieving those goods which are practicable and attainable; having the Ideal Good as a pattern we shall more easily know what things are good for us, and knowing them, obtain them. Now it is true that this argument has a certain plausibility; but it does not seem to square with the actual procedure of the sciences. For these all aim at some good, and seek to make up their deficiencies, but they do not trouble about a knowledge of the Ideal Good. Yet if it were so potent an aid, it is improbable that all the professors of the arts and sciences should not know it, nor even seek to discover it. Moreover, it is not easy to see how knowing that same Ideal Good will help a weaver or carpenter in the practice of his own craft, or how anybody will be a better physician or general for having contemplated the absolute Idea. In fact it does not appear that the physician studies even health in the abstract; he studies the health of the human being—or rather of some particular human being, for it is individuals that he has to cure.

Let us here conclude our discussion of this subject.

vii. We may now return to the Good which is the object of our search, and try to find out what exactly it can be. For good appears to be one thing in one pursuit or art and another in another: it is different in medicine from what it is in strategy, and so on with the rest of the arts. What definition of the Good then will hold true in all the arts? Perhaps we may define it as that for the sake of which everything else is done. This applies to something
ARISTOTLE

δ’ εν ιαστρικῇ μὲν υγλεια, εν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκης, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ’ οἰκία, εν ἄλλῳ δ’ ἄλλο, εν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαίρεσι τὸ τέλος· τοῦτον γὰρ ἔνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ’ εἰ τὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη τὸ 2 πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν, εἰ δὲ πλεῖω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ δ’ λόγος εἰς ταῦτὸν ἀφίκται· τοῦτο δ’ ἐτι 25 μᾶλλον διασαφήσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεί δὴ πλεῖω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τοῦτων δ’ αἱρούμεθα τῶν δι’ ἔτερα, ὡς οὖν πλοῦτον, αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὀργανά, δὴ λος ως οὐκ ἐστὶ πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ’ ἀριστὸν τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ’ εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τὶ μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἔκτομενον, εἰ δὲ πλεῖω, 30 τὸ τελειότατον τοῦτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι’ ἔτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέστοτε δι’ ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ’ 4 αὐτὸ αἱρετὸν ἂεὶ καὶ μηδέστοτε δι’ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον δ’ ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ 1097 αἱρούμεθα ἂεὶ δ’ αὐτὴν καὶ οὕδεστοτε δι’ ἄλλο,

1 εἰ ἐν τι Ζwinger. 2 δὴ Hel.: δὲ. 3 ἔτερον KBBBB. 4 αὐλοὺς secl. Zell. 5 καὶ add. Felicianus. 6 δ’ αὐτὰ KBBBB, δ’ αὐτὸ Λσπ., δ’ ἄλλο Γ.

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2 Cf. c. ii. 1.
3 Perhaps a note on ‘instruments,’ interpolated.
different in each different art—to health in the case of medicine, to victory in that of strategy, to a house in architecture, and to something else in each of the other arts; but in every pursuit or undertaking it describes the end of that pursuit or undertaking, since in all of them it is for the sake of the end that everything else is done. Hence if there be something which is the end of all the things done by human action, this will be the practicable Good—or if there be several such ends, the sum of these will be the Good. Thus by changing its ground the argument has reached the same result as before.\(^a\) We must attempt however to render this still more precise.

Now there do appear to be several ends at which our actions aim; but as we choose some of them—for instance wealth, or flutes,\(^b\) and instruments generally—as a means to something else, it is clear that not all of them are final ends; whereas the Supreme Good seems to be something final. Consequently if there be some one thing which alone is a final end, this thing—or if there be several final ends, the one among them which is the most final—will be the Good which we are seeking. In speaking of degrees of finiteness, we mean that a thing pursued as an end in itself is more final than one pursued as a means to something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means to anything else is more final than things chosen both as ends in themselves and as means to that thing; and accordingly a thing chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely final. Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake and never as a
ΛΑΙΤΟΤΛΕ

τῷ ἔν δὲ καὶ ἡδονῇ καὶ νοῦ καὶ πᾶσαν ἁρετὴν αἱροῦμεθα μὲν καὶ δι’ αὐτὰ (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος εἴλουμεθ’ ἀν ἐκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱροῦμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τοῦτων ὑπὸ λαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονὴσεων τὴν δ’ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ’ ὀλως δι’ ἀλλο.

6 Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐτάρκειας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκεις εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκεις λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ καὶ συν αὐτῷ βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῖς καὶ τέκνοι καὶ γυναῖκι καὶ ὀλως τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ πολιτείας, ἐπειδὴ 7 φύσει πολιτικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπως. τοῦτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἔτι τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπε- σκεπτέον, τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκεις τίθεμεν δ’ ὑπὸ μονόμονον αἱρετόν ποτε ῃ τῶν βίων καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδει. τοιοῦτον 8 δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οἴσομεθα εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμομεένην—συναριθμομεένην γὰρ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἑλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἱρετώτερον

1 πολιτικὸς ῥ. 2 ό ῆμ. ῥ.
3 γονεῖς <τῶν γονέων> Rassow: fort. προγόνους ed.
4 αἱρετόν ῥ. Ασπ., ἄρκιον καὶ αἱρετόν ῥ. Π, αἱρετόν καὶ ἄρκιον ῥ. Π, fort. ἄρκιον ed.
5 συναριθμομεένη Π. 6 γὰρ Λ. ἔρ. 7 αἱρετωτέρα Π.

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*a Lit. 'a political thing.' Pol. 1253 a 2 adds ἔτοι, 'a political animal.'

*b A probable emendation gives 'renders life sufficient, that is, lacking in nothing.'

*c Sc. but as including all other good things as the end includes the means.
means to something else; whereas honour, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes (since we should be glad to have each of them although no extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our securing it. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of honour, pleasure, etc., nor as a means to anything whatever other than itself.

6 The same conclusion also appears to follow from a consideration of the self-sufficiency of happiness—for it is felt that the final good must be a thing sufficient in itself. The term self-sufficient, however, we employ with reference not to oneself alone, living a life of isolation, but also to one's parents and children and wife, and one's friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a social being. On the other hand a limit has to be assumed in these relationships; for if the list be extended to one's ancestors and descendants and to the friends of one's friends, it will go on ad infinitum. But this is a point that must be considered later on; we take a self-sufficient thing to mean a thing which merely standing by itself alone renders life desirable and lacking in nothing, and such a thing we deem happiness to be. Moreover, we think happiness the most desirable of all good things without being itself reckoned as one among the rest; for if it were so reckoned, it is clear that we should consider it more desirable when even the smallest of other good things were combined with it, since this addition would result in a larger total of good, and of two goods the greater is always the more desirable.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

ἀεὶ. τελειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὐσα τέλος.

9 Ἀλλ' ἵσωσ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὀμολογούμενον τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργεστέρον τι ἐστιν ἐπὶ λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἀν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθεὶ τὸ ἔργων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 28 ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνώ, καὶ ὅλως ἂν ἐστὶν ἔργων τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τι ἔργων αὐτῷ.

10 πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πρᾶξις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' 30 ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἡ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργων, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα

12 θέη τις ἂν ἔργων τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἰη ποτὲ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινῶν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ξητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἵδιον ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωῆν. ἐπομενῇ δὲ αὐθητικῇ τις ἂν εἰη' φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ

13 ἵστησι καὶ βοῦ καὶ παντὶ ζῷῳ. λειτεται δὴ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος (τοῦτοι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὃς

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*a ‘Practice’ for Aristotle denotes purposeful conduct, of which only rational beings are capable, cf. vt. ii. 2 note.

*b This anticipation of c. xiii. 19 is irrelevant, and states decisively a point there left doubtful. Also on grounds of Greek this parenthesis has been suspected as an interpolation, and perhaps we should leave it out and render the preceding words ‘the practical life of a rational being.’

30
Happiness, therefore, being found to be something final and self-sufficient, is the End at which all actions aim.

9 To say however that the Supreme Good is happiness will probably appear a truism; we still require a more explicit account of what constitutes happiness.

10 Perhaps then we may arrive at this by ascertaining what is man’s function. For the goodness or efficiency of a flute-player or sculptor or craftsman of any sort, and in general of anybody who has some function or business to perform, is thought to reside in that function; and similarly it may be held that the good of man resides in the function of man, if he has a function.

11 Are we then to suppose that, while the carpenter and the shoemaker have definite functions or businesses belonging to them, man as such has none, and is not designed by nature to fulfil any function? Must we not rather assume that, just as the eye, the hand, the foot and each of the various members of the body manifestly has a certain function of its own, so a human being also has a certain function over and above all the functions of his particular members? What then precisely can this function be? The mere act of living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas we are looking for the function peculiar to man; we must therefore set aside the vital activity of nutrition and growth. Next in the scale will come some form of sentient life; but this too appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally. There remains therefore what may be called the practical life of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions,
ARISTOTLE

ἐπισειθὲς λόγω, τὸ δ’ ὡς ἔχουν καὶ διανοοῦμενον
διττὸς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν
14 θετέων: κυριώτερον γὰρ αὐτὴ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἶ
dὴ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ
λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον
εἰναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίον (ὦσπερ
κυβαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον κυβαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς
δὴ) τοῦτο ἐπὶ πάντων) προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ’ ἀρετὴν
ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (κυβαριστοῦ μὲν
gὰρ τὸ κυβαρίζειν, σπουδαῖον δὲ τὸ εὖ). εἰ δὴ
οὕτως, ἀνθρώπων δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ἔξων τινα,
tαύτην δὲ ψυχής ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγον,
15 σπουδαίον δ’ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἐκαστον
δ’ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται: εἰ δὴ
οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια
γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλεῖον αἱ ἀρεταῖ,
16 κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειωτάτην. ἔτι δ’ ἐν βίω
τελείω: μία γὰρ χελιδῶν ἔαρ ὦ ποιεῖ, οὐ δὲ μία
ήμερα: οὗτω δὲ οὗτος μακάριος καὶ εὐδαιμόνια μία
ήμερα οὖδ’ ὀλύγος χρόνος.

1 τοῦτο...διανοούμενον secl. Grant.
2 δὴ Susemihi; δὲ. 3 ἀνθρώπων...οὕτω secl. Bywater.
4 δὴ Bonitz: δὲ.

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1 In contrast with the mere state of possessing the faculty.
2 Literally 'activity of soul'; ψυχῆ however has a wider
   connotation than either 'soul' or 'mind,' and includes
   the whole of the vitality of any living creature.
3 The word μακάριος, rendered 'blessed' or 'supremely
   happy,' is a derivative of μάκαρ, the adjective applied in
   Homer and Hesiod to the gods and to those of mankind who
   have been admitted after death to the Islands of the Blest.
   See ee. x. 16, xii. 4.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. vii. 13–16

one rational as obedient to principle, the other as possessing principle and exercising intelligence. Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume that we are here concerned with the active exercise of the rational faculty, since this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. If then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul’s faculties in conformity with rational principle, or at all events not in dissociation from rational principle, and if we acknowledge the function of an individual and of a good individual of the same class (for instance, a harper and a good harper, and so generally with all classes) to be generically the same, the qualification of the latter’s superiority in excellence being added to the function in his case (I mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a good harper is to play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul’s faculties and activities in association with rational principle, and say that the function of a good man is to perform these activities well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them. Moreover this activity must occupy a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy.
ἐπιπειθές λόγῳ, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον) ἀπττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν

14 θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὐτῇ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ

λόγον ἡ μὴ ἀνευ λόγου, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦ δε καὶ τοῦ δε σπουδαίου (ὡσπερ

κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς 10
dὴ τοῦτ’ ἐπὶ πάντων) προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ’

ἀρετῆν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐργον (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν
gὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εἰ). εἰ δὴ

οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα,

ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου,

15 σπουδαίου δὲ ἀνδρός εὖ ταύτα καὶ καλῶς, ἐκαστοῦ 15
dὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν ἀποτελεῖται. εἰ δὴ

οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια

γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετῆν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἰ ἀρεταῖ,

18 κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειωτάτην. ἔτι δὲ ἐν βίῳ
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ημέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαιμόνια μία

ημέρα οὐδ’ ὀλύγος χρόνος.

1 tooτου...diavoumenv secl. Grant.

3 δὴ Susemihl: δὲ.

4 ἀνθρώπου...οὕτω secl. Bywater.

5 δὴ Bonitz: δὲ.

a In contrast with the mere state of possessing the faculty.

b Literally 'activity of soul'; ψυχή however has a wider

connotation than either 'soul' or 'mind,' and includes

the whole of the vitality of any living creature.

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17 Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τάγαθὸν ταύτης δεῖ γὰρ
λέγοις ὑποτυπώσαι πρῶτον, εἶτ' ὅστερον ἀναγράψαι.
δόξειε δ' ἄν παντὸς εἶναι προσαγαγεῖκαὶ διαρθρώ-
σαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ δ' χρόνος
τῶν τοιούτων εὑρητῆς ἡ συνεργοῦ ἁγαθὸς εἶναι
οὖν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγονασιν αἱ ἐπιδοσεις.
18 παντὸς γὰρ προσθείναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον, μεμνη-
σθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκριβείαν μὴ
ὀμολογεῖν ἐν ἀπασίν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ
τὴν ὑποκειμενὴν ύλην καὶ ἑπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον
10 οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεω-
μέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν. δ' μὲν 30
γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, δ' δὲ τί ἐστιν
ἡ ποιῶν τι, θεατὴς γὰρ τάληθος. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ
πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητέων, ὡς μὴ τὰ
20 πάρεργα τῶν ἑργῶν πλεῖω γίγνεται. οὐκ ἀπαιτη-
τεὸν δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἀπασίν ὁμολογεῖ, ἀλλ' 1098 b
ἔκανον ἐν τῷ τὸ ὅτι δεικθήναι καλῶς, ὅπως καὶ
21 περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἁρχῆ. τῶν
ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ βεβοροῦνται, αἱ δ' 1101 b
ἀισθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τυί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως.
22 μετιέναι δὴ πειρατέων ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ 22
23 σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσιν καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ

1 δὴ ed.: δὲ.

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a c. iii. 1-4.  b Or 'straight line.'  c Cf. c. iv. 7.
This is usually taken 'that is, different ones in different
ways,' but καὶ . . . δὲ seems to refer to other classes as
well.

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17 Let this account then serve to describe the Good in outline—for no doubt the proper procedure is to begin by making a rough sketch, and to fill it in afterwards. If a work has been well laid down in outline, to carry it on and complete it in detail may be supposed to be within the capacity of anybody; and in this working out of details Time seems to be a good inventor or at all events coadjutor. This indeed is how advances in the arts have actually come about, since anyone can fill in the gaps. Also the warning given above a must not be forgotten; we must not look for equal exactness in all departments of study, but only such as belongs to the subject matter of each, and in such a degree as is appropriate to the particular line of enquiry. A carpenter and a geometrical both seek after a right angle, b but in different ways; the former is content with that approximation to it which satisfies the purpose of his work; the latter, being a student of truth, looks for its essence or essential attributes. We should therefore proceed in the same manner in other subjects also, and not allow side issues to outweigh the main task in hand.

20 Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of the reason why things are what they are; in some cases it is enough if the fact that they are so is satisfactorily established. c This is the case with first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it is a first principle. And principles are studied—some by induction, others by perception, others by some form of habituation, and also others otherwise d; so we must endeavour to arrive at the principles of each kind in their natural manner, and must also be careful to define them correctly,
έχουσι βοτήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα· δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμιον παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι’ αὕτης τῶν ἥττουμένων.

viii Σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμ-περάσματος καὶ εἴ τῶν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄληθει πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ γευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ· 2 [τάλθεσι].

1—νευμημένων δὴ τῶν ἁγαθῶν τριχῆ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἁγαθά. τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργεῖας τὰς περὶ ψυχῆν τίθεμεν· ὡστε καλῶς ἄν λέγοισι κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν πολλαῖς οὕσαν καὶ ὄμολογομένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. 3 ὁρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τῶν λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχῆν ἁγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὔ τῶν ἐκτῶν. συνάδει δὲ τῶν λόγω καὶ τὸ εὐ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράπτειν τὸν εὐδαι-

1 Rassow.

2 ed.: τὰς ψυχικὰς ἐνεργείας περὶ ψυχῆν Κ, τὰς ἐν. τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχῆν Λ.

a The usual form of the proverb is 'The beginning is half of the whole.' Aristotle applies it by a sort of play on words to ἀρχή in its technical sense of a general principle of science, which is a 'beginning' in the sense that it is the starting-point of deductive reasoning. There is a reminiscence of Hesiod, Works and Days 30, πλέον ἡμιον παντός, 'The half is more than the whole,' though the meaning of that is entirely different.

b i.e. our definition of the Good for man, or happiness.

c The turn of phrase associates 'bodily goods' with 'goods of the soul,' both being personal, in contrast with the third class, 'external goods.' But it at once appears that the important distinction is between 'goods of the soul' on the one hand and all the rest ('the goods in the 36
since they are of great importance for the subsequent course of the enquiry. The beginning is admittedly more than half of the whole, and throws light at once on many of the questions under investigation.

Accordingly we must examine our first principle not only as a logical conclusion deduced from certain premises but also in the light of the current opinions on the subject. For if a proposition be true, all the facts harmonize with it, but if it is false, it is soon found to be discordant with them.

Now things good have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and goods of the soul and of the body on the other; and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly pronounce good in the fullest sense and the highest degree. But it is our actions and the soul’s active exercise of its functions that we posit (as being Happiness); hence so far as this opinion goes—and it is of long standing, and generally accepted by students of philosophy—it supports the correctness of our definition of Happiness.

It also shows it to be right merely in declaring the End to consist in actions or activities of some sort, for thus the End is included among goods of the soul, and not among external goods.

Again, our definition accords with the description of the happy man as one who ‘lives well’ or ‘does body and those outside and of fortune,’ vii. xii. 2) on the other. Hence in § 3 ‘external goods’ must include ‘bodily goods,’ as also §§ 15 f., where ‘external goods’ are subdivided into the instruments and the indispensable conditions of well-being (and so in more scientific language, c. ix. 7), the latter subdivision including beauty, the only bodily good there specified.

See the definition, c. vii. 15.  

See note c.
μόνα· σχεδόν γὰρ εὐζωτὰ τις εἰρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. 6 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαι-
6 μονίαν ἀπανθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἀλλοι δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι
dοκεῖ· τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἦ τοῦτων τὶ μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἡ 25
οὐκ ἂνευ ἡδονῆς· ἐτεροί δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐεργετίαν
7 συμμαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ
καὶ παλαιοὶ ἱέγονοι, τὰ δὲ ὀλγοι καὶ ἐνδοξοὶ ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογοῦν διαμαρτάνειν
τοὺς ὅλους, ἀλλὰ ἐν γε τῇ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατ-
8 ὀρθοῦν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγοντι τὴν ἀρετήν ἡ ἀρετήν 30
των συνωδὸς ἐστὶν οἱ λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ
9 κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαιρεῖ δὲ ἵσως οὐ μικρὸν
ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ
ἐν ἐξεῖ ἢ ἐνεργεῖα. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδέχεται
μηδὲν ἁγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ἐν ὑπάρχουσαι; οἴον τῷ
καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν
δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἶον τε πρόξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης,
καὶ εὖ πράξει. ἄσπερ δ᾽ Ὁλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ
κάλλιστοι καὶ ἵσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινὲς νικῶσιν), οὕτω

1 συνωδὸς vulg.: σύνορος Κb, σύμφωνος Λb.
2 Richards.
well'; for it has virtually identified happiness with a form of good life or doing well.\(^a\)

5 And moreover all the various characteristics that are looked for in happiness are found to belong to the Good as we define it. Some people think happiness is goodness or virtue, others prudence, others a form of wisdom; others again say it is all of these things, or one of them, in combination with pleasure, or accompanied by pleasure as an indispensable adjunct; another school include external prosperity as a concomitant factor. Some of these views have been held by many people and from ancient times, others by a few distinguished men, and neither class is likely to be altogether mistaken; the probability is that their beliefs are at least partly, or indeed mainly, correct.

8 Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular virtue, our definition is in agreement; for 'activity in conformity with virtue' involves virtue. But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among these that the winners are found,—so it is those who

* Cf. c. iv. 2 note.
καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πρᾶττοντες

10 ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται. ἦστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος
αὐτῶν καθ’ αὐτὸν ἢδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαί τῶν
ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ἢδύ πρὸς ὁ λέγεται
φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίττῳ, θέαμα
δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ
δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν τῷ

11 φιλαρέτῳ τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μᾶχεται,
διὰ τὸ μή φύσει τοιαύτῇ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλως
ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, τοιαύται δ’ ἀεὶ αἱ κατ’
ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὡστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖα καὶ

12 καθ’ αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὴ προσθεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ

15 βίος αὐτῶν ὤσπερ περιόπτου τινός, ἀλλ’ ἔχει τὴν
ἡδονήν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὖν
ἐστίν ἄγαθος ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεων
οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὖν ἐὰν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα
τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ’ ἐλευθεροῖν τὸν μὴ χαίροντα
ταῖς ἐλευθερίαις πράξεωι, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

13 ἄλλων εἰ δ’ οὕτω, καθ’ αὐτὰς ἢν εἶλεν αἱ κατ’
ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.—ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἄγαθαι γε

1 ἀεὶ αἱ Κβ, αἱ cett.  
2 δ' LβΓ.

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1a Not an experience of the body (cf. x. iii. 6), even in the case of 'bodily pleasures.' This brings pleasure within the definition of happiness as "an activity of the soul."

1b Morally inferior people like things that are only pleasant 'accidentally,' i.e. owing not to some quality inherent in the thing but to something extraneous to it, viz. some depravity of taste or temporary affection in the person. Hence not only do different people think different things pleasant but the same person thinks the same thing pleasant at one time and unpleasant at another—and so repents to-day of his indulgence yesterday; or he desires two incompatible things at once, or desires a thing with one part
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. viii. 9-13

act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life.

10 And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as 'fond of' so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theatre, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and acts conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue. But whereas the mass of mankind take pleasure in things that conflict with one another, because they are not pleasant of their own nature, things pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble, and so always are actions in conformity with virtue, so that they are pleasant essentially as well as pleasant to lovers of the noble.

12 Therefore their life has no need of pleasure as a sort of ornamental appendage, but contains its pleasure in itself. For there is the further consideration that the man who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not a good man at all: no one would call a man just if he did not like acting justly, nor liberal if he did not like doing liberal things, and similarly with the other virtues. But if so, actions in conformity with virtue must be essentially pleasant.

But they are also of course both good and noble,
ARISTOTLE

καὶ καλαὶ, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἐκαστὸν, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς 14 εἴπομεν. ἂριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ 25 Δηλικοῦ ἑπίγραμμα—

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λύστον δ’ ὑμαῖνειν, ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυκ’ οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν—,

ἀπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταῦτας δὲ, ἦ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἄριστην, φαμέν εἶναι 80
15 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.—φαίνεται δ’ ὁμώς καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἡ οὐ βαδίου τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὡντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δ’ ὁργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλοῦτου καὶ πολιτικῆς
10 ὁμώμεως· ἔνιοι δὲ τητώμενοι ρυπαίνοντο τὸ μακάριον, οίον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους· οὐ πάνω γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἡ δυσγενὴς ἡ μονώτης καὶ ἀτεκνός, ἔτι δ’ ἵσως ὅ ἣττον, εἰ τῷ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶν ἡ φίλοι, ἢ ἐν 17 ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν.καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔνωκε προσδείσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐμερείας·

1 ἡ φίλοι om. Ha; ἦ post φίλοι om. Kb.
2 τεθνάσιν (vel supr. εἰς οὐ) Richards.

a It was one of the public duties of rich citizens at Athens to equip the chorus and actors of a drama at their own expense. One so doing was called χορηγὸς (chorus-leader, as no doubt originally he was), and the dresses, etc., he supplied, χορηγία. The latter term is frequently used by

42
and each in the highest degree, if the good man judges them rightly; and his judgement is as we have said. It follows therefore that happiness is at once the best, the noblest, and the pleasantest of things: these qualities are not separated as the inscription at Delos makes out—

Justice is noblest, and health is best,
But the heart's desire is the pleasantest—,

for the best activities possess them all; and it is the best activities, or one activity which is the best of all, in which according to our definition happiness consists.

Nevertheless it is manifest that happiness also requires external goods in addition, as we said; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary equipment. For many noble actions require instruments for their performance, in the shape of friends or wealth or political power; also there are certain external advantages, the lack of which sullies supreme felicity, such as good birth, satisfactory children, and personal beauty: a man of very ugly appearance or low birth, or childless and alone in the world, is not our idea of a happy man, and still less so perhaps is one who has children or friends that are worthless, or who has had good ones but lost them by death. As we said therefore, happiness does seem to require the addition of external prosperity,

Aristotle to denote the maternal equipment of life, and has almost or quite ceased to be felt as a metaphor.

Perhaps 'or friends' is slipped in because of 'alone in the world' just above, but friends should not be mentioned here among the indispensable conditions of happiness, as they were included just above among its instruments (see § 2 note).
ἀριστοτέλη

δὲν εἰς ταῦτα τάττοναν ἔννοι τῇ ἐνυπχαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ [ἔννοι δὲ τῆν ἀρετήν].

IX ὃθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερον ἦστε μαθητῶν ἡ ἑθιστον ἡ ἀλλως πως ἀσκητῶν, ἡ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοίραιν ἡ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγινέται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἦστε θεῶν διόρημα ἄνθρωπος, εὐλογον καὶ τῇ ἐνυδαιμονίᾳ θεόσοδοτον εῖναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν ὅσοι βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἰσως ἀλλης ἄν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ, κἂν εἰ μὴ θεόσπερτος ἦστων ἀλλὰ δὲ ἀρετήν καὶ τῶν μάθησιν ἡ ἁσκήσιν παραγινεται, τῶν θειωτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀθλον καὶ τέλος ἀριστον εἰναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖον τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δὲ ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πάσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δὲ ἦστιν οὕτω βέλτιον ἡ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷον τὸ κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πάσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριστήν· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέπει τύχη λίαν πλημ- μελὲς ἄν εἴη. συμφανές δὲ ἦστι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ξητοῦμενον· εἰρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια [κατ']

[ἔννοι (Kb ἔτεροι) ... ἀρετὴν] Gifunius.  

1 Wilson.

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a This irrelevant addition looks like an interpolation.

b i.e., theology, but Aristotle does not reopen the question in the Metaphysics or elsewhere.

c i.e., the intelligence of man.
and this is why some people identify it with good fortune (though some identify it with virtue ²).

**1x** It is this that gives rise to the question whether happiness is a thing that can be learnt, or acquired by training, or cultivated in some other manner, or whether it is bestowed by some divine dispensation or even by fortune. (1) Now if anything that men have is a gift of the gods, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is divinely given—indeed of all man's possessions it is most likely to be so, inasmuch as it is the best of them all. This subject however may perhaps more properly belong to another branch of study. ⁶ Still, even if happiness is not sent us from heaven, but is won by virtue and by some kind of study or practice, it seems to be one of the most divine things that exist. For the prize and end of goodness must clearly be supremely good—it must be something divine and blissful. (2) And also on our view it will admit of being widely diffused, since it can be attained through some process of study or effort by all persons whose capacity for virtue has not been stunted or maimed. (3) Again, if it is better to be happy as a result of one's own exertions than by the gift of fortune, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how happiness is won; inasmuch as in the world of nature things have a natural tendency to be ordered in the best possible way, and the same is true of the products of art, and of causation of any kind, and especially the highest.⁶ Whereas that the greatest and noblest of all things should be left to fortune would be too contrary to the finness of things.

7 Light is also thrown on the question by our definition of happiness, which said that it is a certain require the gifts of ⁴⁵
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΣ

ἀρετὴν]¹ ποιά τις τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργά καὶ χρήσιμα
8 πέμψας ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ γὰρ τὴς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἀριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείοτην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τού ποιούσ τινας καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοὺς πολλὰς
9 ποιήσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ὑπὸν οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷον τε κοι- 1100 a
10 νωνήσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αὐτίκα οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαιμὼν ἐστὶν οὔτω γὰρ πρα-
κτικός τῶν τοιοῦτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. οἱ δὲ λεγό-
μενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακριζοῦμαι. δει γὰρ, ὅστε ρεὶτομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελειάς καὶ βίου τελείον. 5
11 πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδεχόμεθα τὸν μᾶλιστ' εὐθενοῦτα μεγάλαις συμφορᾶς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γῆρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς² περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύομαι τὸν δὲ τοινύτας χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

Πότερον οὖν οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαι-
10 μοιστέον ἐως ἃν ἢ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεῶν "τέλος ἰ ὀρᾶν"; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἀρά γε καὶ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμών τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθανή; ἦ τούτο γε παντελῶς ἀτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγομεν ήμῖν

¹ Burnet.
² Ἡρωικοῖς Kũ.

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¹ Cf. c. viii. 15, 16, and c. viii. 2 note.
² Viz., that happiness depends on us and not on fortune, the answer implied by the foregoing arguments to the question raised in § 1.
³ See Herodotus, i. 30-33. Solon visited Croesus, king of Lydia, and was shown all his treasures, but refused to
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. ix. 7—x. 2

kind of activity of the soul; whereas the remaining good things \( a \) are either merely indispensable conditions of happiness, or are of the nature of auxiliary means, and useful instrumentally. This conclusion \( b \) moreover agrees with what we laid down at the outset; for we stated that the Supreme Good was the end of political science, but the principal care of this science is to produce a certain character in the citizens, namely to make them virtuous, and capable of performing noble actions.

9 We have good reasons therefore for not speaking of an ox or horse or any other animal as being happy, because none of these is able to participate in noble activities. For this cause also children cannot be happy, for they are not old enough to be capable of noble acts; when children are spoken of as happy, it is in compliment to their promise for the future. Happiness, as we said, requires both complete goodness and a complete lifetime. For many reverses and vicissitudes of all sorts occur in the course of life, and it is possible that the most prosperous man may encounter great disasters in his declining years, as the story is told of Priam in the epics; but no one calls a man happy who meets with misfortunes like Priam's, and comes to a miserable end.

10 Are we then to count no other human being happy either, as long as he is alive? Must we obey Solon's warning, and 'look to the end'? And if we are indeed to lay down this rule, can a man really be happy after he is dead? Surely that is an extremely strange notion, especially for us who call him the happiest of mankind until he should have heard that he had ended his life without misfortune; he bade him 'mark the end of every matter, how it should turn out.'
3 ἐνέργειαν τινα τὴν εὐδαίμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῦτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σῶλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηρικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσευεν ἀνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἡδῆ τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχιμάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τούτῳ ἀμφισθητοῦ τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τῷ τῷ τεθνεῦτι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι <μὲν ὧν> ἀισθανομένω δὲ, οἷον τιμαῖ καὶ ἀτιμίας καὶ τέκνων καὶ δόλως ἀπογόνων εὑρεταί τε καὶ
dυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γῆρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγουν ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἁγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βλοῦ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς 25 δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστάμαι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἀτοπον δὴ γίνοντ' ὅτι εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ τὸ τεθνεύω καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν 5 δ' ἄλλοις· ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ των χρόνων συνυκείσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοὺς γονεῦσιν.
6 ἀλλ' ἐπανεῖσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἃν θεωρηθεῖ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ 7 ἐκείνου. εἰ δ' τὸ τέλος ὅραν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἐκαστὸν οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἰ, ὅτ' ἐστὶν εὐ- δαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον, 25 ὑπάρχον, 25 ὑπάρχον, 25
1 τι om. Kb.  
2 Richards.

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*a* i.e., if our estimate of his life as happy or the reverse had to change. There is no idea of the dead being conscious of what happens to their descendants (cf. § 3 fin.), though this is inconsistently suggested by the wording of § 5.

*b* That raised in § 1.

*c* That raised in § 4.
define happiness as a form of activity! While if on the other hand we refuse to speak of a dead man as happy, and Solon’s words do not mean this, but that only when a man is dead can one safely call him blessed as being now beyond the reach of evil and misfortune, this also admits of some dispute; for it is believed that some evil and also some good can befall the dead, just as much as they can happen to the living without their being aware of it—for instance honours, and disgraces, and the prosperity and misfortunes of their children and their descend-

ants in general. But here too there is a difficulty. For suppose a man to have lived in perfect happiness until old age, and to have come to a correspondingly happy end: he may still have many vicissitudes befall his descendants, some of whom may be good and meet with the fortune they deserve, and others the opposite; and moreover these descendants may clearly stand in every possible degree of remoteness from the ancestors in question. Now it would be a strange thing if the dead man also were to change with the fortunes of his family, and were to become a happy man at one time and then miserable at another; yet on the other hand it would also be strange if ancestors were not affected at all, even over a limited period, by the fortunes of their descendants.

But let us go back to our former difficulty, for perhaps it will throw light on the question we are now examining. If we are to look to the end, and congratulate a man when dead not as actually being blessed, but because he has been blessed in the past, surely it is strange if at the actual time when a man is happy that fact cannot be truly predicated of
Aristotle

diá τὸ μῆθ' βουλεύοντα τοὺς ζῶντας ευδαιμονίζειν ἵνα
diá τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνομον τὶ τὴν εὐ-
dαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμώς εὐμετάβολον,
tὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλείοντα περὶ τοὺς
aὐτούς; δήλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοῦμεν ταῖς
tύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαιμόνα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον
ἐρούμεν πολλάκις, "χαμαίλεοντά" των τὸν εὐ-
dαιμόνα ἀποφαίνοντες "καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον."

ἡ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἑπακολουθεῖν οὐδαιμῶς ὁρθῶν;
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὗ ἡ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῦται
tούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπων βίος, καθάπερ εὐπομεν,
κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετήν ἐνέργειαι τῆς

εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίον. μαρ-
tυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορθένων. περὶ
οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐργῶν
βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνέργειας τὰς κατ' ἀρετήν:
μονιμωτέραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτῶν
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμῶταται

moniμωτεραι1 diα τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχεστατα
[kata]ξῆν2 εν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακάριους· τοῦτο γὰρ
ἔσυκεν αὐτῷ τοῦ μῆ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτᾶ λήθην.

ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐσται
diὰ βίου τούτους· ἀδικ γὰρ ἡ μάλιστα πάντων
πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν. καὶ τὰς τύχας

1 moniμωτεραι Ob. 2 Cornes.

* Perhaps a verse from an unknown play.
him, because we are unwilling to call the living happy owing to the vicissitudes of fortune, and owing to our conception of happiness as something permanent and not readily subject to change, whereas the wheel of fortune often turns full circle in the same person's experience. For it is clear that if we are to be guided by fortune, we shall often have to call the same man first happy and then miserable; we shall make out the happy man to be a sort of 'chameleon, or a house built on the sand.'

But perhaps it is quite wrong to be guided in our judgement by the changes of fortune, since true prosperity and adversity do not depend on fortune's favours, although, as we said, our life does require these in addition; but it is the active exercise of our faculties in conformity with virtue that causes happiness, and the opposite activities its opposite.

And the difficulty just discussed is a further confirmation of our definition; since none of man's functions possess the quality of permanence so fully as the activities in conformity with virtue: they appear to be more lasting even than our knowledge of particular sciences. And among these activities themselves those which are highest in the scale of values are the more lasting, because they most fully and continuously occupy the lives of the supremely happy: for this appears to be the reason why we do not forget them.

The happy man therefore will possess the element of stability in question, and will remain happy all his life; since he will be always or at least most often employed in doing and contemplating the things that are in conformity with virtue. And he
οὔσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὦ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου.» πολλῶν δὲ γυνομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχισμάτων, ὀμοιόμοις δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γυνόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαῖα γίγνεται), ἀνάπαυσιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θῆλθεν καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὄμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλὸν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ἀναληψίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννᾶδας ὡς καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.

13 εἰ δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνεργείαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἄν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος. οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μυστα ταί φαίλαι. τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐμφρόνα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπορχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παράντι στρατοπέδῳ χρησάων πολεμικῶτατα καὶ ὁκυτότομον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνῖτας ἀπαντας. εἰ δὲ οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἃν ὁ εὐδαιμων· οὐ μὴν μακαρίως γε ἂν Πριαμικᾶς τύχας περιπέπησι.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. x. 11–14

will bear changes of fortunes most nobly, and with perfect propriety in every way, being as he is 'good in very truth' and 'four-square without reproach.'

12 But the accidents of fortune are many and vary in degree of magnitude; and although small pieces of good luck, as also of misfortune, clearly do not change the whole course of life, yet great and repeated successes will render life more blissful, since both of their own nature they help to embellish it, and also they can be nobly and virtuously utilized; while great and frequent reverses can crush and mar our bliss both by the pain they cause and by the hindrance they offer to many activities. Yet nevertheless even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience, not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul. And if, as we said, a man's life is determined by his activities, no supremely happy man can ever become miserable. For he will never do hurtful or base actions, since we hold that the truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow; even as a good general makes the most effective use of the forces at his disposal, and a good shoemaker makes the finest shoe possible out of the leather supplied him, and so on with all the other crafts and professions. And this being so, the happy man can never become miserable; though it is true he will not be supremely blessed if he encounters the misfortunes of a Priam. Nor yet recalls the two classes of external goods defined in c. viii. 15, 16 and c. ix. 7.
οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθῆσαι γίνομεν, οὐδ’ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἄλλ’ ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἐκ τε τῶν τουούτων οὐκ ἂν γείωσι τὰλιν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν ὁλίγω χρόνῳ, ἄλλ’ εἶπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τωι καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
15 γενόμενος ἐπτῆβολος· τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐ-
δαιμονα τὸν καὶ ἄρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ 16
tοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανοῖς κεχορηγημένον ἡ μη τῶν
tυχόντα χρόνον ἄλλα τέλειον βίον; ἡ προσθετένων
καὶ βιωσόμενον * οὔτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ
λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἄφανες ἡμῶν ἐστίν, τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντη
16 πάντως. εἰ δ’ οὕτω, μακαρίους ἔροιμεν τῶν
ζωντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λειτύντα, μακα-
ρίους δ’ ὡς ἄνθρωπους. καὶ περί μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ
tοιούτων διωρίσθων.

xi Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων
ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδενίσκων συμβάλλεσθαι λέαν
2 ἀφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον. πολλῶν
dε καὶ παντοίας ἔχοντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμ-
βαίνοντων καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συμπλοκοιμένων
τῶν δ’ ἦττον, καθ’ ἐκαστὸν μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν
καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λειτύν καὶ
3 τύπω τάχ’ ἰκανῶς έχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ
tῶν περὶ αὐτῶν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τί βρῖθος
καὶ ῥοπῆν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ’ ἐλαφροτέρους 80

1 μὴ τὸν . . . βίον transponenda post βιωσόμενον ed., post οὕτω Euckcn.
2 δ’ ὡς Γ et fort. Asp.: δ’.

*a The clause 'not... lifetime' stands above after 'external goods' in the ms.

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assuredly will he be variable and liable to change; for he will not be dislodged from his happiness easily, nor by ordinary misfortunes, but only by severe and frequent disasters, nor will he recover from such disasters and become happy again quickly, but only, if at all, after a long term of years, in which he has had time to compass high distinctions and achievements.

15 May not we then confidently pronounce that man happy who realizes complete goodness in action, and is adequately furnished with external goods? Or should we add, that he must also be destined to go on living not for any casual period but throughout a complete lifetime in the same manner, and to die accordingly, because the future is hidden from us, and we conceive happiness as an end, something utterly and absolutely final and complete? If this is so, we shall pronounce those of the living who possess and are destined to go on possessing the good things we have specified to be supremely blessed, though on the human scale of bliss.

So much for a discussion of this question.

11 That the happiness of the dead is not influenced at all by the fortunes of their descendants and their friends in general seems too heartless a doctrine, and contrary to accepted beliefs. But the accidents of life are many and diverse, and vary in the degree in which they affect us. To distinguish between them in detail would clearly be a long and indeed endless undertaking, and a general treatment in outline may perhaps be enough. Even our own misfortunes, then, though in some cases they exercise considerable weight and influence upon the course of our lives, in other cases seem comparatively un-
€ουκεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως
4 ἄπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἐκαστὸν περὶ
ζωντας ή τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον
ἡ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προπάρχειν εἰν ταῖς
5 τραγωδίαις ή πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ
ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, ἕτοι 1 μᾶλλον δ' ἦσος τὸ 88
διαπορείσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκημήκοτας εἰ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν κοινωνοῦσιν ἡ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. έουκε 1101 b
γὰρ ἐκ τούτων, εἰ καὶ δικαιεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς
οὕτω εὐτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν εἶτε τοικαντίον, ἡφαυρόν 2 τι
καὶ μικρὸν ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἐκεῖνος εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μῆ,
τοσοῦτον γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὡστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαι-
μονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἠφαιρεῖσθαι
6 τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται
τοῖς κεκημήκοσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φιλῶν, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τουαίτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαία
ὡστε μὴ τοὺς εὐδαιμόνας μὴ εὐδαιμόνας ποιεῖν
μὴν ἀλλὸ τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

xii Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψόμεθα περὶ τῆς 10
εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἑπανετῶν ἔστιν ἡ μᾶλλον
tῶν τιμῶν. δὴ λοιπὸν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων υἱκ
2 ἔστιν. φαίνεται δὴ πάν τὸ ἑπανετὸν τῷ ποιοῦ
τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὶ πως ἔχειν ἑπανειθάδει: τὸν
gὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δόλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν 15
καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἑπανοοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ
tὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἴσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ

1 Richards.

a The definition of happiness is now shown to be supported by the current terms of moral approbation: apparently ἑπανετήν, 'praiseworthy' or 'commendable,' was appropriate to means, or things having relative value, and τιμῶν, 'valued' or 'revered,' to ends, or things of absolute value.

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important; and the same is true of the misfortunes of our friends of all degrees. Also it makes a great difference whether those who are connected with any occurrence are alive or dead, much more so than it does in a tragedy whether the crimes and horrors are supposed to have taken place beforehand or are enacted on the stage. We ought therefore to take this difference also into account, and still more perhaps the doubt that exists whether the dead really participate in good or evil at all. For the above considerations seem to show that even if any good or evil does penetrate to them, the effect is only small and trifling, either intrinsically or in relation to them, or if not trifling, at all events not of such magnitude and kind as to make the unhappy happy or to rob the happy of their blessedness.

It does then appear that the dead are influenced in some measure by the good fortune of their friends, and likewise by their misfortunes, but that the effect is not of such a kind or degree as to render the happy unhappy or vice versa.

These questions being settled, let us consider whether happiness is one of the things we praise or rather one of those that we honour; for it is at all events clear that it is not a mere potentiality.

Now it appears that a thing which we praise is always praised because it has a certain quality and stands in a certain relation to something. For we praise just men and brave men, in fact good men and virtue generally, because of their actions and the results they produce; and we praise the men who are strong of body, swift of foot and the like.

\[ i.e., \text{ not merely a potentiality of good but an actual good, whether as means or end.} \]
ARISTOTLE

τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστον τῶν ποιῶν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ
3 ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ σπουδαίον. δῆλον
dὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοῦς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων
γελοιοὶ γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, 20
tοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους
4 δὲ ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν. εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν οὖ
ἐπαινῶς τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαινῶς, ἀλλὰ μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον,
καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν τοὺς
θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν’ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν;
οὐδὲὶς γὰρ τῆν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ
καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ ὡς θειότερὸν τι καὶ
5 βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοκῆς καλῶς
συνηγορήσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ. τὸ
γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὕσαν μηνύειν
ἔμετο ὅτι κρείστων ἐστὶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον 30
δ’ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθὸν, πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ
6 καὶ τὰλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινῶς τῆς
ἀρετῆς, πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης;
τὰ δὲ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων, ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σω-
7 ματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν

a But we do not praise them.
b For a criticism of the hedonism of this unorthodox pupil of Plato see x. ii, iii.
c Encomia or laudatory orations are the chief constituent of Epideictic or Declamatory Oratory, one of the three branches (the others being Deliberative and Forensic) into which rhetoric is divided by Aristotle (Rhet. i. iii.). The topics of encomia are virtue and vice, the noble and disgraceful, which are analysed from this point of view in 58
on account of their possessing certain natural qualities, and standing in a certain relation to something good and excellent. The point is also illustrated by our feeling about praises addressed to the gods: it strikes us as absurd that the gods should be referred to our standards, and this is what praising them amounts to, since praise, as we said, involves a reference of its object to something else. But if praise belongs to what is relative, it is clear that the best things merit not praise but something greater and better: as indeed is generally recognized, since we speak of the gods as blessed and happy, and also 'blessed' is the term that we apply to the most godlike men; and similarly with good things—no one praises happiness as one praises justice, but we call it 'a blessing,' deeming it something higher and more divine than things we praise.

Indeed it seems that Eudoxus took a good line in advocating the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence, when he held that the fact that pleasure, though a good, is not praised, is an indication that it is superior to the things we praise, as God and the Good are, because they are the standards to which everything else is referred.

For praise belongs to goodness, since it is this that makes men capable of accomplishing noble deeds, while encomia are for deeds accomplished, whether bodily feats or achievements of the mind. However,

Rhet. 1. ix. That chapter contains a parenthesis (§§ 33, 34) distinguishing praise, as proper to πράξει; actions in operation, from encomia, which belong to ἄρρητα, the results achieved by action; but this distinction is not maintained in the context (§ 35, and cf. § 2 where God as well as man is given as an object of praise).


ARISTOTLE


díos oikeísteron exakribóthi tois peri tā égkouma 85 peponuménois, hımín de' déllon ek twn eirhmenwv 1102a óti éstiv h eudaimonia twn tvmwn kai telleiwv.

8 èoike ð' ouden éxewv kai dià tò eìnav árkh' tauths gáρ xároν tà loupta pánta pántes prástomev, tòν árkhin dé kai to aution tòν ágathòv týmwn tì kai theiòn tìhevmen.

xiii 'Epeí ð' éstiv h eudaimonia ýxwhs énergioù 6 tìs kath' árhetìs tellelavn, peri árhetìs épiskipetéon. táxh gáρ oûtws òn bèlton kai peri tìs eudai-

2 mouías thewrisaimev. dòkei dé kai ð' álhetiaw políticós peri tauth málwta peponhthetai. boú-

letai gáρ toûs polítas ágathos poieiw kai tòw

3 nómov úptikósous (paraðeigma de toûtwv éxomev 10 toûs Khr'tôn kai Lakédaimoníon nómo dibetás, kai

4 ei tìnes èteroi toîwtoî geγeñetai). ei dé tìs políticís èstiv h sképsiws autìs, déllon óti gínovt' àn h zetìsws katà tìn èx árkhis prouaireswv.

5 peri árhetìs dé épiskipetéon anbrouptính òhìlon ow touti kai gáρ tágathon anbrouptínu eγhìtaimev kai tìn 16 eudaimóniavn anbrouptính. árhetìs dé légomev anbrou-

pínhn ou tìn toû swmatos allà tìn tìs ýxwhs, kai tìn eudaimóniavn dé ýxwhs énergioù légomev.1

7 ei dé taùth' oûtws éxei, déllon óti dei toû poli-

tikón eìðeiavn poiw tò peri ýxwhs, déssper kai toû òphíalmou therapeúonta kai pàv <tò>3 sómu, 20

1 légomev ? ed. 2 ýxwhs Kb: ýxwn. 3 Ramsauer.

a The context seems to disprove the alternative rendering 'just as to cure eyes the oculist must have a general knowledge of the structure of the whole of the body as well.' The illustration is a reminiscence of Plato, Charmides, 156 vi-r, but does not follow that passage exactly.

60
to develop this subject is perhaps rather the business of those who have made a study of encomia. For our purpose we may draw the conclusion from the foregoing remarks, that happiness is a thing honoured and perfect. This seems to be borne out by the fact that it is a first principle or starting-point, since all other things that all men do are done for its sake; and that which is the first principle and cause of things good we agree to be something honourable and divine.

But inasmuch as happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect goodness, it is necessary to examine the nature of goodness. For this will probably assist us in our investigation of the nature of happiness. Also, the true statesman seems to be one who has made a special study of goodness, since his aim is to make the citizens good and law-abiding men—witness the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, and the other great legislators of history; but if the study of goodness falls within the province of Political Science, it is clear that in investigating goodness we shall be keeping to the plan which we adopted at the outset.

Now the goodness that we have to consider is clearly human goodness, since the good or happiness which we set out to seek was human good and human happiness. But human goodness means in our view excellence of soul, not excellence of body; also our definition of happiness is an activity of the soul. Now if this is so, clearly it behoves the statesman to have some acquaintance with psychology, just as the physician who is to heal the eye or the other parts of the body must know their anatomy.
καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσω τιμωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτική
τῆς ἱατρικῆς· τῶν δ' ἱατρῶν οἱ χαριέντες πολλὰ
πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνώσιν.
8 θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς,
θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκανῶς
ἐχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον
ἐξακριβωθὲν ἐργῳδεστερὸν ἦσσι ἐστὶ τῶν προ-
9 κεμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκοῦντως ἐνια, καὶ χρηστέον
αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἁλόγον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
10 λόγον ἔχον (ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ
τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστῶν, ἢ τῶ
λόγω δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα περικότα καθάπερ ἐν
τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοίλον, οὔθεν
11 διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν). τοῦ ἁλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν
ἐσοκε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγον δὲ τὸ αὐτίων τοῦ
τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν
102 b τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἀπασί τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείᾳ τις
ἀν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτήν δὲ ταύτην
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, εὐλογοῦτερον γὰρ ἡ ἀλλην
12 τινὰ. ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινῆ τις ἄρετη καὶ οὐκ

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a πολιτικός means for Aristotle both "political scientist" and "statesman"; for him they are the same thing, since πολιτική is a practical science.

b These ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are also mentioned in vi. iv. 2 and six other places in Aristotle (see Ross on Met. 1076 a 28). In Pol. 1323 a 22 they are appealed to for the tripartite classification of goods which in c. viii. 2 above is ascribed to current opinion "of long standing and generally accepted by students of philosophy." The phrase therefore seems to denote arguments or doctrines (whether familiar in philosophic debates, for which see note on c. v. 6, or actually recorded in books), that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school; in some cases, as here, it may refer specially to the tenets of the Academy.
Indeed a foundation of science is even more requisite for the statesman, inasmuch as politics is a higher and more honourable art than medicine; but physicians of the better class devote much attention to the study of the human body. The student of politics therefore as well as the psychologist must study the nature of the soul, though he will do so as an aid to politics, and only so far as is requisite for the objects of enquiry that he has in view: to pursue the subject in further detail would doubtless be more laborious than is necessary for his purpose.

Now on the subject of psychology some of the teaching current in extraneous discourses is satisfactory, and may be adopted here: namely that the soul consists of two parts, one irrational and the other capable of reason. (Whether these two parts are really distinct in the sense that the parts of the body or of any other divisible whole are distinct, or whether though distinguishable in thought as two they are inseparable in reality, like the convex and concave sides of a curve, is a question of no importance for the matter in hand.) Of the irrational part of the soul again one division appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature: I refer to the part that causes nutrition and growth; for we must assume that a vital faculty of this nature exists in all things that assimilate nourishment, including embryos—the same faculty being present also in the fully-developed organism (this is more reasonable than to assume a different nutritive faculty in the latter). The excellence of this faculty therefore appears to be common to all animate

* Literally “having a plan or principle.”
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕΣ

αὐθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς, ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ’ ὑπνοῦ (ὀθὲν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἡμιοῦν τοῦ βιοῦ τοὺς εὐδαιμονάς τῶν ἁθλίων). συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὑπνός τῆς ψυχῆς ἥ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἰ πη κατὰ μικρὸν δικνυόνται τινὲς τῶν κυνήσεων, καὶ ταῦτα βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλα, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐστέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἄνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἀμοιροῦν πέφυκεν. ἔσχε θεὸς καὶ ἀλλὸ τις τὰς φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πη λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τῶν μὲν λόγου καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν (ὅρθως γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίστα παρακαλεῖ). φαίνεται δὲ εἰν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρά τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, δὲ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἄτεχνως γὰρ καθάπερ τα παραλευ-μένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαίρου-μένων κυνήσεως τοῦντιον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παρα-φέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὅρμαι τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὅρμαι τὸ παραφέρομεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὅρμαι· ἵπτε ό οὐδὲν ἦττου καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ νομιστεῖν εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιοῦμεν

1 Richards.

* For these terms see Bk. VII. init.

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things and not peculiar to man; for it is believed that this faculty or part of the soul is most active during sleep, but when they are asleep you cannot tell a good man from a bad one (whence the saying that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the miserable). This is a natural result of the fact that sleep is a cessation of the soul from the activities on which its goodness or badness depends—except that in some small degree certain of the sense-impressions may reach the soul during sleep, and consequently the dreams of the good are better than those of ordinary men.

We need not however pursue this subject further, but may omit from consideration the nutritive part of the soul, since it exhibits no specifically human excellence.

But there also appears to be another element in the soul, which, though irrational, yet in a manner participates in rational principle. In self-restrained and unrestrained people we approve their principle, or the rational part of their souls, because it urges them in the right way and exhorts them to the best course; but their nature seems also to contain another element beside that of rational principle, which combats and resists that principle. Exactly the same thing may take place in the soul as occurs with the body in a case of paralysis: when the patient wills to move his limbs to the right they swerve to the left; and similarly in unrestrained persons their impulses run counter to their principle. But whereas in the body we see the erratic member, in the case of the soul we do not see it; nevertheless it cannot be doubted that in the soul also there is an element beside that of principle,
τούτω καὶ ἀντιβαίνων (πῶς δὲ ἔτερον, οὐδὲν 25
diaφέρει). λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν,
ὡσπερ ἐπομενεῖ πειθαρχεῖ γονὺ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ
ἐγκρατοῦς, ἐτὶ δὲ ᾧσως εὐθικουτερὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ
σώφρονος καὶ ἄνδρειου, πάντα γὰρ ὀμοφωνεῖ τῷ
λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διατόν· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγον, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ
θυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὅρκετικὸν μετέχει πως, ἣ
κατηκοῦν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ καὶ πειθαρχικὸν (οὔτω δὴ
cαὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμέν ἔχειν λόγον,
cαὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν). ὅτι δὲ πεί-
θεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ
νουθετήσις καὶ πᾶσα ἑπιτίμησις τε καὶ παρά-
κλησι. εἰ δὲ χρῆ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν,
διατόν ἐσται καὶ τὸ λόγου ἔχων, τὸ μὲν κυρίως
cαὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ὡσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικῶν
μὴ πειθησθαι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἁρετή κατὰ τὴν
diaφορὰν ταύτην. λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν ἐ
διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἥβικας, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν

1 [καὶ] Coraes.

* This parenthetical note on the phrase ‘to have logos’ is untranslatable, and confusing even in the Greek. According to the psychology here expounded, the intellect ‘has a plan or principle,’ in the sense of understanding principle, and being able to reason and make a plan: in other words, it is fully rational. The appetitive part of man’s nature ‘has a plan or principle’ in so far as it is capable of following or obeying a principle. It happens that this relationship of following or obeying can itself be expressed by the words ‘to have logos’ in another sense of that phrase, viz. ‘to take account of, pay heed to.’ To be precise the writer should say that the appetitive part λόγου ἔχει τοῦ λόγου, ‘has logos (takes account) of the logos.’ The phrase has yet a third sense in mathematics, where “to have logos”
which opposes and runs counter to principle (though in what sense the two are distinct does not concern us here). But this second element also seems, as we said, to participate in rational principle; at least in the self-restrained man it obeys the behest of principle—and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it is still more amenable, for all parts of his nature are in harmony with principle.

Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in principle, as being amenable and obedient to it (in the sense in fact in which we speak of 'paying heed' to one's father and friends, not in the sense of the term 'rational' in mathematics\(^2\)). And that principle can in a manner appeal to the irrational part, is indicated by our practice of admonishing delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation generally.

If on the other hand it be more correct to speak of the appetitive part of the soul also as rational, in that case it is the rational part which, as well as the whole soul, is divided into two, the one division having rational principle in the proper sense and in itself, the other obedient to it as a child to its father.

Now virtue also is differentiated in correspondence with this division of the soul. Some forms of virtue are called intellectual virtues, others moral virtues: Wisdom or intelligence and Prudence\(^b\) are intel-

\(^{ratio}\) means 'to be rational' in the sense of commensurable.

\(^{b}\) i.e., practical, as distinguished from speculative, wisdom.
καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἡθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πράος ἢ σωφρον. ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξω, τῶν ἐξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπέρομεν.

a Viz. Speculative Wisdom (as distinguished from Prudence or Practical Wisdom), which is therefore a virtue, though not
Lectual, Liberality and Temperance are moral virtues. When describing a man's moral character we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but gentle or temperate; but a wise man also is praised for his disposition, and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues.

A virtue in the narrower sense of moral virtue. Throughout Aristotle's ethical works, praise and blame are the ordinary tests of virtue and vice. (See also c. xii.)
1 Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἄρετῆς οὖσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἐχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διότι έμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου; ἡ δ’ ἡθική εὔ έθους περιγίνεται, οἶδεν καὶ τούνομα ἑσχῆκε
2 μικρῶν παρεγκλῆνον ἀπὸ τοῦ έθους. εὖ οὖ καὶ δήλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἡθικῶν ἄρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται: οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, αἰτόν ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἄν ἐθισθεὶς ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ’ ἄν μυριάκις αὐτῶν ἐθίζη τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως
3 ἂν ἐθισθεὶς. οὔτ’ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ άρεται, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτὰς, τελειομένοις δὲ δια τοῦ έθους.
4 ἐτι δὲ καὶ φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κοιμάσθω, ύστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων

1 δὴ Susemihl: δὲ. 2 ὄντων <ἄλλως> ἄλλως ? Richards.

* It is probable that ἔθος, 'habit' and ἡθος, 'character' (whence 'ethical,' moral) are kindred words.
* ἀρετή is here as often in this and the following Books employed in the limited sense of 'moral excellence' or
BOOK II

1 Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit (ethos), and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word. And therefore it is clear that none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered by habit. For instance, it is the nature of a stone to move downwards, and it cannot be trained to move upwards, even though you should try to train it to do so by throwing it up into the air ten thousand times; nor can fire be trained to move downwards, nor can anything else that naturally behaves in one way be trained into a habit of behaving in another way. The virtues therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit.

2 Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first in a potential form; we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. This is clearly so 'goodness of character,' i.e. virtue in the ordinary sense of the term.
Δὴλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἣ πολλάκις ἀκούσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν). τὰς δ' ἄρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρὸτερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἡ γὰρ δεῖ μαθῶντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιώντες μαθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομώντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρίσται· οὖτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γνώμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 5 σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρείοι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γνώμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιούσιν ἀγαθοῦς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βουλήμα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστιν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὑτὸ ποιοῦσιν, ἀμαρτάνοντες, καὶ διαφερεῖ τούτω συνεία τοιούτους ἀγαθῆς φαύλης. 6 Ἔτει εἰκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πάσα ἄρετή καὶ φθείρεται, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζεως καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρίσται· ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὗρος οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοῖς οἰκοδόμοις εὑσταύων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς 7 κακοῖ· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἴχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἄν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ή 8 κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν ἔχει πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τούς ἀνθρώπους γνώμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἡ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι

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1 ὁν Ῥπ.

*Or possibly 'For things that we have to learn to do [in contrast with things that we do by nature], we learn by doing them.'*

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with our senses: we did not acquire the faculty of
sight or hearing by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly
listening, but the other way about—because we had
the senses we began to use them, we did not get
them by using them. The virtues on the other
hand we acquire by first having actually practised
them, just as we do the arts. We learn an art or
craft by doing the things that we shall have to do
when we have learnt it: for instance, men become
builders by building houses, harpers by playing on
the harp. Similarly we become just by doing just
acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by
5 doing brave acts. This truth is attested by the
experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens
good by training them in habits of right action—
this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do
this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good
6 form of constitution from a bad one. Again, the
actions from or through which any virtue is pro-
duced are the same as those through which it also
is destroyed—just as is the case with skill in the
arts, for both the good harpers and the bad ones are
produced by harping, and similarly with builders
and all the other craftsmen: as you will become a
good builder from building well, so you will become
7 a bad one from building badly. Were this not so,
there would be no need for teachers of the arts,
but everybody would be born a good or bad crafts-
man as the case might be. The same then is true
of the virtues. It is by taking part in transactions
with our fellow-men that some of us become just
and others unjust; by acting in dangerous situa-
tions and forming a habit of fear or of confidence we
ARISTOTLE

οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ: ὠμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργὰς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῴφρονες καὶ πράοι γίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἀκόλογοι καὶ ὄργιλοι. 20
οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὖτων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὐτωσὶ καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὀμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται. διὸ δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὖτως ἡ οὐτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθέλεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

11 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἐνεκά ἔστων ὑσπέρ αἱ ἀλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ίν' εἰδὼμεν τί ἔστων ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ίν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἤν ὁφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς 20 πρακτέων αὐτὰς: αὐταὶ γὰρ εἰς κύριοι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.

2 Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγον πράττειν: κωνὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω (ῥηθήσεται δὲ υστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἔστων ὁ ὅρθος λόγος καὶ πῶς ἔχει 3 πρὸς τὰς ἀλλὰς ἀρετὰς). ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογεῖσθω, ὃτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τῶπω καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὁφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὑσπέρ καὶ κατ' ἀρχαὶ εἰπομεν ὃτι κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν οἱ 1 πράττειν <δεῖ> ? ed.

2 Ῥηθήσεται . . . ἀρετὰς secludenda ? Bywater.

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1 *i.e.*, in Bk. VI. For the sense in which 'the right principle' can be said to be the virtue of Prudence see vi. xiii. 5 note.

2 See i. iiii. 1.
become courageous or cowardly. And the same holds good of our dispositions with regard to the appetites, and anger; some men become temperate and gentle, other profligate and irascible, by actually comporting themselves in one way or the other in relation to those passions. In a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding activities. Hence it is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of our dispositions. It is therefore not of small moment whether we are trained from childhood in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of very great, or rather of supreme, importance.

As then our present study, unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good, without which result our investigation would be of no use), we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of conduct, and to ask how we are to act rightly; since our actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions.

Now the formula ‘to act in conformity with right principle’ is common ground, and may be assumed as the basis of our discussion. (We shall speak about this formula later, and consider both the definition of right principle and its relation to the other virtues.)

But let it be granted to begin with that the whole theory of conduct is bound to be an outline only and not an exact system, in accordance with the rule we laid down at the beginning, that philosophical theories must only be required to correspond
λόγοι ἀπαντητέοι: τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκός ἔχει, ὡστερ ὀυδὲ τὰ δ' ὑμεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἐτι μᾶλλον ὅ περι τῶν καθ' ἑκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τάκριβες: οὕτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὐθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δει δ' αὐτούς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καρδόν σκοπεῖν, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ιάτρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβέρνης. 

5 τικής. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειστέον βοηθεῖν.

8 Πρῶτον οὖν τούτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαύτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δει γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὀρώμεν: τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλειποντα φθείρει τὴν ἴσχυν, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ συνά πλεῖς καὶ ἐλάττω γυμνόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγείαν, τὰ δ' σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σύζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν: ὃς τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὁ το γηδὲν ὠλόω φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζον θραύσει: ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαῦντα καὶ μηδεμίας ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὃ δὲ πᾶσαν1 φεύγων, ὡσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητος τις. φθείρεται δὴ η ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλεύψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σύζεται.

1 πᾶσαν Κb: πᾶσας.
2 δὴ (vel ἄρα;) Susemihl: δ' Κb, γὰρ vulg.
to their subject matter; and matters of conduct and expediency have nothing fixed or invariable about them, any more than have matters of health.

4 And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, still less is exact precision possible in dealing with particular cases of conduct; for these come under no science or professional tradition, but the agents themselves have to consider what is suited to the circumstances on each occasion, just as is the case with the art of medicine or of navigation. But although the discussion now proceeding is thus necessarily inexact, we must do our best to help it out.

5 First of all then we have to observe, that moral qualities are so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and by deficiency—as we see is the case with bodily strength and health (for one is forced to explain what is invisible by means of visible illustrations). Strength is destroyed both by excessive and by deficient exercises, and similarly health is destroyed both by too much and by too little food and drink; while they are produced, increased and preserved by suitable quantities. The same therefore is true of Temperance, Courage, and the other virtues. The man who runs away from everything in fear and never endures anything becomes a coward; the man who fears nothing whatsoever but encounters everything becomes rash. Similarly he that indulges in every pleasure and refrains from none turns out a profligate, and he that shuns all pleasure, as boorish persons do, becomes what may be called insensible. Thus Temperance and Courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by the observance of the mean.
"Ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται; καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἱσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλήν τροφῆν λαμβάνει καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ύπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἱσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἱδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἄπαντες ἔχεσθαι αὐτῶν. οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἔθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ύπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρείου, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησίμεθα ύπομένειν τὰ φοβερὰ.

Σημειοῦν δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἐξεων τὴν ἐπιγνώμενην ἱδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἐργοῖς· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἱδονῶν καὶ αὐτῶ τούτω χαίρων σώφρων, ὃ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὃ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεῦα ἕχει χαίρων ἡ λυποῦμενος γε ἀνδρείος, δὲ λυποῦμενος δεῖσθαι. περὶ ἱδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ θυκὴ ἀρετή, διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἱδονὴν τὰ φαινά πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἥχοθα πως εὕθως ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν τέλος.

οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὐτὴ ἐστὶν.—ἐτι δ' εἰ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσὶν περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ

1 καὶ αἱ Mb. 2 Cobet. 3 al add. Kb.

* We here resume from the end of c. i. The preceding paragraphs, repeating from Bk. I. the caution as to method, and introducing the doctrine of the Mean, which is to be developed below, are parenthetical.

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But not only are the virtues both generated and fostered on the one hand, and destroyed on the other, from and by the same actions, but they will also find their full exercise in the same actions. This is clearly the case with the other more visible qualities, such as bodily strength: for strength is produced by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, while also it is the strong man who will be able to eat most food and endure most exertion.

The same holds good with the virtues. We become temperate by abstaining from pleasures, and at the same time we are best able to abstain from pleasures when we have become temperate. And so with Courage: we become brave by training ourselves to despise and endure terrors, and we shall be best able to endure terrors when we have become brave.

An index of our dispositions is afforded by the pleasure or pain that accompanies our actions. A man is temperate if he abstains from bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself enjoyable, profligate if he feels it irksome; he is brave if he faces danger with pleasure or at all events without pain, cowardly if he does so with pain.

In fact pleasures and pains are the things with which moral virtue is concerned.

For (1) pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain causes us to abstain from doing noble actions. Hence the importance, as Plato points out, of having been definitely trained from childhood to like and dislike the proper things; this is what good education means.

(2) Again, if the virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and every feeling and every action is
πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονή καὶ λύπη, 15 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας.—μηνύοντι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων ἱατρεῖαι γὰρ των εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι 5 διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.—ἐτι, ὡς καὶ πρῶτον εἰπόμεν, πᾶσα ψυχὴς έξει, ύφ' αἰὼν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταύτα καὶ περὶ ταύτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαίλον ἔχονται, τῷ διάκειται ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν ἦ ἂν μὴ δεί ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὃς ὃν δεῖ ἢ δοσαχώς ἀλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡμερίας· οὐκ εὖ δὲ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, 25 ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃς δεῖ καὶ ὃς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ προστίθενται, ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων 7 πρακτικῆ, ἢ δὲ κακία τούναντιον. γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερῶν ἐτι2 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν]3 τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλοχοῦ βλαβερῶς λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταύτα ὁ ἄγαθὸς κατορθωτικὸς ἔστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός,

1 φαίλαι Ob. 2 ἰτι Klb. 3 Coraecs.

a The contrary maxim to similia similibus curantur or homoeopathy. Fever, caused by heat, is cured by cold. Hence if the remedy for wickedness is pain, it must have been caused by pleasure.
b ἢ.e., is actively exercised when fully developed, cf. c. ii. 8.
c The reference is probably to Speusippus, although in the extant remains of Greek philosophy apathy, or freedom 80
attended with pleasure or pain, this too shows that virtue has to do with pleasure and pain.

4 (3) Another indication is the fact that pain is the medium of punishment; for punishment is a sort of medicine, and it is the nature of medicine to work by means of opposites.⁵

5 (4) Again, as we said before, every formed disposition of the soul realizes its full nature in relation to and in dealing with that class of objects by which it is its nature to be corrupted or improved. But men are corrupted through pleasures and pains, that is, either by pursuing and avoiding the wrong pleasures and pains, or by pursuing and avoiding them at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or in one of the other wrong ways under which errors of conduct can be logically classified. This is why some thinkers define the virtues as states of impassivity or tranquillity, though they make a mistake in using these terms absolutely, without adding 'in the right (or wrong) manner' and 'at the right (or wrong) time' and the other qualifications.

6 We assume therefore that moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the opposite.

7 But the following considerations also will give us further light on the same point.

(5) There are three things that are the motives of choice and three that are the motives of avoidance; namely, the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant, and their opposites, the base, the harmful, and the painful. Now in respect of all these the good man is likely to go right and the bad to go wrong, but from passions or emotions, first appears as an ethical ideal of the Stoics.
μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινὴ τε γὰρ
αὐτὴ τοῖς ξέων, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἰδεσιν παρακολουθεῖ, καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον. 1105

8 ἡδυ φαίνεται.—ἐτὶ δ’ ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συν-
τέθραπται: διὸ χαλεπῶν ἀποτρίψαθαι τούτῳ τὸ
πάθος ἐγκεχωσμένον τῷ βίῳ.—κανονίζομεν δὲ
καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἷς μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ’ ἢπτον,

9 ήδονὴ καὶ λύπη. διὰ τοῦτ’ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ
μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἡ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ

10 λυπεῖσθαι.—ἐτὶ δὲ χαλεπῶτερον ἡδονή μάχεσθαι
ἡ θυμὸ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἦρακλείτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ
χαλεπῶτερον ἄει καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή·
καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον εὖ τούτῳ. οὐστε καὶ διὰ 10
τούτῳ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία
καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὃ μὲν γὰρ εὖ
τούτως χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἐσται, ὃ δὲ κακῶς

11 κακῶς. οὔτε μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετῇ περὶ ἡδονᾶς
καὶ λύπας, καὶ οὔτε ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων
καὶ αὐξέται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γνωμενῶν, 15
καὶ οὔτε ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ,
εἰρήσθω.

14 Ἀπορήσεις δὲ ἀν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δει τὰ
μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ
σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια

* Sc., as well as being the sources of our feelings.
* Heraclitus, Fr. cv (Bywater) θυμὸ μάχεσθαι χαλεπῶν. δ' ἐκ γὰρ ἐκχαίρη γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὑπέται, *it is hard to fight with anger [or 'desire,' θυμὸ in the Homeric sense, Burnet]. Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of life.*
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, II. iii. 7—iv. 1

especially in respect of pleasure; for pleasure is common to man with the lower animals, and also it is a concomitant of all the objects of choice, since both the noble and the expedient appear to us pleasant.

8 (6) Again, the susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with all of us from the cradle. Hence this feeling is hard to eradicate, being engrained in the fabric of our lives.

(7) Again, pleasure and pain are also the standards by which we all, in a greater or less degree, regulate our actions. On this account therefore pleasure and pain are necessarily our main concern, since to feel pleasure and pain rightly or wrongly has a great effect on conduct.

10 (8) And again, it is harder to fight against pleasure than against anger (hard as that is, as Heracleitus says); but virtue, like art, is constantly dealing with what is harder, since the harder the task the better is success. For this reason also therefore pleasure and pain are necessarily the main concern both of virtue and of political science, since he who comports himself towards them rightly will be good, and he who does so wrongly, bad.

11 We may then take it as established that virtue has to do with pleasures and pains, that the actions which produce it are those which increase it, and also, if differently performed, destroy it, and that the actions from which it was produced are also those in which it is exercised.

iv A difficulty may however be raised as to what we mean by saying that in order to become just men must do just actions, and in order to become temperate they must do temperate actions. For
καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἡδὴ εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ, γραμματικὸι καὶ μουσικοὶ. ἡ οὐδέ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικὸν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου· τότε οὐν ἦστα τὰ γραμματικὰ, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικὸν τι ποιῆσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν [τὸ] ἑκᾶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικῆν. ἦτι οὐδ’ ὁμοίων ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γνώμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν αὐτὰ πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἄρετὰς γνώμενα οὐκ ἔαν αὐτὰ πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔαν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἔαν εἰδὼς, ἐπειδ’ ἔαν προαρροφόμενος, καὶ προαρροφόμενος δι’ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἔαν βεβαιῶς καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταύτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τεχνὰς ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἄρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἴσχυε, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, εἴπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκης πράττεν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἑπράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἦ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἄν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταύτα πράττων,

1 Richards.  
2 αὐτά Λβ: ταὐτά vulg. ταύτ’ αὐτά ? ed.  
3 εἴπερ conj. Bywater: ἐπερ.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, II. iv. 1–4

if they do just and temperate actions, they are just and temperate already, just as, if they spell correctly or play in tune, they are scholars or musicians.

2 But perhaps this is not the case even with the arts. It is possible to spell a word correctly by chance, or because some one else prompts you; hence you will be a scholar only if you spell correctly in the scholar’s way, that is, in virtue of the scholarly knowledge which you yourself possess.

3 Moreover the case of the arts is not really analogous to that of the virtues. Works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is enough if they are produced having a certain quality of their own; but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character. For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included, except the mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other conditions, so far from being of little moment, are all-important, inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance of just and temperate actions.

4 Thus although actions are entitled just and temperate when they are such acts as just and temperate men would do, the agent is just and temperate not when he does these acts merely, but when he does them unconscious or accidental, and knowledge of moral principle (he must know that the act is a right one).
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

ἀλλὰ καὶ [δ'] ὁ ὦτων πράττωνν ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σῶφρονες πράττοντες. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σῶφρων ὁ σῶφρων ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἀν οὐδὲ μελλῆσεις γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττοντες, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λόγων καταφεύγοντες οὐνται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἐσεθαί σπουδαίοι, ὁμοίων τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κόμῳ νουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούοντι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὔθεν τῶν προστατημένων. ὁπερ οὖν οὗτ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔζουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτως θεραπεύομενοι, οὐδὲ οὕτω τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως φιλοσοφοῦντες.

φίλος ταῦτα τι ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή σκέπτεσθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ, πάθη δυνάμεις ἐξεῖς, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θράσος φθόνον καρὰν φιλίαν μίσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἐπεται ἡδονή ἡ λύπη. δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ὡς παθητικὸ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ὡς δυνατὸ ὀργισθῆναι ἡ λυπηθῆναι ἡ ἐλεησαι. ἐξεῖς δὲ καθ' ὡς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὐ ἡ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφαδρῶς ἡ ἀνεμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τᾶλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὕτ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ

1 kal [δ] Bywater; ὁ kal ? ed.
2 γίνεσθαι Bywater: γενέσθαι.
3 λυπηθῆναι: φοβηθῆναι (sic Stobaeus) ? Rassow.

* Probably for ‘pain’ we should read ‘fear.’
in the way in which just and temperate men do them. It is correct therefore to say that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions; and no one can have the remotest chance of becoming good without doing them. But the mass of mankind, instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue, and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make them good men. In so doing they act like invalids who listen carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out his prescriptions. That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of soul than will the mode of treatment produce health of body.

v We have next to consider the formal definition of virtue.

A state of the soul is either (1) an emotion, (2) a capacity, or (3) a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these three things. By the emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or pain or pity. The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions.

3 Now the virtues and vices are not emotions
Λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἡ φαύλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄρετας καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὃτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὕτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὕτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβοῦμενος οὔδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὔδὲ ψέγηται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄρετας καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ή ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβοῦμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αὐτ' ἄρεται προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ σωκ. ἀνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄρετας καὶ τὰς κακίας οὔ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακείσθαι τῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὔδε δυνάμεις εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἄγαθοι λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πᾶσχειν ἀπλῶς οὕτε κακοὶ· οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὕτε ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἔσμεν φύσει, ἄγαθοὶ δὲ ἡ κακοὶ οὐ γνώμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μῆτε πάθη εἰσίν αἱ ἄρεται μῆτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. δ' τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἄρετη, εἴρηται.

Δεὶ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἕξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιὰ τις. ῥήτεον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἄρετή, οὗ ἄν ἡ ἄρετή, αὐτὸ τε εῦ ἔχοι ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὐ ἀποδίδωσιν· οἶον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἄρετή τὸν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ σπουδαίον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ (τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἄρετῇ εὖ ὀρῶμεν). ὡμοίως δὲ ἡ τοῦ ἰπποῦ ἄρετῇ ἰππὸν τε σπουδαίον ποιεῖ καὶ ἄγαθον δραμεῖν καὶ ἑνεγκείν τὸν ἐπι-

1 ταῦτα Richards: ταῦτα.
2 κακοὶ <καδ> vel <οὔδε> Richards: [οὔτε ... ψεγόμεθα] Bywater.
3 δὲ add. Nb.
because we are not pronounced good or bad according to our emotions, but we are according to our virtues and vices; nor are we either praised or blamed for our emotions—a man is not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he blamed for being angry merely, but for being angry in a certain way—but we are praised or blamed for our virtues and vices. Again, we are not angry or afraid from choice, but the virtues are certain modes of choice, or at all events involve choice. Moreover, we are said to be ‘moved’ by the emotions, whereas in respect of the virtues and vices we are not said to be ‘moved’ but to be ‘disposed’ in a certain way.

And the same considerations also prove that the virtues and vices are not capacities; since we are not pronounced good or bad, praised or blamed, merely by reason of our capacity for emotion. Again, we possess certain capacities by nature, but we are not born good or bad by nature: of this however we spoke before.

If then the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, it remains that they are dispositions.

Thus we have stated what virtue is generically.

But it is not enough merely to define virtue generically as a disposition; we must also say what species of disposition it is. It must then be premised that all excellence has a twofold effect on the thing to which it belongs: it not only renders the thing itself good, but it also causes it to perform its function well. For example, the effect of excellence in the eye is that the eye is good and functions well; since having good eyes means having good sight. Similarly excellence in a horse makes it a good horse, and also good at galloping, at carrying its rider,
3 βάτην καὶ μείωσι τοῦ πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἰ ἂν ἡ ἐξίς ἂφ' ἢς ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἂφ'

4 η̣ς εἴ τὸ εὐαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποθέσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἐσται, ἢδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἢτι δὲ καὶ ὥδ' ἐσται 25 φανερὸν, ὅταν θεωρῆσωμεν πολικά τὸς ἔστων ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαρετικῶς ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλείον τὸ δ' ἐλαττών τὸ δ' ἱσον, καὶ ταύτα ἡ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα ἢ πρὸς ἠμᾶς. τὸ δ' ἵσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἵσον ἀπέχον ἂφ' 80 ἐκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἔστων ἐν καὶ ταύτων πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἴμας δὲ ὁ μῆτε πλεονάζει μῆτε

5 ἐλλείπει: τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἐν, οὐδὲ ταύτων πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὄλιγα, τὰ ἔξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πράγμα: ἵσω γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε 7 καὶ ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἔστι κατὰ τὴν 95 ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἴμας οὐχ οὕτω λεπτεῖον' οὐ γὰρ εἰ τῷ δέκα μυθῷ φαγεῖν πολὺ 110 ἰδιὸ δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἔξ μνᾶς προστάζει: ἐστιν

1 ἡ ἰδιότητα Κb.
2 fort. ἐσται Hél. (Richards).

a c. ii. 8 f.
b i.e., without distinct parts, and so (if divisible at all), divisible at any point, as opposed to what is ἀπαρεθηκὸν, 'discrete,' or made up of distinct parts and only divisible between them.
c Greek comparatives, 'larger,' 'smaller,' etc., may also mean 'too large,' 'too small,' etc.; and there is the same ambiguity in the words translated 'excess' and 'deficiency.' Again μέσον, 'middle' or 'mean,' is used as a synonym for μέτριον 'moderate' or of the right amount, and ἵσον 'equal' can mean 'equitable.' Hence 'to take an equal part with respect to the thing itself' means to take a part equal to the part left, viz. a half;
and at facing the enemy. If therefore this is true of all things, excellence or virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also which will cause him to perform his function well. We have already indicated what this means; but it will throw more light on the subject if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue.

Now of everything that is continuous and divisible, it is possible to take the larger part, or the smaller part, or an equal part, and these parts may be larger, smaller, and equal either with respect to the thing itself or relatively to us; the equal part being a mean between excess and deficiency. By the mean of the thing I denote a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us, that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for everybody.

For example, let 10 be many and 2 few; then one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6; since 6 - 2 = 10 - 6, and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion. But we cannot arrive by this method at the mean relative to us. Suppose that 10 lb. of food is a large ration for anybody and 2 lb. a small one: it does not follow that a

'to take an equal part relatively to us,' means to take what is a fair or suitable amount. The former is a mean as being exactly in the middle between all and none—if the thing in question is represented by a line, this is bisected at a point equidistant from its two ends; the latter is a mean in the sense of being the right amount for the recipient, and also of lying somewhere between any two other amounts that happen to be too much and too little for him.

* We should rather call this an arithmetical progression.
γὰρ ἦσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένω ἡ ὀλίγων. 
Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγων, τῷ δὲ ἄρχομένω τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ ὁμοίως ἦπει ὁ ὁμοίως καὶ πάλις. 5
8 οὕτω δὴ πάσα ἐπιστήμη τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἐλλεψίν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπιτεί καὶ τοῦθεν αἱρείται, μέσων δὲ ού τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ 9 πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέποντα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀγοῦσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰσώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἐξουσίω ἔργοις οὕτω ἀφελεῖν ἔστων οὔτε προσθείναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλεψίως φθειροῦσας τῷ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσοτητὸς σφιξοῦσας)—εἰ δὴ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῶται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας ἐργάζονται, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πᾶσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείων ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ 15
10 φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἄν εὖ στοχαστικὴ. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τοῦτος ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεψίς καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθήσαται καὶ θαρρήσαται καὶ ἐπιθυμήσαι καὶ ὁργισθήσάται καὶ ἐλεηθήσαται καὶ ὅλως ἠσθήση καὶ λυπηθήση ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἠττῶν, 20 καὶ ἄμφοτέρα οὐκ εὖ τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὐ ἔνεικα καὶ ὥς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ 11 ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεψίς καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἔστιν,

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1 ed.
2 εἰ δὴ οἱ Susemihi: εἰ δ' οἱ K b, οἱ δ' vulg.

A famous wrestler.

The formula of the mean does not apply to the intellectual virtues.
trainer will prescribe 6 lb., for perhaps even this will be a large ration, or a small one, for the particular athlete who is to receive it; it is a small ration for a Milo, but a large one for a man just beginning to go in for athletics. And similarly with the amount of running or wrestling exercise to be taken. In the same way then an expert in any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean—the mean, that is, not of the thing but relative to us. If therefore the way in which every art or science performs its work well is by looking to the mean and applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a perfect work of art, that you could not take from it nor add to it—meaning that excess and deficiency destroy perfection, while adherence to the mean preserves it)—if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work, and if virtue, like nature, is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean. I refer to moral virtue, for this is concerned with emotions and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean. For example, one can be frightened or bold, feel desire or anger or pity, and experience pleasure and pain in general, either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue. And similarly there can be excess, deficiency, and the due mean in actions. Now feelings and actions are the objects with which
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕΣ

ἐν οἷς ἦ μὲν ὑπέρβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἐλλειψις 25 [ψέγεται,] ὡς τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπανείταν καὶ κατορθοῦ·

13 ταῖ· ταῦτα δ’ ἀμφὸς τῆς ἁρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἡρά ἡ ἁρετή στοχαστική γε’ ὃυσά τοῦ μέσου.

14 ἐτὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστὶν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ἢς oί Πυθαγόρειοι εὐκαζον, τὸ 30 δ’ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ράδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν, ράδιον μὲν τὸ ἄποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπόν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν). καὶ διὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολή καὶ ἡ ἐλλειψις, τῆς δ’ ἁρετῆς ἡ μεσότης.

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄπλως, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. 35

15 Ἔστων ἡρά ἡ ἁρετή ἐξ ὑπερβολής, ἐν μεσότητι ὥσιν γὰρ ἡμᾶς, ὀρισμένη λόγω καὶ ὡς ἃν ὁ 1107: φρόνιμος ὀρίσειν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακίων, τῆς ἠμαρτημένης 16 μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἐλλειψιν καὶ ἐτὶ τῶν τὸ ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ’ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τὸις πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τῆν 5 δ’ ἁρετημένη τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι.

17 διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἁρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ εὐ ἀκρότης.

1 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἐλλειψις ἀμαρτάνεται <καὶ> ψέγεται Rassow.
2 Bywater.
3 γε ὁμ. Κβ.
4 ὀρισμένη Γ: ὀρισμένη.
5 ο Ἀσπ. (fortasse).
6 lacunam vel alienam mendam suspexit Richards.
7 τὸ add. Κβ, Ἀσπ.

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a Cf. i. vi. 7.
b This verse from an unknown source would come in better just before or just after the last parenthesis.
c Προοιμεία, 'choice' or 'purpose,' is discussed in π. ii., where see note.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, II. vi. 12–17

virtue is concerned; and in feelings and actions excess and deficiency are errors, while the mean amount is praised, and constitutes success; and to be praised and to be successful are both marks of virtue. Virtue, therefore, is a mean state in the sense that it is able to hit the mean. Again, error is multiform (for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery,\(^a\) and good of the limited), whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it); so this is another reason why excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of the mean a mark of virtue:

Goodness is simple, badness manifold.\(^b\)

15 Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice\(^c\) of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is,\(^d\) as the prudent man would determine it.

16 And it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore, it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean. Hence while in respect of its substance and the definition that states what it really is in essence virtue is the observance of the mean, in point of excellence and rightness it is an extreme.\(^e\)

\(^a\) A variant reading gives 'determined by principle, or whatever we like to call that by which the prudent man would determine it' (vide Taylor, Aristotle, p. 77).

\(^b\) Cf. iii. iv. 8.
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18 Où pása δ' ἐπιδέχεται πράξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα. ἕνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ἀνόμασται συνειλήματι μένα μετὰ τῆς φαιλότητος, οδον ἑπιχαρεκακία ἀναίσχυντα φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία: πάντα γὰρ ταύτα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτά φαύλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἰκὶ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' οἰκὶ ἔλλειψεις. οὐκ ἔστων οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἀμαρτάνει. οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἡ μη εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐν τῷ ἡν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσ μοιχείειν, ἀλλ' ἄπλως τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτι οὐν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστὶν. ὁμοίων οὖν τὸ ἄξιον καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολή καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐσται γὰρ οὗτῳ γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἔλλειψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἔλλειψεως. ὅστερ δὲ συφρασοῦντα καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστω ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πας ἀκρον, οὖτως οὖν ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολή καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἀμαρτάνειται ὅλως γὰρ οὖθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἔλλειψεως μεσότης ἐστὶν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἔλλειψις.

vii Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μη μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττευν ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγους οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινώτεροι 1

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1 Mb, λέγεται vulg. 2 τῷ ἄξιοντι Richards. 3 κενώτερος 10b.

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a See c. vii. 15. The word means 'delight at another's misfortune,' Schadenfreude.

b See § 17 above.
18 Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice, shamelessness, envy, and, of actions, adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and feelings are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them—one must always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances, for instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right manner; the mere commission of any of them is wrong. One might as well suppose there could be a due mean and excess and deficiency in acts of injustice or cowardice or profligacy, which would imply that one could have a medium amount of excess and of deficiency, an excessive amount of excess and a deficient amount of deficiency. But just as there can be no excess or deficiency in temperance and justice, because the mean is in a sense an extreme, so there can be no observance of the mean nor excess nor deficiency in the corresponding vicious acts mentioned above, but however they are committed, they are wrong; since, to put it in general terms, there is no such thing as observing a mean in excess or deficiency, nor as exceeding or falling short in the observance of a mean.

vii We must not however rest content with stating this general definition, but must show that it applies to the particular virtues. In practical philosophy, although universal principles have a wider application...
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εἶσων, οὗ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινῶτερον· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἐκαστὰ αἱ πράξεις, δεόν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ¹ ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.

2 περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἃνδρεια μεσότης. ¹¹οτι τῶν δ' ὑπερβάλλοντων ο μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), οὗ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλον θραυσός, οὗ δ' τῶν μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβαλλον τῷ ἐλλειπτων δειωδος. περὶ ἡδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσας, ἤττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότης μὲν συφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολουθεῖ. ἐλλειπούντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονᾶς οὐ πάνω γίνονται, διότι ὑπὲρ οὐδ' ἀνόματος τετυχί- κασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσιν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι.

3 περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρήματων καὶ λήμνιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἐλλειψις ἀσωτία ¹⁰ καὶ ἀνελευθερία, ἐναντίως δὲ αὐτοῖς ὑπερβάλλον καὶ ἐλλειπούσιν. ο μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήμνει ἐλλειπεῖ, ὡς ᾗ ἀνελευθερος ἐν μὲν λήμνει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέει ἐλλειπεῖ.

4 νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῶν τούτων ὑπερβολῆς δὲ ἀκριβεστορον ¹⁵ περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα

¹ lacunam suspexit Burnet.
² οὖν om. K b.
³ δ' ἐν L b.
⁴ καὶ λύπας secl. Richards: καὶ λύπας (vel οὖ πάσας) ... περὶ τὰς λύπας secludenda ? ed.
⁵ καὶ <οὐδ' ἀναλαβέτος> ? Bywater.
⁶ τετυχίκεν αὐδ' δ' τοιοῦτος, ἐστω δὲ ἀναλαβέτος D, nescio an recte (ἐστώ δ' ἀναλαβέτος K b).
⁷ δὲ αὐτοῖς Stewart, Richards: δ' αὐταὶς M b, δ' αὐταίς L b, δὲ K b.
⁸ Or 'have a wider acceptance.'
⁹ Here apparently the lecturer displayed a table of virtues (like the one in E. E. p. 122 b 37), exhibiting each as a mean between two vices of excess and defect in respect of a certain
tion, those covering a particular part of the field possess a higher degree of truth; because conduct deals with particular facts, and our theories are bound to accord with these.

Let us then take the particular virtues from the diagram.

2 The observance of the mean in fear and confidence is Courage. The man that exceeds in fearlessness is not designated by any special name (and this is the case with many of the virtues and vices); he that exceeds in confidence is Rash; he that exceeds in fear and is deficient in confidence is Cowardly. In respect of pleasures and pains—not all of them, and to a less degree in respect of pains—the observance of the mean is Temperance, the excess Profligacy. Men deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures scarcely occur, and hence this character also has not been assigned a name, but we may call it In-
sensible. In regard to giving and getting money, the observance of the mean is Liberality; the excess and deficiency are Prodigality and Meanness, but the prodigal man and the mean man exceed and fall short in opposite ways to one another: the prodigal exceeds in giving and is deficient in getting, whereas the mean man exceeds in getting and is deficient in giving. For the present then we describe these qualities in outline and summarily, which is enough for the purpose in hand; but they will be more accurately defined later.

3 There are also other dispositions in relation to class of action or feeling. This is developed in detail in Bk. III. vi.-end and Bk. IV.

4 This parenthesis looks like an interpolation from III. x. 1.

5 The Greek word is the negative of that translated Liber-
ality, but 'illiberality' and 'illiberal' we do not usually employ with reference to money.
καὶ ἄλλα διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλο-
πρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου. ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ
de ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἐλλευψις δὲ μικρο-
πρέπειαν δ' αὐταί τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευ-
θεριότητα, τῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. ἦ
περὶ δὲ τιμῆν καὶ ἀτυμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλο-
ψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἐλ-
λευψις δὲ μικροψυχία. ὄς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχεων πρὸς
tὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, <τὸ>¹ περὶ 25
μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν
μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμῆν οὕσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ
περὶ μικρὰν οὕσα. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δὲι ὁρέγεσθαι
<μικρὰς>² τιμῆς καὶ μάλλον ἦ δεῖ καὶ ἦττον
λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς³ ὁρέξεσι φιλό-
τιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἄφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ⁸⁰
ἀνώτιμος, ἀνώτιμοι δὲ καὶ αὐξανότιμοι, πλὴν ἡ
tοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ φιλοτιμία: ὅθεν ἐπιδιώκεσθαι οἱ ἄκροι
tῆς μέσης χώρας. καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅπερ ἔστιν μὲν ὅτε τὸν ἡμέρων φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε
ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἐστὶν μὲν ὅτε⁴ ἐπανοιοῦμεν τὸν ¹¹⁰α
φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ' ἄτυχαι τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθῆσεται
νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγομεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφ-
τιμοὺς καὶ περὶ τῆς ὅργης ὑπερ-

¹ Ramsauer. ² <μικρὰς> (vel ταύτης pro τιμῆς) ed. ³ ταύταις vel τοιαύταις ? ed. ⁴ μὲν ὅτε Bywater: ὅτε Κb, ὅτε μὲν Λp. ⁵ δὴ ed.: δὲ.

100
money, namely, the mode of observing the mean
called Magnificence (the magnificent man being
different from the liberal, as the former deals with
large amounts and the latter with small ones), the
excess called Tastelessness or Vulgarity, and the
defect called Paltriness. These are not the same
as Liberality and the vices corresponding to it;
but the way in which they differ will be discussed
later.

7 In respect of honour and dishonour, the observ-
ance of the mean is Greatness of Soul, the excess a
sort of Vanity, as it may be called, and the deficiency,
8 Smallness of Soul. And just as we said that Liber-
ality is related to Magnificence, differing from it in
being concerned with small amounts of money, so
there is a certain quality related to Greatness of
Soul, which is concerned with great honours, while
this quality itself is concerned with small honours;
for it is possible to aspire to minor honours in the
right way, or more than is right, or less. He who
exceeds in these aspirations is called ambitious, he
who is deficient, unambitious; but the middle
character has no name, and the dispositions of
these persons are also unnamed, except that that of
the ambitious man is called Ambitiousness. Con-
sequently the extreme characters put in a claim
to the middle position, and in fact we ourselves
sometimes call the middle person ambitious and
sometimes unambitious: we sometimes praise a
man for being ambitious, sometimes for being un-
9 ambitious. Why we do so shall be discussed later;
for the present let us classify the remaining virtues
and vices on the lines which we have laid down.
10 In respect of anger also we have excess, deficiency,
ARISTOTLE

βολή καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδόν δὲ ἀνωνύμων 5 ὀντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πράον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν, τῶν δὲ ἀκρων δὲ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὁργι- λότης, δὲ ἔλλειπτων ἀργιητός τις, ἡ δὲ ἔλλειψις ἀργησία.

11 ἔχουσαι μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀληθείας, διὰ 10 φερομαι δὲ ἀληθείαν τὰσα μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τάληθες τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδυ, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδίᾳ τὸ δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἓν μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης 16 ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δὲ ἀκρων οὔτ’ ὅρθα οὔτ’ ἐπαινετα ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ 1 μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα πειρατέον δ’, ἁπτερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων, αὐτοὺς ὁμοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἐνεκεν καὶ τοῖς 12 εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθεῖς δὲ μὲν 20 μέσος ἀληθείας τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀληθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποιήσεως ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτήν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλαττων 13 εἰρωνεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων 2 εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδυ 25 τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδίᾳ δὲ μὲν μέσος εὑραπέλος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ’ ὑπερβολὴ βιομολογία καὶ 26

1 Κβ: ἐστὶν vulg. 2 Rams.: καὶ εἰρκῶν ὁ παύτην ἔχων ὁ ed.

*From iv. vii. it appears that the quality intended is sincerity of speech and conduct in the matter of asserting one's own merits. The observance of the mean in this respect is there said to have no name; and here the form of expression apologizes for using 'Truthfulness' in so limited a sense. The defect in this respect Aristotel expresses by εἰρωνεία, a word specially associated with the affectation of ignorance practised by Socrates. Neither this nor its 102*
and the observance of the mean. These states are virtually without names, but as we call a person of the middle character gentle, let us name the observance of the mean Gentleness, while of the extremes, he that exceeds may be styled irascible and his vice Irascibility, and he that is deficient, spiritless, and the deficiency Spiritlessness.

11 There are also three other modes of observing a mean which bear some resemblance to each other, and yet are different; all have to do with intercourse in conversation and action, but they differ in that one is concerned with truthfulness of speech and behaviour, and the other with pleasantness, in its two divisions of pleasantness in social amusement and pleasantness in the general affairs of life. We must then discuss these qualities also, in order the better to discern that in all things the observance of the mean is to be praised, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy, but reprehensible. Most of these qualities also are unnamed, but in these as in the other cases we must attempt to coin names for them ourselves, for the sake of clearness and so that our meaning may be easily followed.

12 In respect of truth then, the middle character may be called truthful, and the observance of the mean Truthfulness⁴; pretence in the form of exaggeration is Boastfulness, and its possessor a boaster; in the form of understatement, Self-depreciation, and its possessor the self-depreciator.

13 In respect of pleasantness in social amusement, the middle character is witty and the middle disposition Wittiness; the excess is Buffoonery and other shades of meaning correspond very closely to that of its English derivative irony.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

δ' ἐξ'ών αὐτήν βωμολόχος, δ' ἐλλείπτων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἐξ' ἄγροικια: περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἢδυ τὸ ἐν τῷ βιώ ὁ μὲν ὃς δεῖ ἥδυς ὃν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλα, δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὖδεν ἔνεκα, ἀρεσκός, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπτων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἄνδης δύσερίς τις καὶ 80 δύσικολος, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητης: 'ἡ γὰρ αίδως ἁρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἑστιν, ἑπανεῖται δὲ, καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων'. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπληκτικὸς ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπτων ἦς 85 μηδὲν ὁλως ἀναισχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. 1108 b

15 νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας: ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὗ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλων τούτον ἐπὶ πάσι λυπεῖται, 9 ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρεκακός τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι

16 ὡστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἀλλοθῇ καμρὸν ἑσταὶ περὶ δὲ δικαίωσιν, ἐπεὶ οὖχ ἀπλώς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ

1 παθήμασι καὶ περὶ Kb: πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ.
2 ἡ γὰρ αἰδώς ... ὁ αἰδήμων post δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων infra transponenda ed.
3 μηδὲν Kb; δ' μηδὲ vulg.
4 λυπεῖται <καὶ δ' μὲν νεμεσητικὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακῶς πράττουσιν λυπεῖται> Sauppe.

* This sentence in the mss. follows the next one.

b See vi. 18 (and note): there envy and 'rejoicing-in-evil' come in a list of emotions in which a due mean is impossible; and in Rhet. ii. ix. 1386 b 34 they are said to be two sides of the same character. The present attempt to force them into the scheme as opposite extremes is not very successful, and it is noteworthy that this group of qualities is omitted in Bk. IV.
104
its possessor a buffoon; the deficient man may be
called boorish, and his disposition Boorishness. In
respect of general pleasantness in life, the man who
is pleasant in the proper manner is friendly, and the
observance of the mean is Friendliness; he that
exceeds, if from no interested motive, is obsequious,
if for his own advantage, a flatterer; he that is
deficient, and unpleasant in all the affairs of life, may
be called quarrelsome and surly.

14 There are also modes of observing a mean in the
sphere of and in relation to the emotions. For in
these also one man is spoken of as moderate and
another as excessive—for example the bashful man
whose modesty takes alarm at everything; while he
that is deficient in shame, or abashed at nothing what-
soever, is shameless, and the man of middle character
modest. For though Modesty is not a virtue, it is
praised, and so is the modest man.

15 Again, Righteous Indignation is the observance of
a mean between Envy and Malice, and these
qualities are concerned with pain and pleasure felt
at the fortunes of one’s neighbours. The righteously
indignant man is pained by undeserved good fortune;
the jealous man exceeds him and is pained by all
the good fortune of others; while the malicious
man so far falls short of being pained that he
actually feels pleasure.

16 These qualities however it will be time to discuss
in another place. After them we will treat Justice,
distinguishing its two kinds—for it has more than
one sense—and showing in what way each is a mode

\[c\] It is difficult not to think that some words have been lost
here, such as ‘and the righteously indignant man is pained
by the undeserved misfortune of others.’

\[d\] Bk. VI.
ἐκατέρας ἐρόμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν [δομοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν].

viii ὁμών δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἐλλεύψιν, μιᾶς δ’ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πάσαι πάσαις ἀντικείμενα πῶς’ αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἄλληλαις

2 ἑναντίαι εἰσὶν, ἡ δὲ μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις. ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἱσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἐλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι εἴσεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλεύψεις ὑπερβάλλουσα πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλεύπουσαν ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεωις. οὐ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖοι πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασύς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασύν δειλὸς. δομοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σωφρόν πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναισθητὸν ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναισθητος, ὁ δὲ ἐλευθέρους πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἀσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν

3 ἀσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτεροι πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασύν ὁ δὲ θρασύς

4 δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλὼν ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ’ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλους τούτων, πλείστη ἑπανατιθησάται ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα [ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον].

πορρωτέρω γὰρ τάτα ἀφεστήκειν ἁλλήλων ἡ τοῦ μέσου, ὡσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἡ ἀμφω τοῦ ἱσον. ἐτὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ

1 Grant. 2 πλείστων. 3 cd.

Grant rightly rejects this sentence, since the intellectual virtues are nowhere else thus designated by Aristotle, nor does he regard them as modes of observing a mean.

This sentence should perhaps follow the next one, as it.
of observing the mean. [And we will deal similarly with the logical virtues.]

There are then three dispositions—two vices, one of excess and one of defect, and one virtue which is the observance of the mean; and each of them is in a certain way opposed to both the others. For the extreme states are the opposite both of the middle state and of each other, and the middle state is the opposite of both extremes; since just as the equal is greater in comparison with the less and less in comparison with the greater, so the middle states of character are in excess as compared with the defective states and defective as compared with the excessive states, whether in the case of feelings or of actions. For instance, a brave man appears rash in contrast with a coward and cowardly in contrast with a rash man; similarly a temperate man appears profligate in contrast with a man insensible to pleasure and pain, but insensible in contrast with a profligate; and a liberal man seems prodigal in contrast with a mean man, mean in contrast with one who is prodigal. Hence either extreme character tries to push the middle character towards the other extreme; a coward calls a brave man rash and a rash man calls him a coward, and correspondingly in other cases.

But while all three dispositions are thus opposed to one another, the greatest degree of contrariety exists between the two extremes. For the extremes are farther apart from each other than from the mean, just as great is farther from small and small from great than either from equal. Again some gives a second test of opposition, viz. unlikeness. However, unlikeness and remoteness are blended together in § 7.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗ

μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὀμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητῃ πρὸς τὴν ἄνδρειαν καὶ τῇ ἁσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομιότης. ταὶ δὲ πλείστων ἀπέχοντα ἀπ’ ἄλληλων ἐναντία ὑποκινοῦται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν—

6 αὑτία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντι-

κείται μᾶλλον ἐφ’ ὄν μὲν ἡ ἐλλευψίς ἐφ’ ὄν δὲ ἡ ἡ 1109 ἀ

ὑπερβολὴ, οἷον ἄνδρεια μὲν οὐχ ἡ ἠράσεις ὑπερ-

βολὴ ὁδὸς ἀλλ’ ἡ δειλία ἐλλευψίς ὁδὸς, τῇ δὲ 

σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἐνδεια ὁδὸς, ἀλλ’ ἡ 

7 ἀκολογία ὑπερβολὴ ὁδὸς. διὰ δύο δ’ αὑτίας τούτω ἀ

συμβαίνει, μιὰν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος— 

τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὀμοιότερον τὸ ἑτέρον 

ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοιούτῳ ἀντι-

τίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὀμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ 

ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομιότερον 

δ’ ἡ δειλία, ταὐτὴν μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ 10 

ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ

8 εἶναι. μιὰ μὲν οὖν αὑτία αὐτή, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγ-

ματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς δ’ γὰρ αὐτῶι 

μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν τῶς, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ 

μέσῳ φαίνεται· οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἴδιονάς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροι ἐσμεν ἐπὶ 15 

ἀκολογία [ἡ πρὸς κοσμομότητα]. ταὐτ’ οὖν μᾶλ-

λον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς δ’ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον 

γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τούτο ἡ ἀκολογία ὑπερβολὴ ὁδὸς 

ἐναντιώτερα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

1 φαίνεται εὖναι; od.
2 ἔχομεν pr. Κδ: ἐσμεν μᾶλλον? Bywater. 3 εὐκατάφορωτεροι Γ.
4 ἔσμεν μᾶλλον Turnebus. 5 Spengel.

a These words are probably an interpolation, since the sense requires 'more than to Insensibility.'
extremes show a certain likeness to the mean—for instance, Rashness resembles Courage, Prodigality Liberality, whereas the extremes display the greatest unlikeness to one another. But it is things farthest apart from each other that logicians define as contraries, so that the farther apart things are the more contrary they are.

6 And in some cases the defect, in others the excess, is more opposed to the mean; for example Cowardice, which is a vice of deficiency, is more opposed to Courage than is Rashness, which is a vice of excess; but Profligacy, or excess of feeling, is more opposed to Temperance than is Insensibility, or lack of feeling. This results from either of two causes. One of these arises from the thing itself; owing to one extreme being nearer to the mean and resembling it more, we count not this but rather the contrary extreme as the opposite of the mean; for example, because Rashness seems to resemble Courage more than Cowardice does, and to be nearer to it, we reckon Cowardice rather than Rashness as the contrary of Courage; for those extremes which are more remote from the mean are thought to be more contrary to it. This then is one cause, arising out of the thing itself. The other cause has its origin in us: those things appear more contrary to the mean to which we are ourselves more inclined by our nature. For example, we are of ourselves more inclined to pleasure, which is why we are prone to Profligacy [more than to Propriety].

7 We therefore rather call those things the contrary of the mean, into which we are more inclined to lapse; and hence Profligacy, the excess, is more particularly the contrary of Temperance.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

1x Ὄτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ἄρετή ἡ Ἰθική μεσότης, καὶ ἡ πώς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἐλλευσιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικῇ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἰκανῶς εἰρηται.

2 διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὗ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὔτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄργον ἴσον παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἄργυρον καὶ δαπανήσας τὸ δ’ ἢ ἄριστε ἢ ἄριστον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἑνεκα καὶ ὡς, οὔκετι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον. διότι περὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπανετῶν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεὶ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίον, καθ’ ἀπερ καὶ Ἡ Καλυψώ παρανεῖ τοῦτον μὲν κατνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἐργεῖ νῆα.

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δὲ ἢττον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρος χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασὶ, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. τοῦτο δ’ ἐσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ δει πρὸς α’ καὶ αὐτοῖς εὐκατάφοροι ἔσμεν (ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἀλλα πεφύκαμεν)—τοῦτο δ’ ἐσται γνώριμον

1 Ramsauer.

2 ἀκρεῖως Richards.

a Od. xii. 219: really the words are said by Odysseus, conveying to his steersman Circe’s advice, to avoid the whirlpool of Charybdis which will engulf them all, and steer nearer to the monster Scylla who will devour only some of them.

110
Enough has now been said to show that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that it is such a mean because it aims at hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions. This is why it is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find the middle point in anything: for instance, not everybody can find the centre of a circle, but only someone who knows geometry. So also anybody can become angry—that is easy, and so it is to give and spend money; but to be angry with or give money to the right person, and to the right amount, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not within everybody’s power and is not easy; so that to do these things properly is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.

Hence the first rule in aiming at the mean is to avoid that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean, as Calypso advises—an—

Steer the ship clear of yonder spray and surge.

For of the two extremes one is a more serious error than the other. Hence, inasmuch as to hit the mean extremely well is difficult, the second best way to sail, as the saying goes, is to take the least of the evils; and the best way to do this will be the way we enjoin.

The second rule is to notice what are the errors to which we are ourselves most prone (as different men are inclined by nature to different faults)—and

Or ‘to hit the mean is extremely difficult.’

A proverb, meaning to take to the oars when the wind fails.
Aristotle

ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ 5 ἡμᾶς—εἰς τούνακτον δ᾿ εαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν [δεὶ] 1·· 5 πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἡξομεν· ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ἡμῶν ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτεόν τὸ ἦδο καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτὴν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἐπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἐλενήν, τούτῳ δὲ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς 10 τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πάσι τὴν ἑκεῖνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἤττον ἡμῶν ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ’ οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυχόνειν. χαλεπῶν δ’ έισως τούτο, καὶ μάλιστ’ ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἐκαστόν· οὐ γὰρ ράδιον διορίσαι πώς καὶ τίς καὶ ἐπὶ πολίς καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέων· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς οτὲ μὲν τοὺς ἐλλειποντας ἐπιμοιμεν καὶ πρᾶσος φαμεν, δῦτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαύνοντας 15 ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. 2· ἂλλ’ δ’ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εἴ 2· παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡντον, δ’ ἐπὶ πλέον· οὔτος γὰρ οὐ λαυβάνει. 20 δ’ ἐπὶ μέσῳ τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτος οὐ βάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐ δέ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἐκαστα, καὶ 25 ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις· τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο

1 ed.
2 ἀποκαλοῦντες Lb.

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*Iliad* iii. 156-160.

6 Or 'repeat.'
we shall discover what these are by observing the
pleasure or pain that we experience—; then we must
drag ourselves away in the opposite direction, for
by steering wide of our besetting error we shall
make a middle course. This is the method adopted
by carpenters to straighten warped timber.

Thirdly, we must in everything be most of all on
our guard against what is pleasant and against
pleasure; for when pleasure is on her trial we are
not impartial judges. The right course is therefore
to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people
felt towards Helen, and to apply their words to
her on every occasion; for if we roundly bid her
be gone, we shall be less likely to err.

These then, to sum up the matter, are the pre-
cautions that will best enable us to hit the mean.
But no doubt it is a difficult thing to do, and especi-
ally in particular cases: for instance, it is not easy
to define in what manner and with what people and
on what sort of grounds and how long one ought
to be angry; and in fact we sometimes praise men
who err on the side of defect in this matter and call
them gentle, sometimes those who are quick to
anger and style them manly. However, we do not
blame one who diverges a little from the right course,
whether on the side of the too much or of the too
little, but one who diverges more widely, for his error
is noticed. Yet to what degree and how seriously
a man must err to be blamed is not easy to define on
principle. For in fact no object of perception is easy
to define; and such questions of degree depend on
particular circumstances, and the decision lies with
perception.

Thus much then is clear, that it is the middle
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dηλοῦ,1 ὅτι ἡ μέση ἔξεσ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπανετῆ, ἀπο-
κλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλλειψιν: οὖτω γὰρ ἡ ῥάστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ
tοῦ εὖ τευχώμεθα.

1 δήλου codd. Morellii.
disposition in each department of conduct that is
to be praised, but that one should lean sometimes
to the side of excess and sometimes to that of
deficiency, since this is the easiest way of hitting
the mean and the right course.
1 Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὲ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεως οὕσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γνωμένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκουσίων καὶ τὸ ἀκουσίων ἀναγκαῖον ἱσως διωρίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦντες ἥρησιμον δὲ καὶ τοὺς νομοθετούσι πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. Δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκουσίας
3 εἶναι τὰ βια ἢ δὲ ἁγνωσιῶν γιανόμενα. Βιαίον δὲ οὕτως ἢ ἁρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὕσα ἢ ἢ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεύμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἀνθρωποὶ κύριοι ὄντες. Ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλῶν τι, οἶον εἰ τύραννος προστάται ἀλοχρόν τι πράξει κύριος ἢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξεως μὲν σωζόντω, μὴ πράξαντος ἢ ἀποθνῄσκοντι, ἀμφισβητήσως ἔχει πότερον ἀκουσία ἐστίν ἢ ἐκουσία.
4 ὅτε (cf. 1109 a 20) Stocks: δὴ. 2 δὴ codd. Morellii: δὲ.
5 μὲν ἢ ἢν? Richards.

* * *

α ἐκουσίων and ἀκουσίων are most conveniently rendered ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’; but the word ἀκουσίων suggests ‘unwilling’ or ‘against the will,’ and to this meaning Aristotle limits it in § 13. There he introduces a third term, ὁχ ἐκούσιον, ‘not voluntary’ or ‘not willing,’ to describe acts done in ignorance of their full circumstances and consequences, and so not willed in the full sense; but such acts when subsequently regretted by the agent are included in the
BOOK III

1. Virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntary; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.

2. It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a) under compulsion or (b) through ignorance; and that (a) an act is compulsory when its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent, who is really passive, contributes nothing to it: for example, when he is carried somewhere by stress of weather, or by people who have him in their power. But there is some doubt about actions done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object—as for instance if a tyrant having a man's parents and children in his power commands him to do something base, when if he complies their lives will be spared but if he refuses they will be put to death. It is open to question whether such class of ἀκούσια or unwilling acts, because had the agent not been in ignorance he would not have done them.
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5 toioúton de ti symβaínei kai peri tás en tois cheimwón ekbolás, aplósis, mén gar oudeis apobálletai ekwón, epí swstíria, d' autò kai tón 10 loipwán ápantes òi nòv òchontes. miktaí mén ouv eisín aí toiau'tai práxeis, éoisai de mállov ekousíous. aíreitai gar eisí tote òte práttontai to de télos tís práxeos kata tón kairón èstwv, kai to ekousíon de kai to akousíon òte práttew 15 lektein práttew de èkwn kai gar è arxh tov kineión tìr organikà mére èn tais toiaútais práxeous èn autò èstwv, òwv d' èn autò è arxh, èp' autò kai to práttew kai mh. ekousia de tã toiauta, aplós d' iswv akousíai oudeis gar án êloito kalò 7 autò tòn toioútwn oudein. epí tais práxei de tais 20 toiaútais ènìote kai òpànowntai, òtan aîxhron tì ò arxhron òu ou metríw phulwv. èp' eînios d' òpànows meû ou gínetai, suxgynwóm d', òtan diá toiau'ta práxe tis è mh dèi, è tìn ántrwpíthn 25 8 fiwv òpèrtein ev kai mhdeis àn òpomewnav. ènnav d' èsws ouk èstwv anagkakosthnai, ålla mállov aîxh- 30 thvatevón páthnti tà dénovtata kal gar tòn

a i.e., partly voluntary, partly involuntary.
6 Which shows that the acts are regarded as voluntary (Peters).
6 i.e., some acts are so repulsive that a man’s abhorrence of them must be stronger than any pressure that can be put on him to commit them; so that if he commits them he must be held to have chosen to do so.

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actions are voluntary or involuntary. A somewhat similar case is when cargo is jettisoned in a storm; apart from circumstances, no one voluntarily throws away his property, but to save his own life and that of his shipmates any sane man would do so. Acts of this kind, then, are 'mixed' or composite; but they approximate rather to the voluntary class. For at the actual time when they are done they are chosen or willed; and the end or motive of an act varies with the occasion, so that the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' should be used with reference to the time of action; now the actual deed in the cases in question is done voluntarily, for the origin of the movement of the parts of the body instrumental to the act lies in the agent; and when the origin of an action is in oneself, it is in one's own power to do it or not. Such acts therefore are voluntary, though perhaps involuntary apart from circumstances—for no one would choose to do any such action in and for itself.

Sometimes indeed men are actually praised for deeds of this 'mixed' class, namely when they submit to some disgrace or pain as the price of some great and noble object; though if they do so without any such motive they are blamed, since it is contemptible to submit to a great disgrace with no advantage or only a trifling one in view. In some cases again, such submission though not praised is condoned, when a man does something wrong through fear of penalties that impose too great a strain on human nature, and that no one could endure. Yet there seem to be some acts which a man cannot be compelled to do, and rather than do them he ought to submit to the most terrible
Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοΐα φανεται τὰ ἀναγ-κάσαντα μητροκοτοηθαί. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνιστε διακρίναι ποίον ἀντὶ πολυοι αἰρετέων καὶ τὶ ἀντὶ τῶν υπομενετέων, ἔτι δὲ χαλαρώτερον ἐμμεναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἀ δὲ ἄναγκαζονται αἰσχρα, οὖν ἔσται καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγ- 1110 ἐκαθένας ἡ μη. τὰ δὲ ποιὰ φατέον βίας; ἡ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὅποτ' ἄν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἑκτὸς ἢ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται; ἀ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν αἰρέτα, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἐνικεν ἐκούσιος: αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ πολυοι αἰρετέων, οὐ βάδιον ἀποδοῦναι. πολλαὶ γὰρ δια- 11 φοραὶ εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐκαστα. εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἤδεια καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίνη βίας εἰναι (ἄναγκαζεν 10 γὰρ ἐξω οὖντα), πάντα ἀν εἰη οὕτω βίαια. τοῦτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν

1 οὕτω Γ': αὐτὸς.

* In a play now lost, Eriphyle was bribed with a necklace to induce her husband Amphiaratus, king of Argos, to join the expedition of the Seven against Thebes. Foreseeing he would lose his life, he charged his sons to avenge his death upon their mother, invoking on them famine and childlessness if they disobeyed. The verse in question is preserved:

μᾶλλον μὲν μ’ ἐφήρ’ ἐπισκῆψας παθῆρ.

Alcmaeon, fr. 69 (Nauck).

* There is no such thing as an act which is not this particular act in these particular circumstances (Burnet).

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, III. 1. 8-11

deadth: for instance, we think it ridiculous that Alcmaeon in Euripides’ play \(^{a}\) is compelled by certain threats to murder his mother! But it is sometimes difficult to decide how far we ought to go in choosing to do a given act rather than suffer a given penalty, or in enduring a given penalty rather than commit a given action; and it is still more difficult to abide by our decision when made, since in most of such dilemmas the penalty threatened is painful and the deed forced upon us dishonourable, which is why praise and blame are bestowed according as we do or do not yield to such compulsion.

What kind of actions then are to be called ‘compulsory’? Used without qualification, perhaps this term applies to any case where the cause of the action lies in things outside the agent, and when the agent contributes nothing. But when actions intrinsically involuntary are yet in given circumstances deliberately chosen in preference to a given alternative, and when their origin lies in the agent, these actions are to be pronounced intrinsically involuntary but voluntary in the circumstances, and in preference to the alternative. They approximate however rather to the voluntary class, since conduct consists of particular things done,\(^{b}\) and the particular things done in the cases in question are voluntary. But it is not easy to lay down rules for deciding which of two alternatives is to be chosen, for particular cases differ widely.

To apply the term ‘compulsory’ to acts done for the sake of pleasure or for noble objects, on the plea that these exercise constraint on us from without, is to make every action compulsory. For (1) pleasure and nobility between them supply the

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βία καὶ ἀκουστες λυπηρῶς, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἥδυ καὶ
calóν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς. γελοοῦν δὲ τὸ αὐτιάσθαι τὰ
ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτόν εὐθήρατον ὁντα ὑπὸ τῶν
τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐμαυτών, τῶν δ’
12 αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἴδεα. ἐοικε δὴ [τὸ]² βίαιον εἶναι οὐ
ἐξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βια-
σθέντος.

13 Τὸ δὲ δι’ ἂννοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἀπαν ἑστίν,
ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυτον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ. οὐ
gὰρ δι’ ἂννοιαν πράξας ὀτιοῦ, μηδὲν τι² δυσ-
κεραιών ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραξεν, ὦ
gε μὴ ἑδει, οὐδ’ αὖ ἁκῶν, μὴ λυπούμενος γε. τοῦ
dὴ δὴ ἂννοιαν οὐκ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἁκῶν δοκεῖ, οὐ
dὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἐτερος, ἐστώ οὐχ ἀκών,
ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἐχειν ἴδιον.

14 ἐτερον δ’ ἐοικε καὶ τὸ δι’ ἂννοιαν πράττειν τοῦ
ἀγνωσίατα ποιεῖν. οὐ γὰρ μεθὺς ἡ ὀργυζόμενος οὐ
dοκεῖ δι’ ἂννοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ τῶν
eἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ, ἀλλ’ ἂννοια. ἂγνοεῖ
μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ὁ δὲ πράττειν καὶ δὲν
ἀφεκτέων, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἄδικοι
15 καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται. τὸ δ’ ἁκούσιον βουλέται; 30

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1 ἄθι Lb. ² Richards.
2 μηδὲν τι K: μηδὲν de L, μηδὲν TMb.

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* See note on § 1 above.
motives of all actions whatsoever. Also (2) to act under compulsion and unwillingly is painful, but actions done for their pleasantness or nobility are done with pleasure. And (3) it is absurd to blame external things, instead of blaming ourselves for falling an easy prey to their attractions; or to take the credit of our noble deeds to ourselves, while putting the blame for our disgraceful ones upon the temptations of pleasure. It appears therefore that an act is compulsory when its origin is from outside, the person compelled contributing nothing to it.

(b) An act done through ignorance is in every case not voluntary, but it is involuntary only when it causes the agent pain and regret: since a man who has acted through ignorance and feels no compunction at all for what he has done, cannot indeed be said to have acted voluntarily, as he was not aware of his action, yet cannot be said to have acted involuntarily, as he is not sorry for it. Acts done through ignorance therefore fall into two classes: if the agent regrets the act, we think that he has acted involuntarily; if he does not regret it, to mark the distinction we may call him a 'non-voluntary' agent—for as the case is different it is better to give it a special name. Acting through ignorance however seems to be different from acting in ignorance; for when a man is drunk or in a rage, his actions are not thought to be done through ignorance but owing to one or other of the conditions mentioned, though he does act without knowing, and in ignorance. Now it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do and refrain from doing, and that this error is the cause of injustice and of vice in general.
ARISTOTLE

λέγεσθαι οὖν εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα:1 οὐ γὰρ
η ἐν τῇ προαίρεσιν ἀγνοίᾳ αἰτία τοῦ ἀκοινού (ἀλλὰ
tῆς μοχθηρίας), οὐδὲ ἥ καθόλου (μεγανται γὰρ διὰ
ye ταύτης), ἀλλ’ ἥ καθ’ ἐκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἀ
η πράξεως έν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμην.
16 ὅ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκοινῶς πράττει. ἵσως
οὖν οἷς χειρὸν διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἔστι,
tίς τε ὑή καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τῇ ἐν τίνι πράττει,
ἐντὸς δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος,
οἶον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἴρεμα καὶ σφόδρα.
17 ἀπαντά μὲν οὖν ταύτα οὗτες ἂν ἀγνοήσεις μὴ
μανόμενος, δήλον δ’ ὡς οὖδὲ τοῦ πράττοντα. πῶς
γὰρ ἐαυτὸν γε; δ’ δὲ πράττει, ἀγνοήσεις ἂν τις,
οἶον λέγοντας2 φασιν ἐκτετείν αὐτοὺς,3 ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι
ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὅπερ Ἀισχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ τὸ
δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφείαι, ὡς ο τὸν καταπέλτην,
οἰηθεὶς δ’ ἂν τις καὶ τὸν ὑδν πολέμιον εἶναι ὅπερ
ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαίρωσκαι τὸ λελογχωμένον
δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κύσηριν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίας

1 τὰ συμφέροντα Κb: τὸ σύμφερον.
2 λέγοντας (ut videtur) Asp.: λέγοντες.
3 αὐτοὺς Ald.: αὑτοῦς.

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1 i.e., choice of Ends: see iii. ii. 1 note.
2 'Things' seems to include persons, see example (3) below.
3 έν τίνι seems to bear a more limited sense than έν οἷς
II. 1, 16, 19, 24, which covers the circumstances of all sorts.
4 Aeschylus was accused before the Areopagus of having
divulged the Mysteries of Demeter in certain of his tragedies,
but was acquitted. A phrase of his, 'It came to my
mouth,' became proverbial (Plato, Rep. 563 c, etc.), and
he may have used it on this occasion.
5 In the lost Cresphontes of Euripides.
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15 But the term 'involuntary' does not really apply to an action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blame-worthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice\(^a\) (that sort of ignorance constitutes vice)—that is to say, it is not general ignorance (because that is held to be blameworthy), but particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things\(^b\) affected by it; for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent.

16 Perhaps then it will be as well to specify the nature and number of these circumstances. They are (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thing\(^b\) that is affected by or is the sphere of\(^c\) the act; and sometimes also (4) the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done, (5) the effect, for instance, saving a man's life, and (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.

17 Now no one, unless mad, could be ignorant of all these circumstances together; nor yet, obviously, of (1) the agent—for a man must know who he is himself. But a man may be ignorant of (2) what he is doing, as for instance when people say 'it slipped out while they were speaking,' or 'they were not aware that the matter was a secret,' as Aeschylus said of the Mysteries\(^d\); or that 'they let it off when they only meant to show how it worked' as the prisoner pleaded in the catapult case. Again (3) a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as Merope does\(^e\); or (4) mistake a sharp spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or (5) one might kill a
Aristotle

ποτίσας ἀποκτείναι ἄν· καὶ δράξαι βουλόμενος,

18 ὡσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειν ἄν· περὶ 18
πάντα δὴ τὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὕσης ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις,

δ' τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ

μᾶλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι

19 δοκεῖ, ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις,3 καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. τοῦ δὴ
κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἁκούσιον λεγομένου 20

ἐτί δεῖ τὴν πράξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.

20 "Οὐντος δ' ἁκούσιον τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἁγνοεῖν,

τὸ ἑκούσιον δοξεῖν ἄν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ

21 εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἐκαστά ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. ἵσως γὰρ

οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἁκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ 25

22 ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐτί τῶν ἄλλων

23 ξίμων ἁκούσιως πράξει, οὐδὲ οἱ παίδες· εἶτα

πότερον οὐδὲν ἁκούσιως πράττομεν τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἁκούσιως τὰ

δ' αἰσχρὰ ἁκούσιοι; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνὸς γε αἰτίον

24 ὅντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἵσως ἁκούσια φάναι ὡς δεὶ 30

ὁρέγεσθαι· δεὶ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐτί τισι καὶ

ἐπιθυμεῖν τυχῶν, οἷον ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως.

25 δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἁκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ'

26 ἐπιθυμίαν Ἰδεά. ἐτί δὲ τὶ διαφέρει τῷ ἁκούσια

1 ποτίσας Bonitz: πατίσας (πισάς Bernays).
3 ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις: secludenda ? ed.
4 Richards.

A style of wrestling in which the adversaries only gripped each other’s hands without closing.

Plato, Laws 683 n ff., coupled anger and appetite with ignorance as sources of wrong action.

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man by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or (6) in loose wrestling a hit him a blow when meaning only to grip his hand. Ignorance therefore being possible in respect of all these circumstances of the act, one who has acted in ignorance of any of them is held to have acted involuntarily, and especially so if ignorant of the most important of them; and the most important of the circumstances seem to be the nature of the act itself and the effect it will produce.

Such then is the nature of the ignorance that justifies our speaking of an act as involuntary, given the further condition that the agent feels sorrow and regret for having committed it.

An involuntary action being one done under compulsion or through ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be an act of which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the particular circumstances in which he is acting. For it is probably a mistake to say b that acts caused by anger or by desire are involuntary. In the first place, (1) this will debar us from speaking of any of the lower animals as acting voluntarily, or children either. Then (2) are none of our actions that are caused by desire or anger voluntary, or are the noble ones voluntary and the base involuntary? Surely this is an absurd distinction when one person is the author of both.

Yet perhaps it is strange to speak of acts aiming at things which it is right to aim at as involuntary; and it is right to feel anger at some things, and also to feel desire for some things, for instance health, knowledge.

Also (3) we think that involuntary actions are painful and actions that gratify desire pleasant. And again (4) what difference is there in respect of their
Aristotle

eιναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἡ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα;
27 φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμφῶς, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἦττον ἀνθρω- 1111.
tικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἁλογα πάθη, ζόστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις
tοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αι> ἀπὸ θύμοι καὶ ἐπιθυμίασ.
ἀτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.
ii Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ
ἀκουσίου, περὶ προαίρεσεως ἑπται διελθεῖν.
οἰκείοτατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον
2 τὰ ἡθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ
ἐκουσίων μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταύτων δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
πλέον τὸ ἐκουσίων τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ
παιδεῖ καὶ τᾶλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαίρεσεως δ' οὐ,
καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφης ἐκουσία μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ 10
3 προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγουσε αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
ἡ θυμὸν ἡ βούλησις ἡ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοίκασιν
ὁρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινων ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ
4 τῶν ἁλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ
ἀκρατῆς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ('
ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δ' ἀνάπολων προαιρούμενος μὲν, 15
ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία
ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ μὲν

1 πάθη om. pr. Kb. 2 ὅστε καὶ αἱ Kb: αἱ δὲ vulg.
3 <αι> conj. Susemihl.

* The writer here examines the operation of the Will, which is regarded as essentially an act of choosing between alternatives of conduct. The technical term employed, 'choice' or 'preference,' has appeared in the formal definition of virtue (II. vi. 15). In the present passage, cf. §9, it is viewed as directed to means: at the moment of action we select from among the alternative acts possible.
involuntary character between wrong acts committed deliberately and wrong acts done in anger? Both are to be avoided; and also we think that the irrational feelings are just as much a part of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger or desire also belong to the human being who does them. It is therefore strange to class these actions as involuntary.

Having defined voluntary and involuntary action, we next have to examine the nature of Choice. For this appears to be intimately connected with virtue, and to afford a surer test of character than do our actions.

Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be said to be done by choice.

Some identify Choice with (1) Desire, or (2) Passion, or (3) Wish, or (4) some form of Opinion. These views however appear to be mistaken.

(1) The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel desire, and also passion. Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire. Again, desire can run counter to choice, but not desire to (or expressing it more loosely, among the various things here and now obtainable by our action) the one which we think will conduce to the end we wish. Elsewhere however (iii. i. 15 and vi. xii. 8) it is used of the selection of ends, and it is almost equivalent to 'purpose'; while at vi. xiii. 8 it includes both ends and means (see also vii. ix. 1). The writer returns to the subject in vii. ii.
Ἀριστοτέλη

ἐπιθυμία ἡδέως καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἢ προαίρεσις δ'.

6 οὗτε λυπηρὸς οὐθ' ἡδέως. θυμὸς δ' ἐτὶ ἦττον' ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαιρεσιν εἶναι.

7 δοκεῖ. ἄλλα μὴν οúde βούλησίς γε, καίπερ 20 σύνεγγυς φαινομένων προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἰ τις φαίη προαίρεσθαι, δοκοὶ ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι. βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἢ μὲν βούλησίς ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δ' αὐτοῦ πραξέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικάν ἡ ἀθλητήν προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οúdeις, ἂλλ' ὡσα οὖντα 9 γενέσθαι ἂν δ' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιροῦμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιαίνει, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαιμέν, προαιροῦμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἄρμοζεν. ὅλως γὰρ ἐσκεν ἡ προαιρεσιν περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἦμῖν 20 εἶναι. οúde δ' ἡ δόξα ἄν εἴη. ἢ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὔδεν ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἦμῖν καὶ τὰ γενεσθαι καὶ ἀληθεί διαφημίται, οὐ τοῦ κακῶ καὶ ἀγαθῶ, ἢ προαιρεσις δ' τούτως μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταύτων ἵως οúde λέγει οúdeis. ἂλλ' οúde τιν'. 1112.

1 ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀσπ.

* i.e., you cannot feel two contradictory desires at once (though you can of course desire two incompatible things: you may want to eat your cake and have it; but you cannot strictly speaking at the same time both desire to eat the cake and desire not to eat it). But you can desire to do a thing and choose not to do it.

* But as good or bad.

* Greek dramas were produced in competitions (and it is noteworthy that in the Old Comedy at Athens the play itself dramatized a contest or debate).
desire. And desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not.  

6  (2) Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion seem very far from being done of deliberate choice.

7  (3) Again, choice is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality. Also we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actor or athlete may win; but no one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act. Again, we wish rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; for example, we wish to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy; we wish to be happy, and that is the word we use in this connexion, but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy; since, speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control.

10  (4) Nor yet again can it be opinion. It seems that anything may be matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal, or impossible, just as much as about what is within our power. Also we distinguish opinion by its truth or falsehood, not by its being good or bad, but choice is distinguished rather as being good or bad. Probably therefore nobody actually identifies choice with opinion in general. But neither is it the same as some parti-

\(^a\) Cf. c. iii. 3 and note.
ΑΡΙΣТОΤΕΛΣ

τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τάγαθὰ ἡ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί
tως ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. καὶ προαιροῦμεθα
μὲν λαβεῖν ἡ φυγεῖν [ἡ] τὸν τὸιοῦτον, δοξά-
ζομεν δὲ τὶ ἐστὶν ἡ τίνι συμφέρει ἡ πῶς. λαβεῖν
δ' ἡ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προ-
αιρεσις ἐπανεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον [ἡ τῷ
ὀρθῶς], ἡ δὲ δοξά τῷ ὡς [ἀληθῶς]. καὶ προ-
αιροῦμεθα μὲν ᾗ μάλιστα ἵσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὀντα,
δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ ὑπ' πάνυ ἵσμεν. δοκοῦσι τε οὐχ
οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν,
ἀλλ' ἔνοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἂμενον, διὰ κακίαν δ' 10
αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς
προαιρέσεως ἡ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει
οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταύτῶν ἐστὶ
δόξῃ τωλ. τῷ οὖν ἡ ποιῶν τὶ ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν
εἰρημένων οὐθὲν; ἐκούσιον μὲν ἡ φαίνεται, τὸ
δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πάν προαιρετῶν. ἀλλ' ἀρά γε τὸ 15
προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαιρεσις μετὰ λόγου
καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἐσοκε καὶ τούνομα
ὡς ὁν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἱρετῶν.

iii Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων καὶ πᾶν
βουλευτῶν ἔστω, ἡ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἐστὶ βουλή;

2 λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτῶν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὐ βουλεύσατ' 20

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3 ed. 4 ὡς om. Lb. 5 ed.

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ἀ. i.e., an opinion or belief that so and-so is good, and is
within our power to obtain.

b. Perhaps to be emended ‘how it is to be achieved.’

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cicular opinion. For it is our choice of good or evil that determines our character, not our opinion about good or evil. And we choose to take or avoid some good or evil thing, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is advantageous, or how it is so: we do not exactly form an opinion to take or avoid a thing. Also we praise a choice rather for choosing the right thing, but an opinion for opining in the right way. And we choose only things that we absolutely know to be good, we opine things we do not quite certainly know to be true. Nor do the same persons appear to excel both at choosing and at forming opinions: some people seem to form opinions better, but yet to choose the wrong things from wickedness. That choice is preceded or accompanied by the formation of an opinion is immaterial, for that is not the point we are considering, but whether choice is the same thing as some form of opinion.

What then are the genus and differentia of Choice, inasmuch as it is not any of the things above mentioned? It manifestly belongs to the genus voluntary action; but not every voluntary act is chosen. Perhaps we may define it as voluntary action preceded by deliberation, since choice involves reasoning and some process of thought. Indeed previous deliberation seems to be implied by the very term proaireton, which denotes something chosen before other things.

As for Deliberation, do people deliberate about every thing— are all things possible objects of deliberation—, or are there some things about which deliberation is impossible? The term 'object of deliberation' presumably must not be taken to
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

ἀν τις ἡλίθιος ἡ μανώμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὃν ὁ νοῦν
3 ἐξων. περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται,
οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ἡ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
4 πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν
ἐν κυησεῖ, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταύτα γινομένων, εἰτ' ἔξ ἀνάγκης εἶτε καὶ φύσει ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰτίων ἡ
5 ἀλλήν, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ
tῶν ἄλλων ἄλλως, οἷον αὖχην καὶ ὁμβρῶν. οὐδὲ
περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θεσαυροῦ εὑρέσεως.
6 οὗ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἄν τούτων οὐθὲν δ' ἡμῶν. βου-
λευμέθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἕφ' ἡμῶν καὶ πρακτών
(ταύτα δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ λοιπὰ: αἰτία γὰρ δοκοῦσιν
ἐναὶ φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ
7 πᾶν τὸ δ' ἀνθρώπου). ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄν-
θρωπων ἀπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἃν Σκύθαι ἄριστα
πολιτεύοντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.
tῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκαστοί βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν
8 δ' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκρίβεις
καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἐστὶ βουλή,
οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὗ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς

1 δὴ Bonitz: δὲ.
2 οὗ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἄν ... ἀνθρώπον hic ed.: infra post
3 δ' secludendum ? Richards.

* The term includes the notion of immutability.

5 Here and in § 7 ‘necessity’ denotes natural law in the
inanimate world, while ‘nature’ or ‘growth’ means
natural law as governing animate creatures. Aristotle held
that these agencies, and with them the operation of human
intelligence and art, beside their designed results, produced
by their interplay certain by-products in the shape of un-
designed and irregular occurrences, which are referred to
in the next section. These in the natural world he spoke
of as due to ἃν το αὐτόματον, or ‘spontaneous’; when due
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, III. iii. 2-8

include things about which a fool or a madman might deliberate, but to mean what a sensible person would deliberate about.

3 Well then, nobody deliberates about things eternal, such as the order of the universe, or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. Nor yet about things that change but follow a regular process, whether from necessity or by nature or through some other cause: such phenomena for instance as the solstices and the sunrise. Nor about irregular occurrences, such as droughts and rains. Nor about the results of chance, such as finding a hidden treasure. The reason why we do not deliberate about these things is that none of them can be effected by our agency.

7 We deliberate about things that are in our control and are attainable by action (which are in fact the only things that still remain to be considered; for Nature, Necessity, and Chance, with the addition of Intelligence and human agency generally, exhaust the generally accepted list of causes). But we do not deliberate about all human affairs without exception either: for example, no Lacedaemonian deliberates about the best form of government for Scythia; but any particular set of men deliberates about the things attainable by their own actions. Also there is no room for deliberation about matters fully ascertained and completely formulated as sciences; such for instance as orthography, for we have no uncertainty as to how a word ought to be spelt to the activity of man he ascribed them to fortune or chance.

In § 7 chance is made to include 'the spontaneous.'

In the mss. the words 'The reason why... list of causes' come after 'But we do not deliberate... Scythia.'

Or, 'the best line of policy.'
ARISTOTLE

γραπτέον): ἄλλ' ὃσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν μὴ ὠσάτως δ' ἀεί, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ιατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μάλλον ἡ γυμναστικὴν, ὡσποδ' ἂν τοὺς διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἐτὶ περὶ τῶν λουπῶν ὁμοίως. 9 μάλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας.

10 μάλλον γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλευόμεθα δὴ ἐν τοῖς οἷς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀδήλος δὲ πῶς ἀποβηθεῖται, καὶ ἐν ὁς ἁδιοριστόν, συμ- βούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐκ ἱκανοῖς διαγνωσάναι.

11 —βουλευόμεθα δ' οὖ περὶ τῶν τελῶν, ἄλλα περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὕτε γὰρ ιατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ δυνάσθαι, οὕτε ἄρτι περὶ πείσει, οὕτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαι ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λουπῶν οὐδὲς περὶ τοῦ τέλους. ἄλλα θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἦσταί σκοποῦσιν, καὶ διὰ πλειονῶν μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνως βάστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσιν, δ' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελομένου πῶς διὰ τοῦτον ἦσταν κάκεινο διὰ τίνως, ἐνώπιον ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῶν, δ' ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἐσχάτον ἦστων (ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἐνεκε ζητεῖν καὶ 20

1 τέχνας: δόξας altera lectio ap. Asp. 2 δή Asp.: δὲ.
3 ἐν ὁς <α δὲ> ? Stewart. 4 τίνως Λ."

4 A less well attested reading gives 'more about our opinions,' and Aristotle does not usually distinguish sharply between the arts and crafts and the practical sciences (the theoretic sciences cannot here be meant, see §§ 3, 4).

b The text is probably corrupt, and perhaps should be altered to run 'and in which the right means to take are not definitely determined.'

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We deliberate about things in which our agency operates but does not always produce the same results; for instance about questions of medicine and of business; and we deliberate about navigation more than about athletic training, because it has been less completely reduced to a science; and similarly with other pursuits also. And we deliberate more about the arts than about the sciences, because we are more uncertain about them.

Deliberation then is employed in matters which, though subject to rules that generally hold good, are uncertain in their issue; or where the issue is indeterminate, and where, when the matter is important, we take others into our deliberations, distrust our own capacity to decide.

And we deliberate not about ends, but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether he is to cure his patient, nor an orator whether he is to convince his audience, nor a statesman whether he is to secure good government, nor does anyone else debate about the end of his profession or calling; they take some end for granted, and consider how and by what means it can be achieved. If they find that there are several means of achieving it, they proceed to consider which of these will attain it most easily and best. If there is only one means by which it can be accomplished, they ask how it is to be accomplished by that means, and by what means that means can itself be accomplished, until they reach the first link in the chain of causes, which is the last in the order of discovery. (For when deliberating one seems in the procedure described to be pursuing an investigation or analysis
ARISTOTLE

αναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὀσπερ διάγραμμα—
12 φαίνεται δ’ ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις—καὶ τὸ ἐσχάτον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύει πρῶτον
13 εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει). Κἀκε μὲν ἄδυνατω ἔντυχωσαν, ἄφισταιναι, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταύτα δὲ μὴ οἷον τε πορισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ δυνατόν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἀ δι’ ἡμῶν γένοιτ’ αὖ τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι’ ἡμῶν πως ἔστιν.
14 ἡ γὰρ ἀρχή ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ’ ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὅργανα, ὅτε δ’ ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι’ οὖ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς δὴ διά τινος. 1
15 τινος. ἤουκε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἀνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων, ἡ δὲ βουλή περὶ τῶν ἀυτῶ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἐνεκα· οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἶπη βουλεύτων τὸ τέλος ἄλλα τὰ πρῶς τὰ τέλη. οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τούτο ἡ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταύτα.
16 εἰ δὲ ἄει βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἀπειρον ἤξει. βουλεύτων δὲ καὶ προαιρετον τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον

1 δὴ διὰ τινος Muenschler: ὑ διὰ τινος (secl. Rassow).
2 αὔ γὰρ ἀν Κο, οὐκ ἀδ’ αὔ Susemihl.
3 ἦ <εἶ> ? ed.

* The reference is to the analytical method of solving a problem: the figure required to be drawn is assumed to have been drawn, and then we analyse it and ask what conditions it implies, until we come down to something that we know how to draw already.

* This clause seems implied by the context.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, III. iii. 11-17

that resembles the analysis of a figure in geometry—a—indeed it appears that though not all investigation is deliberation, for example, mathematical investigation is not, yet all deliberation is investigation—and the last step in the analysis seems to be the first step in the execution of the design. Then, if they have come up against an impossibility, they abandon the project—for instance, if it requires money and money cannot be procured; but if on the other hand it proves to be something possible, they begin to act. By possible, I mean able to be performed by our agency—things we do through the agency of our friends counting in a sense as done by ourselves, since the origin of their action is in us.

14 (In practising an art b) the question is at one moment what tools to use, and at another how to use them; and similarly in other spheres, we have to consider sometimes what means to employ, and sometimes how exactly any given means are to be employed.

15 It appears therefore, as has been said, that a man is the origin of his actions, and that the province of deliberation is to discover actions within one's own power to perform; and all our actions aim at ends other than themselves. It follows that we do not deliberate about ends, but about means. Nor yet do we deliberate about particular facts, for instance, Is this object a loaf? or, Is this loaf properly baked? for these are matters of direct perception. Deliberation must stop at the particular fact, or it will embark on a process ad infinitum.

17 The object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same, except that when a thing is chosen
Ηδη το προαιρετουν το γαρ εκ της βουλης προκυρεθεν προαιρετουν εστιν, παυεται γαρ έκαστος ξητων πως πραξει οταν εις αυτον αναγαγη την αρχην, και αυτον εις το ηγουμενον τοιτο γαρ το προ-
αιρουμενον. δηλον δε τοιτο και εκ των αρχαιων πολυτεων, οι "Ομηρος εμμειτον οι γαρ βασι-
19 λεις α προελωτν ανηγγελλον τω δημων οντος δη τοι προαιρετου βουλευτου αρεκτου των εφ' ιω
ημιν, και η προαρισεις αν ει συντευκτη αρεξις των εφ' ημιν εκ τοι βουλευσαναι γαρ κριναντες
20 ορεγομεβα κατα την βουλευσιν. η μεν ου προ-
αρισεις τυπω ειρηθων και περι ποια έστι και οτι
των προς τα τελη.

iv 'Η δε βουλησις οτι μεν του τελους εστιν, ει-
ρηται, δοκει δε τοις μεν ταγαθου ειναι, τοις δε του
2 φαινομενου αγαθου. συμβαινει δε τοις μεν [το]4
βουλητων ταγαθον λεγουσι μη ειναι βουλητων ο
βουλεται ο μη ορθως αιρουμενος (ει γαρ εσται
βουλητων, και αγαθων ην δ', ει ουτως ετυχε,
3 κακων), τοις δ' αυ το φαινομενον αγαθον βου-
λητων6 λεγουσι μη ειναι φυσε βουλητων, άλλη
εκαστω το δοκοινν άλλο δ' άλλω φαινεται και,
4 ει ουτως ετυχε, ταναντια. ει δε δη ταυτα μη

1 δη (vel δε δη) Σουσεμιλη: δε.
2 βουλησιν Μb (et v.l. ap. Ασρ.). 3 ταγαθοι Γ Ασρ.: αγαθοι.
4 το om. Ασρ 5 το βουλητων ΗνΝb.

a i.e., the intellect or reason, which chooses a line of
action for the individual, as the Homeric monarch chose a
policy for his kingdom.
b Cf. c. ii. 9.
c The inherent ambiguity of the Greek verbal adjective
form causes some confusion in this chapter between what
is and what ought to be wished for, the desired and the
desirable.

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it has already been determined, since it is the thing already selected as the result of our deliberation that is chosen. For a man stops enquiring how he shall act as soon as he has carried back the origin of action to himself, and to the dominant part of himself, for it is this part that chooses. This may be illustrated by the ancient constitutions represented in Homer: the kings used to proclaim to the people the measures they had chosen to adopt.

19 As then the object of choice is something within our power which after deliberation we desire, Choice will be a deliberate desire of things in our power; for we first deliberate, then select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our deliberation.

20 Let this serve as a description in outline of Choice, and of the nature of its objects, and the fact that it deals with means to ends.

iv Wishes, on the contrary, as was said above, are for ends. But while some hold that what is wished for is the good, others think it is what appears to be good. Those however who say that what is wished for is the really good, are faced by the conclusion, that what a man who chooses his end wrongly wishes for is not really wished for at all; since if it is to be wished for, it must on their showing be good, whereas in the case assumed it may so happen that the man wishes for something bad.

3 And those on the other hand who say that what appears good is wished for, are forced to admit that there is no such thing as that which is by nature wished for, but that what each man thinks to be good is wished for in his case; yet different, and it may be opposite, things appear good to different people.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν βουλητῶν εἶναι τάγαθον, ἐκάστως δὲ τὸ φανώμενον τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαῖο τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν (ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διαικαιμένους ὑγεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὢντα, τοῖς δὲ ἐπινόοις ἑτέρα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκεὰ καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὰ); ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἑκαστὰ κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστως τάληθες αὐτῶν φαίνεται· καθ’ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐξήν ἱδία ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἠδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἵσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἑκάστως ὅραν, ὡσπερ καὶ μέτρου αὐτῶν ὅν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν ἐσκε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὐδα ἁγαθὸν φαίνεται· 1118 β

6 αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἁγαθὸν, τὴν δὲ λύτην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

7 "Ὅτες δὴ βουλητῶν μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταύτα πράξεως κατὰ προαιρεσιν ὁν ἔεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι· 2 αἱ δὲ τῶν ἁρετῶν ἐνεργειαὶ περὶ ταύτα· ἐφ’ ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἁρετή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία· ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναι· ὡστ’ ἐι τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὡς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ’

1 δὴ Ηελ.: δὲ.

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a i.e., things really bitter, etc. seem so to a healthy man, but not in some cases to an invalid.

b i.e., in each department of character and conduct.

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If therefore neither of these views is satisfactory, perhaps we should say that what is wished for in the true and unqualified sense is the good, but that what appears good to each person is wished for by him; and accordingly that the good man wishes for what is truly wished for, the bad man for anything as it may happen (just as in the case of our bodies, a man of sound constitution finds really healthy food best for his health, but some other diet may be healthy for one who is delicate; and so with things bitter and sweet, hot, heavy, etc.). For the good man judges everything correctly; what things truly are, that they seem to him to be, in every department—for special things are noble and pleasant corresponding to each type of character, and perhaps what chiefly distinguishes the good man is that he sees the truth in each kind, being himself as it were the standard and measure of the noble and pleasant. It appears to be pleasure that misleads the mass of mankind; for it seems to them to be a good, though it is not, so they choose what is pleasant as good and shun pain as evil.

If then whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation and choice, it follows that actions dealing with these means are done by choice, and voluntary. But the activities in which the virtues are exercised deal with means. Therefore virtue also depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for doing a thing when to do it is right, we are also responsible
ARISTOTLE

ὢμῶν ἐσται αἰσχρὸν ὅν, καὶ εἶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν 10
calóν ὅν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὅν
3 ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ
tὰ αἰσχρά, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τούτο
dὲ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς εἶναι, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀρα
4 τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς
οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ’ ἄκων μάκαρ

έοικε τὸ μὲν ὑπευθεῖ τὸ δὲ ἀληθεὶ: μακάριος μὲν
5 γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἢ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. ἢ τοῖς
gε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἀνθρω-
πον οὐ φατέον ἀρχῇ εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννηθῇ τῶν
6 πρᾶξεων ὅσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταύτα φαίνεται,
καὶ ἢ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ 20
τὰς εἰν’ ἡμῖν, ὅν καὶ αὐτὶ ἢμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ
7 ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτων δ’ ἐοικε μαρτυ-
ρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδία ὡφ’ ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν
νομοθετῶν κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς
δρῶντος μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δὲ ἀγνοοῦν ἢς
μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας 25
tιμῶσι, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες, τοὺς δὲ κω-
lύσοντες καὶ τοὺς ὅσα μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μὴ
ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν
промыш οὗ τὸ πεισθήναι μὴ θερμαίνουν ἢ
ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἀλλ’ ὀτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων:
8 οὐθὲν γὰρ ἦττον πεισόμεθα αὐτὰ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’

1 μάκαρ Victorius: μακάριος.
2 ἐφ’ Lv.

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* c. ii. 11.
* Possibly a verse of Solon. Doubtless πονηρός, translated 'vile' to suit the context here, in the original meant 'wretched.'
* c. iii. 15.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, III. v. 2-7

for not doing it when not to do it is wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, we are also responsible for wrongly doing it. But if it is in our power to do and to refrain from doing right and wrong, and if, as we saw, being good or bad is doing right or wrong, it consequently depends on us whether we are virtuous or vicious. To say that

None would be vile, and none would not be blest

seems to be half false, though half true: it is true that no one is unwilling to be blessed, but not true that wickedness is involuntary; or else we must contradict what we just now asserted, and say that man is not the originator and begetter of his actions as he is of his children. But if it is manifest that a man is the author of his own actions, and if we are unable to trace our conduct back to any other origins than those within ourselves, then actions of which the origins are within us, themselves depend upon us, and are voluntary.

This conclusion seems to be attested both by men's behaviour in private life and by the practice of lawgivers; for they punish and exact redress from those who do evil (except when it is done under compulsion, or through ignorance for which the agent himself is not responsible), and honour those who do noble deeds, in order to encourage the one sort and to repress the other; but nobody tries to encourage us to do things that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntary, since it is no good our being persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or the like, because we shall feel them all the same.

This is assumed by the system of punishment for offences:
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αὐτῷ τῷ ἁγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτίος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἁγνοίας. οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλὰ τὰ ἐπιτύμμα, ἢ γὰρ ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῷ, κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τούτῳ δὲ αὐτίου τῆς ἁγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἁγνοοῦντός τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἄ δεὶ ἐπισταθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπὰ ἐστὶ, κολάζουσιν. 1114α

9 ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δὲ ἀμέλειαν ἁγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ἐς ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς ὅν τὸ μὴ ἁγνοεῖν.

10 τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἵσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὡστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιοῦτος
gενέσθαι αὐτοῖς αὐτίου, ζῶντες ἀνεμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες,
oἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις διάγοντες. αἱ
gὰρ περὶ ἐκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιοῦτοι ποιοῦσιν.

11 τούτῳ δὲ δήλον ἐκ τῶν μελετῶν πρὸς ἡμτινοῦ ἁγνοίαν ἢ πράξιν. διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνέργοοντες.

12 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἁγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ 10 ἐκαστα αἰ ἐξεῖς γίνονται, κομδῇ ἀναισθητοῦ
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἁγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἐσται ἀδικος,

13 ἐκὼν ἀδικος ἢν ἐν. 3 ἢν δὲ ἀλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα
μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταῖνοντα

14 ἀκολαστον. οὐ μὴν ἐὰν γε βούληται, ἀδικος

1 τοιοῦτοι Rassow.
2 ἀδικοι ἢ ἀκολαστοι Rassow.
3 εἰ δὲ . . . εἰ ἐπὶ intra post ἀκολαστον codd.: tr. Rassow.

a An enactment of Pittacus, tyrant of Mitylene, Pol. ii. fin., 1274 b 19.
b The words, 'but if a man . . . unjust ' in the mss. come
after § 13, 'unjust or dissolute.'

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8 Indeed the fact that an offence was committed in ignorance is itself made a ground for punishment, in cases where the offender is held to be responsible for his ignorance; for instance, the penalty is doubled if the offender was drunk, because the origin of the offence was in the man himself, as he might have avoided getting drunk, which was the cause of his not knowing what he was doing. Also men are punished for offences committed through ignorance of some provision of the law which they ought to have known, and might have known without difficulty; and so in other cases where ignorance is held to be due to negligence, on the ground that the offender need not have been ignorant, as he could have taken the trouble to ascertain the facts.

9 It may be objected that perhaps he is not the sort of man to take the trouble. Well, but men are themselves responsible for having become careless through living carelessly, as they are for being unjust or prodigal if they do wrong or pass their time in drinking and dissipation. They acquire a particular quality by constantly acting in a particular way. This is shown by the way in which men train themselves for some contest or pursuit: they practise continually. Therefore only an utterly senseless person can fail to know that our characters are the result of our conduct; but if a man knowingly acts in a way that will result in his becoming unjust, he must be said to be voluntarily unjust.

10 Again, though it is unreasonable to say that a man who acts unjustly or dissolutely does not wish to be unjust or dissolute, nevertheless this by no means implies that he can stop being unjust and
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΣ

ἀν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγίης, καὶ<τοι>, ἐὰν οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν 15 νοσεῖ. ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἱατρῶις. τότε μὲν οὖν ἔξην αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ἀφέπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτῶν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὄμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ λαβεῖν2 καὶ ἰψαί· ἥ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν3 αὐτῷ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἔξ ἀρχής μὲν ἔξην 20 τοιούτως μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰς· γενομένους

15 δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκοῦσι οἴσων, ἀλλ' εἰνοῖς καὶ αἱ τῶν σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἔπισταμόμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχρῶς οὐδεὶς ἔπισταμα, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγωνισμῶν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὄμοιως δὲ καὶ περὶ 25 αἰσθήματι καὶ πῆρωσι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅν ὀνειδίσεις τυφλῶ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλ' μᾶλλον ἔλεησαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οὐσιοφυλήσας ἢ ἄλλης

16 ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἄν ἔπισταμάσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔπισταμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μῆ ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ· εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ

17 ἔπισταμόμεναι τῶν κακῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἄν εἶν. εἰ 30 δὲ τίς λέγω ὅτι "πάντες ἐφίπτονται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖος τοῦ' ἐκαστὸς ἐστὶ, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαύνεται.1114 ἃ

1 καλ<τοί> Rassow: <εί> καὶ Ramsauer.
2 λαβεῖν O1.2. AR.: βαλεῖν (βαλεῖν [καὶ ἰψαί] Bywater).
3 ἐν Rassow: ἐπ'.
become just merely by wishing to do so; any more than a sick man can get well by wishing, although it may be the case that his illness is voluntary, in the sense of being due to intemperate living and neglect of the doctors’ advice. At the outset then, it is true, he might have avoided the illness, but once he has let himself go he can do so no longer. When you have thrown a stone, you cannot afterwards bring it back again, but nevertheless you are responsible for having taken up the stone and flung it, for the origin of the act was within you. Similarly the unjust and profligate might at the outset have avoided becoming so, and therefore they are so voluntarily, although when they have become unjust and profligate it is no longer open to them not to be so.

15 And not only are vices of the soul voluntary, but in some cases bodily defects are so as well, and we blame them accordingly. Though no one blames a man for being born ugly, we censure uncomeliness that is due to neglecting exercise and the care of the person. And so with infirmities and mutilations: though nobody would reproach, but rather pity, a person blind from birth, or owing to disease or accident, yet all would blame one who had lost his sight from tippling or debauchery. We see that bodily defects for which we are ourselves responsible are blamed, while those for which we are not responsible are not. This being so, it follows that we are responsible for blameworthy moral defects also.

17 But suppose somebody says: “All men seek what seems to them good, but they are not responsible for its seeming good: each man’s conception of his end is determined by his character,
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αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν σὺν ἐκαστὸς ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἔξεσις ἐστὶν πως αὐτῶς αὐτῶς, εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδές αὐτῶς τοῦ κακᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἄγνοιαι τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἴομενοι αὐτῷ τὸ ἀριστον ἔσοσθαι, ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἐφεσίς οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύσιν δεῖ ὁσπερ ὅψιν ἔχοντα, ἢ κρίνει καλῶς καὶ τοῦ κατ' ἄλθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστων εὐ-
φυῆς, δ' τοῦτο καλῶς πεφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ δ' παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἰόν τε λάβειν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἴον ἐφίν, τοιοῦτον ἔξει, [καὶ] τὸ εὖ καὶ [τὸ] καλὸς τοῦτο πεφύκειναι 18 ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθὴν ἂν εἴη εὐφυία'· —εἰ δὴ ταὐτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μάλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἐστὶν ἐκούσιον; ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἡ ὑπωστήπτε θείνεται 15 καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὑπωστήπτε. εἰτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκαστω ἐφέσεται ὑπωστήπτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστὶν, εἰτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικὸν, τῶ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσιν ἐκούσιον ὑπὸ οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιον ἐστὶν, οὐθὲν ἔττον καὶ ἡ κακία 20 ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτῶν4 εἰν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ

1 μῆ, οὐδές: μηδές Lb, Γ.
2 [καὶ] τὸ Vermehren: τὸ δ' Lb.
4 αὐτὸν om. Bywater.

a This is Aristotle's view, which the imaginary objector challenges. It is not quite certain that his objection is meant to go as far as the point indicated by the inverted commas.

b i.e., the end he aims at.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, III. v. 17-19

whatever that may be. Although therefore, on the hypothesis that each man is in a sense responsible for his moral disposition, he will in a sense be responsible for his conception of the good, if on the contrary this hypothesis be untrue, no man is responsible for his own wrongdoing. He does wrong through ignorance of the right end, thinking that wrongdoing will procure him his greatest Good; and his aim at his end is not of his own choosing. A man needs to be born with moral vision, so to speak, whereby to discern correctly and choose what is truly good. A man of good natural disposition is a man well endowed by nature in this respect; for if a thing is the greatest and noblest of gifts, and is something which cannot be acquired or learnt from another, but which a man will possess in such form as it has been bestowed on him at birth, a good and noble natural endowment in this respect will constitute a good disposition in the full and true meaning of the term."

18 Now if this theory be true, how will virtue be voluntary any more than vice? Both for the good man and the bad man alike, their view of their end is determined in the same manner, by nature or however it may be; and all their actions of whatever sort are guided by reference to their end as thus determined. Whether then a man's view of his end, whatever it may be, is not given by nature but is partly due to himself, or whether, although his end is determined by nature, yet virtue is voluntary because the good man's actions to gain his end are voluntary, in either case vice will be just as much voluntary as virtue; for the bad man equally with the good possesses spontaneity in his
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20 τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὄσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συναιτιοῖ πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῶν ποιῶν τινὲς εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοῦ ὑπὸ τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶναι ὁμοίως 25 γὰρ.

21 Καὶνὴ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰρηται ἡμῖν τὸ τε γένος τύπω, [ὀτι μεσότης καὶ ἔξις], ὧν ἄν τε γίνονται, ὃτι τούτων καὶ πρακτικοὶ κατ’ αὐτάς, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἄν ὁ ὅρθος λόγος προστάξῃ, καὶ ὃτι ἔφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. οὐχ ὁμοίως 30 δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ ἔξεις: τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ’ ἐκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, 1115 α ὃς ὁπερ επὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν, ἀλλ’ ὃτι ἔφ’ ἡμῖν ἢν οὕτως ἡ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.

22 Ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης εὐπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ περὶ ποία καὶ πῶς’ ἀμα δ’ ἔσται δήλον καὶ 5 νὶ πόσαι εἰσίν. καὶ πρὸ τοῦ περὶ ἀνδρείας. ὃτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἦδη

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1 ὃτι μεσότης καὶ ἔξις Κb, seclusit ed.: ὃτι μεσότητας καὶ ἔξεις Λb: ὃτι μεσότητας εἰσιν καὶ ὃτι ἔξις vulg.
2 πρακτικαὶ Κb, πρακτικαὶ καὶ Οv.
3 καθ’ αὐτὰς ed.: καθ’ αὐτάς (κατὰ ταῦτα Μb).
4 καὶ οὕτως . . . προστάξῃ hic Richards: infra post ἐκούσιοι.

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a This clause looks like an Interpolation: ἔξις is the genus of virtue, ii. v. fin., vi. init., μεσότης its differentia, ii. vi. 15, 17.
b See ii. ii. 8.
c See ii. ii. 2. This clause in the mss. follows the next one.
d See c. v. 2 and 20.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, III. v. 20—vi. 1

20 actions, even if not in his choice of an end. If then, as Conclusion is said, our virtues are voluntary (and in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly the cause of our moral dispositions, and it is our having a certain character that makes us set up an end of a certain kind), it follows that our vices are voluntary also; they are voluntary in the same manner as our virtues.

21 We have then now discussed in outline the virtues in general, having indicated their genus [namely, that it is a mean, and a disposition \( ^a \)], and having shown that they render us apt to do the same actions as those by which they are produced, \( ^b \) and to do them in the way in which right reason may enjoin \( ^c \); and that they depend on ourselves and are voluntary. \( ^d \)

22 "But our dispositions are not voluntary in the same way as are our actions. Our actions we can control from beginning to end, and we are conscious of them at each stage.\(^f \) With our dispositions on the other hand, though we can control their beginnings, each separate addition to them is imperceptible, as is the case with the growth of a disease; though they are voluntary in that we were free to employ our capacities in the one way or the other.

23 But to resume, let us now discuss the virtues severally, defining the nature of each, the class of objects to which it is related, and the way in which it is related to them. In so doing we shall also make it clear how many virtues there are.

vi Let us first take Courage. We have already seen \( ^g \) that Courage is the observance of the mean in

\( ^a \) This section some editors place before § 21, but it is rather a footnote to § 14; and the opening words of § 23 imply that a digression has been made.

\( ^f \) \( τά καθ’ ἐκαστα \) seems to bear a somewhat different sense here from c. i. 15, \( ἤ καθ’ ἐκαστα \) (ὑγνοια).

\( ^g \) π. viii. 2.
2 φανερῶν γεγένηται1: φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι τὰ
φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὑπὸ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν <τὰ>2
κακά: διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκιάν
3 κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷν10
ἀδοξίαν πενίαιν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ
peri πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι· ἔναι γὰρ καὶ δεὶ
φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλῶν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρῶν, οἷον
ἀδοξίαν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ
αιδήμων, ὃ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος· λέγεται15
δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀνδρείων κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γὰρ
τι ἄμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γὰρ τὸς τί καὶ ὁ
4 ἀνδρείος. πενίαιν δ' ἵσως οὖ δεὶ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ
νόσον, οὐδ' ὀλως ὁσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι'
αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ peri ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρείος
(λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὀμοιότητα)· ένιοι γὰρ20
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευ-
θεροὶ εἰς καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς
5 ἐχουσίν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἰ τις ὑβριν peri ταῦτα καὶ
gυμνία φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ φθόνον ἡ τοῦ τῶν τοιοῦτων,
δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ παρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγούσθαι,
6 ἀνδρείος. peri ποία οὖν3 τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρείος;25
ἡ peri τὰ μέγιστα; οὖθεις γὰρ ὑπομενενεκτικῶτερος
tῶν δεινῶν. φοβερῶτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας
γὰρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτι τῷ τεθνεώτι δοκεῖ οὗτ' ἁγαθὸν
7 οὕτε κακῶν εἶναι. δόξεσθε δ' ὃν οὐδὲ peri θάνατον

1 φανερῶν γεγένηται Kβ: καὶ πρῶτον εἴρηται LβΓ.
2 Richards.
3 δ' οὖν Kβ, γαὖν ? Bywater.
2 respect of fear and confidence. Now it is clear that the things we fear are fearful things, which means, broadly speaking, evil things; so that fear is sometimes defined as the anticipation of evil. It is true then that we fear all evil things, for example, disgrace, poverty, disease, lack of friends, death; but it is not thought that Courage is related to all these things, for there are some evils which it is right and noble to fear and base not to fear, for instance, disgrace. One who fears disgrace is an honourable man, with a due sense of shame; one who does not fear it is shameless: though some people apply the term courageous to such a man by analogy, because he bears some resemblance to the courageous man in that the courageous man also is a fearless person.

4 Again, it is no doubt right not to fear poverty, or disease, or in general any evil not caused by vice and not due to ourselves. But one who is fearless in regard to these things is not courageous either (although the term is applied to him, too, by analogy); since some men who are cowards in war are liberal with money, and face loss of fortune boldly.

5 Nor yet is a man cowardly if he fears insult to his wife and children, or envy, or the like; nor courageous if he shows a bold face when about to undergo a flogging.

6 What then are the fearful things in respect of which Courage is displayed? I suppose those which are the greatest, since there is no one more brave in enduring danger than the courageous man. Now the most terrible thing of all is death; for it is the end, and when a man is dead, nothing, we think, either good or evil can befall him any more. But
τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἄνδρείος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ
8 ἐν νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; 30
τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ
9 καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ
αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις.
10 κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἄνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν
θάνατον ἄδεης, καὶ οὐσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυνα
11 ὅντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ 35
μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἄδεης ὁ
ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀπεγεννάκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν
τοιοῦτον δυσχεράνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐελπίδες εἰσὶ παρὰ
12 τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἄμα δὲ καὶ ἄνδρείζονται ἐν ὅσις ἐστὶν
ἀλκή ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ ὁ
φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.

vii Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ, λέγομεν
dὲ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ
φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἐχοντί, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον
dιαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μάλλον καὶ ἥττον (δομίως 10
2 δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα).1 ὁ δὲ ἄνδρείος ἀνέκπληκτος
ὡς ἀνθρωπος· φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,


* Or perhaps 'imminent,' but cf. c. viii. 15.
* i.e., he resents it as inglorious.
* In using τὰ θαρραλέα as the opposite of τὰ φοβερὰ Aristotle
  follows Plato, Rep. 450 ε, Protag. 359 c, Lach. 195 τ, etc.: but
  he is original in distinguishing confidence as regards
  the former from fearlessness as regards the latter, and so
  considering excessive fearlessness in grave dangers as a
  different vice from excessive confidence in dangers not really
  formidable.

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even death, we should hold, does not in all circum-
stances give an opportunity for Courage: for instance,
we do not call a man courageous for facing death
by drowning or disease. What form of death then
is a test of Courage? Presumably that which is the
noblest. Now the noblest form of death is death
in battle, for it is encountered in the midst of
the greatest and most noble of dangers. And this
conclusion is borne out by the principle on which
public honours are bestowed in republics and under
monarchies.

The courageous man, therefore, in the proper sense
of the term, will be he who fearlessly confronts a
noble death, or some sudden\(^a\) peril that threatens
death; and the perils of war answer this description
most fully. Not that the courageous man is not
also fearless in a storm at sea (as also in illness),
though not in the same way as sailors are fearless,
for he thinks there is no hope of safety, and to die
by drowning is revolting to him,\(^b\) whereas sailors
keep up heart because of their experience. Also
Courage is shown in dangers where a man can
defend himself by valour or die nobly, but neither
is possible in disasters like shipwreck.

Now although the same things are not fearful
to everybody, there are some terrors which we pro-
nounce beyond human endurance, and these of course
are fearful to everyone in his senses. And the terrors
that man can endure differ in magnitude and degree;
as also do the situations inspiring confidence.\(^c\) But
the courageous man is proof against fear so far as
man may be. Hence although he will sometimes fear
even terrors not beyond man's endurance, he will
do so in the right way, and he will endure them as
ARISTOTLE

ὁς δεὶ δὲ, ¹ καὶ ὦς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ,² τοῦ καλοῦ ένεκα: τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον ταῦτα φοβείσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαύτα φοβείσθαι. γίνεσαι δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι ὧδε, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ὧ δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἐνεκά ὑπομένειν καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος (κατ’ άξιαν γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἄν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει δὲ ἀνδρείος· τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξω, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ δή· ² ἡ <δ'> ἡ ἀνδρεία καλῶν· τοιούτου δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος, ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τῷ τέλει καλοῦ δὴ ἐνεκά ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ ⁷ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν). τῶν δ’ ὑπερβαλλόντων δ’ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβία ἀνώνυμος (κατ’ ἐρημίαν ²⁵ δ’ ἦμων ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὧτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμοι), εἰ δ’ ἄν τις μανώμενος ἡ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μὴ δὲν ἄνθον, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε ⁶ κύματα, καθάπερ φαοὶ τοὺς Κελτοῦς· δὲ τῷ θαρρέων ὑπερβαλλον

¹ post ὦς δεὶ δὲ interpunxit Burnet.
² ὑπομενεῖ ἑπ’ Σουσμιλ. 
³ δ’ add. I.: εἰ Coraes.
⁴ δὴ Rassow: δὲ.
⁵ δὲ Rassow.
⁶ μήτε ἱπτε ὡδε vulg.

２ i.e., the rightness and fineness of the act itself, cf. § 13, ε. viii. ⁵, ¹⁴, ε. ix. ⁴; and see note on τ. iii. ². This amplification of the conception of virtue as aiming at the mean here appears for the first time: we now have the final as well as the formal cause of virtuous action.

⁵ ii. vii. ².

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principle dictates, for the sake of what is noble a; for
3 that is the end at which virtue aims. On the other
hand it is possible to fear such terrors too much,
and too little; and also to fear things that are not
4 fearful as if they were fearful. Error arises either
from fearing what one ought not to fear, or from
fearing in the wrong manner, or at the wrong time,
or the like; and similarly with regard to occasions
for confidence.
5 The courageous man then is he that endures or
fears the right things and for the right purpose and
in the right manner and at the right time, and who
shows confidence in a similar way. (For the courage-
ous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit,
and as principle may dictate. And every activity
aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition of
which it is the manifestation. So it is therefore with
the activity of the courageous man: his courage
is noble; therefore its end is nobility, for a thing
is defined by its end; therefore the courageous
man endures the terrors and dares the deeds that
manifest courage, for the sake of that which is noble.)
6 Of the characters that run to excess, on the other
hand, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name
(this, as we remarked before, b is the case with many
qualities), but we should call a man mad, or else
insensitive to pain, if he feared nothing, 'earth-
quake nor billows,' c as they say of the Kelts; he
who exceeds in confidence [in the face of fearful

a Apparently a verse quotation. Cf. Eudemian Ethics,
1229 b 28, 'As the Kelts take up arms and march against the
waves '; and Strabo, vii. p. 293, gives similar stories, partly
on the authority of the fourth-century historian Ephorus.
An echo survives in Shakespeare's metaphor 'to take arms
against a sea of troubles.'
ARISTOTLE

8 [peri tò fobèrā] θραυσ. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζών εἶναι ὁ θραυσ. καὶ προσποιητικός ἀνδρείας. ώς 30 γοὺν ἐκεῖνος peri tò fobèrā ἔχει, οὔτως οὔτοις. βουλεταν φαῖνεσθαι. εν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μοιμεῖται.
9 διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θραυσύδειλοι. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θραυσύμενοι τὰ fobèrα οὖν ὑπο-10 μένουσι. ὅ δὲ τῶν fobètων ὑπερβάλλων δειλός.
καὶ γὰρ ὃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεί, καὶ πάντα τὰ 85 τοιαῦτα ἄρθολυθεῖ αὐτῶ. ἐλλειπέτε δὲ καὶ τῶν 1118. θαρρεῖν. ἀλλ' εν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον
11 καταφανῆς ἐστιν. δύσελτος ἢ τις δ’ δειλός, πάντα γὰρ fobètαι. ό δ’ ἀνδρείας ἐναντίως, τὸ γὰρ
12 θαρρεῖν εὐθείτως. peri ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν 5 τε δειλός καὶ ὁ θραυσ. καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείας, διαφόρως δ’ ἐγουσι πρὸς αὐτά. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλειποῦσι, δ’ ὅ μέσως ἔχει, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτῶις δ’ ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ’ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖσι, πρότερον δ’ ἡσύχιοι.
13 Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἢ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστιν 10 peri θαρραλέα καὶ fobèrα ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν θαρρεῖ τε καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. τὸ δ’ ἀποθνήσκων φεύγουσα πενίαν ἢ ἐρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ-
15 μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὕς ὅτι

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1 ed.
2 γοὐν Bywater: οὖν.
3 οὔτως οὔτοι: οὔτως Κ
4 θαρρεῖ τε ed.: αἰρεῖται.

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a These words seem to be an interpolation: confidence is shown in face of θαρραλέα, not fobèrα.
b i.e., en τῶν θαρραλέων, in situations not really formidable.
c For symmetry this should have been 'he that is deficient in fearlessness.'
d See c. vi. 10.
* The mss. have 'it chooses and endures.'
8 things \( \text{a} \) is rash. The rash man is generally thought to be an impostor, who pretends to courage which he does not possess; at least, he wishes to appear to feel towards fearful things as the courageous man actually does feel, and therefore he imitates him in the things in which he can.\( \text{b} \) Hence most rash men really are cowards at heart, for they make a bold show in situations that inspire confidence, but do not endure terrors.

10 He that exceeds in fear \( \text{c} \) is a coward, for he fears the wrong things, and in the wrong manner, and so on with the rest of the list. He is also deficient in confidence; but his excessive fear in face of pain is more apparent. The coward is therefore a despondent person, being afraid of everything; but the courageous man is just the opposite, for confidence belongs to a sanguine temperament.

12 The coward, the rash man, and the courageous man are therefore concerned with the same objects, but are differently disposed towards them: the two former exceed and fall short, the last keeps the mean and the right disposition. The rash, moreover, are impetuous, and though eager before the danger comes they hang back at the critical moment; whereas the courageous are keen at the time of action but calm beforehand.

13 As has been said then, Courage is the observance of the mean in relation to things that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances stated \( \text{d} \); and it is confident and endures \( \text{e} \) because it is noble to do so or base not to do so. But to seek death in order to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or from pain or sorrow, is not the act of a courageous man, but rather of a coward; for it is weakness to fly...
ARISTOTLE

vii kalon upomenei, alla feungon kakon. esti mev oin h andreia toiovtov twn legeontai de kai etera kata pen te tropon, prwtov mev h politike. malista gar eousei. dokousi gar upomenei tous kivdunous oi politai dia ta ek toin vymwv epitima kai ta oneidh kai dia tas timas. kai dia touto andreiostatou dokousin elnav par ois ois deiloi 2 atimoi kai oi andreoiv estimoi. toiovtov de kai "Ommros poiwei, oinon ton Diomhden kai ton 'Ektoara.

Pouludamas moi prwtos elegxei anathseie kai Diomhden

"Ektopr gar poti fhesei evi Trwessan' agoreun, 25 "'Tudeidh vpt' emei to ..."

3 dimiowtai di' auta malista th proterov eirimeven, oti di' argethn ginetai (di' aidw gar) kai dia kalod orexi (timhs gar) kai phygen oneidous, aiaches 4 ontos. tazai di' an tis kai tois upo toin arxonton anagkaeomenv eis tau to cheiros, osw ou di' aidw alla dia fobon autou drwsi, kai feungontes ou to aiaches alla to lypetron: anagkaeouvs gar oie kuroi, wster di' 'Ektopr.

1 Diomhden secl. Bywater.

"Political courage": Plato uses this phrase (Rep. 430 c) of patriotic courage, based on training and 'right opinion about what is terrible and what is not,' and in contrast with the undisciplined courage of slaves and brute beasts. Elsewhere, on the other hand, he contrasts 'popular and citizen virtue' in general with the philosopher's virtue, which is based on knowledge.

2 IIiad, xxii. 100 (Hector)—

Alas, should I retire within the gates,
Polydamas, ...
from troubles, and the suicide does not endure death because it is noble to do so, but to escape evil.

Such is the nature of Courage; but the name is also applied to five divergent types of character.

(1) First, as most closely resembling true Courage, comes the citizen’s courage. Citizen troops appear to endure dangers because of the legal penalties and the reproach attaching to cowardice, and the honours awarded to bravery; hence those races appear to be the bravest among which cowards are degraded and brave men held in honour. It is this citizen courage which inspires the heroes portrayed by Homer, like Diomedes and Hector:

Polydamas will be the first to flout me; and Diomedes says

Hector will make his boast at Troy hereafter:

“By me was Tydeus’ son . . .”

This type of courage most closely resembles the one described before, because it is prompted by a virtue, namely the sense of shame, and by the desire for something noble, namely honour, and the wish to avoid the disgrace of being reproached.

The courage of troops forced into battle by their officers may be classed as of the same type, though they are inferior inasmuch as their motive is not a sense of shame but fear, and the desire to avoid not disgrace but pain. Their masters compel them to be brave, after Hector’s fashion:

* Iliad, viii. 148—

By me was Tydeus’s son routed in flight
Back to the ships.

For this emotion see ii. vii. 14, iv. ix. 1, where it is said not to be, strictly speaking, a virtue.
οὐ δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσοντα νοήσω, ὦν οἱ ἄρκιοι ἐσσεῖται φυγέων κώνας.

5 καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν 1110 τοιούτων παρατάττοντες; πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζον- σιν. δεῦ δ' οὖ δι' ἀνάγκην ἄνδρείου εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι

6 καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἑκαστα ἄνδρεία [τις] εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἡ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἄνδρείαν. τοιούτου δὲ ἄλλους μὲν ἐν ἄλλους, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιώται: δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενά τοῦ πολέμου, ἡ μάλιστα συμεωράκασιν οὕτως φαίνονται δὴ ἄνδρείοι ὅτι

7 οὐκ ἱσασώ οἱ ἄλλοι οἷὰ ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιήσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, ὑποάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοὺς ὀπλῶς καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὑποίην καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιήσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ

8 μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα. ἄσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοι ὀπλι- σμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγώσιν οὗ τῆς ἄνδρειστατοῦ μαχε- μάχατον εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύσοντες καὶ τὰ 15

9 σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρατιώται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ δ' κύνδυνος καὶ λείπωσιν τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθισκεῖν,

1 προστάττοντες codd. Amioti, Vict.: προστάττοντες.
2 τις om. Kb.
3 καὶ εἰς Kb.

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a Iliad, ii. 391, but the words are Agamemnon's, and are slightly different in our Homer.

b i.e., knowledge of what is truly formidable and what is not (cf. note on c. viii. 1); but Socrates went on to show that this depended on knowledge of the good, with which he identified all virtue: see Plato's Laches.

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Let me see any skulking off the field—
He shall not save his carcasse from the dogs! "

5 The same is done by commanders who draw up their troops in front of them and beat them if they give ground, or who form them in line with a trench or some other obstacle in the rear; all these are using compulsion. A man ought not to be brave because he is compelled to be, but because courage is noble.

6 (2) Again, experience of some particular form of danger is taken for a sort of Courage; hence arose Socrates’ notion that Courage is Knowledge." This type of bravery is displayed by various people in various circumstances, and particularly in war by professional soldiers." For war (as the saying is) is full of false alarms, a fact which these men have had most opportunity of observing; thus they appear courageous owing to others’ ignorance of the true situation.

7 Also experience renders them the most efficient in inflicting loss on the enemy without sustaining it themselves, as they are skilled in the use of arms, and equipped with the best ones both for attack and defence. So that they are like armed men fighting against unarmed, or trained athletes against amateurs; for even in athletic contests it is not the bravest men who are the best fighters, but those who are strongest and in the best training. But professional soldiers prove cowards when the danger imposes too great a strain, and when they are at a disadvantage in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to run away, while citizen troops stand their ground and die fighting, as happened in the

" i.e., ἔτνος, foreign mercenary troops, much employed in Greek warfare in Aristotle’s time.
ARISTOTLE

οπερ κατι τω Ερμαιω συνεβη. τοις μεν γαρ 
αισχρον το φευγεν και δι θανατος της 
toiατης σωτηριας αιρετωτερος· οι δε και εξ αρχης εκυ 
δυνευν ως κρειττους οντες, γνωντες δε φευγουνυ, 
tou θανατον μαλλον tou αισχρον φοβουμενου· δι δ' 
10 ανδρειος ου τουτου—και τον θυμον δ' επι την 
ανδρειαν αναφερουσιν. ανδρειοι γαρ ειναι δοκοσι 
kai oι δια θυμον αιστερ τα θηρια επι τους τρω— 
σαντας φερομενα, 2 οτι και oι ανδρειοι θυμοειδεις 
(υπηρκωτων γαρ ο θυμος προς τους κυβισους) 
οθεν και "Ομηρος "σθενος εμβαλε θυμου" και 
μενος και θυμον έγειρε" και "δριμυ δ' ανα φινα 
μενος" και "εξεσεν αλητη"· παντα γαρ τα τουτα 
εουκα σημαινει την του θυμου έγερσαι και ορμην. 30 
11 οι μεν ουν ανδρειοι δια το καλον πραττουσιν, δε 
θυμος συνεργει αυτοις· τα θηρια δε δια λυπην· δια 
γαρ το πληγηναι, η διa το 3 φοβεισθαι, επει εαν γε 
εν ουκ [η] εν έλει 4 η, ου προσερχονται. ου δη 
επι πο δια το υπ' αλγητον και θυμον 
αξιανυμενα προς τον κυβισουν ορμαν, οθεν των 
35 δεινων προορωντα, επει ουτω γε καν οι ουν 
ανδρειοι ειεν πεωτυντες· τυπτομενου γαρ ουκ αφ' 1117 a

1 αναφερουσιν Λb; φερουσιν Kb, επιφερουσιν Π.
2 φερομενα Γ. 3 δια το om. Λb.
5 η fort. secludendum ed.

a In Coronea, 353 b.c.; the Acropolis had been seized by Onomarchus the Phocian, and mercenaries, brought in by the Boeotarchs to aid the citizens, ran away at the beginning of the battle (schol.).

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battle at the temple of Hermes. This is because citizens think it disgraceful to run away, and prefer death to safety so procured; whereas professional soldiers were relying from the outset on superior strength, and when they discover they are outnumbered they take to flight, fearing death more than disgrace. But this is not true courage.

10 (3) Spirit or anger is also classed with Courage. Spirit. Men emboldened by anger, like wild beasts which rush upon the hunter that has wounded them, are supposed to be courageous, because the courageous also are high-spirited; for spirit is very impetuous in encountering danger. Hence Homer writes, 'he put strength in their spirit,' and 'roused their might and their spirit,' and 'bitter wrath up through his nostrils welled,' and 'his blood boiled'; for all such symptoms seem to indicate an excitement and impulse of the spirit. Thus the real motive of courageous men is the nobility of courage, although spirit operates in them as well; but wild animals are emboldened by pain, for they turn to bay because they are wounded, or frightened—since if they are in a forest or a swamp they do not attack. Therefore they are not to be considered courageous for rushing upon danger when spurred by pain and anger, and blind to the dangers that await them; since on that reckoning even asses would be brave when they are hungry, for no blows will make them

\[ b \text{ θυμός means both 'spirit' or 'high spirit' and also its manifestation in anger.} \]
\[ c \text{ i.e., in describing courageous men, } \textit{Iliad}, \text{ xiv. 151 or xvi. 529, v. 470, Odyssey, xxiv. 315. The fourth phrase is not in our Homer, but occurs in Thucydides xx. 15.} \]
\[ d \text{ i.e., in a place where they can escape. The words 'or a swamp,' are probably interpolated.} \]
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΗ

ιστανται τῆς νομῆς. (καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν
12 ἐπιθυμίαν τολμῆσα πολλὰ δρᾶσιν.) [οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ δὲ ἀλγηδόνος ἡ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κνώδυνον.] ¹ ψυχικωτάτη σὲ ἐκεῖν ἡ
dιὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαμβάνει προαίρεσιν ἵκ
καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι
de ὀργίζομενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωροῦμενοι δὲ ἔδον-
tαι· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχησιν μὲν, οὐκ
ἀνδρείοι δὲ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος.
13 ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· ² παραπλήσιον δὲ ἔχουσι τι.—οὖδὲ
dὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρείοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολ- 10
λάκις καὶ πολλοὶς νεικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν εἰς τοὺς
κνώδυνους. παρόμοιοι δὲ, ὅτι αἵμαθα δαιμολέοι·
ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα δαι-
μολέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ
14 μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν ² (τοιοῦτος δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ
μεθυσκόμενοι, εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται). ὅταν δὲ 15
αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῆναι τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσι· ἀνδρείοι δὲ
ἡν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπων ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπο-
15 μένεω, ὅτι καλὸν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. διὸ καὶ
ἀνδρειστέροι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰσχυνδίοις
φόβοις ἀφοβοῦν καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἡ ἐν τοῖς προ-
δήλοις· ἀπὸ ἐξεσθε γὰρ μάλλον, [ἡ καὶ] ³ ὅτι ἦττον 20
ἐὰν παρασκευήν· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ

² ψυχικωτάτη δὲ . . . εἶναι post τι l. 9 ponenda Rassow,
Susemihl (ψυχικωτάτη γὰρ).
³ πάθος Kb., τὸ πάθος vulg:
⁴ ἂν παθεῖν Asp.: ἀντιπαθεῖν.
⁵ Susemihl: καὶ om. Kb.

⁶ See Iliad, xi. 558.
⁷ This parenthetical note does not bear on the context.
⁸ This sentence should apparently come at the end of the
section, ' but ' being amended to ' for.'

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, III. viii. 11-15

stop grazing! (And adulterers also are led to do many daring things by lust.)

But the form of courage that is inspired by spirit seems to be the most natural, and when reinforced by deliberate choice and purpose it appears to be true Courage. And human beings also feel pain when angry, and take pleasure in revenge. But those who fight for these motives, though valiant fighters, are not courageous; for the motive of their confidence is not honour, nor is it guided by principle, but it springs from feeling. However, they show some affinity to true Courage.

Nor yet again is the boldness of the sanguine the same thing as Courage. The sanguine are confident in face of danger because they have won many victories over many foes before. They resemble the courageous, because both are confident, but whereas the courageous are confident for the reasons already explained, the sanguine are so because they think they are stronger than the enemy, and not likely to come to any harm. (A similar boldness is shown by those getting drunk, for this makes them sanguine for the time being.) When however things do not turn out as they expect, the merely sanguine run away, whereas the mark of the courageous man, as we have seen, is to endure things that are terrible to a human being and that seem so to him, because it is noble to do so and base not to do so. Hence it is thought a sign of still greater courage to be fearless and undismayed in sudden alarms than in dangers that were foreseen. Bravery in unforeseen danger springs more from character, as there is less time for preparation; one might resolve to face a

\[a\] Cf. c. vii. 2-6.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕΣ

λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλυτο, τὰ δ' ἔξαιρής
κατὰ τὴν ἔξω.—ανδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ
ἀγνουόντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίσδων,
χείρος δ' οὖσιν ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ,
διὸ καὶ μένονσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἡπατημένοι, ἔαν
γνώσων ὅτι ἐτερον ἡ ὑποπτεύσωσιν, φεύγουσιν·
.offsetHeight τοῖς Λάκωνων
ὡς Σικυωνίωι.—οὐ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰρηνται ποιοί
τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

19 Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὕσα οὗ,
ἵνα ὅμοιας περὶ ἁμφαὶ ἑστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ ὁ
φοβερά· ὃ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραξος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ
ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρείος μᾶλλον ἡ δ' περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.
τῷ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἰρηνται, ἀνδρεῖοι
2 λέγονται. Διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυσον ἡ ἀνδρεία· καὶ δικαίως
ἐπαινεῖται, χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν 88
3 ἡ τῶν ἡδεῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειν αὐ 1117 δὲ
εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν
κύκλων δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον καὶ τοῖς γυμνοῖς
ἀγώοι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ,
οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ στέφανοι καὶ αἰ τιμαῖ, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι

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*a This occurred in the battle at the Long Walls of Corinth, 392 B.C. Lacedaemonian cavalry had dismounted and armed themselves with the shields of the routed Sicyonians, marked Σ (Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. iv. 10).
*b Cf. c. vi. 4.
*c Cf. c. vii. 6.
danger one can foresee, from calculation and on principle, but only a fixed disposition of Courage will enable one to face sudden peril.

16 (5) Those who face danger in ignorance also appear courageous; and they come very near to those whose bravery rests on a sanguine temperament, though inferior to them inasmuch as they lack self-confidence, which the sanguine possess. Hence the sanguine stand firm for a time; whereas those who have been deceived as to the danger, if they learn or suspect the true state of affairs, take to flight, as the Argives did when they encountered the Lacedaemonians and thought they were Sicyonians. a

17 We have now described the characteristics both of the courageous and of those who are thought to be courageous.

ix Courage is displayed with respect to confidence and fear, but not with respect to both equally: it is more particularly displayed in regard to objects of fear; for one who is unperturbed in the presence of terrors and comports himself rightly towards these is courageous in a fuller sense than one who does so in situations that inspire confidence. In fact, as has been said, b men are sometimes called courageous for enduring pain. Hence Courage itself is attended by pain; and it is justly praised, because it is harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure.

2 Not but what it would appear that the end corresponding c to the virtue of Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant circumstances. This is illustrated by the case of athletic contests: to boxers, for example, their end—the object they box for, the wreath and the honours of victory—is pleasant, but the blows they
άλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος: διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτα εἶναι, μικρὸν ὅν τὸ
οὐ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἢδύν φαίνεται ἔχειν. εἶ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἄνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ
tὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἄνδρεῖῳ καὶ ἄκοιντι ἐστιν, ὑπομενεὶ δὲ αὕτα ὅτι καλὸν, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ.
καὶ ὅσῳ ἄν μᾶλλον τὴν ἄρετήν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαμονέστερος ἢ, μᾶλλον ἔπλε τῷ θανάτῳ λυπη-
σεται τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἁγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς: λυπη-
ρόν δὲ τούτῳ. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἄνδρείοις, ἦσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ’
ἐκεῖνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἁρεταῖς τὸ ἥδεως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ’ ὅσον τοὐ
τέλους ἐφάπτεται. στρατιώτας δ’ οὐδὲν ἦσως καλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
tοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἄνδρείους, ἀλλ’ ἦττον μηδέν ἔχοντας: ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὕτω πρὸς τούς κυνδύνους,
καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλαμάττονται. 20
7 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἄνδρείας ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον εἰρήσθω: τί δ’
ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν
eἰρημένων.

Χ Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν:
δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλώνων μερῶν αὕτα εἶναι αἰ
ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσοτής ἐστὶ περὶ ἥδονας ἢ 25
σωφροσύνη, εἰρητεὶ ἡμῖν (ἡττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ

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* This qualifies what was said in π. iii. 1.

* π. vii. 3.
receive must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and also all the labour they undergo is painful; and these painful incidentals are so numerous that the final object, being a small thing, appears not to contain any pleasure at all. If then the same is true of Courage, the death or wounds that it may bring will be painful to the courageous man, and he will suffer them unwillingly; but he will endure them because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so. And the more a man possesses all virtue, and the more happy he is, the more pain will death cause him; for to such a man life is worth most, and he stands to lose the greatest goods, and knows that this is so, and this must be painful. But he is none the less courageous on that account, perhaps indeed he is more so, because he prefers glory in war to the greatest prizes of life.

5 It is not true therefore of every virtue that its active exercise is essentially pleasant, save in so far as it attains its end.

6 No doubt it is possible that such men as these do not make the best professional soldiers, but men who are less courageous, and have nothing of value besides life to lose; for these face danger readily, and will barter their lives for trifling gains.

7 Let this suffice as an account of Courage: from what has been said it will not be difficult to form at all events a rough conception of its nature.

x After Courage let us speak of Temperance; for these appear to be the virtues of the irrational parts of the soul.

Now we have said that Temperance is the observance of the mean in relation to pleasures
δομοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ πολίς οὖν τῶν
2 ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ
ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία, φιλο-
μάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει οὗ φιλητικός
3 ἐστιν οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἄλλα μᾶλλον
tῆς διαινοίας· οὐ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε
σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὅμως δὲ
οὐδὲ οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσια μὴ σωματικὰ εἰσὶν·
tοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν
τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας,
4 ἀκόλαστους δὲ οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους
5 ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἡ φίλοις. περὶ δὴ τὰς σωματικὰς
ἐἰπὰν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ
γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς δόξεως, οἷον χρώμασι
καὶ σχῆμα καὶ γραφῆ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀ-
κόλαστοι λέγονται· κατὰ δὲ δόξειν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς
5 δὲι χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ

1 δὴ Bonitz: δὲ.
2 δὴ Susemihl (et fort. Asp.): δὲ.

a i.e., by association.
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(for it is concerned only in a lesser degree and in a different way with pains); and Profligacy also is displayed in the same matters. Let us then now define the sort of pleasures to which these qualities are related.

2 Now we must make a distinction between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the soul. Take for instance ambition, or love of learning: the lover of honour or of learning takes pleasure in the thing he loves without his body being affected at all; the experience is purely mental. But we do not speak of men as either temperate or profligate in relation to the pleasures of ambition and of learning. Nor similarly can these terms be applied to the enjoyment of any of the other pleasures that are not bodily pleasures: those who love hearing marvellous tales and telling anecdotes, and who spend their days in trivial gossip, we call idle chatterers, but not profligates; nor do we call men profligate who feel excessive pain for the loss of fortune or friends.

8 Temperance therefore has to do with the pleasures of the body. But not with all even of these; for men who delight in the pleasures of the eye, in colours, forms and paintings, are not termed either temperate or profligate, although it would be held that these things also can be enjoyed in the right manner, or too much, or too little. Similarly with the objects of hearing: no one would term profligate those who take an excessive pleasure in music, or the theatre, nor temperate those who enjoy them as is right. Nor yet does Temperance apply to enjoyment of the sense of smell, unless accidentally; we do not call those who are fond of the scent of fruit or roses or incense profligate, though we may

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ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τούς μύρων καὶ ὀψων· χαίροντι γὰρ
τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις
6 γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. 1 ἵδοι δὲ ἄν τις
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πενῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς
τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτους χαίρειν
7 ἀκόλαστου· τούτω γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ 2 ταῦτα. οὐκ
ἐστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄψινι κατὰ ταύτας τὰς
αἰσθήσεις ἔδοξην πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐδὲ γὰρ
ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωνίνα καὶ κύνες χαίροντων, ἀλλὰ
τῇ βρωσεί· τὴν δὲ αἰσθήσιν ἡ ὅσμη ἐποίησεν. οὐδὲ 20
ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῶς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδή· ὅτι δὲ
ἔγγυς ἔστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἡσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ
tαύτη θαίνεται. ὅμοιώς δὲ οὐδὲ ἱδὼν " ἡ [εὖρων].
8 ἔλαβον ἤ ἁγριόν αἰγὰ, ἀλλὶ ὅτι βορᾶν ἐξει. περὶ
tὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡ ἐδοξᾶς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀ-
κόλασια ἐστὶν ὅτι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν 25
ἀνθρωποδῶδες καὶ θηριώδες φαίνονται· αὐταὶ δὴ
9 εἰσὶν ἁφῆ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεῦσις
ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὕδεν χρησθαί· τῆς γὰρ γεῦσεως
ἔστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν τοὺς
οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὀμα ἄρτυσθεν· οὐ
πάνυ δὲ χαίρονται τούτοις, ἡ οὖν οἱ γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι, 30
ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαίπει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δὴ ἁφῆς καὶ
ἐν σύντοις καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τοὺς ἀφροδισίους λε-
10 γομένους. διὸ καὶ ἡμικάτῳ τις ὁμοφάγος ἄν τιν

1 ἐπιθυμητῶν ἘΩ: ἐπιθυμητῶν Κb, ἐπιθυμῶν Lb.
2 ἐπιθυμητὰ ἩνΝbΟb: ἐπιθυμήσητα ΚbΛbΜb: ἐπιθυμητῶν
tοῦτο Γ.
3 οὐδ' ἐν ᾦ Κb Γ. 4 Bywater.
5 δὲ Ασπ.: δη. 6 post tis add. Φιλάξεως ἐν Ὑπῆκοοι ΚbΓ.

a The text here is doubtful, and possibly the whole
of § 6 is an interpolation.

b i.e., by association.

c Iliad, iii. 24.
d Apparently a character of comedy, though later writers

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be inclined so to style those who love perfumes and the smell of savoury dishes, for the profligate take pleasure in these odours because they remind them of the objects of their desires. One may notice that other persons too like the smell of food when they are hungry; but to delight in things of this kind is a mark of the profligate, since they are the things on which the profligate's desires are set.\(^a\)

7 Nor do the lower animals derive any pleasure from these senses, except accidentally.\(^b\) Hounds do not take pleasure in scenting hares, but in eating them; the scent merely made them aware of the hare. The lion does not care about the lowing of the ox, but about devouring it, though the lowing tells him that the ox is near, and consequently he appears to take pleasure in the sound. Similarly he is not pleased by the sight of 'or stag or mountain goat,'\(^c\) but by the prospect of a meal.

8 Temperance and Profligacy are therefore concerned with those pleasures which man shares with the lower animals, and which consequently appear slavish and bestial. These are the pleasures of touch and taste.

9 But even taste appears to play but a small part, if any, in Temperance. For taste is concerned with discriminating flavours, as is done by wine-tasters, and cooks preparing savoury dishes; but it is not exactly the flavours that give pleasure, or at all events not to the profligate: it is actually enjoying the object that is pleasant, and this is done solely through the sense of touch, alike in eating and drinking and in what are called the pleasures of sex. This is why a certain gourmand\(^d\) wished speak of him as a real person. Some miss. here insert his name, 'Hospitable, the son of Belch,' cf. \textit{E.U.} iii., 1231 a 16, where the story recurs, and Aristophanes, \textit{Frogs}, 934.
ARISTOTLE

φάρυγγα αὐτῶν μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς

ο  ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφή, καυστάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων 1118 ἂ

καθ’ ἡν ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ δοξεύει αὐτοὺς ἐπονεί-

δυστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ ἄνθρωπος ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει,

ἀλλ’ ἡ ζωὴ. τὸ δ’ ἰδοὺ τοιούτους χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα

ἀγαπάν θεριώδες καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώτατα τῶν ἦ

dia τής ἀφής ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηται, οἶον αἱ ἐν τοῖς

γυμνασίοις διὰ τρήψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γυνο-

μεναι οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολαστοῦ

ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ των μέρη.

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Τὼν δ’ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,

αἱ δ’ ἵδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι. οἶον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς

φυσική. πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεχὴς ἔπαρα ἡ ἄγρα

τροφή, οτὲ δ’ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὖν, ἤσοιν Ἰμηρος,

δ’ νεόσ καὶ ἀκμάζων, τῆς1 δὲ τοιαῦτα ἡ τοιαῦτα

οὐκέτι πᾶσιν διὸ οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν.2 διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον

εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἔχει γε τι καὶ φυσικὸς ἔτερος

gὰρ οὗτος ἐστὶν ἴδιον, καὶ ἐνα πάσοιν ἴδίῳ τῶν 15

τυχόντων. εὖ μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίας

ἀργοῦ ἀμαρτάμουσι καὶ ἐφ’ ἐν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον το

γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἡ πῦνει ἐως ἄν ὑπερ-

πληθηθή, ὑπερβάλλει ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῶ

πλήθει. ἀναπληρώσεως3 γὰρ τῆς ἐνδεια ἡ φυσικὴ

ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὕτου γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς

1 τῆς Bywater: τῆς. 2 τῶν αὐτῶν ἄ [ἀ] Richards. 3 ἀναπληρώσεως Asp. (Richards): ἀναπληρώσεως.

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a A reminiscence of Ἱππάδ, xxiv. 130.

b The text should perhaps be amended to run ‘nor desires the same food always.’

c Preferences are natural because (1) men’s natures vary and therefore their tastes vary, (2) some preferences are universal.

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that his throat might be longer than a crane's, showing that his pleasure lay in the sensation of contact.

Hence the sense to which Profligacy is related is the most universal of the senses; and there appears to be good ground for the disrepute in which it is held, because it belongs to us not as human beings but as animals. Therefore it is bestial to revel in such pleasures, and to like them better than any others. We do not refer to the most refined of the pleasures of touch, such as the enjoyment of friction and warm baths in the gymnasia; the tactual pleasures of the profligate have to do with certain parts only, not with the whole of the body.

Desires seem to be of two kinds, one common to all men, the other peculiar to special peoples, and adventitious. For instance, the desire for food is natural, since everyone desires solid or liquid nourishment, and sometimes both, when in need of them; and also sexual intercourse, as Homer says, when young and lusty. But not everybody desires this or that particular sort of nourishment, any more than everyone desires the same particular portion of food; hence a taste for this or that sort of food seems to be an individual peculiarity. Not but what there is also something natural in such tastes; for different things are pleasant to different people, and there are some special delicacies which all men like better than ordinary food.

In the case of the natural desires, then, few men err, and in one way only, that of excess in quantity; for to eat or drink to repletion of ordinary food and drink is to exceed what is natural in amount, since the natural desire is only to satisfy one's wants. Hence people who over-eat are called 'mad-bellies,'
παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν· τοιοῦτοι δὲ 20
4 γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς
ιδίας τῶν ἢδουνῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρ-
tάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιούτων λεγομένων ἡ τῷ1
χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἡ τῷ2 μᾶλλον ἡ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ,
ἡ μὴ ὡς3 δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ24 οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερ-
βάλλουσι καὶ γὰρ χαίροντων ἐνυοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ 25
(μισητὰ γὰρ), καὶ εἰ τισὶ δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων,
μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ, καὶ ἡ4 ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίροντων. ἡ
μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἢδουνὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὑπὶ ἀκολοσιὰ
καὶ ψεκτῶν, δὴ λοιπὸν περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὡσπέρ
ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ύπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων39
ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ
λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ ὑπὶ τῶν ἢδεῶν οὐ τυγχάνει
(καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἢδονή), ὁ δὲ
σώφρων τῷ μῆ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ [καὶ τῷ
ἀπέχεσθαι]6 τοῦ ἢδεὸς.
5 'Ο μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἢδεῶν 1119 α
πάντων ἡ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς
ἐπιθυμίας ὃστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τὰθ6 αἱρεῖσθαι·
dιὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ ἐπιθυμοῖς,
μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπως δ᾽ ἔοικε τὸ 5
7 δι᾽ ἢδονῆν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλεῖποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς
Ľδονὰς καὶ ἢττον ἡ δεῖ χαιροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται·

1 τῶν Μ6 Q6. 2 τῶν Q6. 3 ἡ μὴ δῆ (vel καὶ μὴ ὡς) Richards. 4 δὴ Μ6. 5 ἡ add. Κ6. 6 καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι om. Κ6.

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meaning that they fill that organ beyond the right measure; it is persons of especially slavish nature that are liable to this form of excess.

4 But in regard to the pleasures peculiar to particular people, many men err, and err in many ways. For when people are said to be 'very fond of' so-and-so, it is either because they like things that it is not right to like, or like them more than most people do, or like them in a wrong manner; and the profligate exceed in all these ways. For they like some things that are wrong, and indeed abominable, and any such things that it is right to like they like more than is right, and more than most people.

5 It is clear then that excess in relation to pleasures is Profligacy, and that it is blameworthy. As regards pain, pains on the other hand, it is not with Temperance as it is with Courage: a man is not termed temperate for enduring pain and profligate for not enduring it, but profligate for feeling more pain than is right when he fails to get pleasures (in his case pleasure actually causing pain), and temperate for not feeling pain at the absence of pleasure [or at abstaining from it].

6 The profligate therefore desires all pleasures, or those that are the most pleasant, and is led by his desire to pursue these in preference to everything else. He consequently feels pain not only when he fails to get them, but also from his desire for them, since desire is accompanied by pain; paradoxical though it seems that pain should be caused by pleasure.

7 Men erring on the side of deficiency as regards Insensibility pleasures, and taking less than a proper amount of enjoyment in them, scarcely occur; such insensibility
οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικῆ ἑστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν χαίρει τοὺς δὲ οὖ· εἰ δὲ τῷ μηθὲν ἑστὶν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἐτερον ἐτέρου, πάρρω ἀν 10 εἰ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ νόμον διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνω γίνεσθαι. δὲ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταῦτ’ ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἦδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνεις, οὔθ’ ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα τοιούτω σφάδει, οὔτε ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὔθ’ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως οὔθε μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ οὔθ’ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὔθ’ ἀλώς 16 τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγιείαν ἑστὶν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἢδεα ὄντα, τοῦτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἢδεων μὴ ἐμποδίζων τούτως ὑντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν ὑσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξιῶς· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ 20 τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

ΧΙI ᾨκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐσικεῖν ἢ ἀκολογία τῆς δείδιας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἡδονῆς, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπης, 2 δὲν τὸ μὲν αἴρετον, τὸ δὲ φευκτὸν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἢ δὲ ἡδονῆ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ· μᾶλλον δὴ ἐκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἔθισθηναι ὑδίων πρὸς αὐτὰ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ

1 δὴ Argyropylus: δὲ.
is not human. Indeed, even the lower animals discriminate in food, and like some kinds and not others; and if there be a creature that finds nothing pleasant, and sees no difference between one thing and another, it must be very far removed from humanity. As men of this type scarcely occur, we have no special name for them.

8 The temperate man keeps a middle course in these matters. He takes no pleasure at all in the things that the profligate enjoys most, on the contrary, he positively dislikes them; nor in general does he find pleasure in wrong things, nor excessive pleasure in anything of this sort; nor does he feel pain or desire when they are lacking, or only in a moderate degree, not more than is right, nor at the wrong time, et cetera. But such pleasures as conduce to health and fitness he will try to obtain in a moderate and right degree; as also other pleasures so far as they are not detrimental to health and fitness, and not ignoble, nor beyond his means. The man who exceeds these limits cares more for such pleasures than they are worth. Not so the temperate man; he only cares for them as right principle enjoins.

xii Profligacy seems to be more voluntary than Cowardice. For the former is caused by pleasure, the latter by pain, and pleasure is a thing we choose, pain a thing we avoid. Also pain makes us beside ourselves: it destroys the sufferer's nature; whereas pleasure has no such effect. Therefore Profligacy is the more voluntary vice. And consequently it is the more reprehensible; since moreover it is easier to train oneself to resist the temptations of pleasure, because these occur frequently in life, and to practise
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tὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
8 φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλων. δόξειε δ’ ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τὸς καθ’ ἔκαστον· αὐτῇ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἔξιστησιν, ὡστε καὶ τὰ ὁπλα βίπτειν καὶ τάλλα ἀσχημονεῖν. 80
dιὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαμα εἶναι. τῶ δ’ ἀκολάστῳ ἀνά-
pαλων τὰ μὲν καθ’ ἔκαστα ἐκούσια, ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὅρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ’ ἄλοι ἦττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκολάστος εἶναι.

5 Τὸ δ’ ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γὰρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. 1.1.9.1 πότερον δ’ ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθέν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δήλου δ’ ὅτι τὸ ὑστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προ-

6 τέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ’ ἔουσε μετεννηχθεῖν· κεκο-
lάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὅρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὐξήσῃν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἑπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ’ ἐπιθυμίας γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδεός ὀρέξεις· εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθές καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ

7 ἀρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἦξει. ἀπληστός γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδεός ὀρέξεις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοίγτω, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἑπιθυμίας ἑνεργεια αὐξεῖ τὸ συγγενές, καὶ 10

1 ἐκούσιον Γ’: φευκτών.

*ἀκολασία,* literally ‘the result of not being punished,’ seems to have been used of spoiled children as well as of vicious adults.

*The primary meaning of κολάζειν, ‘to punish.’*
resistance to them involves no danger, whereas the reverse is the case with the objects of fear.

3 On the other hand, the possession of a cowardly character would seem to be more voluntary than particular manifestations of cowardice: for cowardliness in itself is not painful, but particular accesses of cowardice are so painful as to make a man beside himself, and cause him to throw away his arms or otherwise behave in an unseemly manner; so that cowardly actions actually seem to be done under compulsion. But with the profligate on the contrary the particular acts are voluntary, for they are done with desire and appetite, but the character in general is less so, since no one desires to be a profligate.

4 The word Profligacy or wantonness we also apply to the naughtiness of children, which has some resemblance to the licentiousness of adults. Which of the two takes its name from the other is of no importance for the present enquiry, but it would seem clear that the state which comes later in life must be named from the one which comes earlier.

5 The metaphor appears apt enough, since it is that which desires what is disgraceful and whose appetites grow apace that needs chastisement or pruning, and this description applies in the fullest degree to desire, as it does to the child. For children, like profligates, live at the prompting of desire; and the appetite for pleasure is strongest in childhood, so that if it be not disciplined and made obedient to authority, it will make great headway. In an irrational being the appetite for pleasure is insatiable and undiscriminating, and the innate tendency is fostered by active gratification; indeed, if such
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μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὃσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούσωσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ
8 ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθέν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον—,
ὡσπερ δὲ τὸν παιδὰ δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ
9 τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν 18 συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. σκοπὸς γὰρ ἁμφοῖν τὸ
καλὸν· καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὃν δεῖ καὶ ὃς δεῖ
10 καὶ ὅτε, οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' ὁμὸν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

1 δὲ: γὰρ ΛΘΓ'.
gratification be great and intense it actually overpowers the reason. Hence our indulgences should be moderate and few, and never opposed to principle —this is what we mean by ‘well-disciplined’ and ‘chastened’—; and the appetitive part of us should be ruled by principle, just as a boy should live in obedience to his tutor. Hence in the temperate man the appetitive element must be in harmony with principle. For (1) the aim of both Temperance and principle is that which is noble; and (2) the temperate man desires the right thing in the right way at the right time, which is what principle ordains.

Let this then be our account of Temperance.
Δ

1 Δέγωμεν δ' εξής περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι3 περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἔν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσων χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν· μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα οὐσία ᾧ ἀξία νομίμως μετρεῖται. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλεύψεις.

3 καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν αἰεί τοῖς μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' 80 ἀσωτίαν ἐπιθέμεν μὲν ἐνστε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολούθιαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν· διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦν δὲ εἶναι, πολλὰς γὰρ ἁμα κακίας έχουσιν. οscrollTop; δὲ3 οἰκεῖως προσαγορεῦονται. βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι δ' ἐν τί κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρει τὴν οὐσίαν. 1120 κἂν ἄσωτος γὰρ δ' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύομενος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπωλεία τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ἐς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀ-

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1 δή Bywater: δὲ.  a εἶναι Ἡ Ἐκ.  b δὲ Γ: δὴ.

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a The word λαμβάνειν, the antithesis of 'give,' varies in meaning with the context between 'get,' 'receive' and 'take.'

b See note on π. vii. 4.

c ἀσωτός, 'prodigal,' means literally 'not saved,' 'in desperate case.'

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BOOK IV

1 Next let us speak of Liberality. This virtue seems to be the observance of the mean in relation to wealth: we praise a man as liberal not in war, nor in matters in which we praise him as temperate, nor in judicial decisions, but in relation to giving and getting a wealth, and especially in giving; wealth meaning all those things whose value is measured by money.

2 Prodigality and Meanness b on the other hand are both of them modes of excess and of deficiency in relation to wealth. Meanness is always applied to those who care more than is proper about wealth, but Prodigality is sometimes used with a wider connotation, since we call the unrestrained and those who squander money on debauchery prodigal; and therefore prodigality is thought to be extremely wicked, because it is a combination of vices. But this is not the proper application of the word: really it denotes the possessor of one particular vice, that of wasting one's substance; for he who is ruined by his own agency is a hopeless case indeed, c and to waste one's substance seems to be in a way to ruin oneself, inasmuch as wealth is the means of life. This then is the sense in which the term Prodigality is here understood.

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6 ἄριστον ἐκδεχόμεθα. διὸ δέ ἐστι χρεία, ἐστὶν τούτους χρῆσθαι καὶ εἴ καὶ κακῶς, ὁ πλοῦτος δὲ ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστῳ δὲ ἄριστα χρῆσται ὁ ἐξων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν· καὶ πλοῦτῳ δὴ χρῆσται ἄριστα ὁ ἐξων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν· οὕτως δὲ 7 ἐστιν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δὲ εἰναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἴς δεῖ ἡ λαμβάνειν ἀθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ἄθεν σύ δει. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἡ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ 8 πράττετε μᾶλλον ἡ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μή πράττετε· οὐκ ἀδηλὸν δὲ οτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἐπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττετε, τῇ δὲ λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἡ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἐπαινοῦ δὲ μᾶλλον. 9 καὶ ἄραν δὲ τῷ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοθήναι· τὸ γὰρ οἴκειον ἦττον προιένται μᾶλλον ἡ οὐ λαμβάνονσι τὸ 10 ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἦττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην. 11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὖν ἐπαινοῦνται πάντες. φιλοδοῦν· ταὶ δὲ σχεδον μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθερίων τῶν ἄντ' 12 ἀρετῆς. ὁφελομοι γὰρ· τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει· ἂδὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαί καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα. καὶ ὅρθως· οῖς γὰρ δεὶ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, 25

1 τὰ Νοετέλι τῷ 2 τῶν ἤπ' ἀρετῆς οἰμ. Κβ.

a ἵστ., those who refrain from taking more than their due.
b ἵστ., those who take what is their due.

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Now riches are an article of use; but articles of use can be used either well or ill, and he who uses a thing best is he who possesses the virtue related to that thing; therefore that man will use riches best who possesses the virtue related to wealth; and this is the liberal man. But the use of wealth seems to consist in spending and in giving; getting wealth and keeping it are modes of acquisition rather than of use. Hence the liberal man is more concerned with giving to the right recipients than with getting wealth from the right sources and not getting it from the wrong ones. Virtue is displayed in doing good rather than in having good done to one, and in performing noble acts rather than in avoiding base ones; but manifestly doing good and acting nobly go with giving, while having good done to one and avoiding base actions go with getting. Again, gratitude is bestowed on a giver, not on one who refrains from taking; and still more is this true of praise. Also it is easier not to take than to give: men are more reluctant to give away what belongs to them than to refrain from taking what belongs to someone else. Again, it is those who give whom we call liberal; those who refrain from taking are not praised for Liberality but rather for Justice, and those who take are not praised at all. And of all virtuous people the liberal are perhaps the most beloved, because they are beneficial to others; and they are so in that they give. Acts of virtue are noble, and are performed for the sake of their nobility; the liberal man therefore will give for the nobility of giving. And he will give rightly, for he will give to the right people, and the right amount, and at the right time, and fulfil all
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13 καὶ τὰλλα ὁσα ἐπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἥδεως ἡ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ’ ἄρετὴν ἤδυ ἢ ἀλυπον, ἦκιστα δὲ λυπηρῶν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς ὡς ἡ μὴ δει, ἡ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ των ἀλλῶν αἰτίων, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ’ ἄλλος τις ῥηθήςσεται· οὐδ’ ὁ λυπηρῶς, μάλλον γὰρ ἔλοιπ’ ἀν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἐλευθερίου.

15 οὐδὲ λήψεται δὴ οθέν μὴ δει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λήψις. οὐκ ἂν εἰη δὲ οὔτ’ αἰτητικὸς· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ εὑρηκαίνεσα. οθέν δὲ δει, λήψεται, οιον ἀπὸ τῶν ἴδιων κτηματῶν, οὐκ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὕπως ἔχη διδόναι. οὐδ’ ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων, βουλόμενος γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἔπαρκείν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι διώσει, ἵνα ἔχη διδόναι οἷς δει καὶ οὔ καὶ καλὸν.

17 ἐλευθερίου δ’ ἔστι σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὅστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἑλάττων· τὸ 19 γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν4 ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ’ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλῆθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθερίου, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἔσει, αὐτὴ δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν διδωσιν.5 οὐθέν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθεριότερον εἶναι τῶν τὰ ἑλάττων ἑλάττων, εἰν’ ἀπ’ ἑλαττόνων διδώ. ἐλευ-

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1 ὡς ed.: οἷς.
2 δὴ Richards: δὲ.
3 oikelon Lb: lělōn.
4 ἐπιβλέπειν Lb.
5 διδωσιν secludendum? Bywater.

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a The ms. text gives 'to the wrong people,' but cf. § 12, l. 25 ὀρθῶς.
b Or (accepting Bywater’s emendation) 'and this is relative to his substance.'

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the other conditions of right giving. Also he will
give with pleasure, or at all events without pain;
for virtuous action is pleasant, or painless—it cer-
tainly cannot be painful. One who gives to the
wrong people, or not for the nobility of giving but
from some other motive, will not be called liberal,
but by some different title; nor will he who gives
with pain, for he would prefer the money to the
noble deed, which is not the mark of a liberal man.

Consequently the liberal man will not take money
from a wrong source either, since one who holds
wealth in low esteem is not the man to make im-
proper gains. Nor yet will he be fond of asking
favours, for one who confers benefits does not readily
accept them. But he will acquire wealth from the
proper source, that is, from his own possessions, not
because he thinks it is a noble thing to do, but
because it is a necessary condition of having the
means to give. He will not be careless of his
property, inasmuch as he wishes to employ it for
the assistance of others. He will not give in-
discriminately, in order that he may be able to give
to the right persons and at the right time, and where
it is noble to do so. But the liberal man is certainly
prone to go to excess in giving, so as to leave himself
the smaller share; for it is a mark of a liberal nature
to be regardless of self.

In crediting people with Liberality their resources
must be taken into account; for the liberality of a
gift does not depend on its amount, but on the dis-
position of the giver, and a liberal disposition gives
according to its substance. It is therefore possible
that the smaller giver may be the more liberal, if
he give from smaller means. Men who have inherited
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θεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπεροῖ τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσιν μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ πατήται. πλουτεῖν δ᾽ οὐ βάδιον τὸν ἐλευθερίον, μήτε λή-15 πτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετοῖκν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ᾽ ἔνεκα τῆς 21 δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἤκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμπαύει δ᾽ οὐκ ἀλώγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶδον τε χρήματ᾽ ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελοῦμενον ὅπως ἔχει. 22 ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς ὅποι οὐδ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθερίατην, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ᾗ δεῖ 23 ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ᾗ δεῖ· ᾗ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγο-25 μεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ βάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσει καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλων. τῆς ἐλευθερίατητος δὴ μεσότητος οὐς ἐνεργεῖ ὁ θρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὁ ἐλευθερίος καὶ δόσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ᾗ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὡμοίως ἐν μικρῶσι καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ 30 ταῦτα ἠδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ᾽ ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεί. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἀμφῶν οὐσίας μεσότη-τος, ποιός ἀμφότερα ὃς δεῖ· ἐπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεί δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λήψις, ὡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη
a fortune are reputed to be more liberal than those who have made one, since they have never known what it is to want; moreover everybody is specially fond of a thing that is his own creation: parents and poets show this. But it is not easy for a liberal man to be rich, since he is not good either at getting money or at keeping it, while he is profuse in spending it and values wealth not for its own sake but as a means of giving. Hence people blame fortune because the most deserving men are the least wealthy. But this is really perfectly natural: you cannot have money any more than anything else, without taking pains to have it.

22 On the other hand, the liberal man will not give to the wrong people, nor at the wrong time, and so forth, for this would not be an act of Liberality at all; and if he spent his money on the wrong objects he would not have any to spend on the right ones.

23 In fact, as was said before, the liberal man is one who spends in proportion to his means as well as on the right objects; while he that exceeds his means is prodigal. This is why we do not call the lavishness of princes Prodigality; because we feel that however much they spend and give away they can hardly exceed the limit of their resources.

24 Liberality then being the observance of the mean in the giving and getting of wealth, the liberal man will not only give and spend the right amounts on the right objects alike in small matters and in great, and feel pleasure in so doing, but will also take the right amounts, and from the right sources. For as this virtue is a mean both in giving and in getting, he will do both in the right way. Right getting goes with right giving, wrong getting is opposed to right


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ἐναντία ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν ὁδὸν ἐπόμεναι γίγνονται ἀμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ’ ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὖ. 1121

25 εὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δεόν καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀνάλογως, λυπησται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὃς
dεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι
26 ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὃς ἐπὶ. καὶ εὐκομωτητος δ’
27 ἐστίν ὁ ἔλευθερος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἰ τί δεόν μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἥ
lυπομένους εἰ μὴ δεόν τι ἀνάλωσε, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδου¹ οὐκ
28 ἀρεσκόμενος. οὐ δ’ ἀσωτός καὶ ἐν τούτοις
diáμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἤδεται ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὃς
dεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἐσται δὲ προϊόντα φανερώ·
29 τερον. εὑρηται δὴ ημίν ὃτι ὑπερβολαῖ καὶ
 ἐλλεύσεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ
eπὶ δυσί, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν διατάγην
gὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία
tῶν διδόναι [καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν]² ὑπερβάλλει, τῶ
dὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ’ ἀνελευθερία τῶ
didόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῶ λαμβάνειν δ’ ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν
30 ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ
sυνυνάζεται (οὐ γὰρ ράδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα
pάσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἔπειεται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ
ἰδιωτας διδόντας, οὐπερ καὶ δοκοῦν τὸν
31 εἶναι). ἐπει δ’ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειν ἀν οὐ μικρὸ
βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐλογος τε γὰρ 20

¹ Σιμωνίδου Bywater: Σιμωνίδη.
² δὴ Bywater: δ.’
³ δὴ Bywater: δ.’
⁴ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν] Noetel, om. Lb.
⁵ ἐπὶ KB, εν Lb.

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a Several parsimonious aphorisms, sincere or ironical, are ascribed to Simonides, but none exactly fits this allusion.
b See § 2.  
c These words seem to be interpolated.
d Cf. § 23 above.

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giving; the two concordant practices therefore may be found in the same person, but the two opposite ones clearly cannot be.

25 If the liberal man should happen to spend in a manner contrary to what is right and noble, he will feel pain, though in a moderate degree and in the right manner; for it is a mark of virtue to feel both pleasure and pain on the right occasions and in the right manner. Also the liberal man is an easy person to deal with in money matters; he can be cheated, because he does not value money, and is more distressed if he has paid less than he ought than he is annoyed if he has paid more; he does not agree with the saying of Simonides.a

28 The prodigal on the other hand errs in his feelings with regard to money as well as in his actions; he feels neither pleasure nor pain on the right occasions nor in the right manner. This will become clearer as we proceed.

29 We have saidb then that Prodigality and Meanness are modes of excess and of deficiency, and this in two things, giving and getting—giving being taken to include spending. Prodigality exceeds in giving [without gettingc], and is deficient in getting; Meaness falls short in giving and goes to excess in getting, only not on the great scale. Now the two forms of Prodigality are very seldom found united in the same person, because it is not easy to give to everyone without receiving from anyone: the giver's means are soon exhausted, if he is a private citizen, and only such persons are considered prodigal.d

31 In fact, a man who is prodigal in both ways may be thought considerably superior to the mean man; for he is easily cured by age or by poverty, and is
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ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν· ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δὲ ὡς δεῖ οὐδὲ εὑ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐδυσθείη ἣ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλλοι, εἰ ἄν ἐλευθερίως· δώσει γὰρ οὐ δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται οὐδὲν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ 25 καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαύλος τὸ ἱθυς· οὐ γὰρ μοχ-θηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διάντα καὶ 32 μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δὲ. ὁ δὴ τοῦτον τῶν τρόπων ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ ταῦτα εἰρήμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἡ μέγεθελει 33 πολλοὺς, ὁ δὲ οὐκέτα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οἱ 50 πολλοὶ τῶν ἄσωτων, καθάπερ εἰρητως, καὶ λαμ-βάνουσιν οὖν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰς κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελευ- 34 θεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βουλευθήσεται μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύ- νασθαι, ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα· ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἀμα δὲ καὶ 1121 ἰδία τὸ μὴθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὁλιγώρους καὶ 35 δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὔθέν αὐτῶς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἠλευθερίως αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαὶ, οὐδὲ τοῦτον 3 ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐνιότε ὡς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τοῦτον πλουσίους ποιεῖν, καὶ τό σὲ μὲν μετρίους τὰ ἥθη οὔθεν ἄν δοθὲν, τοὺς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζομαι πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλουθοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὸς ἀκολοχίας διαπανηροὶ

1 οὗ bis om. K[bc
2 τοῦτον Kb: τοῦτον αὐτοῦ Lbc
able to be brought to the due mean, because he possesses the essentials of the liberal character—he gives, and he refrains from taking, though he does neither in the proper way or rightly. Correct this by training, or otherwise reform him, and he will be liberal, for he will now give his money to the right objects, while he will not get it from the wrong sources. This is why he is felt to be not really bad in character; for to exceed in giving without getting is foolish rather than evil or ignoble. The prodigal of this type therefore seems to be much superior to the mean man, both for the reasons stated, and because the former benefits many people, but the latter benefits nobody, not even himself.

But the majority of prodigal people, as has been said, besides giving wrongly, take from wrong sources; in respect of getting they are in fact mean. And what makes them grasping is that they want to spend, but cannot do so freely because they soon come to the end of their resources, and so are compelled to obtain supplies from others. Moreover, being indifferent to nobility of conduct, they are careless how they get their money, and take it from anywhere; their desire is to give, and they do not mind how or where they get the means of giving.

Hence even their giving is not really liberal: their gifts are not noble, nor given for the nobility of giving, nor in the right way; on the contrary, sometimes they make men rich who ought to be poor, and will not give anything to the worthy, while heaping gifts on flatterers and others who minister to their pleasures. Hence most prodigal men are also profligate; for as they spend their money freely, some of it is squandered in debauchery;
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eis, kai dia to mu prós to kalon xēn prós tás 10
36 ἡδονὰς ἀποκλάνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἁσωτος ἀπαιδ-
αγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβάινει, τυχῶν
δὲ ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφικοῦτ' 37
ἀν. ή δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατος τ' ἐστιν (δοκεῖ
γάρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους
ποιεῖν), καὶ συμφύεστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς 15
ἀσωτίας. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μάλλον ἦ
38 δοτικοὶ. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδές
ἐστιν' πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας
εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οἷσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς
δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πάσω
ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίστε χωρίζεται, 20
καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ
39 δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις
προσηγορίαις οἱ οὖν φειδολοὶ γλύσχροι κύμβικες,
pántes τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων
οὐκ ἐφίλεται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἱ μὲν
diá τινα ἐπιτείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν
(δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἐνοῦ ἡ φασὶ γε diá τοῦτο φυλάττειν, 25
τὰν μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρὸν τι πράξαι:
toútvn δὲ καὶ δ' κυμωνοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος:
ουσῶμαι δ' ἄπο τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθὲν4 ἂν
doúnavai), οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβου ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλο-
τρίων ὡς οὐ βράδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέραν λαμ-. 30
βάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοὶ ἐτέρους μὴ ἀρέσκειν5 οὖν

1 τ' Bywater: γ' K, om. vulg. 2 μηθὲν Ὡσ. 3 ἀρέσκειν: ἀρέσκει Γ.

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and having no high moral standard they readily yield to the temptation of pleasure.

36. This then is what the prodigal comes to if he is not brought under discipline; but if he is taken in hand, he may attain the due mean and the right scale of liberality. Meanness on the contrary is incurable; for we see that it can be caused by old age or any form of weakness. Also it is more ingrained in man’s nature than Prodigality; the mass of mankind are avaricious rather than open-handed. Moreover Meanness is a far-reaching vice, and one of varied aspect: it appears to take several shapes. For as it consists in two things, deficiency in giving and excess in getting, it is not found in its entirety in every case, but sometimes the two forms occur separately, some men going too far in getting, while others fall short in giving. The characters described by such names as niggardly, close-fisted, and stingy all fall short in giving, but they do not covet the goods of others nor wish to take them. With some of them this is due to an honourable motive of a sort, namely a shrinking from base conduct—since some persons are thought, or at all events profess, to be careful of their money because they wish to avoid being forced at some time or other to do something base; to this class belong the skinflint a and similar characters, who get their names from an excessive reluctance to give. But some keep their hands off their neighbours’ goods from fear; they calculate that it is not easy to take what belongs to others without others taking what belongs to oneself, and so they prefer (as they say)

\[\text{a \, κυμηνοπλέτης means literally ‘one who saws cummin-}
\text{seed in half’.}\]
ARISTOTLE

40 αὕτως τὸ μὴτε λαμβάνειν μὴτε διδόναι. οἵ δὲ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἵν οἳ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοί καὶ πάντες οἳ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοιοῦτα κατὰ μικρὰ ἐπί πολλῶ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι θένων οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνοντο, καὶ ἕκαστον οὐ δεῖν ὁ ὅπωςον οὐ δεῖ. Κοινὸν δὲ ἐπ' αὕτως ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται πάντες γὰρ ἑνῆκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὅνειδον ὑπομένουσων. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ θένων [δὲ] δεὶ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ δὲ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἳν τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις τοὺς πορθοῦντας καὶ ίτα καὶ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. οἱ μὲντοι κυβερνήτες καὶ δ λαμπροῦσι καὶ δ ληστῆς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰοῦν· αἰσχροκέρδεις γὰρ κέρδους γὰρ ἑνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὅνειδον ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἳ μὲν κυνᾶντος τοὺς μεγίστους ἑνεκέ τοῦ λήμματος οἳ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδοῦσιν, οἳ δὲ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ θένων οὐ δεὶ κερδοῦντας θουλομένους αἰσχροκέρδεις καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαύται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα ἀνελευθερία ἐναιτίνων λέγεται· μεῖζον τε γάρ ἐστί κακῶν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λειψείσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριοτήτος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακῶν τοσαύτ' εἰφήσθων.

1 κατὰ μικρὰ Asp.: κατὰ μικρῶν pr. KβMβ, καὶ τὰ μικρὰ corr. KVLβΓ.
2 [δὲ] ed.

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neither to take nor to give.' The other sort of people are those who exceed in respect of getting, taking from every source and all they can; such are those who follow degrading trades, brothel-keepers and all people of that sort, and petty usurers who lend money in small sums at a high rate of interest; all these take from wrong sources, and more than their due. The common characteristic of all these seems to be sordid greed, since they all endure reproach for gain, and for a small gain. Those who make improper gains from improper sources on a great scale, for instance princes who sack cities and rob temples, are not termed mean, but rather wicked or impious or unjust. But the dicer and the footpad or brigand are to be classed as mean, as showing sordid greed, for both ply their trade and endure reproach for gain, the robber risking his life for plunder, and the dicer making gain out of his friends, to whom one ought to give; hence both are guilty of sordid greed, trying as they do to get gain from wrong sources. And all similar modes of getting wealth are mean for the same reasons.

Meanness is naturally spoken of as the opposite of Liberality; for not only is it a greater evil than Prodigality, but also men more often err on the side of Meanness than on that of Prodigality as we defined it.¹

Let this suffice as an account of Liberality and of the vices which are opposed to it.

¹ See § 5.
11 Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτῇ1 περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι. οὐκ ὄσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθερία περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήματι πράξεως, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανήμας μόνον· ἐν τούτοις2 δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθερίατητος μεγέθει· καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποστηρίζει, ἐν 2 μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τιν' οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριπλάρχου 3 καὶ ἄρχωντων. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐν ὧ καὶ περὶ δ'.3 δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἄξιοις δαπανῶν ὅπως λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἴον τὸ "πολλάκις δόσικον ἄλητη"· ἀλλ' δ' ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως.4 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐλευθερίας, δ' ἐλευθερίας οὕθεν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς. 4 τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἔξεως ἡ μὲν ἐλλευψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὀσικοτικία, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσα τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἄ δει, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὃς οὐ δεῖ λαμ- 6 προνόμεναι· ὄστερον δὲ ὑπὲρ5 αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ

1 αὐτῇ Coraes, αὐτῇ codd.
2 πρὰ ταῖς ? ed.
3 ἀ Γ Asp., ἀ <καὶ ὦς> Thurot.
4 οὕτως Mb; οὕτως (τοιοῦτος ? Richards).
5 ὑπὲρ: περὶ Ob.

* μεγαλοπρεπεία denotes Munificence of a magnificent kind, the spending of money on a grand scale from the motive of public spirit. In discussing it Aristotle is thinking especially of the ληπτουργία or public services discharged at Athens, and in other Greek cities, by wealthy individuals; such as the refitting of a naval trireme, the equipment of a dramatic chorus, and the defraying of the cost of a θεωρία or delegation representing the State at one of the great Hellenic festivals. The word literally means 'great con-

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Next it would seem proper to discuss Magnificence, for this also appears to be a virtue concerned with wealth. It does not however, like Liberality, extend to all actions dealing with wealth, but only refers to the spending of wealth; and in this sphere it surpasses Liberality in point of magnitude, for, as its name itself implies, it consists in suitable expenditure on a great scale.

But this greatness of scale is relative. An amount of outlay that would be great for a person fitting out a galley for the navy would not be great for one equipping a state pilgrimage. The suitability of the expenditure therefore is relative to the spender himself, and to the occasion or object. At the same time the term magnificent is not applied to one who spends adequate sums on objects of only small or moderate importance, like the man who said 'Oft gave I alms to homeless wayfarers'; it denotes someone who spends suitably on great objects. For though the magnificent man is liberal, the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent.

The defect corresponding to the magnificent disposition is called Paltriness, and the excess Vulgarity, Want of Taste or the like. The latter vices do not exceed by spending too great an amount on proper objects, but by making a great display on the wrong occasions and in the wrong way. We will however speak of them later.

spicuousness' or splendour, but in eliciting its connotation Aristotle brings in another meaning of the verb πρεπεῖν, viz. 'to be fitting,' and takes the noun to signify 'suitability on a great scale'; and also he feels that the element 'great' denotes grandeur as well as mere magnitude.

b Odyssey, xvii. 420; said by Odysseus pretending to be a beggar who formerly was well-to-do. c §§ 20-22.
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δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμων έοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπάνησαι μεγάλα.

6 ἐμελῶς. (ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἄρχῃ εἴπομεν, ἢ ἔξις 1122, ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ἂν ἔστιν.) αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ.1 ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ 7 δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ύπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ 8 ἐνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τούτῳ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἐτὶ ἥδεως καὶ προσεκτικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικρο-9 πρεπεῖ. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδεστάτον σκέψασθαί δὲν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσον καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστον. 10 

10 ἀναγκαίων δὴ2 καὶ ἔλευθεροι τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔλευθερος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ "μέγα" τοῦ "μεγαλο- πρεποῦς," οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα3 τῆς ἑλευ- θεριότητος οὕτως.4 καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπεότερον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀυτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτήμα μὲν γὰρ 15 τὸ πλεῖστον ἄξιον τυμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλὸν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιοῦτου ἡ θεωρία

1 τά ἔργα secludendum? ed. 2 δὲ Γ. 
3 ταῦτα corr. Κβ. 4 ὑν Wilson.

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1 Cfr. ii. i. 7 fin., ii. 8.
2 These words are better omitted: 'suitable to the occasion' seems to be meant.
3 Cfr note on § 1.
4 Se. than the vulgar man or the shabby man.
The magnificent man is an artist in expenditure: he can discern what is suitable, and spend great sums with good taste. (For as we said at the outset, a disposition is defined by the activities in which it is displayed, and by the objects to which it is related.) So the magnificent man’s expenditure is suitable as well as great. And consequently the objects he produces must also be great and suitable; for so only will a great expenditure be suitable [to the result b] as well. Hence, as the object produced must be worthy of the expenditure, so also must the expenditure be worthy of or even exceed the object produced. Again, the motive of the magnificent man in such expenditure will be the nobility of the action, this motive being characteristic of all the virtues. Moreover he will spend gladly and lavishly, since nice calculation is shabby; and he will think how he can carry out his project most nobly and splendidly, rather than how much it will cost and how it can be done most cheaply.

The magnificent man will therefore necessarily be also a liberal man. For the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; and it is in the amount and manner of his expenditure that the element ‘great’ in the magnificent or ‘greatly splendid’ c man, that is to say his greatness, is shown, these being the things in which Liberality is displayed. And the magnificent man from an equal outlay will achieve a more magnificent result d; for the same standard of excellence does not apply to an achievement as to a possession: with possessions the thing worth the highest price is the most honoured, for instance gold, but the achievement most honoured is one that is great and noble.
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θαυμαστὴ, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστὸν) καὶ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀρετὴ [μεγαλοπρέπεια] ἐν μεγέθει.

11 ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων ὁδα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοῦ, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευὰς καὶ θυσίας, ὅμοιὸς δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν δαμόνων, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοίνὸν εὐφιλοτήμητα ἔστω, οἷον εἰ ποι ορηγεῖν οὐκοῦν δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἡ τριήμηρα ἢ αρχέων ἢ καὶ ἐστὶν τὸν πόλιν. ἐν ἀπασι δ', ὡσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται, τὸ τίς ὃν καὶ πάνω ὑπαρχόντων ἀξια γὰρ δεῖ τοῦτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένθις μὲν οὖν ὃν εἰ γε μεγαλοπρεπής οὐ γὰρ ἔστω ἀφ' ὃν τολλα δαπανήσει πρεπόντως. δ' ἐπικεκινων ἡλιθίον παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετῇ δὲ τὸ ὀρθώς. πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα προὔπαρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὃν αὐτοῖς μέτεστων, καὶ τοὺς εὑρενεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἐνδόξους καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἐχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὡσπερ εἴρηται (μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ οἷον ἐντιμώτατα) τῶν δὲ ἱδίων ὅσα εἰσάπταξ γίνεται, 1133a

3 Bywater.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, IV. ii. 10-15

(since a great achievement arouses the admiration of the spectator, and the quality of causing admiration belongs to magnificence); and excellence in an achievement involves greatness. Now there are some forms of expenditure definitely entitled honourable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods—votive offerings, public buildings, sacrifices—and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions which are favourite objects of ambition, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in certain states, of equipping a chorus splendidly or fitting out a ship of war, or even of giving a banquet to the public. But in all these matters, as has been said, the scale of expenditure must be judged with reference to the person spending, that is, to his position and his resources; for expenditure should be proportionate to means, and suitable not only to the occasion but to the giver. Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means to make a great outlay suitably; the poor man who attempts Magnificence is foolish, for he spends out of proportion to his means, and beyond what he ought, whereas an act displays virtue only when it is done in the right way. But great public benefactions are suitable for those who have adequate resources derived from their own exertions or from their ancestors or connexions, and for the high-born and famous and the like, since birth, fame and so on all have an element of greatness and distinction. The magnificent man therefore is especially of this sort, and Magnificence mostly finds an outlet in these public benefactions, as we have said, since these are the greatest forms of expenditure and the ones most honoured. But Magnificence is
οἶον γάμος καὶ εἰ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλεις σπουδάζει ἡ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ἕνων δὲ ὑποδοχάς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεὰς. οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἄλλο εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς
16 ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὁμοιον. μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἷον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμῳ γὰρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανῶν ὡσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων
17 (κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον (οὐ γὰρ ταύτα ἁμοίως θεοῖς καὶ ἄνθρώποις, οὐδὲ ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ). καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἑκατοστὸν μέγα, ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν
18 τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι (σφαίρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήκυθος ἡ καλλιστή ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν παιδικὸν δώρου, 15
19 ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον), διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν δὲ δὲν ποιητὰ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπός τι ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπερβλητόν) καὶ ἔχον καὶ ἡξίων τοῦ δαπανήματος.
20 Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς· ὁ δὲ ὑπερ-

1 ἐπεὶ Asp., Felicianus: ἐπὶ.
2 μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ὑπὸ ἐπι Bywater.
3 μεγαλοπρεπὴς? Richards.

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also shown on those private occasions for expenditure which only happen once, for instance, a wedding or the like, and which arouse the interest of the general public, or of people of position; and also in welcoming foreign guests and in celebrating their departure, and in the complimentary interchange of presents; for the magnificent man does not spend money on himself but on public objects, and his gifts have some resemblance to votive offerings. It is also characteristic of the magnificent man to furnish his house in a manner suitable to his wealth, since a fine house is a sort of distinction; and to prefer spending on permanent objects, because these are the most noble; and to spend an amount that is appropriate to the particular occasion, for the same gifts are not suitable for the gods and for men, and the same expenditure is not appropriate to a sacrifice and a funeral. In fact, inasmuch as the greatness of any form of expenditure varies with its particular kind, and, although the most magnificent expenditure absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, the most magnificent in a particular case is the amount that is great in that case, and since the greatness of the result achieved is not the same as the greatness of the expenditure (for the finest ball or oil-flask does not cost much or involve a very liberal outlay, though it makes a magnificent present in the case of a child), it follows that it is the mark of the magnificent man, in expenditure of whatever kind, to produce a magnificent result (for that is a standard not easily exceeded), and a result proportionate to the cost.

Such then is the character of the magnificent man. His counterpart on the side of excess, the
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βάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν 19 ὑπερβάλλει, ὦσπερ εἰρήται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρῶνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἔραυντος γαμικῶς ἑστὶ τῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῦς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὦσπερ οἱ Μεγαροὶ. 21 καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα ποιήσει οὗ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τῶν πλούτων ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα 2 o οὐκείμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεί πολλὰ ἀναλώσαι,

21 ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ’ ὀλίγα, πολλά. δ’ δὲ μικρο-πρεπῆς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσαι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολέσαι, καὶ δ’ τι ἄν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἄν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ’ ὀδύρομενος, καὶ πάντ’ οἰό- μενος μείζων ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ, εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις αὐταὶ κακιάς, οἷς μὴν ὅνειδῇ γ’ ἐπιφέροις διὰ τὸ μῆτε βλαβερὰ τῷ πέλας εἰλαι μῆτε λίαν ἀσχή-

22 μονείς.

iii ὃ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος έοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποιά δ’ ἐστι πρῶτον 35

2 λάβωμεν διαφέρει δ’ οὐδεν ὑπὸ τὴν ἔξω ἥ τὸν κατὰ 1123 b

3 τὴν ἔξω σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὴ 4 μεγαλοψυχος εἶναι δ

1 Μεγαροὶ Bywater; Μεγαροὶ pr. K.b, μεγαρεῖς vulg.
2 τὰ τοιαύτα K.b.
3 τοι <τος> ? Richards.
4 δὴ Bywater: δὲ.

* In the earlier scenes of the comedies of Aristophanes, the chorus appear in character as charcoal-burners, cavalrymen, wasps, clouds, etc., and take part in the action of the play as such. They seem to have stripped off their outer dress for the Parabasis, or interlude, in which they address the audience on behalf of the author (Ach. 627, Pax 730). In the later scenes they tend to fall more into the position of spectators, like the chorus of tragedy; and the play usually ends with something in the nature of a triumphal procession, 212
vulgar man, exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right. He spends a great deal and makes a tasteless display on unimportant occasions: for instance, he gives a dinner to his club on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when equipping a chorus at the comedies he brings it on in purple at its first entrance, as is done at Megara. Moreover, he does all this not from a noble motive but to show off his wealth, and with the idea that this sort of thing makes people admire him; and he spends little where he ought to spend much and much where he ought to spend little. The paltry man on the other hand will err on the side of deficiency in everything; even when he is spending a great deal, he will spoil the effect for a trifle, and by hesitating at every stage and considering how he can spend least, and even so grudging what he spends and always thinking he is doing things on a greater scale than is necessary. These dispositions then are vices, but they do not bring serious discredit, since they are not injurious to others, nor are they excessively unseemly.

Greatness of Soul, as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great objects; let us first ascertain what sort of objects these are. It will make no difference whether we examine the quality itself or the person that displays the quality.

Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he when purple robes (like the scarlet worn by the chorus at the end of the Eumenides of Aeschylus) would not be inappropriate, as they would be in the opening scenes. Megarian comedy is elsewhere associated with coarse buffoonery. *megalopsychia, magnanimitas*, means lofty pride and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-mindedness (in the modern sense of the word).
μεγάλων αὐτοῦ ἄξιων ὃς ἄν. ὁ γὰρ μή κατ᾿ ἄξιαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθως, τῶν δὲ κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ᾿ ἀνόητος. μεγαλοψυχὸς μὲν 4 οὐν ὁ εἰρμηνεὺς. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ ποιῶν, 5 ἄξιων ἐαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλοψυχὸς δ᾿ οὐ. ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὁσπέρ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ᾿ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμ- 6 μετοι, καλοὶ δ᾿ οὐ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἐαυτὸν ἄξιων ἀνάξιος ὃν χαίνοις. ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἡ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς 7 χαίνοις. ὁ δ᾿ ἐλαττόνων ἡ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν 10 τε μεγάλων εὰν τε μετρίων, εάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ἄν ἐτὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτοῦ ἄξιοι. καὶ μάλιστα ἃν δόξειν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιοι· τί γὰρ ἄν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ 8 τοσοῦτων ἢν ἄξιος; ἡστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλοψυχὸς τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὅς δεῖ μέσος (τοῦ γὰρ κατ᾿ ἄξιαν αὐτοῦ ἄξιοι): οἱ δ᾿ ὑπερβάλλοντι καὶ 15 ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ 1 μεγάλων ἐαυτὸν ἄξιοι ἄξιος ἃν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα 10 ἃν εἰη. ἡ δ᾿ ἄξια λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθό- μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἄν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπο- νέμουμεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ’ ἐφιέναι οἱ ἐν ἄξιώματι, καὶ 20 τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἀθλον· τοιοῦτον δ᾿ ἡ τιμὴ. 214

1 δὴ pr. K: δὲ δὴ, 2 ὁ γὰρ Susemihl.

*The term χαίνοις does not apply to a man who deserves much but claims even more, nor to one who claims little but deserves even less.*

b Cf. pi. vi. 17.
claims much and deserves much; he who claims much without deserving it is foolish, but no one of moral excellence is foolish or senseless. The great-souled man is then as we have described. He who deserves little and claims little is modest or temperate, but not great-souled, since to be great-souled involves greatness just as handsomeness involves size: small people may be neat and well-made, but not handsome. He that claims much but does not deserve much is vain; though not everybody who claims more than he deserves is vain. He that claims less than he deserves is small-souled, whether his deserts be great or only moderate, or even though he deserves little, if he claims still less. The most small-souled of all would seem to be the man who claims less than he deserves when his deserts are great; for what would he have done had he not deserved so much?

Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the great-souled man is an extreme, by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves; while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively.

If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, Greatness of Soul must be concerned with some one object especially. ‘Worthy’ is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds; and such a thing is honour, for honour is
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μεγιστον γαρ δη τοιτο των έκτων αγαθων. περι
τιμας δη και ατιμιας ο μεγαλοφυσχος έστων ως δει.
11 και άνευ δε λογου φαινονται οι μεγαλοφυσχοι περι
τιμην ειναι τιμης γαρ μαλισθοι οι μεγαλοι αξιον
12 έαυτους, κατ' αξιαν δε. ο δε μικροφυσχος ελλειπει
και προς έαυτον και προς το μεγαλοφυσχον 25
13 αξιωμα. ο δε χανος προς έαυτον μεν υπερβαλλει,
14 ου μην τον γε μεγαλοφυσχον. ο δε μεγαλοφυσχον,
ειπερ των μεγιστων αξιων, αριστος αν ειη μειονος
γαρ αει ο βελτιων αξιων, και μεγιστων ο αριστος
των ως αληθως αρα μεγαλοφυσχον δει αγαθον ειναι.
και δοξειεν <αν >3 ειναι μεγαλοφυσχον το εν έκαστη 80
15 αρετη μεγα ουδαμως γαρ αριστοι μεγαλοφυσχου
φευγειν παρασεισαντι, ουδε αδικειν. των γαρ
ενεκα πραξει αισχρα φευγειν μεγα; καθ' 
έκαστα ο επισκοπουντι παμπαν γελοιον φαινον
αν ο μεγαλοφυσχος μη άγαθος ουν. ουκ ειη δι
ουδε τιμης αξιων φαιλος ουν της αρετης γαρ άθλουν 85
16 η τιμη, και απονεμεται τοις άγαθοις. έουκε μεν 1124
1 ol μ. sec. Bywater. 2 δοξειεν δ' L, b. <αν> Turnebus.
4 γ' ed. (? γοιν άριστοι, vel γαρ αριστοι); τ'.
5 παρασεισαντι ? Richards. ουδε διώκειν ignotus.
7 γ' add. Kb.

* * *

§§ 12, 13 should properly follow § 8.
That is, the small-souled man claims less than he
deserves and less than the great-souled man deserves and
claims; the vain man claims more than he deserves, but
not more than the great-souled man deserves and claims.

* Literally 'fleeing swinging his arms at his side,' i.e.
deficient in the virtue of Courage. If this be the meaning,
the phrase recalls by contrast the leisurely retirement of
Socrates from the stricken field of Delium (Plato, Symposium,
221 a). But the words have been taken with what follows,
as illustrating the lack of Justice or Honesty, and the whole
translated either 'outstripping an opponent in a race by

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clearly the greatest of external goods. Therefore the great-souled man is he who has the right dis-
position in relation to honours and disgraces. And even without argument it is evident that honour is the object with which the great-souled are concerned, since it is honour above all else which great men claim and deserve.

12 The small-souled man a falls short both as judged by his own deserts and in comparison with the claim of the great-souled man; the vain man on the other hand exceeds as judged by his own standard, but does not however exceed the great-souled man. b

14 And inasmuch as the great-souled man deserves most, he must be the best of men; for the better a man is the more he deserves, and he that is best deserves most. Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man. Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with greatness of soul. For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at full speed when retreating in battle, c nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct has a man to whom nothing is great d? Considering all the virtues in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture the great-souled man as other than a good man. Moreover, if he were had, he would not be worthy of honour, since honour is the prize of virtue, and the tribute that we pay to the good. Greatness of Soul seems therefore to flinging the arms backward [which was considered unsports-
manlike], nor fouling,' or else 'being prosecuted on a charge of blackmailing, nor cheating in business.' Emendation would give a buried verse-quotation, 'To swing his arms in flight, nor in pursuit.'

a i.e., nothing is of much value in his eyes (cf. §§ 30, 34), so that gain, which is a motive to dishonesty with others, is no temptation to him.
οὖν ἡ μεγαλουσία οἰον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἅρετῶν. μείζους γὰρ αὐτᾶς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ εἴκείων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἁλθείᾳ μεγαλοσύνην εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸν τε ἄνευ καλοκα-

γαθίας. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλοσύνης ἔστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκεῖων τυχάνων καὶ ἑλπτόνων ἅρετῆς γὰρ παντελῶς οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμὴ· οὖ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦς μείζων αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπων ἄλγυρρήσει, οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιοσ· ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας, οὐ γὰρ έσται δικαῖως

περὶ αὐτῶν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ἀσπερ εἰρηται, ὁ μεγαλοσύνης περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείων καὶ πάσαν εὔτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' ἐνευσυχών περικράτης ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχών περιλυπτόσ. οὔτ' γὰρ περὶ τιμῆς οὔτως ἔχει, [ὡς] ¹ μέγιστον οὖν (ἂν γὰρ δυναστείαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται). ὡς δ' ἡ τιμὴ μικρὸν ἐστιν, τούτῳ καὶ τάλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσίν εἶναι. ²

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὔτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλουσίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἄξιονται τιμῆς

1 [ὡς] Ramsauer.

2 δ' ἐν L."
be as it were a crowning ornament of the virtues; it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great-souled, for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility.

17 Honour and dishonour then are the objects with which the great-souled man is especially concerned. Great honours accorded by persons of worth will afford him pleasure in a moderate degree: he will feel he is receiving only what belongs to him, or even less, for no honour can be adequate to the merits of perfect virtue, yet all the same he will deign to accept their honours, because they have no greater tribute to offer him. Honour rendered by common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise, for this is not what he merits. He will also despise dishonour, for no dishonour can justly attach to him. The great-souled man then, as has been said, is especially concerned with honour; but he will also observe due measure in respect to wealth, power, and good and bad fortune in general, as they may befall him; he will not rejoice overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity. For he does not care much even about honour, which is the greatest of external goods (since power and wealth are desirable only for the honour they bring, at least their possessors wish to be honoured for their sake); he therefore to whom even honour is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. Hence great-souled men are thought to be haughty.

18 But it is thought that the gifts of fortune also conduce to greatness of soul; for the high-born and those who are powerful or wealthy are esteemed
καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἦν πλούσιοι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ, τὸ δὲ ἄγαθόν ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοφυκτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται 20 γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. καὶ ἀληθεῖαν δὲ οὗ ἄγαθός μόνος τε 
τιμητέος· δὲ ἀμφοῖ ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἄξιονται τιμῆς. οἷον δὲ ἀνευ ἄρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγαθα ἔχοντες οὐτε δικαίως ἐαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἄξιον οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλοφυκτὸ

21 παντελῶς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ 
ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἄγαθὰ γίγνον- 
ται· ἀνευ γὰρ ἄρετῆς οὐ δίδων φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ 
ἐντυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχεις ἐκεῖνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, 
αὐτὸ τὸ τι ἄν τύχωσι πράττοντων. μμισθοῦ 
γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόφυκχον σοῦ ὀμοίως ὀντες, τούτο δὲ 
δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄρετην οὐ 
22 πράττοντι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὲν 
γὰρ μεγαλόφυκχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει 
23 γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οὶ δὲ παλαιοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ 
μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα 
τιμῶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δὲ, καὶ ὅταν κυδυνεύῃ, 
ἀφείδης τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὑπὸ πάντως ζῆν. 
24 καὶ οἷος ἐν ποιεῖν, εὐρεγετοῦμενος δὲ αἰσχύνεται.
worthy of honour, because they are superior to their fellows, and that which is superior in something good is always held in higher honour; so that even these gifts of fortune make men more great-souled, because their possessors are honoured by some people. But in reality only the good man ought to be honoured, although he that has both virtue and fortune is esteemed still more worthy of honour; whereas those who possess the goods of fortune without virtue are not justified in claiming high worth, and cannot correctly be styled great-souled, since true worth and greatness of soul cannot exist without complete virtue. It is true that even those who merely possess the goods of fortune may be haughty and insolent; because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly, and such men, being unable to carry their prosperity, and thinking themselves superior to the rest of mankind, despise other people, although their own conduct is no better than another's. The fact is that they try to imitate the great-souled man without being really like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not his virtuous conduct.

22 For the great-souled man is justified in despising other people—his estimates are correct; but most proud men have no good ground for their pride.

23 The great-souled man does not run into danger for trifling reasons, and is not a lover of danger, because there are few things he values; but he will face danger in a great cause, and when so doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that life is not worth having at every price.

24 He is fond of conferring benefits, but ashamed to receive them, because the former is a mark of
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tὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δὲ ὑπερεχομένου.
καὶ ἀντευπερεχομένους πλείονων οὕτω γὰρ οἱ προσ-
25 ὁφλήσαει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθῶς. δοκοῦσι
δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὐ2 ἄν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὅν3 δὲ ἄν
πάθωσιν οὐ (ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθῶν εὖ τοῦ ποιῆ-
σαντος, βούλεται4 δὲ ὑπερέχειν), καὶ τὰ μὲν ἥδεως 15
ἀκούειν, τὰ δὲ ἄγδας5 διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτων οὐ λέγειν
τὸς εὐφρενίας τῷ Διό, οὐδ' οἱ Δάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
26 Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἀ πεπονθέσαν εὖ. μεγαλομηχύχου
δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ
προθύμως: καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν δαιμονιαῖς, καὶ
ἐυτυχίας μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον. 20
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνὸν, τῶν
δὲ βαθιον, καὶ ἐπ'6 ἐκεῖνοι μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ
ἀγεννέσ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς
27 τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐντιμα μὴ
ιέναι, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι. καὶ ἄργον εἶναι
καὶ μελλῆτην ἄλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμή μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, 25
καὶ ὀλγῶν μὲν πρακτικὸν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ
28 ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισθὴ εἶναι
καὶ φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου),
καὶ μέλεω8 τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ

1 of add. K; 2 oBywater: oθς (ὁν Asp.). 3 <υφ> ὅν Muenscher, 4 δοκοῦσι 5 ἄγδας Bywater: ἄγδας. 6 ἐπ' K; ἐν.
7 φανερομισθὴ cod. Morelin: φανερομισθὴ πρ' K, φανερόμισθον vulg. 8 ἀμέλειν pr K.

a An incorrect recollection of Iliad, i. 393 ff., 503 f.; there Achilles says that his mother has often reminded Zeus how
she rescued him when the other gods wished to put him in
chains; and Thetis goes to Zeus and reminds him of her
services in general terms.
b The reference is uncertain.

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superiority and the latter of inferiority. He returns a service done to him with interest, since this will put the original benefactor into his debt in turn, and make him the party benefited. The great-souled are thought to have a good memory for any benefit they have conferred, but a bad memory for those which they have received (since the recipient of a benefit is the inferior of his benefactor, whereas they desire to be superior); and to enjoy being reminded of the former but to dislike being reminded of the latter: this is why the poet makes Thetis not specify her services to Zeus; nor did the Spartans treating with the Athenians recall the occasions when Sparta had aided Athens, but those on which Athens had aided Sparta.

It is also characteristic of the great-souled man never to ask help from others, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly; and to be haughty towards men of position and fortune, but courteous towards those of moderate station, because it is difficult and distinguished to be superior to the great, but easy to outdo the lowly, and to adopt a high manner with the former is not ill-bred, but it is vulgar to lord it over humble people: it is like putting forth one's strength against the weak. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition, or go where other people take the first place; and he will be idle and slow to act, except when pursuing some high honour or achievement; and will not engage in many undertakings, but only in such as are important and distinguished. He must be open both in love and in hate, since concealment shows timidity; and care more for the truth than for what people will think; and speak
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λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς (παρρησιαστὴς) γὰρ
diὰ τὸ καταφρονητικός εἶναι, καὶ ἀληθευτικός.
πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δὴ εἰρωνεύαν ἑίρων δὲ πρὸς τὸν
πολλοὺς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἄλλος ἡ
φίλον (δουλικὸν γὰρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες
θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες). οὐδὲ θαυμα-
στικός· οὔθεν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἔστιν. οὐδὲ μονη-
κακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοπρόχου τὸ ἀπομνημονευμένον,

31 ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἄλλα μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδὲν ἄνθρωποι· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἕτερον· οὔτε γὰρ ἢν ἐπαινηταί· μελείς αὐτῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ψεύδονται (οὔτε οἱ ἐπαινητικὸς ἔστιν). διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ

32 δὲ ύβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἡ μικρᾶ Ἡκίστα
δολοφυτικὸς καὶ θετικὸς· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ.

33 οὕτως ἐξευθεῖ ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος κεκτήθαι
μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀκαρπὰ τῶν καρπίμων καὶ

34 ὑβελλόμενοι· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κόσμος
δὲ βραδεία τοῦ μεγαλοπρόχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φως
βαρεία, καὶ λέξεις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς· δὲ

35 περὶ ὅλγα σπουδαῖων, οὐδὲ σύντονον. οὐδὲν μέγα
οἴόμενος· ἡ δὲ ζυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτής διὰ
tοῦτων.

Τούτων μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρόχος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλεῖπτων
μικροφυχος, ὁ δὲ ὑπερβάλλων χαῖνος. οὐ κακοὶ
μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσι εἶναι οὗτος οὕτως, οὐ γὰρ κακο-
ποιοὶ εἰσὶ, ἡμαρτημένοι δὲ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρό-

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1 sir Bywater: παρρησιαστικὸς γὰρ· διὸ καταφρονητικὸς· κατα-

2 ἐφρων ? Susemihl: ἐφρων N³, εφρωνεὶς vulg.

3 ἡ πρὸς L₁.

* See note on π. vii. 12. b Cf. c. ii. 22.

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and act openly, since as he despises other men he is outspoken and frank, except when speaking with ironical self-deprecation, as he does to common people. He will be incapable of living at the will of another, unless a friend, since to do so is slavish, and hence flatterers are always servile, and humble people flatterers. He is not prone to admiration, since nothing is great to him. He does not bear a grudge, for it is not a mark of greatness of soul to recall things against people, especially the wrongs they have done you, but rather to overlook them.

He is no gossip, for he will not talk either about himself or about another, as he neither wants to receive compliments nor to hear other people run down (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he deliberately intends to give offence. In troubles that cannot be avoided or trifling mishaps he will never cry out or ask for help, since to do so would imply that he took them to heart. He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show his independence more.

Other traits generally attributed to the great-souled man are a slow gait, a deep voice, and a deliberate utterance; to speak in shrill tones and walk fast denotes an excitable and nervous temperament, which does not belong to one who cares for few things and thinks nothing great.

Such then being the Great-souled man, the corresponding character on the side of deficiency is the Small-souled man, and on that of excess the Vain man. These also are not thought to be actually vicious, since they do no harm, but rather mistaken.
ψυχος ἄξιος ὃν ἄγαθων ἑαυτὸν ἀποστέρει ὃν 30 ἄξιος ἐστι, καὶ ἐσοκε κακόν ἐχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἄξιουν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἄγαθων [καὶ ἄγνοειν δι᾽ ἑαυτὸν]. ὦρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὃν ἄξιος ἦν, ἄγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἡλιθιοὶ γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀκνηροὶ. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρως ποιεῖν· ἐκαστῷ γὰρ ἐφίενται 35 τῶν κατ' ἄξιαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἄγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλιθιοὶ καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἄγνοοντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς. οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοὺς ἐντύμοις ἐπι- χειροῦν, εἰτα ἐξελέγχονται καὶ ἐσθήτῃ κοσμοῦν- 38 ται καὶ σχῆματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσιν ἐπὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι.

37 Ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχίᾳ μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χείρον ἐστιν.

38 Ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμῆν ἐστὶ μεγά- 38 λη, ὡσπερ εἰρηται.

Ἐσοκε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις ἐξέλθῃ, ἤ δοξείες ἂν παραπλησίως ἐχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὡσπερ καὶ ἢ ἐλευθερίας πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρεπείαν. ἀμφοὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστάσι, περὶ 5

1 [καὶ ... ἑαυτῶν] ed. (v.l. ἄγνοιει Stewart).
2 ἡλιθιοὶ om. K b. 3 οὐ K b, ὡς vulg. 4 αὐτῶν L b T.

† These words seem to be interpolated. The small-souled man does not claim his deserts, but he may know what they are; he is not charged with ignorance of self, as is the vain man, § 36.

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The small-souled man deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him [and also that he does not know himself], for (people argue), if he deserved any good, he would try to obtain it. Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather too retiring; yet this estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men's ambitions show what they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and pursuits, and forgo the good things of life, presumably they think they are not worthy of them.

36 The vain on the other hand are foolish persons, vanity, who are deficient in self-knowledge and expose their defect: they undertake honourable responsibilities of which they are not worthy, and then are found out. They are ostentatious in dress, manner and so on. They want people to know how well off they are, and talk about it, imagining that this will make them respected.

37 Smallness of Soul is more opposed than Vanity to Greatness of Soul, being both more prevalent and worse.

38 Greatness of Soul then, as we have said, is concerned with great honours.

44 It appears however that honour also, as was said in the first part of this work, has a certain virtue concerned with it, which may be held to bear the same relation to Greatness of Soul that Liberality bears to Magnificence. This virtue as well as Liberality is without the element of greatness, but

* A variant reading is 'talk about themselves.'
* *i.e.*, honour as well as wealth is the object of both a major and a minor virtue: see π. vii. 8.
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dé tā métra kai tā mikrā diagnostēasv ἦμας ὡς
2 deî. óswper δὲ ἐν λῆψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἐλλεψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὑπέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ καὶ ἦττον, καὶ τὸ
3 ódēn deî καὶ ὡς deî. τὸν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγο-
μεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ καὶ ὀδὴν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς
ἐφιέμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς
4 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δὲ οτὲ τὸν
φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρῶδη καὶ φιλόκαλον,
tὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σωφρόνα, ὡσπερ
cαὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. δὴ λοι δ᾽ οτι πλεονα-
χῶς τοῦ φιλοτιμουτοῦ λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
5 ἑλεῖ φέρομεν τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαινοῦτες μὲν
ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἡ οὐ πολλοὶ, ψέγοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλ-
λον ἡ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμονον δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς
ἐρήμης έοικεν ἄμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἀκρα. ἐν οἷς δ᾽
6 ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον ὃρε-
gονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ καὶ ἦττον ἐστὶ
7 δὴ καὶ ὡς deî. ἐπαινεῖται δὲ οὖν ἡ εξίς αὐτῆς,
μεσότης οὕσα περὶ τιμῆν ἀνωνύμος. φαίνεται δὲ
πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
8 ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφό-
tέρα πως. ἐοικε δὲ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας
ἀρετὰς ἀντικείσθαι δὲ ἐνταῦθα οἱ ἀκροὶ φαινονται
diὰ τὸ μῆ ἀνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

1 τὸ Bywater: τὸν.
2 ἔστῃ δ᾽ οτὲ Mb.
3 δ᾽ οὖν Kβ: οὖν LαΓ, γοῦν HαNβ.

a See ii. viii. 8.

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causes us to be rightly disposed towards moderate and small honours as Liberality does towards moderate and small amounts of money; and just as there is a mean and also excess and deficiency in getting and in giving money, so also it is possible to pursue honour more or less than is right and also to seek it from the right source and in the right way. We blame a man as ambitious if he seeks honour more than is right, or from wrong sources; we blame him as unambitious if he does not care about receiving honour even on noble grounds. But at another time we praise the ambitious man as manly and a lover of what is noble, or praise the unambitious man as modest and temperate, as we said in the first part of this work. The fact is that the expression ‘fond of’ so-and-so is ambiguous, and we do not always apply the word ‘fond of honour’ (ambitious) to the same thing; when we use it as a term of praise, we mean ‘more fond of honour than most men,’ but when as a reproach, ‘more than is right.’ As the observance of the mean has no name, the two extremes dispute as it were for the unclaimed estate. But where there is excess and deficiency there must also be a mean. Now men do seek honour both more and less than is right; it must therefore be possible also to do so rightly. It is therefore this nameless middle disposition in regard to honour that we really praise. Compared with ambition it appears unambitiousness, and compared with unambitiousness it appears ambition; compared with both, it appears in a sense to be both. This seems to be true of the other virtues also; but in the present case the extremes appear to be opposed only to one another, because the middle character has no name.
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5 Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς, ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν
2 ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνωνύμου οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἢν τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὑπ
3 ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ὦς δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεὶ ὀργιζόμενος, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς δεὶ καὶ ὡς δεὶ καὶ ὡς ὁ σοὶ χρόνου, ἑπανεῖται πρᾶος δὴ οὕτως ἢν εἰπ' ἐπερ ἡ πραότης ἑπανεῖται (βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἄταραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἢν ὁ λόγος τάξει, ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπὸν τοῦ χρόνου χα...
4 λεπαίνειν' ἁμάρτανεν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν' οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικός ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλ-
5 λον συγγνωμονικός). ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἰτ' ἀργησία τίς ἐστὶν εἰν' ὁ τε δὴ ποτε, ψέγεται· οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' ὦς δεὶ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσι εἶναι, καὶ 6 οἱ μὴ ὡς δεὶ μηδ' ὦς μηδ' ὦς δεὶ δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προσπηλαχιζόμενον ἢν ἐχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἶκείους περιορὰν ἄνδρας γίνεται.
7 ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται (καὶ γὰρ

1 ἐστὶ μὲν Ἐ.
2 τὸν Victorius.

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Gentleness is the observance of the mean in relation to anger. There is as a matter of fact no recognized name for the mean in this respect—indeed there can hardly be said to be names for the extremes either—so we apply the word Gentleness to the mean though really it inclines to the side of the defect. This has no name, but the excess may be called a sort of Irascibility, for the emotion concerned is anger, though the causes producing it are many and various.

Now we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time. He may then be called gentle-tempered, if we take gentleness to be a praiseworthy quality (for 'gentle' really denotes a calm temper, not led by emotion but only becoming angry in such a manner, for such causes and for such a length of time as principle may ordain; although the quality is thought rather to err on the side of defect, since the gentle-tempered man is not prompt to seek redress for injuries, but rather inclined to forgive them).

The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of Lack of Spirit or what not, is blamed; since those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, and with the right people. It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry he will not stand up for himself; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or suffer one’s friends to be insulted.

Excess also is possible in each of these ways, for
οίς οὐ δεὶ, καὶ ἐφ’ οίς οὐ δεὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεὶ, καὶ θάττουν, καὶ πλείω χρόνον), οὐ μὴν ἀπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναις εἶναι τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὅλοκληρον ἢ, 8 ἁφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλου ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἴς οὐ δεὶ καὶ ἐφ’ οίς οὐ δεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεὶ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως. δ’ καὶ βέλτιστον 15 ἔχουσιν· συμβαίνει δ’ αὐτοῖς τούτο ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσιν τὴν ὀργήν ἀλλ’ ἀνταποδιδόσαν ἢ φανερὸν εἰσιν 9 διὰ τὴν ὄξυτητα, εἰτ’ ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολὴ δ’ εἰσίν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πάν ὀργίλοι καὶ 10 ἐπὶ παντὶ ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδία- λυτοὶ, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμὸν. παύλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἢ γὰρ τιμωρία παῦει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λάπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοῖς οὐδές, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέσαι τὴν 25 ὀργὴν χρόνον δεῖται. 1 εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς 11 ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ’ οίς τε μὴ δεὶ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεὶ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ δι- 12 ἀλλαττομένους ἁνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. τῇ πράοτητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν·

1 δεῖται Bywater: δεῖ.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, IV. v. 7–12

one can be angry with the wrong people, for the wrong things, or more violently or more quickly or longer than is right; but not all these excesses of temper are found in the same person. This would be impossible, since evil destroys even itself, and when present in its entirety becomes unbearable. 

8 There are then first the Irascible, who get angry quickly and with the wrong people and for the wrong things and too violently, but whose anger is soon over. This last is the best point in their character, and it is due to the fact that they do not keep their anger in, but being quick-tempered display it openly by retaliating, and then have done with it. The excessively quick-tempered are Passionate; they fly into a passion at everything and on all occasions: hence their name. The Bitter-tempered on the other hand are implacable, and remain angry a long time, because they keep their wrath in; whereas when a man retaliates there is an end of the matter: the pain of resentment is replaced by the pleasure of obtaining redress, and so his anger ceases. But if they do not retaliate, men continue to labour under a sense of resentment—for as their anger is concealed no one else tries to placate them either, and it takes a long time to digest one’s wrath within one. Bitterness is the most troublesome form of bad temper both to a man himself and to his nearest friends. Those who lose their temper at the wrong things, and more and longer than they ought, and who refuse to be reconciled without obtaining redress or retaliating, we call Harsh-tempered.

12 We consider the excess to be more opposed to Gentleness than the defect, because it occurs more
καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται (ἀνθρωπικῶτερον γὰρ τὸ τρὶς 
τιμωρεῖσθαι), καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιών οἱ χαλεποὶ 
χέιρας.

13 "Ο δὲ καὶ έν τοῖς πρῶτοι εὑρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν 
λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ράδιον διορίσαι τὸ πώς 
καὶ τίς καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺς καὶ πάσον χρόνον ὁρυστέον, 85 
καὶ τὸ μέχρι τῶν ὁρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἡ ἀμαρτάνει. 
ὅ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' 
ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἑττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς 
ἐλλείποντας ἐπανοικεῖ καὶ πράσοις φαμέν, καὶ 1126b 
τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους 
ἀρχεῖν. ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, 
οὐ ράδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' 
εἴκαστα, κἂν1 τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τὸ γε 
τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἐξεῖ ἐπανευτῇ, 
καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὁρυεύομεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς 
δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ 
ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γυνώμεναι 
ηρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. 
15 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἐξεῖς ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν 
οὖν περὶ τῆς ὁργῆς ἐξεῖς εἰρήσωσαν.

vi Ἔν δὲ ταῖς ὀμλίασι καὶ τῷ συζήτῃ καὶ λόγων 
καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ὀρεσκοὶ δοκοῦσιν 
εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἥδονὴν ἐπανοικεῖν καὶ οὐθέν

1 κἂν Bywater (καὶ ἐν: Rainsauer): καὶ.

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* p. ix. 7-9, a passage closely repeated here.

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frequently, human nature being more prone to seek redress than to forgive; and because the harsh-tempered are worse to live with than the unduly placable.

13 But what was said above is also clear from what we are now saying; it is not easy to define in what manner and with whom and on what grounds and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point one does right in so doing and where error begins. For he who transgresses the limit only a little is not held blameworthy, whether he errs on the side of excess or defect; in fact, we sometimes praise those deficient in anger and call them gentle-tempered, and we sometimes praise those who are harsh-tempered as manly, and fitted to command. It is therefore not easy to pronounce on principle what degree and manner of error is blameworthy, since this is a matter of the particular circumstances, and judgement rests with the faculty of perception.

14 But thus much at all events is clear, that the middle disposition is praiseworthy, which leads us to be angry with the right people for the right things in the right manner and so on, while the various forms of excess and defect are blameworthy—when of slight extent, but little so, when greater, more, and when extreme, very blameworthy indeed. It is clear therefore that we should strive to attain the middle disposition.

15 Let this be our account of the dispositions related to anger.

vi In society and the common life and intercourse of conversation and business, some men are considered to be Obsequious; these are people who complaisantly approve of everything and never raise
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ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἴομενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐν-

2 τυγχάνονσιν εἶναι· οἳ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτων πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὁριοῦν φροντὶζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσερήδες καλοῦνται.

3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρήμεναι ἡγεῖσθαι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἀδηλοῦν, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπανετή, καθ' ἂν ἂν ἀποδέξεται ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοῦς δὲ καὶ δυσ-

4 χερανεῖ. ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἐστι δὲ μᾶλλοντα φιλία· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἔστω ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἐξισοφοροῦνν οὐκ βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ.

5 φιλοῦ, τὸ στέργεις προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὀμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἡ ἐχθαῖρειν ἀποδέχεται ἐκαστὰ ὡς δεί, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. ὁμοῖος 25 γὰρ πρὸς ἀγωνίας καὶ γνωρίμως καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἁσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἄρμοζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοῖος προσήκει συνήθως καὶ

6 θυμεῖν φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὐτὴν λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἰρηται ὅτι ὡς δεὶς δείκνυσι, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον σχολάσεται τοῦ ἂν 30

7 λυπεῖν ἢ συνηθύνειν. ἐστὶ δὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὸς ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις γνωρείας, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλα-

1 βερὸν συνηθύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ

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* At p. vii. 13 it was actually termed φιλία, Friendliness.

* So. by refusing to participate.
objections, but think it a duty to avoid giving pain
to those with whom they come in contact. Those
on the contrary who object to everything and do
not care in the least what pain they cause, are called
Surly or Quarrelsome. Now it is clear that the dis-
positions described are blameworthy, and that the
middle disposition between them is praiseworthy—
that is, the tendency to acquiesce in the right
things, and likewise to disapprove of the right things,
in the right manner. But to this no special name
has been assigned, though it very closely resembles
friendship\(^a\); for he who exemplifies this middle dis-
position is the sort of man we mean by the expres-
sion ‘a good friend;’ only that includes an element
of affection. It differs from friendship in not pos-sess-
ing the emotional factor of affection for one’s associ-
ates; since a man of this character takes everything
in the right way not from personal liking or dislike,
but from natural amiability. He will behave with
the same propriety towards strangers and acquaint-
ances alike, towards people with whom he is familiar
and those with whom he is not—though preserving
the shades of distinction proper to each class, since
it is not appropriate to show the same regard or
disregard for the feelings of friends and of strangers.

We have said then in general terms that he will
behave in the right manner in society. We mean
that in designing either to give pain or to contribute
pleasure he will be guided by considerations of
honour and of expediency. For he seems to be
concerned with pleasure and pain in social inter-
course. He will disapprove of pleasures in which
it is dishonourable or harmful to himself for him to
join, preferring to give pain\(^b\); and he will also dis-
ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἥ βλάβην, ἥ δ’ ἐναντίωσις 85 μικράν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἄλλα δυσχεραινεῖ.

8 διαφερόντως δ’ ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχόσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἥ ἤττον γνωρίμοις, ὅμοιως 1127α δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰς, ἐκάστοις ἀπομέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ’ εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ’ ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἕαν ἢ μείζων, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ 9 καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονής δ’ ἐνεκα.

9 τῆς εἰσαύθις μεγάλης1 μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιούτος ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀνόμασται δὲ· τοῖς δὲ συνηδύνοντος δὲ μὲν τοῦ ἡδος ἐλευθεραίον ἂν ἡ δ’ ἢπος εὐφέλει ὁ τοῦ αὐτῶν γίγνεται εἰς θρήματα καὶ οὕτω διὰ θρήματων, κόλαξ. δ’ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι 10 δύσκολος καὶ δύσορις. ἀντικείσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

vii Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἔστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας2 μεσότης. ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή· ὁυ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον 15 τε γὰρ ἂν εἴδωλης τὰ περὶ τὸ ἤθος, καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύονται ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον

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1 μεγάλης om. Kb.
2 ἀλαζονείας <καὶ εἰρωνείας> Bywater.

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* See note on 11. vii. 12.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, IV. vi. 7—vii. 1

approve of and refuse to acquiesce in a pleasure that brings any considerable discredit or harm to the agent, if his opposition will not cause much pain. And he will comport himself differently with men of high position and with ordinary people, with persons more and less well known to him, and similarly as regards other distinctions, assigning to each class the proper degree of deference, and, other things apart, preferring to join in the pleasures of his companions and being reluctant to give pain; but being guided by the consequences, that is to say, the effects on his and his friends' credit or interest, if these outweigh the pleasure he will give by compliance. Also he will give a small amount of pain at the moment for the sake of a large amount of pleasure in the future.

Such is the middle character, although it has no name. The man who always joins in the pleasures of his companions, if he sets out to be pleasant for no ulterior motive, is Obsequious; if he does so for the sake of getting something by it in the shape of money or money's worth, he is a Flatterer. He that disapproves of everything is, as we said, Surliness. As the mean has no name, the extremes appear to be opposite to each other.

The observance of the mean in relation to Boastfulness has to do with almost the same things. It also is without a name; but it will be as well to discuss these unnamed excellences with the rest, since we shall the better understand the nature of the moral character if we examine its qualities one by one; and we shall also confirm our belief that the virtues are modes of observing the mean, if we notice how this holds good in every


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συνεδόντες. ἐν δὴ τῷ συζήτην οἵ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμαλοῦντες εἰρημένοι, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθεύοντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἰπὼμεν ὁμοίως 20 ἐν λόγωι καὶ πράξει καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι.

2 δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζών προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειώνων ἢ ὑπάρχει,

3 ὁ δὲ εἰρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ 4 ἐλάττων ποιεῖν, ὅ δὲ μέσος αὐθέντοσίς τις ὑν ἀληθεύτικὸς κἀπὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὕτε μείζων 5 οὕτε ἐλάττων. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἐκαστὰ καὶ ἑνεκὰ τῶν ποιεῖν καὶ μηθενὸς· ἐκαστὸς δ' ὁδὸς ἐστι, τοιαύτα λέγει καὶ πράξει καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μὴ 6 τῶν ἑνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἰεύδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτὸν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπανετέων· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος 80 ὑν ἐπανετέως, οὐ δὲ ἰεύδομενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτὸ, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἐκαστὸν δ' 7 εἰπὼμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθεύτικοι. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδὲ ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν εἰῆ ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς 1127a μηθενὸς τοιοῦτον διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν 8 βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἐξίσι τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξεω δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύει καὶ 5

1 [καὶ] Imelmann.
2 κἀπι Bywater: καὶ.

a This oddly contradicts the preceding words.
b Viz. Justice, Book V.
instance. Now we have treated of behaviour in society with relation to giving pleasure and pain. Let us now discuss truthfulness and falsehood similarly displayed in word and deed, and in one's personal pretensions.

2 As generally understood then, the boaster is a man who pretends to creditable qualities that he does not possess, or possesses in a lesser degree than he makes out, while conversely the self-depreciator disclaims or disparages good qualities that he does possess; midway between them is the straightforward sort of man who is sincere both in behaviour and in speech, and admits the truth about his own qualifications without either exaggeration or understatement. Each of these things may be done with or without an ulterior motive; but when a man is acting without ulterior motive, his words, actions, and conduct always represent his true character.\(^a\) Falsehood is in itself base and reprehensible, and truth noble and praiseworthy; and similarly the sincere man who stands between the two extremes is praised, and the insincere of both kinds are blamed, more especially the boaster. Let us discuss each of the two, beginning with the truthful man.

7 We are speaking not of truthfulness in business relations, nor in matters where honesty and dishonesty are concerned (for these matters would come under a different virtue\(^b\)), but of cases where a man is truthful both in speech and conduct when no considerations of honesty come in, from an habitual sincerity of disposition. Such sincerity may be esteemed a moral excellence; for the lover of truth, who is truthful even when nothing depends on it, will
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ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἐτὶ μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ αἰσχρῶν τὸ ἰεύ-
δος εὐλαβὴσται, ο γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο.
9 ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ
μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλινεῖ. ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ
10 φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς υπερβολὰς εἶναι. ὁ
δὲ μείζων τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος μη-
θενός ἔνεκα φαύλω μὲν ἐοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξαιρε-
τῷ ψεῦδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἡ κακός.
11 εἶ δὲ ἔνεκα τινός, δὴ μὲν δόξης ἡ τιμὴς οὐ λίαν
ψεκτὸς [ὦς ὁ ἀλαζών], ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίων, ἡ ὅσα εἰς
12 ἀργυρίων, ἀσχημονέστερος. (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ὁ
ἐστίν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει. κατὰ τὴν
15 ἐξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τρούσε στε στὶν ἀλαζῶν ἑστω;) ὧσ-
περ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεῦδει αὐτῷ χαῖρων,
13 ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἡ κέρδος. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης
χάρων ἀλαζοεῦμενοι τὰ τουάλτα προσποιοῦνται
ἐφ' οἷς ἐπαινος ἡ εὐδαιμονία, οἱ δὲ κέρδους,
ἐὼν καὶ ἀπολαυσίς ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεὶν εἰς
ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντων σοφῶν ἰατρῶν. διὰ
τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τουάλτα καὶ
ἀλαζοεῦμεναι. ἐστι γὰρ ἂν αὐτῶς τὰ εἰρημένα.
14 οἱ δὲ εἰρωνεῖς ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι
μὲν τὰ ἡθη φαίνονται, οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἐνεκα

1 οὗ Λb: ὅσ.
2 ἀποκλινεῖ Coraee: ἀποκλινεῖ.
3 el. Hel.
5 οὐκ . . . ἀλαζών ἐστι post εἰρημένα § 13 fin. hubuisse videtur Asp. (Bywater): nescio an secludenda.
6 καὶ Κb: καὶ δ.
7 σοφῶν ἰατρῶν Κb: σοφῶν ἡ ἰατρῶν ΜbLb: ἡ ἰατρῶν σοφῶν Ob: ἰατρῶν ἡ μάντων σοφῶν ΘEaNb.

*The true text very probably is 'for example ''physician or seer sage,''' a verse quotation.

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a fortiori be truthful when some interest is at stake, since having all along avoided falsehood for its own sake, he will assuredly avoid it when it is morally base; and this is a disposition that we praise. The sincere man will diverge from the truth, if at all, in the direction of understatement rather than exaggeration; since this appears in better taste, as all excess is offensive.

10 The man who pretends to more merit than he possesses for no ulterior object seems, it is true, to be a person of inferior character, since otherwise he would not take pleasure in falsehood; but he appears to be more foolish than vicious. When, on the other hand, a man exaggerates his own merits to gain some object, if that object is glory or honour he is not very much to be blamed [as is the boaster], but if he boasts to get money or things that fetch money, this is more unseemly. (Boastfulness is not a matter of potential capacity but of deliberate purpose; a man is a boaster if he has a fixed disposition to boast—a boastful character.) Similarly liars are divided into those who like lying for its own sake and those who lie to get reputation or profit. Those then who boast for the sake of reputation pretend to possess such qualities as are praised and admired; those who do so for profit pretend to accomplishments that are useful to their fellows and also can be counterfeited without detection; for instance, a proficiency in prophecy, philosophy, or medicine. Because these arts have the two qualities specified they are the commonest fields of pretence and bragging.

14 Self-depreciators, who understate their own merits, seem of a more refined character, for we feel that the
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δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρὸν.  
μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὕτω τὰ ἐνδοξα ἀπανθοῦνται, οἷον 25
καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίησε. οἶ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ
φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] 3 βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγον-
tαι καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροι εἰσιν. καὶ ἐνίοτε
ἀλαξονεῖα φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἔσθησι·
καὶ γὰρ ὡς ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλεψις ἀλαξο
κονίκον.  
16 οἳ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ 30
μὴ λιὰν ἐμποδῶν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνεύομενοι χαρίε
νεῖς φαίνεται.
17 Ἀντικείσθαι δ’ ὁ ἀλαξῶν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευ-
tικῷ: χείρων γάρ.

viii Οὖσις δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν
ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδίας, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα
εἶναι ὁμολογία τῆς ἐμελήσεως, καὶ οἶα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ 1128 a
ὡς, ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ἄκοουσι· διοίκησε δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν
2 τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἢ τοιούτῳ ἄκοουσι. δῆλον δ’ ὡς
καὶ περὶ ταύτῃ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολῇ τε καὶ ἔλλεψις τοῦ
3 μέσου. οἳ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοῖῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες
βαυκοπανοῦργοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φωτικοί, γλυχό-
μενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζό-
μενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἡ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα
καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον. οἳ δὲ μὴ
αὐτῷ ἀν εἰποῦντες μηθὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγοντι

1 ὀχληρῶν Kb.  
2 δὲ Kb: δὲ καὶ.
3 [προσποιούμενοι] Vahlen: ἀπαρνοῦμενοι Asp., Hel.
4 εὐκαταφρονητότεροι Kb: εὐκαταφρόνητοι.

a Just as boastfulness is chiefly shown in pretending to qualities of value.

b Aristotle regards the cheapness and simplicity of the Spartans' dress as an affectation; or perhaps the reference is to ' 'Laconizers' at Athens who affected Spartan manners.
motive underlying this form of insincerity is not gain but dislike of ostentation. These also, mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim merely trifling or obvious distinctions are called affected humbugs, and are decidedly contemptible; and sometimes such mock humility seems to be really boastfulness, like the dress of the Spartans, for extreme negligence in dress, as well as excessive attention to it, has a touch of ostentation. But a moderate use of self-deprecation in matters not too commonplace and obvious has a not ungraceful air.

The boaster seems to be the opposite of the sincere man, because Boastfulness is worse than Self-deprecation.

But life also includes relaxation, and one form of relaxation is playful conversation. Here, too, we feel that there is a certain standard of good taste in social behaviour, and a certain propriety in the sort of things we say and in our manner of saying them, and also in the sort of things we allow to be said to us; and it will also concern us whether those in whose company we speak or to whom we listen conform to the same rules of propriety. And it is clear that in these matters too it is possible either to exceed or to fall short of the mean.

Those then who go to excess in ridicule are thought to be buffoons and vulgar fellows, who itch to have their joke at all costs, and are more concerned to raise a laugh than to keep within the bounds of decorum and avoid giving pain to the object of their raillery. Those on the other hand who never by any chance say anything funny themselves and take
δυσχεραίνοντες ἀγροικοιὶ καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δὲ ἐμελεῖας παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσ- ἀγορεύονται, οίων εὐτροποὶ τοῦ γὰρ ἦθος αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ἀσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ 4 ἡθη. ἐπιστολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδίῳ καὶ τῷ σκάπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσ- ἀγορεύονται ὡς χαρίζετε. οτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ 5 οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εὐθρημένων δήλων. τῇ μέσῃ δὲ ἐξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστὶν τού δὲ ἐπι- δεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπισκεψι καὶ ἐλευθερίω ἀρμόστει. ἐστὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδίᾳ μέρει καὶ 20 ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδία διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἁπαθ- 6 δεῦτος. ἰδοὺ δὲ ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμιδῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν κωμῶν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια. διαφέρει 7 δὲ οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὐς αἰσχρολογοῦντα δριστείν τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῇ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἡ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἡ καὶ τέρπειν; ἡ καὶ τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; 8 ἀλλο γὰρ ἄλλος μισθότων τε καὶ ἤδυ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἁκούεται. ἢ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα 9 καὶ ὁ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὲ πᾶν ποίησει. τὸ γὰρ 80 σκώμμα λαυδόρημα τῇ ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἐνια

1 ἀγροικοὶ K: ἀγροὶ. 2 καὶ: καὶ αἱ τοῦ L, καὶ αἱ τοῦ M. 3 κωμιδῶν; Ρ Richards. 4 μὴ ἀπρεπῆς K: μὴ καὶ πρεπεῖ Γ, καὶ πρέπει L, M. 5 καὶ Βουτέρ: καὶ. 6 ποιεῖ: ἁκούεται Zwinger, λέξει Cornes.

a εὐτράπελοι, lit. 'turning well,' nimble-witted.

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offence at those who do, are considered boorish and morose. Those who jest with good taste are called witty or versatile—that is to say, full of good turns; for such sallies seem to spring from the character, and we judge men’s characters, like their bodies, by their movements. But as matter for ridicule is always ready to hand, and as most men are only too fond of fun and raillery, even buffoons are called witty and pass for clever fellows; though it is clear from what has been said that Wit is different, and widely different, from Buffoonery. The middle disposition is further characterized by the quality of tact, the possessor of which will say, and allow to be said to him, only the sort of things that are suitable to a virtuous man and a gentleman: since there is a certain propriety in what such a man will say and hear in jest, and the jesting of a gentleman differs from that of a person of servile nature, as does that of an educated from that of an uneducated man.

The difference may be seen by comparing the old and the modern comedies; the earlier dramatists found their fun in obscenity, the moderns prefer innuendo, which marks a great advance in decorum.

Can we then define proper raillery by saying that its jests are never unbecoming to gentlemen, or that it avoids giving pain or indeed actually gives pleasure to its object? Or is it impossible to define anything so elusive? For tastes differ as to what is offensive and what amusing. Whatever rule we lay down, the same will apply to the things that a man should allow to be said to him, since we feel that deeds which a man permits to be ascribed to him he would not stop at actually doing. Hence a man will draw the line at some jokes; for raillery is a sort of vilification, and
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λοιδορέων κωλύουσιν· εἶπε δ' ὅσως καὶ σκόπτειν. 10 ὁ δὲ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθερίας οὕτως ἔχει, οἶον νόμος ὑπ' ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἔστιν, εἰτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἰτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ δὲ βιωμο- λόχος ἦττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοῦν, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι, 85 καὶ τοιαύτα λέγων ὑπ' οὔθεν ἄν εἶποι ὁ χαρίεις, 1123 b ἕνα δ' οὔθ' ἄν ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγροικος1 εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρείους· οὔθεν γὰρ συμβαλλόμε- 11 νος πάσι δυσχεραίνει· δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶλαι ἀναγκαῖον.

12 Τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσί δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων των καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀληθείαν ἐστι, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

ix Περὶ δὲ αἰδοὺς ὡς των ἄρετης οὐ προσήκει 10 λέγειν πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὃριζεται γοῦν φόβος τὶς ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖ δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβων παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίωνται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν βάναυσαν φοβοῦμενοι ἀχρισῶν· σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεται πως εἶναι ἀμφό- 15 τερα, ὡσπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεις εἶναι.

3 οὐ πάση δ' ἥλικία τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ- οἰκία γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικοὺς αἰδοίμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὡπο

1 ἄγροικος Corres.: ἄγρεσ.
2 καὶ ἀποτελεῖ δὲ ed.: καὶ ἀποτελεῖται Κ b, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ Λ b, καὶ ἀποτελεῖ τὶ Ross.

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some forms of vilification are forbidden by law; perhaps some forms of raillery ought to be prohibited also.

10 The cultivated gentleman will therefore regulate his wit, and will be as it were a law to himself.

Such then is the middle character, whether he be Buffoonery. called 'tactful' or 'witty.' The buffoon is one who cannot resist a joke; he will not keep his tongue off himself or anyone else, if he can raise a laugh, and will say things which a man of refinement would never say, and some of which he would not even allow to be said to him. The boor is of no use in playful conversation; he contributes nothing and takes Boorish-ness.

11 offence at everything; yet relaxation and amusement seem to be a necessary element in life.

12 We have now discussed three modes of observing the mean in our behaviour, all of which are concerned with conversation or with common occupations of some sort. They differ in that one is concerned with truthfulness and the others with being pleasant. Of the two that deal with pleasure, one is displayed in our amusements, and the other in the general intercourse of life.

ix Modesty cannot properly be described as a virtue, Modesty. for it seems to be a feeling rather than a disposition;

2 at least it is defined as a kind of fear of disrepute, and indeed in its effects it is akin to the fear of danger; for people who are ashamed blush, while those in fear of their lives turn pale; both therefore appear to be in a sense bodily affections, and this indicates a feeling rather than a disposition.

3 The feeling of modesty is not suitable to every age, but only to the young. We think it proper for the young to be modest, because as they live by feeling they often err, and modesty may keep them
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tῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀν ἐπαινεῖσθαι ὅτι αἰσχυντηλὸς· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν εφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἰπερ γίγνεται ἐπὶ τοὺς φαύλους· οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα (εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀληθείαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθὲν διαφέρει οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα), ὡστ' ἐν πρὸς αἰσχυντέον φαύλον δὲ, καὶ τῷ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἰον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν. τὸ δ' οὖτως ἔχειν ὡστ' εἰ πράξειν τι τῶν τοιοῦτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἶσθαι ἐπιεική εἶναι, ἀτυπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκών δὲ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδὲ· ποτε πράξει τὰ φαύλα. εἰ δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς εξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικῆς· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν· οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τούτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς. εἰ δ' ἂν αἰσχυντα ἐπὶ πράξει καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεύοιτα τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐθὲν μάλλον τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικῆς· οὐκ ἐστὶ δ' οὐδ' ἡ εγκράτεια ἀρετῆ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτῆ· δειχθῆσθαι δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς εἶν τοῖς υπερτομ. υἱὸν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰπώμεν.

1 οὖδ' Ι'.
3 καὶ τῷ? Bywater: καὶ τῷ (τὸ 1', διὰ τὸ Kassow).
in check; and we praise young people when they are modest, though no one would praise an older man for being shamefaced, since we think he ought not to do anything of which he need be ashamed. For indeed the virtuous man does not feel shame, if shame is the feeling caused by base actions; since one ought not to do base actions (the distinction between acts really shameful and those reputed to be so is immaterial, since one ought not to do either), and so one never ought to feel shame. Shame is a mark of a base man, and springs from a character capable of doing a shameful act. And it is absurd that, because a man is of such a nature that he is ashamed if he does a shameful act, he should therefore think himself virtuous, since actions to cause shame must be voluntary, but a virtuous man will never voluntarily do a base action. Modesty can only be virtuous conditionally—in the sense that a good man would be ashamed if he were to do so and so; but the virtues are not conditional. And though shamelessness and not shrinking from shameful actions is base, this does not prove that to be ashamed when one does shameful acts is virtuous—any more than Self-restraint is a virtue, and not rather a mixture of virtue and vice. But this will be explained later. Let us now speak of Justice.

* In Bk. vii.
Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκέπτεσθαι περὶ 1129α
ποιας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις καὶ ποια
μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῶν καὶ
μέσου· ἢ δὲ σκέψεις ἠμῶν ἐστὶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
μέθοδον τῶς προειρήμενοις.

‘Ορώμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξω βου-
λομένους λέγεω δικαιοσύνην ἄφ’ ἦς πρακτικὸς
τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ, καὶ ἄφ’ ἦς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ
βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
περὶ ἀδικίας, ἄφ’ ἦς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ 10
ἀδικα. διὸ καὶ ἠμῶν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑπο-
κείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον
ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

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[a] In what follows δικαιοσύνη is found to possess both
the wider meaning of Righteousness in general, covering
all right conduct in relation to others, and the narrower
sense of the virtue of right conduct in relation to others
where gain or loss (whether to the agent or to other parties)
is involved. δικαιοσύνη in this narrower sense is the
special Moral Virtue which is the subject of Book V.;
it would be described in English sometimes as Justice, some-
times as Honesty or uprightness. The related adjectives and
verbs have various connotations connected with the various
meanings of δικαιοσύνη both in its wider and in its narrower
usage. For instance, τὰ δίκαια means sometimes ‘just
acts’ in the English sense, sometimes any acts in conformity
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BOOK V

In regard to Justice and Injustice, we have to enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned with, in what sense Justice is the observance of a mean, and what are the extremes between which that which is just is a mean. Our enquiry may follow the same procedure as our preceding investigations.

Now we observe that everybody means by Justice that moral disposition which renders men apt to do just things, and which causes them to act justly and to wish what is just; and similarly by Injustice that disposition which makes men act unjustly and wish what is unjust. Let us then assume this definition to start with as broadly correct.

The fact is that it is not the same with dispositions as with sciences and faculties. It seems that the with the law, sometimes 'rights' or 'claims,' i.e., any consideration which by law, equity, or custom, certain persons have a right to expect from certain others. Or again δικαίωμα means not only to act unjustly, or dishonestly, but also to do, or have done, any wrongful injury to another, or any wrongful or illegal act, and so, as a legal term, to be guilty of a breach of the law.

In translating however, if the connexion of all these various meanings in the writer's mind is to be represented, it seems necessary to keep the words 'justice,' 'injustice,' etc., throughout, in spite of their occasional unsuitability to the context.
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έξειν. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοιεἰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξεις δ’ ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ, ὅλων ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγείωα μόνον λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγείωας βαδίζειν ὅταν βαδίζει ὡς ἃν ὁ ὑγείων.

5 Πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκεμένων· ἐὰν τε γὰρ ἡ ἐυεξία ἤ φανερά, καὶ ἡ καχεξία φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐυεκτικῶν ἡ ἐυεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ ἐυεκτικά· εἰ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐυεξία πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μαυτητή σαρκός καὶ τὸ ἐυεκτικὸν τὸ πουτυκὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκὶ.

6 Ἀκολουθεῖ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, εἰών βάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ βάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικλα. ἐκοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄδικλα, ἀλλά διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὄμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λαυθάνει, καὶ οὐχ ὡσπέρ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δῆλη μᾶλλον· (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν) οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεῖς ὄμωνυμος ἡ τε ὑπὸ τῶν αὐχένα τῶν ἑσῶν

1 βάτεραν ... βάτερα Γ. 2 καὶ ἡ ἄδικλα om. M Ob. 3 ὄμωνυμα Thuot.

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a For instance, medicine studies both health and disease.
b i.e., it does not also mean walking lame.
c Because a faculty or science is the same for opposite things.
d Literally 'that which has to do with good condition'; the word here slightly shifts its meaning, for just above it meant 'that which is in good condition.'

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same faculty or science deals with opposite things; but a disposition or condition which produces a certain result does not also produce the opposite results; for example, health does not give rise to unhealthy actions, but only to healthy ones: healthy walking means walking as a healthy man would walk.

5 Hence sometimes the nature of one of two opposite dispositions is inferred from the other, sometimes dispositions are known from the things in which they are found; for instance, if we know what good bodily condition is, we know from this what bad condition is as well, but we also know what good condition is from bodies in good condition, and know what bodies are in good condition from knowing what good condition is. Thus, supposing good condition is firmness of flesh, bad condition must be flabbiness of flesh, and a diet productive of good condition must be a diet producing firmness of flesh.

6 Also, if one of two correlative groups of words is used in several senses, it follows as a rule that the other is used in several senses too: for example, if ‘just’ has more than one meaning, so also has ‘unjust’ and ‘Injustice.’ Now it appears that the terms Justice and Injustice are used in several senses, but as their equivocal uses are closely connected, the equivocation is not detected; whereas in the case of widely different things called by a common name, the equivocation is comparatively obvious: for example (the difference being considerable when it is one of external form), the equivocal use of the word kleis (key) to denote both the bone at the base of the neck and the instrument with which we lock our doors.

- The clavicle (clavis, a key), or collar-bone.
καὶ ἦ τὰς θύρας κλείονσιν. εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἁρικος
ποσακχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ τε παράνομος
ἁρικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἁνισος, ὥστε
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος
καὶ ὁ ἅνισος. το μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα το νόμιμον καὶ
to ἁνίσον, το δὲ ἁρικον το παράνομον καὶ το ἁνίσον. 1129\frac{4}{4}

9 —ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἁρικος, περὶ τάγαθα
ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ
ἀτυχία, ὁ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δὲ ὅν
ἀεὶ. οἱ δὲ ἀνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διάκονοι
δὲι δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ’ εὐχονται μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθα, καὶ
ἀυτοῖς ἀγαθά εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς

10 ἀγαθά.—ὁ δὲ ἁρικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. ἀλλ’
ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν ἁγαθόν πως εἶναι,
tοῦ δ’ ἁγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονέξια, διὰ τούτο δοκεῖ

11 πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἐστὸν δ’ ἁνισος: τούτο γὰρ 10
12 περιέχει καὶ κοινὸν. ἀπεὶ δ’ ὁ παράνομος
ἁρικος ἢν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα
tὸ νόμιμα ἐστὶ πῶς δίκαιο: τὰ τε γὰρ ἄριστον

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2 δὴ Bywater: δὲ.
4 δὲ καὶ Ῥb.
5 ἐστὶν Vermehren: ἐστὶ.
6 post κοινὸν add. καὶ παράνομος: τούτο γὰρ, ἡ παρανομία ἤτοι
ἡ ἁνισος, περιέχει πᾶσαν ἁδίκειαν καὶ κοινὸν ἐστὶ πάσης ἁδίκειας
LPG.

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9 The word ἅνισος means both ‘equal’ and ‘equitable’
or ‘fair.’
10 Here some ms. add ‘Also a law-breaker, for this, law-
breaking or else unfairness, includes all injustice and is a
common term for all injustice.’
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8 Let us then ascertain in how many senses a man is said to be 'unjust.' Now the term 'unjust' is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes more than his due, the unfair man. Hence it is clear that the law-abiding man and the fair man will both be just. 'The just' therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and 'the unjust' means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or unfair.

9 Again, as the unjust man is one who takes the larger share, he will be unjust in respect of good things; not all good things, but those on which good and bad fortune depend. These though always good in the absolute sense, are not always good for a particular person. Yet these are the goods men pray for and pursue, although they ought not to do so; they ought, while choosing the things that are good for them, to pray that what is good absolutely may also be good for them.

10 The unjust man does not however always choose the larger share: of things that, speaking absolutely, are bad he chooses the smaller share; but nevertheless he is thought to take more than his due, because the lesser of two evils seems in a sense to be a good, and taking more than one's due means taking more than one's due of good. Let us call him 'unfair,' for that is a comprehensive term, and includes both taking too much of good things and too little of bad things.

11 Again, we saw that the law-breaker is unjust and the law-abiding man just. It is therefore clear that all lawful things are just in one sense of the word, for what is lawful is decided by legislation, and the several decisions of the legislature we call rules of
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13 τούτων δίκαιων εἶναι φαμέν. οὐ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορευομενὶ περὶ ἀπάντων στοχαζόμενοι ἡ τοῦ κοινῇ 15 συμφέροντος πάσιν [ἡ τοῖς ἄριστοις] 2 καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν 3 ἡ κατ᾽ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον. ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν

14 μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῆ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάτει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον 20 μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ βίπτειν τὰ ὁπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεῖειν μὴδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράσιον, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ἐμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοιχηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύειν τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύειν, ἀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χείρον δ' ὁ 28

15 ἀπεσχηδισμένοις. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἔστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἑτερον. καὶ διὰ τούτο πολλαί τε κατάστασι τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἐσπερος οὔθ' ἐφος οὔτω θανμαζόμενοι καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φαμέν

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσιν ἀρετῇ ἃν. 3 80

καὶ τελεία μᾶλλον ἀρετή, ότι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσις ἐστὶν. τελεία δ' ἐστὶν, 4 ότι δ' ἐχειν αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἑτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸν πολλοὶ γαρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκεῖοι τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς

1 Spengel. 2 κατ' ἀρετὴν om. K; ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν Γ.
3 'ν ed.; ἐνι (ἐστὶ ΓΜ Ἀλδ.).
4 καὶ τελεία μᾶλλον et τελεία δ' ἐστὶν inter se mutanda Jackson.

According to a scholiast, this is a quotation, slightly altered, from the lost play Melanippe of Euripides (fr. 400 Dindorf).

Theognis 147.

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justice. Now all the various pronouncements of the law aim either at the common interest of all, or at the interest of a ruling class determined either by excellence or in some other similar way; so that in one of its senses the term 'just' is applied to anything that produces and preserves the happiness, or the component parts of the happiness, of the political community.

And the law prescribes certain conduct; the conduct of a brave man, for example not to desert one's post, not to run away, not to throw down one's arms; that of a temperate man, for example not to commit adultery or outrage; that of a gentle man, for example not to strike, not to speak evil; and so with actions exemplifying the rest of the virtues and vices, commanding these and forbidding those—rightly if the law has been rightly enacted, not so well if it has been made at random.

Justice then in this sense is perfect Virtue, though with a qualification, namely that it is displayed towards others. This is why Justice is often thought to be the chief of the virtues, and more sublime or than the evening or the morning star; and we have the proverb—

In Justice is all Virtue found in sum.

And Justice is perfect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue; and perfect in a special degree, because its possessor can practise his virtue towards others and not merely by himself; for there are many who can practise virtue in their own private affairs but cannot do so in their relations with another.

\* In the mss. the words 'in a special degree' follow 'perfect' in the line before.
16 Προς ἐτερον ἀδυνατοῦσαν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βιαντος, ὅτι "ἀρχὴν ἄνδρα δεῖξει." πρὸς ἐτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἕδη
17 ὁ ἀρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἐτερον ἐστὶν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα
18 πράττει, ἡ ἀρχοντὴ ἡ κοινωνίᾳ. κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρῶ-μενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἀριστος δὲ οὖχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἄλλ' ὁ πρὸς ἐτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐργον
19 χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἄλλ' ὡλὴ ἀρετή ἐστὶν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία.
20 ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἄλλ' ὡλὴ κακία. (τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτή, δήλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων· ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἐτερον, δι-

Ζητούμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἐστὶ γὰρ τις, ὡς φαμέν· ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ περὶ
2 ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀλλὰς μοχθηρίας ὁ ἑυρέγον ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδὲν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀστίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἡ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπό-

1 ἀρχὴν Κβ.
2 ἄλλ' ὁ ΓΗαΝβΟβ : ἄλλα.

* Put into the mouth of the sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, 343 c.

b Cf. vi. viii. 1.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, V. i. 16—ii. 2

16 This is why we approve the saying of Bias, 'Office will show a man'; for in office one is brought into relation with others and becomes a member of a community.

17 The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the view a that Justice alone of the virtues is 'the good of others,' because it does what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate. As then the worst man is he who practises vice towards his friends as well as in regard to himself, so the best is not he who practises virtue in regard to himself but he who practises it towards others; for that is a difficult task.

19 Justice in this sense then is not a part of Virtue, but the whole of Virtue; and its opposite Injustice is not a part of Vice but the whole of Vice (the distinction between Virtue and Justice in this sense being clear from what has been said: they are the same quality of mind, but their essence is different b; what as displayed in relation to others is Justice, as being simply a disposition of a certain kind is Virtue).

21 What we are investigating, however, is the Justice which is a part of Virtue, since we hold that there is such a thing as Justice in this sense; and similarly we are investigating Injustice in the particular sense.

2 The existence of the latter is proved by the following considerations: (1) When a man displays the other vices—for instance, throws away his shield, from Cowardice, or uses abusive language, from Bad Temper, or refuses to assist a friend with money, from Meanness—though he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of anything; whereas
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΩΣ

ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ’ οὐδεμίαν τῶν 20
ποιοῦτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ
πονηρίαν δὲ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ’
3 ἀδικίαν. ἔστων ἂρ’ ἄλλη τις ἄδικα ὡς μέρος
τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἄδικον
4 τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι2 εἶ δὲ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν
ἐνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλημβάνων, δὲ δὲ προσ- 25
τιθεὶς καὶ ξημιούμενος δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν, οὕτος μὲν
ἀκόλαστος δοξεῖν ὡς εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ πλεονέκτησις,
ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ’ οὐ. δήλον ἄρα
5 ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν ταῦτα πάντα
ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἑπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινα μοχθηρίαν
ἀει, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπὶ ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἑγκατ- 30
ἐλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἑπάταξεν,
ἐπ’ ὁργήνει εἰ δ’ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ’ οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν
6 ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐπ’ ἀδικίαν. ὡστε φανερὸν ὅτι
ἔστι τις ἄδικια παρὰ τῆν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει,
συνάνυμος, ὅτι δ’ ὄρισμός ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει. 1130
ἀμφοῦ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἑτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν,
ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμήν ἡ χρήματα ἡ σωτηρίαν, ἡ
ἐπὶ των ἐχομεν ἐνὶ ὅνωματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα
πάντα, καὶ δ’ ἠδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, δὲ
περὶ ἀπαντα περὶ ὅσα δ’ ὀποιοῦδεν.

7 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν3 δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι

1 ἀ’ Bywater: γὰρ Ἀβί, ἀρα γε Λ.
2 ἄτι Κ.
3 εἰσὶν αἱ Ἀβί.
when a man takes more than his share, it is frequently not due to any of these vices, and certainly not to all of them, yet nevertheless the action does display some vice, since we blame it; in fact it displays the 3 vice of Injustice. Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the universal sense, and there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general, or illegal. (2) 4 Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay, and so losing by it: then the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is being done for profit that makes the action unjust. (3) Again, whereas all other unjust acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is put down to Profligacy, desertion from the ranks to Cowardice, assault to Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice except Injustice.

6 Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice, the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its definition falls in the same genus, both sorts of Injustice being exhibited in a man's relation to others; but whereas Injustice in the particular sense is concerned with honour or money or security, or whatever term we may employ to include all these things, its motive being the pleasure of gain, Injustice in the universal sense is concerned with all the things that are the sphere of Virtue.

7 Thus it is clear that there are more kinds of
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ἔστι τις καὶ ἐτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον.

8 τίς δὲ καὶ ὁποία τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἁνίσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ τε νόμμων καὶ τὸ ἵσων. κατὰ μὲν 10 οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἄδικια.

9 ἔστιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἁνίσον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταύτῳ ἄλλῳ ἔτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ἄλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁνίσον ἀπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἀπαν ἁνίσον'), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικια οὐ ταύτα ἄλλα ἔτερα έκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὁλα. μέρος γὰρ αὐτῆ ἡ ἄδικια τῆς ὅλης ἄδικιας, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. οὕστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἄδικιας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου 10 καὶ ἄδικου ὁσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἄδικια, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὐσὶς χρήσις πρὸς ἄλλον, ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα ἔστω· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζήν καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην μοιχητρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς 25

1 ἀρετήν secl. Gisanius.
2 παράνομον Ald. Ar. : πλεόν Lb, παράνομον πλεόν ΚβΓ.
3 ὡς μέρος καὶ Κβ : καὶ ὡς μέρος β. Bywater.
4 τὸ μὲν ... ἁνίσον Bywater; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἀπαν ἁνίσον τὸ δ' ἁνίσον οὐ πάν πλεόν ΚβLb, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁνίσον ἀπαν παράνομον τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἀπαν ἁνίσον· καὶ τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἀπαν ἁνίσον τὸ δ' ἁνίσον οὐ πάν πλεόν Γ (et eadem fere Μb).
5 ἄδικου Κβ : τοῦ ἄδικου.
6 προστάτωμενα ΚβΓ.

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Justice than one, and that the term has another meaning besides Virtue as a whole. We have then to ascertain the nature and attributes of Justice in this special sense.

8 Now we have distinguished two meanings of 'the unjust,' namely the unlawful and the unequal or unfair, and two meanings of 'the just,' namely the lawful and the equal or fair. Injustice then, in the sense previously mentioned, corresponds to the meaning 'unlawful'; but since the unfair is not the same as the unlawful, but different from it, and related to it as part to whole (for not everything unlawful is unfair, though everything unfair is unlawful), so also the unjust and Injustice in the particular sense are not the same as the unjust and Injustice in the universal sense, but different from them, and related to them as part to whole; for Injustice in this sense is a part of universal Injustice, and similarly the Justice we are now considering is a part of universal Justice. We have therefore to discuss Justice and Injustice, and the just and unjust, in the particular sense.

10 We may then set aside that Justice which is co-extensive with virtue in general, being the practice of virtue in general towards someone else, and that Injustice which is the practice of vice in general towards someone else. It is also clear how we should define what is just and unjust in the corresponding senses. For the actions that spring from virtue in general are in the main identical with the actions that are according to law, since the law enjoins conduct displaying the various particular virtues and forbids conduct displaying the various particular vices. Also the regulations laid down for the educa-
δὴς ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὡσα νεομοθέτηται
11 περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν. περὶ δὲ τῆς
cαθ’ ἐκαστὸν παιδείας, καθ’ ἡν ἀπλῶς ἀνήρ
ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ
ἐτέρας, ύποτερον διοριστέων· οὐ γὰρ ἰσως ταύτων
ἀνδρὶ τ’ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτη παντὶ.
12 Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ’ ὧν
ἀυτὴν ἤκειν ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἰδὸς τὸ ἐν ταῖς δια-
νομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἀλλων ὡσα μεριστὰ
τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνίσον ἔχειν καὶ ἵναν ἐπερον ἐτέρου), ἐν
13 δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικῶν. τούτου ἑν
δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν
ἐκούσια ἐστὶ τὰ δ’ ἄκουσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ
τοιαύτες ὡς πράσιν, ὑνη, δανεισμὸς, ἐγγύη, χρησίς,
παρακατάθηκη, μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι
ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος),
tῶν δ’ ἄκουσιῶν τὰ μὲν λαθραία, ὡς κλοπή,
μουχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλαπατία,
δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, ὡς
αικία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἄρπαγη, πτήρωσις, κακη-
γορία, προπηλακισμός.

11  Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ τ’ ἀδικὸς ἀνίσον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον ἀνίσον, ἑν
δήλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τὸ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνίσου, τοῦτο

1 ἐπερον; ἐτέρω? Ramsauer.

a This topic is discussed in Politicis III. Under certain
forms of government the good man in the moral sense
may not be a good citizen, that is, a citizen who will help
to maintain the constitution.

b 'Involuntary' here means lacking the consent of one
of the parties.

c In c. iv. below, the writer gives no illustration of the
operation of Corrective Justice in Voluntary Transactions,
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tion that fits a man for social life are the rules pro-
ductive of virtue in general. As for the education
of the individual as such, that makes a man simply a
good man, the question whether this is the business
of Political Science or of some other science must
be determined later; for it would seem that to be a
good man is not in every case the same thing as to be
a good citizen.\(^a\)

12 Particular Justice on the other hand, and that
which is just in the sense corresponding to it, is
divided into two kinds. One kind is exercised in
the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other
divisible assets of the community, which may be
allotted among its members in equal or unequal
shares. The other kind is that which supplies a
corrective principle in private transactions. This Cor-
rective Justice again has two sub-divisions, corre-
spanding to the two classes of private transactions,
those which are voluntary and those which are in-
voluntary.\(^b\) Examples of voluntary transactions are
selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending
without interest, depositing, letting for hire; these
transactions being termed voluntary because they
are voluntarily entered upon.\(^c\) Of involuntary trans-
actions some are furtive, for instance, theft, adultery,
poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassina-
tion, false witness; others are violent, for instance,
assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence,
maiming, abusive language, contumelious treatment.

111 Now since an unjust man is one who is unfair, and
the unjust is the unequal, it is clear that corresponding
to the unequal there is a mean, namely that which

but he is clearly thinking of actions at law for damages
resulting from breach of contract. See c. iv. 13 note.

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2 δὲ ἦστι τὸ ἴσον· εὖ ὅποια γὰρ πράξει ἦστι τὸ
3 πλέον καὶ τὸ ἑλαττον, ἦστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν
tὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ
λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσων, τὸ
4 δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη. ἦστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν 15
ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. ἀνάγκη τοῖνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον
tε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν], 1 καὶ ἢ
μὲν μέσον, τυπών (ταῦτα δὲ ἦστι πλείον καὶ ἑλατ-
tον), ἢ δὲ ἴσον ἦστιν, <ἐν3> δυσὶν, ἢ δὲ δίκαιον,
5 τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἀρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις
eἶναι τέταρτον· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὁν 20
6 δύο ἦστι, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, 3 δύο. καὶ
ἡ αὐτῇ ἦσται ἴσότης οῖς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα
ἐχει [τὰ ἐν οἷς], 4 οὕτω κάκεινα ἔχεις· εἰ γὰρ μὴ
ἴσοι, οὐκ Ίσα ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνέθειν αἱ μάχαι
καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι
7 ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται. ἐτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἁξίαν
tούτο δήλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς διανομαῖς 26
ὀμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἁξίαν τυλὰ δεὶν εἶναι,
tὴν μέντοι ἁξίων οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες
[ὑπάρχειν], 5 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθεριάν,
οἱ δ' ὀλυγαρχικὸ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ
8 δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἦστιν ἀρα τὸ δίκαιον
ἀνάλογον τι· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μονον ἦστι 30
μοναδικοῦ ἄριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἄριθμοῦ· ἡ
γὰρ ἀνάλογα ἴσότης ἦστι λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέταρτοις
ἐλειπότοις.

2 Richards.
3 Scaliger.
4 [τὰ ἐν οἷς] om. Kb; τὰ οἷς Richards.
5 ἔχει: Richards: ἔχει.
6 [ὑπάρχειν] om. Ob; κατ' ἁξίαν τυλὰ δεὶν εἶναι Kb.

a These words appear to be an interpolation.
2 is equal; for every action admitting of more and less
3 admits of the equal also. If then the unjust is the
unequal, the just is the equal—a view that commends
itself to all without proof; and since the equal is a
4 mean, the just will be a sort of mean too. Again,
equality involves two terms at least. It accordingly
follows not only (a) that the just is a mean and equal
[and relative to something and just for certain
persons a], but also (b) that, as a mean, it implies
certain extremes between which it lies, namely the
more and the less; (c) that, as equal, it implies two
shares that are equal; and (d) that, as just, it implies
5 certain persons for whom it is just. It follows
therefore that justice involves at least four terms,
namely, two persons for whom it is just and two
shares which are just. And there will be the same
equality between the shares as between the persons,
since the ratio between the shares will be equal to
the ratio between the persons; for if the persons
are not equal, they will not have equal shares; it is
when equals possess or are allotted unequal shares,
or persons not equal equal shares, that quarrels and
complaints arise.

7 This is also clear from the principle of ‘assignment
by desert.’ All are agreed that justice in distributions
must be based on desert of some sort, although they
do not all mean the same sort of desert; democrats
make the criterion free birth; those of oligarchical
sympathies wealth, or in other cases birth; up-
8 holders of aristocracy make it virtue. Justice is
therefore a sort of proportion; for proportion is not
a property of numerical quantity only, but of quantity
in general, proportion being equality of ratios, and
involving four terms at least.
9 (Ἡ μὲν σὺν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέταρτοι, δὴ λοικός ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχῆς τῷ γὰρ ἐν ὑπὸ δυσὶ χρήται καὶ διὰ λέγει, οἶον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α' πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β', οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ β' πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ'. διὰ οὖν ἡ τοῦ β' εἰρηνάν ὡστ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β' τεθῇ δίσ', τέταρτα ἐσται τὰ ἀνάλογα.)

10 Ἕστι δὴ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέταρτοι ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς. διηρήνηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς δὲ τε καὶ ἂ. ἐσται ὁ οὗ δὸ πρῶτος ὁρὸς πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον, οὕτως ὁ τρίτος πρὸς τὸν τέταρτον, καὶ ἐναλλαξάρα, ὡς ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς τὸν τρίτον, ὃ δεύτερος πρὸς τὸν τέταρτον. ὃστε καὶ τὸ ὁλον πρὸς τὸ ὁλον. ὀπερ ἡ μονὴ συνδυάζει,

11 καὶ οὖτως συντεθῆ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἀρά τοῦ πρῶτου ὁρὸν τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ ἡ τοῦ δεύτερου τῷ τέταρτῳ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιον ἐστὶ. ὁ καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον.

1 πρῶτον, δεύτερον, τρίτον Κb.  
2 ἡν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δὶσ τεθῆ Κb.  
3 δὴ ed. δὲ.  
4 διηρήνηται Κb: διηρήνων vel διηρήσωσαν ed.  
5 ὀπερ Bywater.  
6 τὸν παρὰ τὸ παρὰ Κb, <τὸ δ' ἄδικον> τὸ παρὰ Γ, Bywater.

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a A 'discrete proportion' means one in which the two ratios are disconnected, being between different terms, whereas in a 'continuous proportion' they have one term in common.

b Here the lecturer displayed a diagram.

c Here was another diagram (one would expect the sentence to run 'Let two lines representing . . . have been similarly divided'). Two segments, A and B, of one line

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(That a discrete proportion has four terms is plain, but so also has a continuous proportion, since it treats one term as two, and repeats it: for example, as the line representing term one is to the line representing term two, so is the line representing term two to the line representing term three; here the line representing term two is mentioned twice, so that if it be counted twice, there will be four proportionals.)

Thus the just also involves four terms at least, and the ratio between the first pair of terms is the same as that between the second pair. For the two lines representing the persons and shares are similarly divided; then, as the first term is to the second, so is the third to the fourth; and hence, by alternation, as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth; and therefore also, as the first is to the second, so is the sum of the first and third to the sum of the second and fourth. Now this is the combination effected by a distribution of shares, and the combination is a just one, if persons and shares are added together in this way. The principle of Distributive Justice, therefore, is the conjunction of the first term of a proportion with the third and of the second with the fourth; and the just in this sense is a mean between two extremes that are disproportionate, since the proportionate is a mean, and the just is the proportionate.

represented two persons, two segments, C and D, of another their shares. It is shown that, if A : B :: C : D, then A + C : B + D :: A : B, i.e., if the shares are proportioned to the persons, their relative condition after receiving them will be the same as it was before.

\( a \) i.e., A's just share lies between too large a share and too small a one, too large and too small here meaning more or less than is proportionate to A's claim. Cf. ii. vi. 4 note \( a \) and 7.
13 (Καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ: ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὀλὸν πρὸς τὸ ὀλὸν ὑπερ ἐκάτερον 15 πρὸς ἐκάτερον.—ἔστι δὲ οὐ συνεχής αὐτὴ ἡ ἀναλογία: οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἄριθμῷ ὄρος, ὥς καὶ ὁ.)

Τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τούτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, τὸ δ’ ἄδικον τὸ παρά τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἅρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἐλαττοῦ. ὑπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργῶν συμβαίνει: ὅ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὅ δ’ ἄδικούμενος ἐλαττοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ 20 ἀνάπαλυ: ἐν ἀγαθῷ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἐλαττοῦ κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακοῦ: ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλαττοῦ κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετοῦ τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ δ’ αἱρετοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον.

17 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἰδοῖς τοῦ δίκαιου τοῦτ’ ἔστιν.

iv Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικῷ, δ’ γίνεται ἐν 25 τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκονομοῖς καὶ τοῖς 2 ἀκονοσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἰδὸς ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀει κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην (καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀντικείμενον πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ ἐςενεχθέντα), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δίκαιῳ τούτῳ 3 παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἔστιν: τὸ δ’ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἵσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἀ-

* We call this a proportion simply: cf. c. iv. 3 and note.
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, V. iii. 13—iv. 3

13 (This kind of proportion is termed by mathematicians geometrical proportion; for a geometrical proportion is one in which the sum of the first and third terms will bear the same ratio to the sum of the second and fourth as one term of either pair bears to the other term.—Distributive justice is not a continuous proportion, for its second and third terms, a recipient and a share, do not constitute a single term.)

The just in this sense is therefore the proportionate, and the unjust is that which violates proportion. The unjust may therefore be either too much or too little; and this is what we find in fact, for when injustice is done, the doer has too much and the sufferer too little of the good in question; though vice versa in the case of an evil, because a lesser evil in comparison with a greater counts as a good, since the lesser of two evils is more desirable than the greater, but what is desirable is good, and the more desirable it is, the greater good it is.

17 This then is one kind of Justice.

iv The remaining kind is Corrective Justice, which operates in private transactions, both voluntary and involuntary. This justice is of a different sort from the preceding. For justice in distributing common property always conforms with the proportion we have described (since when a distribution is made from the common stock, it will follow the same ratio as that between the amounts which the several persons have contributed to the common stock); and the injustice opposed to justice of this kind is a violation of this proportion. But the just in private transactions, although it is the equal in a
δικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὖ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκεῖνην 1132 τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρήται ὡς ἱκανός, εἰ δὲ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαβεν ὁ δ' ἐβδολπαται. ὥστε τὸ ἀδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὁ ἱκάζειν πειράται ὁ δικαστὴς: καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πλήγη ὁ δ' πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάψῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξει εἰς ἄνισα: ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ ἱκανίᾳ. 10

5 ἵκαζειν, ἀφαιρών τὸ κέρδος. 1 (λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοι, καὶ εἰ μὴ τις ὁικεῖον ὄνομα εἰπ', τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξατι,

6 καὶ ἡ ἱκανία τῷ παθῶν: ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ἱκανία τὸ δ' κέρδος.) ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάπτονος τὸ ἱσον μέσον, τὸ δ' κέρδος καὶ ἡ ἱκανία τὸ μὲν πλέον 15 τὸ δ' ἐλάπτον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἱκανία: ἢν ἢν μέσον τὸ ἱσον, δ' λέγομεν εἰκαί δικαιον. ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἢν εἰ ἡ τὸ μέσον ἱκανίας καὶ κέρδους.

1 τὸ κέρδος Richards: τοῦ κέρδους

That is, two pairs of terms (e.g. 1, 3; 7, 9), of which the second term exceeds the first by the same amount as the fourth exceeds the third. We do not call this a proportion at all, but, if also the third term exceeds the second by the same amount (e.g. 1, 3, 5, 7), an arithmetical progression.

For Corrective Justice the merits of the parties are immaterial.

Again a diagram is employed, cf. c. iii. 9, 10, and infra. § 8.

ημια has both senses.
sense (and the unjust the unequal), is not the equal according to geometrical but according to arithmetical proportion.\(^a\) For it makes no difference\(^b\) whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad one a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only at the nature of the damage, treating the parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has done and the other suffered injustice, whether one inflicted and the other has sustained damage.

Hence the unjust being here the unequal, the judge endeavours to equalize it: as much as when one man has received and the other has inflicted a blow, or one has killed and the other been killed, the line\(^c\) representing the suffering and doing of the deed is divided into unequal parts, but the judge endeavours to make them equal by the penalty or loss\(^d\) he imposes, taking away the gain. (For the term ‘gain’ is used in a general way to apply to such cases, even though it is not strictly appropriate to some of them, for example to a person who strikes another, nor is ‘loss’ appropriate to the victim in this case; but at all events the results are called ‘loss’ and ‘gain’ respectively when the amount of the damage sustained comes to be estimated.) Thus, while the equal is a mean between more and less, gain and loss are at once both more and less in contrary ways, more good and less evil being gain and more evil and less good loss; and as the equal, which we pronounce to be just, is, as we said, a mean between them, it follows that Justice in Rectification\(^e\) will be the mean between loss and gain.

\(^a\) A slightly different term is here introduced, but apparently without difference of meaning.
7 Διό καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἔστων ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βουλεῖται εἶναι οἶον δίκαιον ἐμφυχῶν. καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐννοι κειμένων, ὡς εἴναι τῶν μέσων, τῶν δίκαιων, τῶν δικαίων τευχέμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανειλαμβάνει, καὶ ὁ ὑπότροπος γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνω τετμημένης, ὡς τὸ μεῖζον μικρὰ τῆς ημειοειδοτέρον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττον τιμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ διὰ διαρεθῆσθα τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασίν ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἑκατόν. 

9 [τὸ δ᾽ ᾦσον] μέσον ἑστὶν τοῦ μεῖζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.] διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι διὰ ἔστων, ὡς περὶ ἐν εἴς εἰς τῶν δίκαιων, καὶ ὁ δικαστής δικαστής ἐπὶ τὸν γὰρ δύο ἴσον ἄφαιρεθ ἀπὸ τὸν ἀριθμοῦ, πρὸς τὸν ἀριθμὸ πρὸς τὸν ἀριθμὸν διαρεθηθῇ, δυσὶ τούτῳ ὑπερέχει θατέρου, εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρεθῇ μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ διε, ἐν γὰρ ὑπερέχει τοῦ μέσου τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἔνι, καὶ τοῦ μέσου τοῦ μέσου ἄφετος ἀφεῖλεθ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἐχοντος, καὶ τὸ προσθεῖ εἰς τῷ ἐλάττον ἐχοντι. ὡς μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει,

1 τὰ αὐτῶν Coraes: τὸ αὐτοῦ.  
2 τὸ δ᾽ ἴσον . . . ἀναλογίαν infra post δικαστὴς tr. Rassow.  
4 Zell.

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8 In the mss. this sentence follows the next one.
9 If $a=b$, then $(b+n)-(a-n)=2n$, and $(b+n)-a=n$. 

and 

$$
\frac{(b+n)-(a-n)}{2} = n = \frac{(b+n)+(a-n)}{2} - (a-n).
$$

Aristotle, of course, represented the quantities by lines, not algebraically.

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This is why when disputes occur men have recourse to a judge. To go to a judge is to go to justice, for the ideal judge is so to speak justice personified. Also, men require a judge to be a middle term or medium—indeed in some places judges are called mediators—for they think that if they get the mean they will get what is just. Thus the just is a sort of mean, inasmuch as the judge is a medium between the litigants.

Now the judge restores equality: if we represent the matter by a line divided into two unequal parts, he takes away from the greater segment that portion by which it exceeds one-half of the whole line, and adds it to the lesser segment. When the whole has been divided into two halves, people then say that they ‘have their own,’ having got what is equal.

This is indeed the origin of the word dikaios (just): it means dicha (in half), as if one were to pronounce it dichaion; and a dikast (judge) is a dichast (halver). The equal is a mean by way of arithmetical proportion between the greater and the less. For when of two equals a part is taken from the one and added to the other, the latter will exceed the former by twice that part, since if it had been taken from the one but not added to the other, the latter would exceed the former by once the part in question only. Therefore the latter will exceed the mean by once the part, and the mean will exceed the former, from which the part was taken, by once that part.

This process then will enable us to ascertain what we ought to take away from the party that has too much and what to add to the one that has too little: we must add to the one that has too little the amount whereby the mean between them exceeds him,
διανεμητικοῦν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικὸν ἢ
(καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 'Ραδα-
μάνθους δίκαιον·

εἰ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἐρέξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεία γένοστο).

4 πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οίον εἰ ἄρχην ἓχων
ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγήναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχονται
ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγήναι μόνον δεῖ ἄλλα καὶ κολα- 30
5 σθῆναι. ἐτι τὸ ἐκοῦσιν καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει
6 πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτι-
καῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός,
κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἵστητα. τῷ ἀντι-
ποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ
κακῶς ἔτοιμον, εἰ δὲ μῆ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι [εἰ
μὴ ἀντιποιηθεῖ] 3. ἢ τὸ εὖ, εἰ δὲ μῆ, μετάδοσις
7 οὗ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένους. διὸ καὶ
Χαρίτων ἔρεον ἐμποδῶν ὡς ποιοῦται, ὡς ἀνταπόδοσις
ἡ τοῦτο γὰρ ἓδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετήσας τε
γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισμένῳ καὶ πάλιν αὐτῶν ἄρξαι ἂ
χαριζόμενον.

8 Ποιεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀντίδοσιν τῇ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ
κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, οἰον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ϑ ἂ
σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ϑ έ Β, οἰκία ἐφ' ἃ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ'
ϑ ᾳ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμου παρὰ τοῦ
σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνως

1 τ' Coraes: κ'.
2 ἀναλογίαν <δὲ> Richards.
3 Muretus.
4 ἐν πόλεσιν? Jackson.

α Literally 'whether the act was voluntary or involuntary'; see note 6 on c. ii. 13.

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3 Distributive or with Corrective Justice (although people mean to identify it with the latter when they quote the rule of Rhadamanthys—

An a man suffer even that which he did,
Right justice will be done).

4 For in many cases Reciprocity is at variance with Justice: for example, if an officer strikes a man, it is wrong for the man to strike him back; and if a man strikes an officer, it is not enough for the officer to strike him, but he ought to be punished as well. Again, it makes a great difference whether an act was done with or without the consent of the other party.a But in the interchange of services Justice in the form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the basis of equality. The very existence of the state depends on proportionate reciprocity; for men demand that they shall be able to requite evil with evil—if they cannot, they feel they are in the position of slaves.—and to repay good with good—failing which, no exchange takes place, and it is exchange that binds them together.

5 This is why we set up a shrine of the Graces in a public place, to remind men to return a kindness; for that is a special characteristic of grace, since it is a duty not only to repay a service done one, but another time to take the initiative in doing a service oneself.

8 Now proportionate requital is effected by diagonal conjunction. For example, let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, and D a shoe. It is required that the builder shall receive from the shoemaker a portion of the product of his labour, and give him
Aristotle

metadidónavi toû aûtou. ëan oûn prôton ë to 10
catà tìn ânâlogían ísou, elîta to àntipetroûthos
gêntai, èstai to legrómenon. eî de ëiî, ouk ísou,
oûde suymenêi. outhèn gar koulyei kretostûn ènnavi
tò thatéròn èrgoun ë to thatéròu, dei ouv tauta
9 isasôthînai. èsti1 de toûto kai èpti tòv ãllon
teknovâ anerovûto gar ån, ei îi îpoteî2 to poiôvôn, 15
cài òsou kai òhou kai to vaghov, èpasaçe toûto
kai tosoûtov kai toioûtov. ou gar èk duo iatrôv
înetai kouvunia, allî èx iatrou kai geôrgou, kai
ôlou èteron kai ouk ísouv. ãlla toûtov dei
10 isasôthînai. didi pànta sumblîtag deî pws ènnavi,
ën èstîn allagh. èf' ò to vômôvî èlîlîthe, kai 20
gînetai pous mésonî. pànta gar metreî, ìostê kai
tîn vperochî kai tîn ellexînî, ðôsa ãtta dh
ûpodhîmatî ísou oikia ã trofhi. deî toiôvî òper
ôikodîmov prôs skoutotômov, tosoài ûpodhîmatas

1 èsti . . , toioûtov secl Ramsauer.
2 ei îh îh îpoteî Berg.; ei îh îpoteî <to vaghov òsou kai òhou
touê> to poiôvôn Jackson

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The relative value of the units of the two products must be ascertained, say one house must be taken as worth a

\[ A \cdot B \]

shoes. Then the four terms are and cross-

\[ C \cdot nD \]

conjunction gives totals \( A + nD \), \( B + C \), which are in 'arithmetical proportion' (see note \(^a\) on c. iv. 3) with the two first terms, i.e. the difference between each pair is the same; the builder and the shoemaker after the transaction are by an equal amount richer than they were before they began to make the articles.

\(^b\) This sentence also appeared in the mss. above, at c. iv. 12, where it made no sense. If genuine here, the phrases 'active element' and 'passive element' seem to mean producer and consumer. Even so, it is probable that there

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a portion of the product of his own. Now if proportionate equality between the products be first established, and then reciprocation take place, the requirement indicated will have been achieved; but if this is not done, the bargain is not equal, and intercourse does not continue. For it may happen that the product of one of the parties is worth more than that of the other, and in that case therefore they have 9 to be equalized. This holds good with the other arts as well; for they would have passed out of existence if the active element did not produce, and did not receive the equivalent in quantity and quality of what the passive element receives. For an association for interchange of services is not formed between two physicians, but between a physician and a farmer, and generally between persons who are different, and who may be unequal, though in 10 that case they have to be equalized. Hence all commodities exchanged must be able to be compared in some way. It is to meet this requirement that men have introduced money; money constitutes in a manner a middle term, for it is a measure of all things, and so of their superior or inferior value, that is to say, how many shoes are equivalent to a house or to a given quantity of food. As therefore a builder is to a shoemaker, so must such and such a number of is some corruption; Jackson’s insertion gives ‘unless the passive element produced the same in quantity and quality as the active, and the latter received the same in quantity and quality as the former.’

* It is uncertain whether this merely refers to the difference in value (or perhaps in labour used in production) between the unit products of different trades, or whether it introduces the further conception that different kinds of producers have different social values and deserve different rates of reward.
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πρὸς οἰκίαιν ἡ τροφῆν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία· τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἱσα. 25
11 εἰς πος, οὐκ ἔσται.· δεῖ ἀρα ἐνὶ τωι πάντα μετερεῖσθαι, ὡσπερ ἐλέχησθα ἐρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ
τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἡ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέωντο ἡ μὴ ὀμοίως, ἡ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ
ἡ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ. οὗν δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 30
τούνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἔστι, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον.
12 ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἵσασθη, ὡστε ὀπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμουν, τὸ ἐργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτο-
τόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀνα- 1133 
λογίας [οὐ] δ' ἰγνομ. ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται· εἰ δ' μὴ, ἀμφοτέρας ἐξεῖ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἐτερον ἄκρον· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσιν τὰ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ὑσου, καὶ κοινω-
νοί, ὅτι αὐτῇ ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι
(γεωργὸς A, τροφή) Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἐργον δ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἰσαμένου Δ). εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἂν ἀντι-
13 πεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἂν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία
συνέχει ὀπερ ἐν τι δυν., δὴλοι ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρεία
ἀδύν ἀλλήλων ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάτ-

1 Richards.
2 [οὐ] Bekker: om. Γ.

a Apparently interpolated from the last sentence.
b ἄχρηστον also connotes ‘worthless,’ but an obsolete coin retains some value as metal.
c See p. 283, note a.
d That is, ‘after any unfair exchange one party has too much by just the amount by which the other has too little. I ought to have given you ten shillings more or something worth that. Then I have ten shillings too much, and you have ten too little; these two tens are my two “excesses”; in respect of the exchange. I am better off than you by twice ten’ (Richards). Cf. c. iv. §§ 10-12.
e For this proverbial phrase see c. iv. §§ 8, 14.
f Or ‘shoemaker’s product D multiplied to equivalence with C’ (Blunt).
shoes be to a house [or to a given quantity of food]; for without this reciprocal proportion, there can be no exchange and no association; and it cannot be secured unless the commodities in question be equal in a sense.

11 It is therefore necessary that all commodities shall be measured by some one standard, as was said before. And this standard is in reality demand, which is what holds everything together, since if men cease to have wants or if their wants alter, exchange will go on no longer, or will be on different lines. But demand has come to be conventionally represented by money; this is why money is called nomisma (customary currency), because it does not exist by nature but by custom (nomos), and can be altered and rendered useless at will.

12 There will therefore be reciprocal proportion when the products have been equated, so that as farmer is to shoemaker, so may the shoemaker's product be to the farmer's product. And when they exchange their products they must reduce them to the form of a proportion, otherwise one of the two extremes will have both the excesses; whereas when they have their own, they then are equal, and can form an association together, because equality in this sense can be established in their case (farmer A, food C, shoemaker B, shoemaker's product equalized D); whereas if it were impossible for reciprocal proportion to be effected in this way, there could be no association between them.

13 That it is demand which, by serving as a single standard, holds such an association together, is shown by the fact that, when there is no demand for mutual service on the part of both or at least of one of the parties, no exchange takes place between
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tontai [ώστερ1 ὅταν οὖ ἔχει2 αὐτὸς δέηται τις, οἷον οὖνοι διδόντες σίτου ἔξαγωγήν3]. δεῖ ἄρα 10
toῦτο ἵσασθηναι. ὑπερ δὲ τῆς μελλοῦσης ἀλλα-
γῆς, εἰ νῦν μὴ δεῖται, ὅτι ἐσταὶ εὰν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἑγγυητής ἐσθ᾽ ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο
φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο
τὸ αὐτὸ, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἰσος δύναται· ὁμως δὲ βούλεται
μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετμησθαί· οὔτω 15
γὰρ ἂν ἔσται ἀλλαγῆ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ
ἡ νόμισμα ὥστερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιήσαν ἴσα-
ζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἢν μὴ οὕσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἢν,
οὔτ' ἀλλαγῆ ἴσοτητος μὴ οὕσης, οὔτ' ἴσοτης μὴ
οὕσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον
τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς 20
15 δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανός. ἐν δὴ τι δεῖ
eἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ εἶς ὑποθέσεως (διὸ νόμισμα κα-
λεῖται). τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖ-
ται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία Α, μναὶ δέκα
Β, κλάτη Γ. τὸ δὴ Α τοῦ Β ἡμῖν (εἰ πέντε μνῶν
2 οὔ ἔχει: οὖχι Κb, οὖκ ἔχει Münscher. 3 ἔξαγωγής Κb.

* The clauses bracketed make neither grammar nor sense, and have justly been suspected as interpolated. Münscher inserts a negative: 'Just as there is no exchange when the producer wants what the consumer has <not> got, for example, when one state needs wine while another can only offer corn for export.' But there seems to be no question here of foreign commerce.

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them [as when someone needs something that one has oneself, for instance, the state offering a license to export corn in exchange for wine]. This inequality of demand has therefore to be equalized.

14 Now money serves us as a guarantee of exchange in the future: supposing we need nothing at the moment, it ensures that exchange shall be possible when a need arises, for it meets the requirement of something we can produce in payment so as to obtain the thing we need. Money, it is true, is liable to the same fluctuation of demand as other commodities, for its purchasing power varies at different times; but it tends to be comparatively constant. Hence the proper thing is for all commodities to have their prices fixed; this will ensure that exchange, and consequently association, shall always be possible. Money then serves as a measure which makes things commensurable and so reduces them to equality. If there were no exchange there would be no association, and there can be no exchange without equality, and no equality without commensurability. Though therefore it is impossible for things so different to become commensurable in the strict sense, our demand furnishes a sufficiently accurate common measure for practical purposes.

15 There must therefore be some one standard, and this accepted by agreement (which is why it is called nomisma, customary currency); for such a standard makes all things commensurable, since all things can be measured by money. Let A be a house, B ten minae and C a bedstead. Then \( A = \frac{B}{2} \) (supposing the house to be worth, or equal to, five minae),
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ἀξία ἢ οἰκία, ἢ ἵσον), ἢ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τὸ 28
Γ τοῦ Β. δήλον τούτων πόσαν κλίναι ἵσον οἰκία, ὅτι
16 πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὖτως ἡ ἀλλαγή ἢ πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα
εἶναι, δήλον: διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡ κλίναι πέντε
ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσον αἱ πέντε κλίναι.

17 Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον ἐστὶν,
εἰρηταί. διωξισμένων δὲ τουτῶν δήλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεί-
σθαι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἑλαττόν ἐστὶν.
ὁ δὲ δικαιωσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν
de2  τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις3 ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσον
ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἀκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιο-
sύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικός
cata' προαιρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανοητικὸς καὶ
aυτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἐτέρῳ πρὸς ἔτερον οὕς οὕτως
ὡς τὸ μὲν αἵρετον πλέον αὐτῷ ἑλαττὸν δὲ τῶν
πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἵσου
5 τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πρὸς
ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τουσκανίων τοῦ ἄδικου, τούτῳ
de2 ἐστίν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις τοῦ ωφελίμου ἢ
βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως
ἐστιν, εFmt αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς
ωφελίμου, ἐλλειψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
1  tis om. GMB.
2  de om. GMB.
3  allais Kblb: protetero M et fort. G.

о That is, when A distributes unjustly not between him-
self and B but between B and C, the result for either B or
C may be either excess or defect, either too large a share
or too small of something beneficial (and either too small
a share or too large of something harmful).

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and C (the bedstead) = \frac{B}{10}; it is now clear how many

16 bedsteads are equal to one house, namely five. It is clear that before money existed this is how the rate of exchange was actually stated—five beds for a house—since there is no real difference between that and the price of five beds for a house.

17 We have now stated what Justice and Injustice are in principle. From the definition given, it is plain that just conduct is a mean between doing and suffering injustice, for the former is to have too much and the latter to have too little. And Justice is a mode of observing the mean, though not in the same way as the other virtues are, but because it is related to a mean, while Injustice is related to the extremes. Also, Justice is that quality in virtue of which a man is said to be disposed to do by deliberate choice that which is just, and, when distributing things between himself and another, or between two others, not to give too much to himself and too little to his neighbour of what is desirable, and too little to himself and too much to his neighbour of what is harmful, but to each what is proportionately equal; and similarly when he is distributing between two other persons. Injustice on the contrary is similarly related to that which is unjust, which is a disproportionate excess or deficiency of something beneficial or harmful. Hence Injustice is excess and defect, in the sense that it results in excess and defect: namely, in the offender’s own case, an excess of anything that is generally speaking beneficial and a deficiency of anything harmful, and in the case of others, though the result as a whole
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αλλων το μεν ολον δοιως, το δε παρα το αναλογον 
σποτερως έτυχεν.—του δε αδικηματος το μεν 
ελαττον το αδικεοθαι εστι, το δε μεεζων το αδικειν.

19 Περι μεν ουν δικαιοσυνης και αδικιας, τις 
εκατερας εστιν η φυσις, ειρησθω τοιτων των 16 
τρωτων, δοιως δε και περι τοι δικαιου και αδικου 
καθολου.

vi 'Επει δε εστιν αδικοθυτα μηπω αδικον ειναι, δ 
ποια αδικηματα αδικων ηδη αδικος εστιν έκαστην 
αδικιαν, οιον κλεπτης η μοιχος η ληστης; η ουτω 
μεν ουδεν διωσει; και γαρ αν συγγενουτο γυναικι 
ειδως το η, άλλη ου δια προαιρεσεως αρχην άλλα 
2 δια παθος αδικει μεν ουν, αδικος δ τοι 
οιον ου κλεπτης, έκλειψε δε, ουδε μοιχος, εμοι 
χευσε δει θοιως δε και επι των αλλων.

3 Πως μεν ουν έχει το αντιπεπονθος προς το 
δικαιον, ειρηται προτερον.

4 Δει δε μη λανθανειν οτι το ξητουμενον εστι και 28 
to απλως δικαιον και το πολιτικον δικαιον. τουτο 
δε εστιν [επι]2 κοιμωνων βίου προς το ειναι αυτ 
άρκειαν, ελευθερων και ισων η κατ' αναλογιαν η 
κατ' αριθμον. ωστε ος ου σει εστι τουτο, ουκ εστι 
tουτοις προς άλληλους το πολιτικον δικαιον, άλλα 
t δικαιον και καθ' ομοιοτητα. εστι γαρ δικαιον, 80 
oi και νομος προς αυτους νομος δ', εν οις αδικια:

2 ου Κβ: ουδε vulg., Hampke (seclusus ουδε μοιχος, εμοιχευσε 
δε).

a §§ 1, 2, are an irrelevant fragment which Jackson would 
insert in c. viii. 8 after βλαβη; § 3 he would transpose to 
the beginning of c. x.; § 4 continues the end of c. v.

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is the same, the deviation from proportion may be in either direction as the case may be.

Of the injustice done, the smaller part is the suffering and the larger part the doing of injustice.

19 So much may be said about the nature of Justice and Injustice, and of the Just and the Unjust regarded universally.

vi But seeing that a man may commit injustice without actually being unjust, what is it that distinguishes those unjust acts the commission of which renders a man actually unjust under one of the various forms of injustice, for example, a thief or an adulterer or a brigand? Or shall we rather say that the distinction does not lie in the quality of the act? For a man may have intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from the motive of deliberate choice, but under the influence of passion; in such a case, though he has committed injustice, he is not an unjust man: for instance, he is not a thief, though guilty of theft, not an adulterer, though he has committed adultery, and so forth.

3 The relation of Reciprocity to Justice has been stated already.

4 But we must not forget that the subject of our investigation is at once Justice in the absolute sense and Political Justice. Political Justice means justice as between free and (actually or proportionately) equal persons, living a common life for the purpose of satisfying their needs. Hence between people not free and equal political justice cannot exist, but only a sort of justice in a metaphorical sense. For justice can only exist between those whose mutual relations are regulated by law, and law exists among those between whom there is a possibility of injustice,
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

η γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαῖου καὶ τοῦ ἄδικου· ἐν οἷς δὴ ἄδικια, καὶ τὸ ἄδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἄδικεῖν, οὐ πάσην ἄδικια), τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμεις τῶν ἀπλῶς ἁγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. διὸ οὖν ἐώμεν ἁρχεῖν ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον, οὗ ἐπεὶ ἑαυτῷ τὸν τούτο ποιεῖ, καὶ 1134 ἃ γίνεται τύραννος· ἔστι δ' ὁ ἁρχηγὸς φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἱσοῦ. ἐπεὶ δ' οὔθεν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἰπερ δίκαιος (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἁγάθου αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογον ἐστίν· διὸ ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοτριον εἶναι φασώ ἁγάθον τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέηθη καὶ πρῶτερον), μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμῆ καὶ γέρας· ὅτι δὲ μὴ ἴκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὔτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δησοπτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὗ ταῦτα τοῦτοι ἀλλ' ὁμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄδικия πρὸς τὰ 10 αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἐως ἃν ἥ πηλίκου καὶ χωρίσθη, ὅσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ,
for the administration of the law means the discrimination of what is just and what is unjust. Persons therefore between whom injustice can exist can act unjustly towards each other (although unjust action does not necessarily involve injustice): to act unjustly meaning to assign oneself too large a share of things generally good and too small a share of things generally evil. This is why we do not permit a man to rule, but the law, because a man rules in his own interest, and becomes a tyrant; but the function of a ruler is to be the guardian of justice, and if of justice, then of equality. A just ruler seems to make nothing out of his office; for he does not allot to himself a larger share of things generally good, unless it be proportionate to his merits; so that he labours for others, which accounts for the saying mentioned above, that 'Justice is the good of others.' Consequently some recompense has to be given him, in the shape of honour and dignity. It is those whom such rewards do not satisfy who make themselves tyrants.

Justice between master and slave and between father and child is not the same as absolute and political justice, but only analogous to them. For there is no such thing as injustice in the absolute sense towards what is one's own; and a chattel, or a child till it reaches a certain age and becomes independent, is, as it were, a part of oneself, and no one chooses to harm himself; hence there can be no injustice towards them, and therefore nothing just or unjust in the political sense. For these, as we saw, are embodied in law, and exist between persons whose relations are naturally regulated by law, that is, persons who share equally in ruling and
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ισότης τοῦ ἀρχεῖον καὶ ἀρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκα ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἡ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα: τούτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον. ἔτερον δὲ καὶ τούτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

vii Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δίκαιον τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ νομικὸν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ 20 ὃ ἐξ ἀρχὴς μὲν οὐθὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, οταν δὲ θώνται, διαφέρει, οἶον τὸ μιᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αὐγα θύειν ἄλλα μὴ 1 δύο πρόβατα, ἐπὶ δὲα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκατὰ νομοθετοῦσιν, οἶον τὸ θύειν

2 Βρασίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον 25 καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καΐει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια

3 κυνούμενα ὅρωσιν. τούτο δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν οὕτως ἔχον, ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ὡς, καὶ τοὺς παρά γε τοὺς θεοὺς ἵσως οὐδαμῶς: παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κυνητὸν μέντοι πάν: ἄλλ' ὃμως 30 ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει 30

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1 ἄλλα μὴ: μίαν ἢ? Jackson.
2 quattuor sententias ἄλλ' ὃμως... οὐ φύσει, ποῖον δὲ... 
δηλοῦ (πρὸ δῆλον), καὶ ἐπὶ... διορισμός, φύσει γὰρ... γενέσθαι
inverso ordine tr. Richards.

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*a* The Spartan Brasidas detached Amphilochus from the Athenian empire 424 B.C., and fell defending it against Cleon 422. He was worshipped as a hero by the city, 'with games and yearly sacrifices' (Thucydides, v. xi.).

*b* The order of the following sentences seems confused. With the transpositions suggested by Richards, and the emendations given in the critical notes, they will run:

'But in our world, although there is such a thing as natural law, yet everything is capable of change. For example, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is

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being ruled. Hence Justice exists in a fuller degree between husband and wife than between father and children, or master and slaves; in fact, justice between husband and wife is Domestic Justice in the real sense, though this too is different from Political Justice.

Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and any regulations enacted for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice in honour of Brasidas, and ordinances in the nature of special decrees. Some people think that all rules of justice are merely conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary. That rules of justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world, although there is such a thing as Natural Justice, all rules of justice are variable. But nevertheless there is such a thing as Natural

possible for some persons to be born ambidextrous; and the same distinction will hold good in all matters; though what sort of things that admit of variation are as they are by nature, and what are merely customary and conventional, it is not easy to see, inasmuch as both alike are capable of change. But nevertheless some things are ordained by nature and others not.'
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4 τὸ δ' οὖ φύσει. ποιον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποιον οὐ ἄλλα νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἀμφοὶ κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δέχλου.¹ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμός ἐνδορισμός. φύσει γὰρ ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας.²

5 ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι.³ τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὁμοία ἔστι τοῖς μέτροις. 1135 θ. οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἵσα τὰ οὐνηρᾶ καὶ σινηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν ὄνουντα, μειώντων, ἐλάττων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἄλλ' ἀνθρώπως δικαια ὡς ταύτα πανταχοῦ, ἔπει οὐδ' αἱ πολιτείαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ γέρστη. τῶν δὲ δικαιῶν καὶ νομίμων ἑκαστὸν ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἑκαστὰ ἔχει. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἑκεῖνων δ' ἑκαστὸν ἐνν' καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιωμα. ἀδικον μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν τῇ φύσει η τάξει τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημα ἐστὶν, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὕτω, ἀλλ' ἀδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα (καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαστράγημα τὸ κοινὸν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τὸ ἀδικήματος). καθ' ἑκαστὸν δὲ αὐτῶν, πολά τε εἴδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποία τυγχάνει ὁντα, ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

¹ ἀδέχλον Paley.
² πάντας om. Γ: tivas Wilkinson.
³ γενέσθαι ὁ ed.

ᵃ Perhaps Aristotle wrote 'though it is not easy.'
ᵇ Possibly a reference to an intended (or now lost) book of the Politics on laws (Ross).

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Justice as well as justice not ordained by nature; and it is easy to see which rules of justice, though not absolute, are natural, and which are not natural but legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable. The same distinction will hold good in all other matters; for instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is possible for any man to make himself ambidextrous.

The rules of justice based on convention and expediency are like standard measures. Corn and wine measures are not equal in all places, but are larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly the rules of justice ordained not by nature but by man are not the same in all places, since forms of government are not the same, though in all places there is only one form of government that is natural, namely, the best form.

The several rules of justice and of law are related to the actions conforming with them as universals to particulars, for the actions done are many, while each rule or law is one, being universal.

There is a difference between 'that which is unjust' and 'unjust conduct,' and between 'that which is just' and 'just conduct.' Nature or ordinance pronounces a thing unjust: when that thing is done, it is 'unjust conduct'; till it is done, it is only 'unjust.' And similarly with 'just conduct,' dikaiôma (or more correctly, the general term is dikaiopragêma, dikaiôma denoting the rectification of an act of injustice).

We shall have later to consider the several rules of justice and of law, and to enumerate their various kinds and describe them and the things with which they deal.
viii Ὡντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἄδικεὶ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὡταν ἐκῶν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὡταν δὲ ἄκων, οὔτε ἄδικεὶ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβεβηκε δικαίως εἶναι ἡ ἄδικως, πράττουσιν.

2 ἄδικημα δὴ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὀρισται τῷ ἐκούσιοι καὶ ἄκουσιω· ὡταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ἡ, ψεύγεται, ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἄδικημα τὸτ' ἐστὶν· ὡστ' ἐσται τι άδικον μὲν, ἄδικημα δ' οὕτω, εάν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῆ.  

3 λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, δ' ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἁγνοοῦν πράττῃ μήτε δὴ μήτε ὃ μήτε οὐ <ἐνεκα> ὥστε καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος ἐνεκα), κακείως ἐκαστὸν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ βία· ὥσπερ εἰ τίς λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἐτερον, οὐχ ἐκῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἡ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὃτι δὲ πατήρ ἁγνοεῖν. ὅμως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ἐνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πράξεις ὅλην. τὸ δὴ ἁγνοοομενὸν, ἡ μὴ ἁγνοοομενὸν μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὅν, ἡ βία, ἄκουσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει υπερχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, δἐν 1135 b

1 δὴ Münchener; δὲ.  
2 <ἐνεκα> add. Γ.

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a πρ. 1. 19.
b i.e., mistake, ignorance: as in the illustration, it is an accident that the person struck is the striker's father.
c So., of whom he knows his father to be one.

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Such being an account of just and unjust actions, it is their voluntary performance that constitutes just and unjust conduct. If a man does them involuntarily, he cannot be said to act justly, or unjustly, except incidentally, in the sense that he does an act which happens to be just or unjust. Whether therefore an action is or is not an act of injustice, or of justice, depends on its voluntary or involuntary character. When it is voluntary, the agent is blamed, and only in that case is the action an act of injustice; so that it is possible for an act to be unjust without being an act of injustice, if the qualification of voluntariness be absent. By a voluntary action, as has been said before,¹ I mean any action within the agent’s own control which he performs knowingly, that is, without being in ignorance of the person affected, the instrument employed, and the result (for example, he must know whom he strikes, and with what weapon, and the effect of the blow); and in each of these respects both accident² and compulsion must be excluded. For instance, if A took hold of B’s hand and with it struck C, B would not be a voluntary agent, since the act would not be in his own control. Or again, a man may strike his father without knowing that it is his father, though aware that he is striking some person, and perhaps that it is one or other of the persons present³; and ignorance may be similarly defined with reference to the result, and to the circumstances of the action generally. An involuntary act is therefore an act done in ignorance, or else one that though not done in ignorance is not in the agent’s control, or is done under compulsion; since there are many natural processes too that we perform or undergo knowingly,
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οὐθέν ὁ οὖθ' ἐκούσιον οὖτ' ἀκούσιον ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ

γνώμην ἢ ἀποδινήσκειν. ἐστὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν

ἀδικεῖν καὶ τῶν δικαιῶν καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός

καὶ γὰρ ἃν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοή τις ἄκων

καὶ διὰ φόβου, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἀκούστα τὴν

παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός

φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀδικά πράττειν. τῶν δὲ

ἐκουσών τὰ μὲν προελομενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὗ

προελομενοι, προελομενοι μὲν ὡσα προβολευσάμενοι,

ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὡσα ἀπροβολεύετα.

6 Τριῶν δὴ οὖσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις,

τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτήματά ἐστων, ὅταν μήτε

ἐν μῆτε ὃ μήτε οὗ ἐνεκα ὑπελάβη πράξῃς.

ἡ γὰρ οὗ βάλλειν ἢ οὗ τούτω ἢ οὗ τούτων ἢ οὗ

τούτων ἐνεκα. ὡσθη, ἀλλὰ συνεβῇ ὡσὶν ὡσιν ἐνεκα.

7 ὡσθη (οἷον οἷον ἰνα τρώση ἀλλ' ἰνα κεντήσῃ) ὡσὶν

ὅταν μὴ οὐκ ὡς." ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη

γένηται, ἀτύχημα. ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἀνευ δὲ

καιρίας, ἀμάρτημα (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἢ ἀρχή

ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀτυχεῖς δ' ὅταν ἐξωθεῖν)."  

1 οὐθέν οoulos' ἐφ' ἦμών οὖθ' ἐκούσιον [σουτ' ἀκούσιον] Russow.

2 βάλλειν Kβ: βάλειν.

3 ὡς Kβ: ὡς.

4 ἀγνοίας Jackson: aitiaes.

'o 'Involuntary' is certainly corrupt: perhaps Aristotle wrote 'in our control.'

The three sorts of injury are ἀτύχημα, ἀμάρτημα, and ἀδίκημα. The second term is introduced first, in its wider sense of a mistake which leads to an offence against some one else (the word connotes both things). It is then subdivided into two; ἀτύχημα, accident or misadventure, an offence 300
though none of them is either voluntary or involuntary; for example, growing old, and dying.

4 Also an act may be either just or unjust incidentally. A man may restore a deposit unwillingly and from fear of consequences, and we must not then say that he does a just act, nor that he acts justly, except incidentally; and similarly a man who under compulsion and against his will fails to restore a deposit can only be said to act unjustly or do what is unjust incidentally.

5 Again voluntary acts are divided into acts done by choice and those done not by choice, the former being those done after deliberation and the latter those done without previous deliberation.

6 There are then three ways in which a man may injure his fellow. An injury done in ignorance is an error, the person affected or the act or the instrument or the result being other than the agent supposed; for example, he did not think to hit, or not with this missile, or not this person, or not with this result, but it happened that either the result was other than he expected (for instance he did not mean to inflict a wound but only a prick), or the person, or the missile. When then the injury happens contrary to reasonable expectation, it is (1) a misadventure. When, though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it is done without evil intent, it is (2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's ignorance lies in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself.

due to mistake and not reasonably to be expected, and ἀμάρτημα in the narrow sense, a similar offence that ought to have been foreseen. The third term, ἀθλημα, a wrong, is subdivided into wrongs done in a passion, which do not prove wickedness, and wrongs done deliberately, which do.
δόται δὲ εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβολεύσας δὲ, ἀδίκημα, ὁλον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἦλλα πάθη ὅσα ἀναγκαία ἥ φυσικά συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματα ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι τω ἀδικοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὔδε πονηροὶ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη. ὅταν δ’ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικοὶ καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοιας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμὸς ποιῆν, ἀλλ’ ὅ ὀργίας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου (ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστιν). οὐ γὰρ ὦσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφὶ σβητοῦσιν, ἢν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐτερον εἶναι μοχθηρὸν, ἢν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ’ ὀμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, [ὅ δ’ ἐπιβουλεύοις οὐκ ἁγνοεῖ] ὅταν ὁ μὲν οίτεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ’ οὐ. ἂν δ’ ἐκ 1138 a προαιρέσεως βλάψη, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ’ ἢδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἱσον. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελομένος δικαιοπραγῆ. δικαιο-πραγεῖ δὲ, ὃν μόνον3 ἐκών πράττῃ, τῶν δ’ ἄκουσί, σίων τὰ μὲν ἔστι συγγνωμονικά τὰ δ’ οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἁγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δ’ ἁγνοοι ἀμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δ’ ἁγνοοι, ἀλλ’ ἁγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ

1 post βλάψη inserit c. vi. 1, 2 έπει δ’ ἐστιν . . . τῶν ἅλλων Jackson.
2 ὁ δ’ . . . ἁγνοεῖ infra post ὁ δ’ οὗ tr. Richards.
3 μόνον aut ante ἄν ponendum aut secludendum Spengel.

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When an injury is done knowingly but not deliberately, it is (8) an act of injustice or wrong; such, for instance, are injuries done through anger, or any other unavoidable or natural passion to which men are liable; since in committing these injuries and errors a man acts unjustly, and his action is an act of injustice, but he is not ipso facto unjust or wicked, for the injury was not done out of wickedness. When however an injury is done from choice, the doer is unjust and wicked. Hence acts due to sudden anger are rightly held not to be done of malice aforethought, for it is the man who gave the provocation that began it, not he who does the deed in a fit of passion. And moreover the issue is not one of fact, but of justification (since it is apparent injustice that arouses anger); the fact of the injury is not disputed (as it is in cases of contract, where one or the other of the parties must be a knave, unless they dispute the facts out of forgetfulness). They agree as to the facts but dispute on which side justice lies; so that one thinks he has been unjustly treated and the other does not. On the other hand, one who does an injury intentionally is not acting in ignorance; but if a man does an injury of set purpose, he is guilty of injustice, and injustice of the sort that renders the doer an unjust man, if it be an act that violates proportion or equality. Similarly one who acts justly on purpose is a just man; but he acts justly only if he acts voluntarily.

Of involuntary actions some are pardonable and some are not. Errors not merely committed in ignorance but caused by ignorance are pardonable; those committed in ignorance, but caused not by

* In the ms., this clause stands before the preceding one.
πάθος δὲ μῆτε φυσικὸν μῆτ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐ συγ-
γνωμονικά.

 ix 'Απορήσειε δ' ἀν τις εἰ ἰκανὸς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐστὶν ὁσπερ Εὐρυπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀπόσως

μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.

ἐκὼν ἐκοῦσαν, ἦ <οὐχ> ἐκοῦσαν⁴ οὐχ ἐκὼν;

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἄληθῶς ἐστὶν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, 15 ἦ οὐ ἄλλ' ἀκούσιον ἄπαν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον. καὶ ἀρα πᾶν οὕτως ἦ ἐκεῖνος [ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον], 3 ὡς τὸ μὲν 2 ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι (τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον). ὡστ' εὐλογον ἀντικείσθαι ὀμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον 20 τὸ τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι—ἡ ἐκούσιον ἦ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἀτοπον δ' ἂν δόξει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἐνοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται

3 οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἔπει' καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἀδίκον πεπονθὸς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἦ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πᾶσχειν 28 ἐστὶν. κατὰ συμβεβηκός γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαιῶν. ὀμοίως δὲ δήλου ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταυτὸν τὸ τάδικα πράττει τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀδικα πᾶσχειν

1 κατέκταν Γ: κατέκτα.
2 <οὐχ> ἐκοῦσαν Jackson: θέλουσαν. 3 Bywater.
4 καὶ Russow. 5 ἐπειτα Bywater.

a Apparently from a dialogue between Alcmaeon and (possibly) Phaegus in the last play of Euripides named after the former. Cf. ττ. 1. 8.

b i.e., to suffer wrong; for the wide sense of ἀδικεῖν see c. i. 1, note.

c Cf. c. viii. 1.

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that ignorance but by unnatural or inhuman passion, are unpardonable.

But it may perhaps be doubted whether our discussion of suffering and doing injustice has been sufficiently definite; and in the first place, whether the matter really is as Euripides has put it in the strange lines—a—

'I killed my mother—that's the tale in brief!'
'Were you both willing, or unwilling both?'

Is it really possible to suffer injustice voluntarily, or on the contrary is suffering injustice always involuntary, just as acting unjustly is always voluntary? And again, is suffering injustice always voluntary, or always involuntary, or sometimes one and sometimes the other? And similarly with being treated justly (acting justly being always voluntary). Thus it would be reasonable to suppose that both being treated unjustly and being treated justly are similarly opposed to acting unjustly and acting justly respectively: that either both are voluntary or both involuntary. But it would seem paradoxical to assert that even being treated justly is always voluntary; for people are sometimes treated justly against their will. The fact is that the further question might be raised, must a man who has had an unjust thing done to him always be said to have been treated unjustly, or does the same thing hold good of suffering as of doing something unjust? One may be a party to a just act, whether as its agent or its object, incidentally. And the same clearly is true of an unjust act: doing what is unjust is not identical with acting unjustly, nor yet is suffering what is unjust identical with being treated.
τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιο-
πραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι 80
μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἡ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος.
4 εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα
tuά, τὸ δὲ ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὅν καὶ ὧς καὶ ὧς, ὃ
δὲ ἀκρατής ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτὸν, ἑκὼν τ’ ἢ
ἀδικοῦτο καὶ 1 ἐιδέχετο αὐτὸν 2 αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν (ἐστὶ
dὲ καὶ τούτο ἐν τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται 1136 b
5 αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν). ἔτι ἑκὼν ἂν τις δι’ ἀκρασίαν
ὑπ’ ἄλλου βλάπτοντο ἐκόντος, ἄστ’ εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ’
ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἡ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσ-
θετέον τῷ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα καὶ ὅν καὶ ὧς καὶ ὧς
6 τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν 5
οὐν τις ἑκὼν καὶ τάδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ’
οὐθεὶς ἑκὼν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐθ’ ὃ ἀκρατής,
ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττειν οὐτε γὰρ βού-
λεται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε
7 ἀκρατής ὃ οὐκ’ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττειν. ὃ
δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδοὺς, ἀσπερ ὁ Ὀμηρός φησι δοῦναι 10
τὸν Γλαύκον τῷ Διομήδει

χρύσα παλαιών, ἐκατόμβοι ἐνεαβοῖν,
οὔκ ἀδικεῖται: ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ διδόναι,
tὸ δ’ ἀδικεῖσθαι οὔκ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα

1 καὶ vulg.: καὶ Κb. 2 αὐτὸν ΓMb; αὐτός ΚbLb.

* Ἰηθ., vi. 236.
unjustly, and the same is true of acting and being treated justly; for it is impossible to be treated unjustly unless the other acts unjustly, or to be treated justly unless he acts justly.

4 But if to act unjustly is simply to do harm to someone voluntarily, and voluntarily means knowing the person affected, the instrument, and the manner of injury, it will follow both that the man of defective self-restraint, inasmuch as he voluntarily harms himself, voluntarily suffers injustice, and also that it is possible for a man to act unjustly towards himself (for the possibility of this is also a debated question).

5 Moreover, lack of self-restraint may make a person voluntarily submit to being harmed by another; which again would prove that it is possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. But perhaps this definition of acting unjustly is incorrect, and we should add to the words 'to do harm knowing the person affected, the instrument and the manner' the further qualification 'against that person's wish.' If so, though a man can be harmed and can have an unjust thing done to him voluntarily, no one can suffer injustice voluntarily, because no one can wish to be harmed: even the unrestrained man does not, but acts contrary to his wish, since no one wishes for a thing that he does not think to be good, and the unrestrained man does what he thinks he ought not to do. One who gives away what is his own—as Homer a says that Glaucus gave to Diomedes—

golden arms for bronze,

An hundred beeves' worth for the worth of nine—
cannot be said to suffer injustice; for giving rests with oneself, suffering injustice does not—there has to be another person who acts unjustly.
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8 ὃς ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἁδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι
οὐχ ἐκούσιον, ἰήλον.

"Ετι δ’ ὡς προειλόμεθα δῦ’ ἔστω εἰπεῖν, πότερον ἐπ’ ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἁξίαν τὸ πλέον ἢ
9 ὃ ἐχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστω αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἁδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ
ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων
ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὃ ἐχων τὸ πλέον, εἰ τις πλέον
ἐτέρω ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδώς καὶ ἐκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς
αὐτὸν ἁδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν, ὃ
20 γὰρ ἔντυχες ἑλαττωτικὸς ἐστὶν. ἢ οὔδε τοῦτο
ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρω γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἐτυχέν, ἐπλεονέκτει,
οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται καὶ
κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἁδικεῖν· οὔθὲν γὰρ παρὰ
τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἁδικεῖται
διὰ γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ εἰπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. 25
10 φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἁδικεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ
ὁ τὸ πλέον ἐχων ἀεὶ. οὐ γὰρ ὁ τὸ ἁδικον ὑπάρχει
ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ’ ὁ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ’
ἀθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ἔστω ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι
11 ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς

1 καὶ ὅτι ΓΜb.
2 de (ἀδικεῖ Kb) in proximam sententiam transponendum
Richards.
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It is clear then that it is not possible to suffer injustice voluntarily.

There still remain two of the questions that we proposed to discuss: (1) Is it ever he who gives the unduly large share, or is it always he who receives it, that is guilty of the injustice? and (2) Can one act unjustly towards oneself?

If the former alternative is possible, that is, if it may be the giver and not the receiver of too large a share who acts unjustly, then when a man knowingly and voluntarily assigns a larger share to another than to himself—as modest people are thought to do, for an equitable man is apt to take less than his due—this is a case of acting unjustly towards oneself. But perhaps this also requires qualification. For the man who gave himself the smaller share may possibly have got a larger share of some other good thing, for instance glory, or intrinsic moral nobility. Also the inference may be refuted by referring to our definition of acting unjustly: in the case supposed, the distributor has nothing done to him against his wish; therefore he does not suffer injustice merely because he gets the smaller share: at most he only suffers damage.

And it is clear that the giver as well as the receiver of an undue share may be acting unjustly, and that the receiver is not doing so in all cases. For the charge of injustice attaches, not to a man of whom it can be said that he does what is unjust, but to one of whom it can be said that he does this voluntarily, that is to say one from whom the action originates; and the origin of the act in this case lies in the giver and not in the receiver of the share.

Again, ‘to do a thing’ has more than one meaning.
ARISTOTLE

τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἕστιν ὡς τὰ ἰσμυχα κτελεῖ 30 καὶ ἡ χεῖρ καὶ ὁ οὐκετής ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἄδικεὶ 12 μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἄγνοον ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἄδικεὶ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικος ἢ κρίσις ἕστιν (ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος, ἔτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον). εἰ δὲ γνώσκων ἔκρινεν ἄδικως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ 1187 a τιμωρίας. ὃσπερ οὖν καὶ εἰ τις μερίσατο τοῦ ἄδικήματος, καὶ δὲ διὰ ταύτα κρίνας ἄδικως πλέον ἔχει καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνη 1 τὸν ἄγρον κρίνας οὐκ ἄγρον ἀλλ' ἄργυριον ἐλαβειν.

14 Οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖς οἴονται εἰναι τὸ ἄδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἰναι ῥάδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἕστων συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦνα τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργυρίον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὦδε ἔχοντα ταύτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτε ἐπ' αὐτοῖς.

15 ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τὸ γνώναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα 10 οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἰναι, ὅτι περὶ ἄν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπόν ἔμυναν. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια; τοῦτο δ' πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγείαν εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κάκει

1 ἐκείνη K: ἐκείνυν δ'.
2 πῶς . . . πῶς . . . δὴ Bywater: πῶς . . . τῶς . . . δὲ

*It is not clear whether this is meant to apply, in certain circumstances, to the distributor, or to the receiver, or to both.

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In a certain sense a murder is done by the inanimate instrument, or by the murderer's hand, or by a slave acting under orders. But though these do what is unjust, they cannot be said to act unjustly.  

12 Again, although if a judge has given an unfair judgement in ignorance, he is not guilty of injustice, nor is the judgement unjust, in the legal sense of justice (though the judgement is unjust in one sense, for legal justice is different from justice in the primary sense), yet if he knowingly gives an unjust judgement, he is himself taking more than his share, either of favour or of vengeance. Hence a judge who gives an unjust judgement for these motives takes more than his due just as much as if he shared the proceeds of the injustice; for even a judge who assigns a piece of land on that condition does not receive land but money.  

14 Men think that it is in their power to act unjustly, and therefore that it is easy to be just. But really this is not so. It is easy to lie with one's neighbour's wife or strike a bystander or slip some money into a man's hand, and it is in one's power to do these things or not; but to do them as a result of a certain disposition of mind is not easy, and is not in one's power. Similarly men suppose it requires no special wisdom to know what is just and what is unjust, because it is not difficult to understand the things about which the law pronounces. But the actions prescribed by law are only accidentally just actions. How an action must be performed, how a distribution must be made to be a just action or a just distribution—to know this is a harder task than to know what medical treatment will produce health. Even in medicine, though it is easy to know what
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μέλι καὶ οὖνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον καὶ καθαυ καὶ τομὴν εἴδεναι ράδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ύγείαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἵστρον εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὖνται εἶναι οὕθεν ἢττον τὸ ἄδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἢττον ὁ
dίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλλον δύναι ἡ ἐκαστὸν πράξαι τούτων καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι,
καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεύσας τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὀποτερασοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ
tὸ ἄδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί (πλὴν κατὰ
sυμβεβηκός), ἀλλὰ τὸ Ὄδη ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὃσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ
tέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμα-
κεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ Ὅδη.

17 Ἑστὶ δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τοῦτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν
ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τοῦτοις
cαὶ ἐλλευσιν, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ
cαύ山西, οἴον ἵσως τοῖς θεοῖς· τοῖς δ' οὐθὲν μόριον
wφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνισάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα
βλάπτει· τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινον ἔστιν.

1 οὐχ Ἐα: οὐθὲν.
2 τοῦτο δ' Γ: διὰ τοῦτ' (διὸ τοῦτ' Zwinger).

α i.e., that acting unjustly is in our own power, § 14.
β ἐπιεικὲς in some contexts means "suitable" or "reasonable."

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honey, wine and hellebore, cautery and surgery are, to know how and to whom and when to apply them so as to effect a cure is no less an undertaking than to be a physician. And for this very reason a men think that the just man may act unjustly no less than justly, because the just man is not less but rather more able than another to do any particular unjust thing: for example, he can he with a woman, or strike a blow, and a brave man can throw away his shield, and can wheel to the right or left and run away. But to be a coward and to be guilty of injustice consists not in doing these things (except accidentally), but in doing them from a certain disposition of mind; just as to be a physician and cure one’s patients is not a matter of employing or not employing surgery or drugs, but of doing so in a certain manner.

Claims of justice exist between persons who share in things generally speaking good, and who can have too large a share or too small a share of them. There are persons who cannot have too large a share of these goods: doubtless, for example, the gods. And there are those who can derive no benefit from any share of them: namely, the incurably vicious; to them all the things generally good are harmful. But for others they are beneficial within limits; and this is the case with ordinary mortals.

We have next to speak of Equity and the equitable, and of their relation to Justice and to what is just respectively. For upon examination it appears that Justice and Equity are neither absolutely identical nor generically different. Sometimes, it is true, we praise equity and the equitable man, so much so that we even apply the word ‘equitable’ as a term
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ

τὰ ἄλλα ἐπανωθῆσες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἅπαστὶ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἀτοπον εἴ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τι ὃν ἐπανετῶν ἐστιν· ἦ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἦ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς [οὐ δίκαιον], ἦ ἀλλὰ· ἦ ἦ ἄμφω σπουδαία, ταύτον ἦ ἐστιν. ἦ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταύτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, ἔχει δ' ἀπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐθὲν ὑπεναντίον ἐαυτοῖς· τὸ τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον τινὸς ὃν βέλτιον ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὃς ἀλλὰ τὸ γένος ὃν βέλτιον ἐστὶ τοῦ δικαίου. ταύτων ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἄμφω σπουδαῖοι οὕτως κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς.

3 τοιεὶ δὲ τήν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστὶν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δίκαιον. αὐτον δ' ὅτι ὃ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνώπιον δ' οὐχ οἶδον τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὐν ἄναγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἶδον τε δ' ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει τὸ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοοῦν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστω οὐδὲν ἦττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτη ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος ἐστὶν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἦ τῶν πρακτῶν ὑλὴ ἐστὶν. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὃ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἦ παραλείπει τὸ νομοθέτης καὶ ἦμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπόν, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸν

1 τῷ Ross: τῷ. 2 [οὐ δίκαιον] om. 1. 3 ὀρθός Γ: ὀρθῶς.
of approval to other things besides what is just, and use it as the equivalent of 'good,' denoting by 'more equitable' merely that a thing is better. Yet at other times, when we think the matter out, it seems strange that the equitable should be praise-worthy if it is something other than the just. If they are different, either the just or the equitable is not good; if both are good, they are the same thing.

2 These then are the considerations, more or less, from which the difficulty as to the equitable arises. Yet they are all in a manner correct, and not really inconsistent. For equity, while superior to one sort of justice, is itself just: it is not superior to justice as being generically different from it. Justice and equity are therefore the same thing, and both are good, though equity is the better.

3 The source of the difficulty is that equity, though just, is not legal justice, but a rectification of legal justice. The reason for this is that law is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement. In matters therefore where, while it is necessary to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do so correctly, the law takes into consideration the majority of cases, although it is not unaware of the error this involves. And this does not make it a wrong law; for the error is not in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case: the material of conduct is essentially irregular. When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right, where the lawgiver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

ἐλλειψθέν, δὲ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἀν εἶπαι 1 ἡ ἐκεὶ² παραίν, καὶ εἰ ὡδεί, ἔνομοθέτησεν ἄν.³ διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἔστι, καὶ βέλτιον τῶν δικαίων, οὐ 25 τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁμαρτηματος. καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου ἤ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτίον καὶ τοῦ μη πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἁδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὡστε 7 ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀφίστου ἀφίστου καὶ ὁ κανών ἐστιν, ἂσπερ καὶ τῆς Δεσβίας 80 οἰκοδομῆς 4 ὁ μολίβδων κανών πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ 8 κανών, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ὡσπερ δίκαιον, καὶ τινὸς 5 βέλτιον δικαίου, δήλου. φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τῆς ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιοῦτων 35 προαιρητικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ μη ἄκριβος 1139 δικαίος ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς καὶ περ ἐχθὼν τῶν νόμων βοηθόν, ἐπιεικὴς ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἐξις αὐτή ἐπιεικεία, δικαιοσύνη τις οὐσία καὶ οὐχ ἐτέρα τις ἔξις.

11 Πότερον δὲ ἐνδεχεται ἐαυτὸν ἀδικείν ἢ οὐ, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ

1 ἀν εἶπαι: εἶπεν Κᵇ.
2 ἡ ἐκεὶ ομ. Κᵇ.
3 ἂν om. Κᵇ.
4 οἰκοδομήσεως Κᵇ, οἰκοδομήσεωι ed.
5 τινὸς Γ: τινὸς.
rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case in question. Hence, while the equitable is just, and is superior to one sort of justice, it is not superior to absolute justice, but only to the error due to its absolute statement. This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality. In fact this is the reason why things are not all determined by law: it is because there are some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary. For what is itself indefinite can only be measured by an indefinite standard, like the leaden rule used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fit the circumstances of the case.

It is now plain what the equitable is, and that it is just, and that it is superior to one sort of justice. And from this it is clear what the equitable man is: he is one who by choice and habit does what is equitable, and who does not stand on his rights unduly, but is content to receive a smaller share although he has the law on his side. And the disposition described is Equity; it is a special kind of Justice, not a different quality altogether.

The foregoing discussion has indicated the answer to the question, Is it possible or not for a man to commit injustice against himself? (1) One class of just actions consists of those acts, in accordance with

\( a \) Explained either as used in building with polygonal stones (but this was not peculiar to Lesbos), or in making the Lesbian form of moulding, which had a double curve.
νόμον τεταγμένα: οίον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινώναι ἐαυτόν δ ἁ νόμος (ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει).

2 ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτη (μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων) ἔκών, ἀδικεῖ (ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὁν καὶ ὃ). δὲ δὲ δὲ ὁ ὅρηγον ἐαυτὸν σφάττων ἔκών τούτο ὅρα 10

3 (παρὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον), οὐκ ἐὰν ὁ νόμος. ἀδικεῖ ἀρα· ἄλλα τίνα; ἡ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δὲ οὐ; ἐκὼν γὰρ πᾶσχει, ἀδικεῖται δὲ οὖθες ἔκών, διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ἑκμοῦ, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἐαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ως τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι.

4 ἔτι καθ' ὁ ἀδικος ὁ μόνον ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαύλος, οὐκ ἔστων ἀδικήσαι ἐαυτόν. (τούτο γὰρ ἀλλο ἐκείνων· ἔστι γὰρ πως ὁ ἀδικος οὐτω πονηρός ἄσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἐκὼν τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ.) ἀμα γὰρ ἂν τῇ αὐτῷ εἶν ἀφηρῆσαι καὶ προσκείσαι τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν πλεῖοσιν ἀνάγκη 20

5 εἶναι τὰ δικαίων καὶ τὸ ἀδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσοιν τε καὶ ἡ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον (ὁ γὰρ διότι ἐπαθε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν, οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν). αὐτὸς δὲ ἐαυτόν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἀμα καὶ πᾶσχει καὶ

1 αὐτὸν Κβ.  2 νόμον ΙΜβ.  3 μόνον ο Λαμβίνου.

a The argument seems to be, that suicide does not prove the possibility of a man's committing 'injustice,' in the wider sense of any illegal injury, against himself. Suicide is an act of injustice in this sense, since it is the voluntary infliction of bodily harm not in retaliation and therefore contrary to law; but it is an offence not against oneself but against the State, since it is punished as such.

b Or perhaps, 'and any form of homicide that it does not expressly permit.'

c i.e. the principle of retaliation.

d At Athens a suicide's hand was buried apart from the body; Aeschines, Ctes. 244.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, V. xi. 1-5

any virtue, which are ordained by law. For instance, the law does not sanction suicide (and what it does not expressly sanction, it forbids). Further, when a man voluntarily (which means with knowledge of the person affected and the instrument employed) does an injury (not in retaliation) that is against the law, he commits injustice. But he who kills himself in a fit of passion, voluntarily does an injury (against the right principle) which the law does not allow. Therefore the suicide commits injustice; but against whom? It seems to be against the state rather than against himself; for he suffers voluntarily, and nobody suffers injustice voluntarily. This is why the state exacts a penalty; suicide is punished by certain marks of dishonour, as being an offence against the state.

(2) Moreover, it is not possible to act unjustly towards oneself in the sense in which a man is unjust who is a doer of injustice only and not universally wicked. (This case is distinct from the former, because Injustice in one sense is a special form of wickedness, like Cowardice, and does not imply universal wickedness; hence it is necessary further to show that a man cannot commit injustice against himself in this sense either.) For (a) if it were, it would be possible for the same thing to have been taken away from and added to the same thing at the same time. But this is impossible: justice and injustice always necessarily imply more than one person. Again (b) an act of injustice must be voluntary and done from choice, and also unprovoked; we do not think that a man acts unjustly if having suffered he retaliates, and gives what he got. But when a man injures himself, he both does and suffers
6 Ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἰὴ ἃν ἑκόντα ἄδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι, ἀνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἄδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἄδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὔδεις τὴν ἐαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἐαυτοῦ τοίχον οὔδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἐαυτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ ἐαυτὸν ἄδικεῖν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἐκοναῖως ἄδικεῖσθαι.

7 (Φανερῶν δὲ καὶ ὧτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἄδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἄδικεῖν—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐλαττον τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὃς ἄλλος βουλεύων μὲν ἐν ἱατρικῇ, εὐεκτικῷ δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ—ἀλλ' ὃμως χείρον τὸ ἄδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ πεικτῶν, καὶ κακίας ἡ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἑγγύς—οὐ γὰρ ἀπαν τὸ ἐκοναῖον μετὰ κακίας—, τὸ δὲ ἄδικεῖσθαι ἀνευ κακίας καὶ τὰ ἄδικας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικεῖσθαι ἦττον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δ' οὔθεν κωλύει μείζον 1133 αἰνει κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρίτων λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπαθεῖσας, καταὶ γένοι τ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπαθεῖσαν διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίνῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων λῃσθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.)

8 Ἀριστοτέλη. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὑμωίστητα ἐστὶν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν,

1 καὶ . . . γυμναστικῆ: v. infra adn. a.
2 κακίας Rassow: ἄδικας.

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*a This clause has no grammatical connexion with the rest of the sentence; Ramsauer brackets it, Rassow supplies before it τὸ δὲ δίκαιοπράγειν μέσον, 'whereas just conduct is a mean.'*

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the same thing at the same time. Again (c) if a man could act unjustly towards himself, it would be possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. Furthermore (d) no one is guilty of injustice without committing some particular unjust act; but a man cannot commit adultery with his own wife, or burglary on his own premises, or theft of his own property.

(8) And generally, the question, Can a man act unjustly towards himself? is solved by our decision upon the question, Can a man suffer injustice voluntarily?

(7) It is further manifest that, though both to suffer and to do injustice are evils—for the former is to have less and the latter to have more than the mean, corresponding to what is health-giving in medicine and conducive to fitness in athletic training—nevertheless to do injustice is the worse evil, for it is reprehensible, implying vice in the agent, and vice utter and absolute—or nearly so, for it is true that not every wrong act voluntarily committed implies vice—, whereas to suffer injustice does not necessarily imply vice, viz. injustice, in the victim. Thus in itself to suffer injustice is the lesser evil, though accidentally it may be the greater. With this however science is not concerned; science pronounces pleurisy a more serious disorder than a sprain, in spite of the fact that in certain circumstances a sprain may be accidentally worse than pleurisy, as for instance if it should happen that owing to a sprain you fell and in consequence were taken by the enemy and killed.

(9) In a metaphorical and analogical sense however there is such a thing as justice, not towards oneself but between different parts of one’s nature; not,
οὐ πάν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ σικονομικὸν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχουν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἠλογον· εἰς ἄ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὅτι [ἐν] τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἐαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὡσπερ οὖν ἀρχοντὶ καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιον τι καὶ τούτοις.

10 Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

1 Jackson.
Nicomachean Ethics, V. xi. 9–10

It is true, justice in the full sense of the term, but such justice as subsists between master and slave, or between the head of a household and his wife and children. For in the discourses on this question a distinction is set up between the rational and irrational parts of the soul; and this is what leads people to suppose that there is such a thing as injustice towards oneself, because these parts of the self may be thwarted in their respective desires, so that there may be a sort of justice between them, such as exists between ruler and subject.

So much may be said in description of Justice and of the other Moral Virtues.

a Plato’s Republic and the writings of Plato’s followers: cf. i. xiii. 9.
1 Ἔπει δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι 

dei τὸ μέσον αἴρεισθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν 

μηδὲ τὴν ἐλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος 20 

ὁ ὁρθὸς λέγει, τούτῳ διέλυμεν.

Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, καθάπερ 

cai ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἡστὶ τις σκοτὸς πρὸς ὅν 

ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, 

cai tis ἐστιν ὁρὸς τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξὺ 

φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλεῖψεως, 

2 οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν 25 

eἰπεῖν οὕτως ἄληθες μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. καὶ 

γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὁσα ἐστὶν 

ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἄληθες μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε 

πλεῖστον οὔτε ἐλάττων δεὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲ βαθύμενον, 

ἄλλα τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος· τούτῳ δὲ 

μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐθὲν ἀν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον 30 

πολλὰ δεὶ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἰ τις εἰπεῖν 

ὅτι ὁσα ἡ ἱατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων.

3 διὸ δεὶ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔξεις μὴ μόνον

1 καὶ om. Κβγ.

a Cf. π. vi., esp. § 15.

b The words denote tightening and loosening a bowstring, 

and also tuning a lyre. The former image is suggested by 

the preceding words, but the latter perhaps is a better
BOOK VI

1 We have already said a that it is right to choose the mean and to avoid excess and deficiency, and that the mean is prescribed by the right principle. Let us now analyse the latter notion.

In the case of each of the moral qualities or dispositions that have been discussed, as with all the other virtues also, there is a certain mark to aim at, on which the man who knows the principle involved fixes his gaze, and increases or relaxes the tension accordingly; there is a certain standard determining those modes of observing the mean which we define as lying between excess and defect, being in conformity with the right principle. This bare statement however, although true, is not at all enlightening. In all departments of human endeavour that have been reduced to a science, it is true to say that effort ought to be exerted and relaxed neither too much nor too little, but to the medium amount, and as the right principle decides. Yet a person knowing this truth will be no wiser than before: for example, he will not know what medicines to take merely from being told to take everything that medical science or a medical expert would prescribe.

3 Hence with respect to the qualities of the soul also, metaphor for that avoidance of the too much and the too little which, according to Aristotle, constitutes right conduct.
ἀληθῶς¹ εἶναι τοῦτ᾿ εἴρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τὸς εἰς ὅ όρθος λόγος καὶ τούτου τὸς ὁρος.

4 Τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν ἐνειπεῖτο ὡς ἐφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοιας. 1135α περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἰθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν

5 οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέξθη δι’ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἀλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων διαμετέοι, καὶ ὑποκείσαθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν δὲ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὅντων ὅσων αἱ ἄρχαι μὴ ἐνδεχόμεναι ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ὧν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἐτέρα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἐκά- 10 τερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ’ ὅμοιοτητά τινα καὶ οἱ-

6 κειότητα ἡ γνώσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικόν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὕτως δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχόμενων ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὡστε τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐστὶν εἰν τῷ μέρος τοῦ 15 λόγου ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἀρ’ ἐκατέρου τούτῳ τὸν τῆς ἡ βελτιστή ἔξις· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου.

7 ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἑργὸν τὸ οἰκεῖον. τρία δ’ ἐστὶν εἰν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας,

¹ ἀληθῶς Κ'ι': ἀληθὲς. ² τις Κ': τίς τ’.

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a Book VI. thus purports to explain further the definition of Moral Virtue (ii. vi. 15), while at the same time (§ 4) continuing the analysis of the definition of Happiness (i. vii. 15) by examining the Intellectual Virtues.

b i. xiii. 9.

§26
it is not enough merely to have established the truth of the above formula; we also have to define exactly what the right principle is, and what is the standard that determines it.\(^a\)

4 Now we have divided the Virtues of the Soul into two groups, the Virtues of the Character and the Virtues of the Intellect. The former, the Moral Virtues, we have already discussed. Our account of the latter must be precised by some remarks about psychology.

5 It has been said before\(^b\) that the soul has two parts, one rational and the other irrational. Let us now similarly divide the rational part, and let it be assumed that there are two rational faculties, one whereby we contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and one whereby we contemplate those things which admit of variation: since, on the assumption that knowledge is based on a likeness or affinity of some sort between subject and object, the parts of the soul adapted to the cognition of objects that are of different kinds must themselves differ in kind. These two rational faculties may be designated the Scientific Faculty and the Calculative Faculty respectively; since calculation is the same as deliberation, and deliberation is never exercised about things that are invariable, so that the Calculative Faculty is a separate part of the rational half of the soul.

6 We have therefore to ascertain what disposition of each of these faculties is the best, for that will be the special virtue of each.

But the virtue of a faculty is related to the special function which that faculty performs. Now there are three elements in the soul which control action.
Aristotle

2 αἰσθήσεις νοῦς ὀρέξεις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθήσεις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως. δὴ λοιπὸν ὅπως τῷ τὰ θηρία ἀἰσθήσεως μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν.—ἐστὶ δὲ ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τούτ' ἐν ὀρέξει διάφθεις καὶ φυγῆ. ὡστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἥθική ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετικῆς, ἡ δὲ προαιρεσίς ὀρέξεις βουλευτικῆ, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τὸν τε λόγου ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀρέξειν ὀρθῆν, εἴπερ ἡ προαιρεσίς σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διάκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διανοία καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτικῆ, τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακὸς τάληθες ἐστὶ καὶ ψευδός. τούτῳ γὰρ ἔστι παντὸς διανοητικὸν ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ [καὶ] διανοητικὸν ἡ ἀλήθεια ὀμολόγος ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.—πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχή προ- αίρεσις (ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἄλλ' οὐχ οὖ ἐνεκα), προ- αίρεσεως δὲ ὀρέξεις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἐνεκα τινος. διὸ οὖτ' ἀνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὖτ' ἀνευ ἥθικῆς ἐστιν ἔξεως ἡ προαιρεσίς. [ἐνπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ

1 διὰ ταῦτα Μ; δὲ ταῦτα μὲν Κ, διὰ μὲν ταῦτα Λ, μὲν διὰ ταῦτα Γ, διὰ ταῦτα Απελλ.

a νοῦς here bears its usual philosophic sense of the intellect, or rational part of the 'soul,' as a whole, whose function is διάνοια, thought in general. In c. vi. it is given a special and restricted meaning, and this in c. xi. is related to the popular use of the word to denote 'good sense' or practical intelligence.

b πράξις means rational action, conduct. The movements of animals, Aristotle appears to think, are mere reactions to the stimuli of sensation.

c Greenwood points out that the passage would be clearer if § 2 mid.—§ 3, 'Pursuit . . . right desire,' and § 5, 'Thought by itself . . . desire aims,' came lower down, after 328
and the attainment of truth: namely, Sensation, Intellect, and Desire.

2 Of these, Sensation never originates action, as is shown by the fact that animals have sensation but are not capable of action. 

3 Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of Desire correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the Intellect. Hence inasmuch as moral virtue is a disposition of the mind in regard to choice, and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, both the principle must be true and the desire right, and that desire must pursue the same things as principle affirms. We are here speaking of practical thinking, and of the attainment of truth in regard to action; with speculative thought, which is not concerned with action or production, right and wrong functioning consist in the attainment of truth and falsehood respectively. The attainment of truth is indeed the function of every part of the intellect, but that of the practical intelligence is the attainment of truth corresponding to right desire.

4 Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice, and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end. Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect or thought and a certain disposition of character [for doing well the verse-quotiation in § 6. The earlier part of § 6 is a parenthetical note. 

4 See vi. 15. 

5 i.e., truth about the means to the attainment of the rightly desired End.

6 Cf. iii. ii. 1 note. Here again προαίρεσις seems to mean choice of means, not of ends.

7 This clause must be rejected as superfluous and logically unsound: the nature of action is explained by that of 'choice,' not vice versa.
AKISTOILE


d' εναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἥθους οὐκ ἢ ἐστὶν. —διάνοια δ' αὐτή οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐνεκά τοῦ καὶ πρακτική: αὐτή γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιήσης τικής ἄρχει· ἐνεκά γὰρ τοῦ ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλώς ἄλλα πρὸς τι καὶ τινὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ. ἄλλα τοῦ πρακτοῦ· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὀρέξεως τούτου· διὸ ἡ ὀρεικτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαιρέσεις ἡ ὀρέξεως διανοητική, καὶ [ἡ] ἡ τοιαύτη ἄρχη ἀνθρώπως.

6 (Ὅπες ἐστὶ δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐθεῖς προαιρεῖται Ἰλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχόμενου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὁρθῶς Ἀγάθων μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται. ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἀσοῦ ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.

'Αμφιτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ἂς οὐδὲ μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύεσθαι ἐκάτερον, αὐτῷ ἄρετα ἀμφότερον.

iii 'Αρεάμενοι οὖν ἀνωθέν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ ὃς ἀληθεύει ἢ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι πέντε τῶν ἀριθμοῦ ταῦτα

1 Greenwood.  2 [ἡ] Α Richards.

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* For this distinction between making and doing, production and action or conduct, see i. i. 2, 5.

* See note b on i. iv. 2.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VI. ii. 4—iii. 1

...and the reverse in the sphere of action necessarily involve thought and character].

5 Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action. This indeed is the moving cause of productive activity also, since he who makes something always has some further end in view: the act of making is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and belongs to something else. Whereas a thing done is an end in itself: since doing well (welfare) is the End, and it is at this that desire aims.

Hence Choice may be called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect.

6 (Choice is not concerned with anything that has happened already: for example, no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for neither does one deliberate about what has happened in the past, but about what still lies in the future and may happen or not; what has happened cannot be made not to have happened. Hence Agathon is right in saying

This only is denied even to God,
The power to make what has been done undone.)

The attainment of truth is then the function of both the intellectual parts of the soul. Therefore their respective virtues are those dispositions which will best qualify them to attain truth.

iii Let us then discuss these virtues afresh, going more deeply into the matter.

Let it be assumed that there are five qualities through which the mind achieves truth in affirmation...
ARISTOTLE

δ' ἦστι τεχνή, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς· ὑπολήψεις γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαφεύγειν. 2 ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τι ἦστιν, ἐντεύθεν φανερῶν, εἰ δεὶ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, δ’ ἐπί- σταμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ’ ἐν- δεχόμενα ἄλλως, οταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λαμβάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἡ μή. εἰ ἀνάγκης ἁρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἶδιον ἄρα, τὰ γὰρ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ὁντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἴδια· τὰ δ’ αἴδια ἀγένητα

3 καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ 25 εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητὸν. ἐκ προογνωσκο- μένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἑπαγωγής, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἑπαγωγὴ ἀρχής ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, δ’ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου· ἐπὶ ἄρα ἄρχαι ἐξ ἄν ὅ συλλογισμὸς, 30

4 ὅν οὐκ ἦστι συλλογισμὸς· ἑπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἦστιν ἐξὶς ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· οταν γὰρ ποις πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ διὶ διὰ τόν καθόλου· ἐπὶστηταὶ· ἐγὼ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμ- περάσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐξεὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην. 35

1 ἀρχής Lb: ἀρχή. 2 ὅ om. Kvb.

¹ τεχνή, Art, as appears below, stands for εὐτεχνία and means here craftsmanship of any kind; it includes skill in fine art, but is not limited to it.
² See An. Post. i. 71 a 1 ff.
³ Demonstration in Aristotle means proof by deduction.
or denial, namely Art or technical skill, a Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence. Conception and Opinion are capable of error.

2 The nature of Scientific Knowledge (employing (1) Science, the term in its exact sense and disregarding its analogous uses) may be made clear as follows. We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically cannot vary; when a thing that can vary is beyond the range of our observation, we do not know whether it exists or not. An object of Scientific Knowledge, therefore, exists of necessity. It is therefore eternal, for everything existing of absolute necessity is eternal; and what is eternal does not come into existence or perish. Again, it is held that all Scientific Knowledge can be communicated by teaching, and that what is scientifically known must be learnt. But all teaching starts from facts previously known, as we state in the Analytics, b since it proceeds either by way of induction, or else by way of deduction. Now induction supplies a first principle or universal, deduction works from universals; therefore there are first principles from which deduction starts, which cannot be proved by deduction; therefore they are reached by induction. Scientific Knowledge, therefore, is the quality whereby we demonstrate, c with the further qualifications included in our definition of it in the Analytics, d namely, that a man knows a thing scientifically when he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first principles on which that conviction rests are known to him with certainty—for unless he is more certain of his first principles than of the conclusion drawn from them he will only possess the knowledge

a See An. Post. i. 71 b 9 ff.
ΔΕΙΚΤΗΣ

PERI ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ ΔΙΩΡΙΘΘΡ ΣΤΟΝ ΤΡΟΠΟΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΝ.

1 ν ΤΟΥ δ΄ ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΥ ΆΛΛΩΣ ΕΧΕΙΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΚΑΙ 1140 Α
2 ΠΟΙΗΣΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΟΝ, ΕΤΕΡΟΝ δ΄ ΕΣΤΙ ΠΟΙΗΣΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΑΞΙΣ (ΠΙΣΤΕΥΟΜΕΝ δΕ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ). ΩΣΤΕ ΚΑΙ Η ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΕΞΙΣ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΟΙΗΣΗΣ ΕΞΕΩΣ. [ΔΙΟ] ΑΟΙΔΕ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝΤΑΙ ΥΠ’ ΆΛΛΗΛΑΝ. ΟΥΤΕ ΓΑΡ Η ΠΡΑΞΙΣ ΠΟΙΗΣΙΣ ΟΥΤΕ Η ΠΟΙΗΣΙΣ ΠΡΑΞΙΣ 3 ΕΣΤΙΝ. ΕΠΕΙ ΔΙ Η ΟΙΚΟΔΟΜΙΚΗ ΤΕΧΝΗ ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΠΕΡ ΕΞΙΣ ΤΙΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ, ΚΑΙ ΟΥΔΕΜΙΑ ΟΥΤΕ ΤΕΧΝΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΥΤΙΣ ΟΥ ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ ΕΞΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ΟΥΤΕ ΠΟΙΑΝΤΗ Η ΟΥ ΤΕΧΝΗ, ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΑΝ 10 ΕΙΣ ΤΕΧΝΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΞΙΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΆΛΘΟΘΙΣ ΠΟΙΗΣΗ.

4 ΕΣΤΙ ΔΕ ΤΕΧΝΗ ΠΑΣΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΤΕΧΝΑΖΕΙΝ [ΚΑΙ] ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ ΌΠΩΣ ΑΝ ΓΕΝΗΤΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ΩΝ Η ΆΡΧΗ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΙ ΆΛΛΑ ΜΗ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΩ. ΟΥΤΕ ΓΑΡ ΤΩΝ ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ΟΝΤΩΝ Η ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ Η ΤΕΧΝΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ, 15 ΟΥΤΕ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΝ ΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΓΑΡ ΕΧΟΥΣΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΆΡΧΗΝ. ΕΠΕΙ ΔΕ ΠΟΙΗΣΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΑΞΙΣ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ, ΑΝΑΓΚΗ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ ΠΟΙΗΣΕΩΣ ΆΛΛΗ ΟΥ ΠΡΑΞΕΩΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ΚΑΙ ΤΡΟΠΟΝ ΤΙΝΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΤΥΧΗ ΚΑΙ Η ΤΕΧΝΗ, ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ ΚΑΙ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΦΗΣΙ

ΤΕΧΝΗ ΤΥΧΗΝ ΕΣΤΕΡΓΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΥΧΗ ΤΕΧΝΗ.

6 Η ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ, ΩΣΠΕΡ ΕΙΡΗΝΑΙ, ΕΞΙΣ ΤΙΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΆΛΘΘΟΘΙΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ, Η δ’ ΑΤΕΧΝΙΑ

1 [ΔΙΟ] ed.: καὶ Lb. 2 Muretus.

a i.e., the conviction may happen to be true, but he will not hold it as Scientific Knowledge in the proper sense of the term.

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in question accidentally. Let this stand as our definition of Scientific Knowledge.

iv The class of things that admit of variation includes (2) Art. Both things made and actions done. But making is different from doing (a distinction we may accept from extraneous discourses). Hence the rational quality concerned with doing is different from the rational quality concerned with making. Nor is one of them a part of the other, for doing is not a form of making, nor making a form of doing.

3 Now architectural skill, for instance, is an art, and it is also a rational quality concerned with making; nor is there any art which is not a rational quality concerned with making, nor any such quality which is not an art. It follows that an art is the same thing as a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly. All Art deals with bringing something into existence; and to pursue an art means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the maker and not in the thing made; for Art does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity, or according to nature, since these have their efficient cause in themselves.

5 But as doing and making are distinct, it follows that Art, being concerned with making, is not concerned with doing. And in a sense Art deals with the same objects as chance, as Agathon says:

Chance is beloved of Art, and Art of Chance.

6 Art, therefore, as has been said, is a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly. Its opposite, Lack of Art, is a rational quality,

b See note on i. xiii 9.
τούναντλοι μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἔξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

5 Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἀν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεὶ δὴ 25 φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῶ ἁγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποία πρὸς ὅγειαν ἑώς πρὸς ἴσχυν,

2 ἀλλὰ ποία πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῇν ὅλωσ.² σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τοὺ φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι ὁπουδαίον εὖ λογίσανται (ἀν μὴ ἑστὶ τέχνη). ὡστε καὶ ὅλως ἄν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βου-

3 λευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθές περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῶ πράξαι· ὡστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὅν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑποταμών, οὐκ ἃν εἴη ἡ φρόνισις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ τέχνη· ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο

4 τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως· τῆς³ μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἐτερον τὸ τέλος· τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἃν εἴη· ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. λειπεται ἁρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακ-

5 τικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπω ἁγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ. διὰ


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a The words 'since . . . itself the end' in the mss. follow § 4 'for human beings.'  
b See note on β. iv. 2.

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concerned with making, that reasons falsely. Both deal with that which admits of variation.

V. We may arrive at a definition of Prudence by considering who are the persons whom we call prudent. Now it is held to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, for instance what is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous as a means to the good life in general. This is proved by the fact that we also speak of people as prudent or wise in some particular thing, when they calculate well with a view to attaining some particular end of value (other than those ends which are the object of an art); so that the prudent man in general will be the man who is good at deliberating in general.

3 But no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do. Hence inasmuch as scientific knowledge involves demonstration, whereas things whose fundamental principles are variable are not capable of demonstration, because everything about them is variable, and inasmuch as one cannot deliberate about things that are of necessity, it follows that Prudence is not the same as Science. Nor can it be the same as Art. It is not Science, because matters of conduct admit of variation; and not Art, because doing and making are generically different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is in itself the end. It remains therefore that it is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to things that are good and bad for human beings.
τότε Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἶόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν: εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγοομέθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς.
(ἐνθὲν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τοῦτως προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σφιξούσαν τὴν φρόνησιν).
6 σοφεὶ δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν: οὐ γὰρ ἀπασχόρησιν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν, ὥστε τὸ τρίγυνον δυσλ ὀρθὰς ἵσας ἢ έχει ἢ οὐκ έχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα τὰ πρακτά: τῷ δὲ διεθαρμήσθην δὴ ἡδονὴν ἡ λυπην.eυθὺς οὐ φαίνεσαι ἄρχη, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτον ἐνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτον αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἐστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἄρχης.) ἀστραγάκη 20 τὴν φρόνησιν εἶναι εὔμεν ἐματὶ λόγου ἁληθή, περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν· ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν εὔστων ἄρετῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ οὐκ εὔστων· καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνη ὃ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνον αἱρετώτερον, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἦττων, ὧστε καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.
7 δὴ λοιμὸν οὐν ὅτι ἄρετή τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυσλ 25 δὲ ὀντων μεροὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγων ἑχόντων, θατέρου αὐν εὕρ ἄρετη, τὸ δοξάστικον· ἢ τε γὰρ

1 δύο ὀρθάς λοιας K, δυο ὀρθάς Bywater. 2 ἡ ἀρχή L.
Hence men like Pericles are deemed prudent, because they possess a faculty of discerning what things are good for themselves and for mankind; and that is our conception of an expert in Domestic Economy or Political Science.

(This also accounts for the word Temperance, which signifies 'preserving prudence.' And Temperance does in fact preserve our belief as to our own good; for pleasure and pain do not destroy or pervert all beliefs, for instance, the belief that the three angles of a triangle are, or are not, together equal to two right angles, but only beliefs concerning action. The first principles of action are the end to which our acts are means; but a man corrupted by a love of pleasure or fear of pain, entirely fails to discern any first principle, and cannot see that he ought to choose and do everything as a means to this end, and for its sake; for vice tends to destroy the sense of principle.

It therefore follows that Prudence is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to the things that are good for human beings.

Moreover, we can speak of excellence in Art, but not of excellence in Prudence. Also in Art voluntary error is not so bad as involuntary, whereas in the sphere of Prudence it is worse, as it is in the sphere of the virtues. It is therefore clear that Prudence is an excellence or virtue, and not an Art.

Of the two parts of the soul possessed of reason, Prudence must be the virtue of one, namely, the of principles for such a procedure—one may be good at it or bad; whereas ἰδιώτης, Prudence or practical wisdom, itself denotes an excellence, not a neutral sphere in which one may excel or the reverse. Elsewhere in this book τέχνη has the positive sense of artistic excellence or technical skill.
Δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἄλλα μὴν οὐδ’ ἔξω μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖοι δ’ ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν1 τουαύτης ἐξεως ἐστὶ, φρονήσεως δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. 80

vi Ἕπειρ δ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἔστιν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἄρχης τοῦ ἐπιστήμητος οὖτ’ ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἶναι οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμητον ἀποδεικτῶν, αἱ 85 δὲ τυχάνουσιν οὐσαὶ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἔστιν· τοῦ γὰρ 2 σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνόμων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ ὅσιν ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδὲποτε διαφεύγομεν περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἔστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηθὲν ἐνδεχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία3 φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

vii Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τῇ τῶν τέχναις τοῖς ἀκρι- βεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδιδομένην, οἶκον Φείδιαν 10

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1 τῆς μὲν Γ: τῆς μὲν τῆς Κ5 (Bekker), μὲν τῆς Λ5
2 <τὰ> τρία Richards.

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*a* Called in c. i. 6 the Calculative Faculty.
*b* A loss of Prudence is felt to involve a moral lapse, which shows that it is not a purely intellectual quality.
*c* i.e., not exclusively: see c. vii. 3.
*d* See c. iii. 4, note *c*.
*e* Cf. c. iii. 1. Art is here omitted from the list.
*f* νοῦς now receives its special sense (see c. ii. 1, note) of a particular virtue of the intellect, viz. that faculty of rational
part that forms opinions; for Opinion deals with that which can vary, and so does Prudence. But yet Prudence is not a rational quality merely, as is shown by the fact that a purely rational faculty can be forgotten, whereas a failure in Prudence is not a mere lapse of memory.

vi Scientific Knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity; and demonstrated truths and all scientific knowledge (since this involves reasoning) are derived from first principles. Consequently the first principles from which scientific truths are derived cannot themselves be reached by Science; nor yet are they apprehended by Art, nor by Prudence. To be matter of Scientific Knowledge a truth must be demonstrated by deduction from other truths; while Art and Prudence are concerned only with things that admit of variation. Nor is Wisdom the knowledge of first principles either: for the philosopher has to arrive at some things by demonstration.

2 If then the qualities whereby we attain truth, and are never led into falsehood, whether about things invariable or things variable, are Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence, and if the quality which enables us to apprehend first principles cannot be any one among three of these, namely Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, and Wisdom, it remains that first principles must be apprehended by Intelligence.

vii The term Wisdom is employed in the arts to denote those men who are the most perfect masters of their art, for instance, it is applied to Phidias intuition whereby it correctly apprehends (by process of induction, see c. iii. 8) undemonstrable first principles. It is thus a part of sōφία (c. vii. 3, 5).
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λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύειστον ἀνδριαντοποιοῦν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν 2 σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴς τέχνης ἐστὶν· εἶναι δὲ τινας σοφοὺς οὐκέμεθα ὅλως, οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφοὺς, ὥσπερ "Ομηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργάτῃ τὸν δὲ οὔτ' ἀρ εκαπτηρὰ θεοὶ θέουν οὔτ' ἀριστήρα 15 οὔτ' ἀλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δὴλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν 3 εἰς ἡ σοφία. δεὶ ἀρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἰς ἢ ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ' κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων. 20 —ἀτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὶς τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιότατην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον 4 τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δ' ὑγιεινόν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐτερον ἀνθρώπως καὶ ἰχθύς, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸν πάντες ἀν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἐτερον. 25 τὸ γὰρ τὸν<τὸ>2 περὶ αὐτὰ εἴκαστα [τὸ]5 εἰδ' θεωροῦν φησίν9 εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτω ἐπιπρέπει7 αὐτὰ8. διὸ καὶ τῶν θερίων ἐναφ' φρονιμάς φασὶν εἶναι, ὡς περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικῆν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι αὐτ' ἄν εἰς ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ 80

1 καὶ ὥσπερ L.1 2 δ' M.1 δῆν vulg: γὰρ τι ed. 3 <τὸ> ed: <τὸ> Cor. 4 αὐτὰ ed: αὐτὰ. 5 [τὸ] om. GM. 6 φαίνεν L.1 φαίεν ἅν Γ. 7 ἐπιπρέπειαν L.1 ἐπιπρέπειαν Γ.1. 8 αὐτὰ Ald. corr2 K1: αὐτὰ vulg., αὐτὰ? ed.

a The sense rather requires 'wise in some particular thing,' but the expression is assimilated to the quotation.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VI. vii. 1-4

as a sculptor and to Polycleitus as a statuary. In this use then Wisdom merely signifies artistic excellence. But we also think that some people are wise in general and not in one department, not 'wise in something else,' as Homer says in the Margites:

Neither a delver nor a ploughman him
The Gods had made, nor wise in aught beside.

Hence it is clear that Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and Scientific Knowledge: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.

For it is absurd to think that Political Science or Prudence is the loftiest kind of knowledge, inasmuch as man is not the highest thing in the world. And as 'wholesome' and 'good' mean one thing for men and another for fishes, whereas 'white' and 'straight' mean the same thing always, so everybody would denote the same thing by 'wise,' but not by 'prudent'; for each kind of beings will describe as prudent, and will entrust itself to, one who can discern its own particular welfare; hence even some of the lower animals are said to be prudent, namely those which display a capacity for forethought as regards their own lives.

It is also clear that Wisdom cannot be the same thing as Political Science; for if we are to call

\[ b \] See vi. 1, 2.

\[ c \] Literally 'knowledge having as it were a head,' a phrase copied from Plato, Gorgias, 505 d.

\[ d \] See §§ 4, 5, and, for the technical sense of \( \tau \iota\mu\omicron\sigma \), 1. xii.
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ωφέλιμα τα αυτοῖς ἔρουσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται
σοφίας: οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν
tῶν ζῶν, ἀλλὰ ἔτερα περὶ ἐκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ
ἰστρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δὲ ὅτι
βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῶν, οὐδὲν
diaferei καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα 1141 b
tὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερῶτατά γε ἐξ δὲν ὁ κόσμος
συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δὴλον ὅτι ἡ
σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων
tῆς φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς
tοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ᾽ οὐ φασιν
εἶναι, ὅταν ἵδωσιν ἄγνωστα τὰ συμφέρονθ᾽
ἐαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστά καὶ χα-
λεπὰ καὶ δαμόνια εἰσέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἀχρῆστα
δ᾽, ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἄνθρωπων ἄγαθα ζητοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ
φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἄνθρωπων, καὶ περὶ ἀν ἐστὶ
βουλευήσασθαι. τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἐργον
εἶναι φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι: βουλευέται
d᾽ οὔθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἑκεῖν, οὔδ᾽
ὅσων μὴ τέλος τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἄγαθὸν;
δ᾽ ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀριστοῦν ἄνθρωπω τῶν
πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν. οὖδ᾽
ἔστιν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δὲν ἂν

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α This means apparently the sun, stars, and planets, elsewhere referred to by Aristotle as 'the divine bodies that move through the heaven,' 'the visible divine things,' 'the heaven and the most divine of visible things' (Met. 1074 a 30, 1026 a 18, Phys. 196 a 33).

β See § 2, note.

ε Thales was the first of the Seven Wise Men: Anaxagoras belonged to a later generation.

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knowledge of our own interests wisdom, there will be a number of different kinds of wisdom, one for each species: there cannot be a single such wisdom dealing with the good of all living things, any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things. It may be argued that man is superior to the other animals, but this makes no difference: since there exist other things far more divine in their nature than man, for instance, to mention the most visible, the things of which the celestial system is composed.

5 These considerations therefore show that Wisdom is both Scientific Knowledge and Intuitive Intelligence as regards the things of the most exalted nature. This is why people say that men like Anaxagoras and Thales "may be wise but are not prudent," when they see them display ignorance of their own interests; and while admitting them to possess a knowledge that is rare, marvellous, difficult and even superhuman, they yet declare this knowledge to be useless, because these sages do not seek to know the things that are good for human beings.

6 Prudence on the other hand is concerned with the affairs of men, and with things that can be the object of deliberation. For we say that to deliberate well is the most characteristic function of the prudent man; but no one deliberates about things that cannot vary nor yet about variable things that are not a means to some end, and that end a good attainable by action; and a good deliberator in general is a man who can arrive by calculation at the best of the goods attainable by man.

7 Nor is Prudence a knowledge of general principles only: it must also take account of particular facts,
kai tα kαθ' ékastat γνωρίζεται πρακτική γάρ, ἢ
dé prozis perί tα kαθ' ékastat. Did kai énnoi
ouic eidoítes étérws eidoíton praktikóterou. 1 ei
gár eídēi or to tα koufha eúpetta kréa kal úginein,
poua dé koufha ágnouoi, ou poii'seis úginein, all̮
ó eidois or tα ornîtheia [koûfa kal]2 úginein poi'seis
μάλλον kai én tois álllois oí empeiroi. 'I, dé
frînhsis praktikí: woste dei ámufo exew, ἢ taîtin
mállon. εἰη δ' ἂν tis kai éntaîha arxitek-
tonikí.

viii "Esti dé kai ἡ politikí kai ἡ frônhsis ἡ autή
2 men ejis, to méntou eînai ou taîtoν autais. tʰis
dé perί polw men ws arxitektonikí [frônhsis]3 26
nomothetikí, ἢ dé ẉs <perί>4 tα kαθ' ékasta tο
koinon ëxei ónomα, politikí: autῆ dẹ̃ praktikí
kai bouleutikí (tο γάρ ψήφισμα πρακτόν ὡς tο
ëschaton), did poîntesĕthai toụtois múnois lé-
γousov, múnoi gár pråttoụsw oûtoû ãsper oî
3 cheịrótēxna. dokiei dé kai frônhsis málios5 eihai 80
h' perί autŏn kai éna: kai ëxei autῆ tο koinon

1 el γάρ . . . μαλλόν hic Richards: infrar post ëmpeiroi.
2 Trendelenburg.
3 Scaliger.
4 <perί> Γ2.
5 de: γάρ ? ed.

a The words 'for instance . . . chicken is wholesome' in
the mss. come after 'theorists.'

b i.e., politịḳ, Political Science or Statesmanship (cf. i.
1., ii.), the relation of which to Prudence is next considered.

c Cf. v. i. 20. Political Wisdom is not a special sort of
Prudence but a special application of it, for though the term
'Prudence' is in ordinary usage confined to practical wisdom
in one's private affairs, it really extends to the affairs of one's
family and of the community.

a In the Greek city-state legislature was not regarded as
the normal function of parliament, but of a founder or reformer
of the constitution, or of a special legislative commission.
since it is concerned with action, and action deals with particular things. This is why men who are ignorant of general principles are sometimes more successful in action than others who know them: for instance, if a man knows that light meat is easily digested and therefore wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are light, he will not be so likely to restore you to health as a man who merely knows that chicken is wholesome; and in other matters men of experience are more successful than theorists. And Prudence is concerned with action, so one requires both forms of it, or indeed knowledge of particular facts even more than knowledge of general principles. Here too however there must be some supreme directing faculty.

Prudence is indeed the same quality of mind as Political Science, though their essence is different. Of Prudence as regards the state, one kind, as supreme and directive, is called Legislative Science; the other, as dealing with particular occurrences, has the name, Political Science, that really belongs to both kinds. The latter is concerned with action and deliberation (for a parliamentary enactment is a thing to be done, being the last step in a deliberative process), and this is why it is only those persons who deal with particular facts who are spoken of as 'taking part in politics,' because it is only they who perform actions, like the workmen in an industry.

Prudence also is commonly understood to mean especially that kind of wisdom which is concerned with oneself, the individual; and this is given the

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* Cf. iii. iii. 12.

† In contrast with the law-giver and the master-craftsman respectively.
ARISTOTLE

δονομα, φρονήσεις, ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν οἰκονομία, ἢ
dὲ νομοθεσία, ἢ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἢ μὲν
βουλευτική ἢ δὲ δικαστική. εἴδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν
eἶν [γνώσεως1] τὸ τὸ2 αὐτῶν3 εἶδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχει δια-
φορὰν πολλήν, καὶ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ4 περὶ αὐτὸν εἴδως 1142 a
καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οὐ̈ δὲ πολιτικοὶ
πολυπράγμονες4 διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῦν, ὃ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡρωικαῖς5 στρατοῦ
ἐσον μετασχεῖν;

τοὺς γὰρ περίσσους καὶ τι πράσοντας πλέον.

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτώς ἁγαθὸν, καὶ οὖνται τοῦτο
dεὶν πράττειν. εἰκα ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε
tὸ τοῦτον φρόνιμον εἶναι. καὶ τοι ὅσα οὐκ
ἐστι τὸ αὐτῶν εἴ4 οὖν ἀνευ ὀικονομίας οὐτ4 οὖν πο-
λυτῆς.6 ἐτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὸν πῶς δεὶ διουκεῖν,
ἀδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον.6

5 Σημειών δ' ἐστι τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεω-

mekrikou μὲν νεοὶ καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γύνονται
καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεὶ
γνωσθαι. αὐτῶν δ' ὅτι καὶ9 τῶν καὶ' ἐκαστά

2 τὸ τὸ ed., τὸ τὰ Lb, τὸ Kb.
3 αὐτῶ Mb et ut videtur pr. Kb: corr1 Kb αὐτῶν, corr2
αὐτῶν, Lb αὐτῶ.
5 ἡρωικαῖς Mbg -μένῳ Lb.
6 ed Kb: εἴδεναι Mb, om. Lbg.
7 politeikh Richards.
8 ἐτι δὲ... σκεπτέον secludenda? ed.
9 καὶ om. Mb.

a From the lost Philoctetes of Euripides, frr. 785, 786
Dindorf. The third line went on

with the wisest. . .
For there is naught so foolish as a man!
Restless, aspiring, busy men of action
We honour and esteem as men of mark . . .

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name, Prudence, which really belongs to all the kinds, while the others are distinguished as Domestic Economy, Legislature, and Political Science, the latter being subdivided into Deliberative Science and Judicial Science. Now knowledge of one's own interest will certainly be one kind of Prudence; though it is very different from the other kinds, and people think that the man who knows and minds his own business is prudent, and that politicians are busybodies: thus Euripides writes—

Would that be prudent? when I might have lived
A quiet life, a cipher in the crowd,
Sharing the common fortune . . .
Restless, aspiring, busy men of action . . .

For people seek their own good, and suppose that it is right to do so. Hence this belief has caused the word 'prudent' to mean those who are wise in their own interest. Yet probably as a matter of fact a man cannot pursue his own welfare without Domestic Economy and even Politics. Moreover, even the proper conduct of one's own affairs is a difficult problem, and requires consideration.

5 A further proof of what has been said b is, that although the young may be experts in geometry and mathematics and similar branches of knowledge, we do not consider that a young man can have Prudence. The reason is that Prudence includes a

b The reference seems to be to c. vii. 7, where it is stated that Prudence takes cognizance of particular facts. The intervening passage, examining the relation of Prudence to Political Science, emphasizes its other aspect, the apprehension of general principles.
ARISTOTLE

"Εστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἀ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, 15
νέος δ' ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου
6 ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. (ἔπει καὶ τοῦτο ἂν τις
σκέψαι, διὰ τὸ δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ',
ἀν, σοφὸς δ' ἡ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δὲ
ἀφυρέσεις ἔστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας·
cαὶ τὰ μὲν οὖ πιστεύουσιν οὐ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, 20
7 τῶν δὲ τὰ τί ἔστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον;)—ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία
ἡ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἡ περὶ
tὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν· ἡ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα
ὑδατα φαίλα, ἢ ὅτι τοῦτο βαρύσταθμον.
8 "Οτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερὸν·
tοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτον ἔστιν, ὡσπερ εἰρήνη· τὸ γὰρ 25
9 πρακτῶν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῦν. δὲ
μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὀρῶν, ὅν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἢ δὲ
τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις,
οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδιων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ
ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἐσχάτον τρίγωνον στήρισται

1 [οὐ] . . . ἀλλοις λέγουσι Immelmann. 2 μὲν om. Lb.

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a The Greek looks like a buried verse quotation.
b The three divisions of the subject matter of Wisdom.
c Immelmann’s emendation gives ‘can only take them
on credit from others.’
d Cf. § 2 above, c. vii. 7. and iii. 12.
e See notes on c. vi. 2 and xi. 4. Definitions are the first
principles of science.
f Literally ‘of the objects peculiar to the special senses.’
Shape was one of the ‘common sensibles,’ perceived through
the medium of more than one of the special senses, by the
‘common sense.’
g A triangle is the last form into which a rectilinear figure
can be divided: two straight lines cannot enclose a space.
Or the words may possibly mean ‘whereby we perceive
that a particular mathematical figure is [for example] a
triangle.’ But this would rather be expressed by τοῦ τὸ
ἐσχάτον, or τοῦ alone.

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knowledge of particular facts, and this is derived from experience, which a young man does not possess; for experience is the fruit of years. (One might indeed further enquire why it is that, though a boy may be a mathematician, he cannot be a metaphysician or a natural philosopher. Perhaps the answer is that Mathematics deals with abstractions, whereas the first principles of Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy are derived from experience: the young can only repeat them without conviction of their truth, whereas the formal concepts of Mathematics are easily understood.) Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility of error: you may go wrong either in your general principle or in your particular fact: for instance, either in asserting that all heavy water is unwholesome, or that the particular water in question is heavy.

And it is clear that Prudence is not the same as Scientific Knowledge: for as has been said, it apprehends ultimate particular things, since the thing to be done is an ultimate particular thing.

Prudence then stands opposite to Intelligence; for Intelligence apprehends definitions, which cannot be proved by reasoning, while Prudence deals with the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be apprehended by Scientific Knowledge, but only by perception: not the perception of the special senses, but the sort of intuition whereby we perceive that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle; for there, too, there will be a stop. But the term

That is, we reach the limit of analysis just as much when we descend to particulars as when we ascend to first principles or definitions (Burnet). Or the words may mean in mathematics as in problems of conduct there is a point where analysis must stop.
γὰρ κακεῖ. ἀλλ' αὐτῇ μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἡ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἀλλο εἴδος.

1126 ix 2Δεὶ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐδοκίας τὶ ἔστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τις ἡ δόξα ἡ εὐστοχία, ἡ ἀλλο 2 τι γένος. ἐπιστήμην μὲν δὴ σοῦ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἡ λόγου περὶ ἰδίᾳ ἵσας, ἡ δ' εὐδοκία βουλή τις, ὤ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ εὐστοχία· ἀνεύ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχὺ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δὲν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευόμενα, βουλεύομεν δὲ βραδέως.5

3 ἔτι ἡ ἁγχώνια ἐτερον καὶ ἡ εὐδοκία· ἐστὶ δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἁγχώνια. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐδοκία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δὲ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἄμαρτάνει, δ' εὖ ὁρθῶς βουλεύεται, δὴλον ὅτι ὁρθότης τις ἡ εὐδοκία ἐστὶν, οὔτ' ἐπιστήμην δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμην μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁρθότης 10

1 ἡ Λογ.: ἡ; ? Burnet.
2 δεὶ δὲ . . . λογίζεται: hic Richards: infra post τὸ ζητεῖν . . . ἔστιν.
3 πράττει Richards.

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The intuition of particular facts which is a part of Prudence also belongs to the genus perception, but it is intellectual, not sensuous. The Greek may however conceivably mean, 'But the intuition of the ultimate particular in problems of conduct approximates more to sensation than to prudence, though it is a different species from the perception of the separate senses.'

b In the mss. the chapter begins with the sentence 'But deliberation,' etc., here transferred to the middle of § 2.

Viz., matters of conduct.

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perception applies in a fuller sense to mathematical
intuition than to Prudence; the practical intuition
of the latter belongs to a different species.\textsuperscript{a}

\textbf{ix}

\textsuperscript{b} We ought also to ascertain the nature of Delibera-
tive Excellence, and to discover whether it is a
species of Knowledge, or of Opinion, or skill in
Conjecture, or something different from these in
kind.

2 Now it is not Knowledge: for men do not investi-
gate matters about which they know, whereas
Deliberative Excellence is one form of deliberation,
and deliberating implies investigating and calculating.
But deliberation is not the same as investigation:
it is the investigation of a particular subject.\textsuperscript{v}

Nor yet is it skill in Conjecture: for this operates
without conscious calculation, and rapidly, whereas
deliberating takes a long time, and there is a saying
that execution should be swift but deliberation slow.

3 Again, Deliberative Excellence is not the same as
Quickness of mind,\textsuperscript{d} which is a form of skill in
Conjecture.

Nor yet is Deliberative Excellence any form of
Opinion.

But inasmuch as a bad deliberator makes mistakes
and a good deliberator deliberates correctly,\textsuperscript{e} it is
clear that Deliberative Excellence is some form of
correctness; though it is not correctness of Know-
ledge, nor of Opinion. Correctness cannot be predi-

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{ἀγγελευω} appears from \textit{Analytica Posteriora}, 1. xxxiii.
\textit{89 b} 10, to denote the faculty of guessing immediately the
‘middle term’ or fact which explains the relation observed
between two objects.

\textsuperscript{b} Perhaps the text should be emended to read ‘inasmuch
as one who deliberates badly goes wrong and one who
deliberates well acts rightly.’
(οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), δόξης δὲ ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἀμα
dὲ καὶ ὁρισται ἴδη πάν ὁ δέξα ἐστίν. [ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδὲ ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοιας ἄρα
λεῖπεται. αὐτή γὰρ οὕτω φῶς:]₁ καὶ γὰρ ἡ
dόξα οὐ ξητησὶς ἀλλὰ φάσις τῆς ήδη, ο̄ δὲ βου-
λευόμενον, εάν τε εἰν εάν τεRequestMapping: 15
cακῶς βουλεύσῃ, ₁₅
ξητεί τι καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης τής ἐστὶν
ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς. [διὸ η βουλῆ ξητησέα πρώ-
tον τί καὶ περί τί.]₂ ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς,
δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πάσα· ο̄ γὰρ ἀκρατῆς καὶ ὁ φαινός ὁ
προτίθεται δεῖν, ἐὰν τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεῦξθαι, ἃς
ἄρθρος ἐσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα ¹η
εἰληφῶς· δοκεὶ δὲ ἄγαθον τι εἶναι τὸ εἰν βεβο-
λευθαί. ἡ ἄρα τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία,
ἡ ἄγαθος τεικτική. ἀλλ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τούτου ζευδεῖ
συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν,
δι᾽ οὐ δὲ οὖς, ἀλλὰ ψευδή τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι

₁ Gifanias.
² τε καὶ Ῥb.
₃ Spengel.
₄ δεῖν Π (δεῖν <ποιεῖν> Richards): δεῖν (εἰ δεῖν<κ> Apcert).
₅ ἄρα Spengel: γὰρ.

a i.e., correct knowledge is a redundant expression; knowledge means correct notions; erroneous notions are not
knowledge.

b The two sentences bracketed interrupt the argument. The first seems to belong to § 2, though it does not fit in
there exactly. The second is altogether irrelevant, and
employs the term διάνοια of the intellect as enquiring, not
as contemplating the results of enquiry, a Platonic use not
found elsewhere in Aristotle: ‘correctness in thinking’
here is in fact equivalent to ‘correctness in deliberation’
in § 4.

c The sentence bracketed interrupts the argument; and
no examination of deliberation follows.

d No distinction seems to be made between arriving at
the right conclusion of a practical syllogism, i.e. inferring
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cated of Knowledge,\(^a\) any more than can error, and correctness of Opinion is truth; and also any matter about which one has an opinion has been settled already; [then again Deliberative Excellence necessarily involves conscious calculation. It remains therefore that Deliberative Excellence is correctness in thinking, for thought has not reached the stage of affirmation;]\(^b\) for Opinion has passed beyond the stage of investigation and is a form of affirmation, whereas a man deliberating, whether he deliberates well or badly, is investigating and calculating something.

But Deliberative Excellence is a form of correctness in deliberation [so that we have first to investigate what deliberation is, and what object it deals with].\(^c\) However, 'correctness' in this connexion is ambiguous, and plainly it is not every kind of correctness in deliberation that constitutes Deliberative Excellence. A man of deficient self-restraint or a bad man may as a result of calculation arrive at the object he proposes as the right thing to do, so that he will have deliberated correctly, although he will have gained something extremely evil; whereas to have deliberated well is felt to be a good thing. Therefore it is this kind of correctness in deliberation that is Deliberative Excellence, namely being correct in the sense of arriving at something good.\(^d\)

But it is possible to arrive at a good conclusion, as well as at a bad one, by a false process of reasoning; one may arrive at what is the right thing to do, but not arrive at it on the right grounds, but by means of a wrong middle term. This quality correctly what is to be done as a means to some End, and actually achieving that End by action.
6 τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὔ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν 
χρόνον θυμουμένον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν 
οὔτε ἐκεῖνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ 
7 τὸ ὀφέλιμον, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὃς καὶ ὁτε. ἔτι ἔστι 
καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεύοντα καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ 
μὲν δὴ ἀπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατ' 
8 ὀρθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρο-
νίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεύοντα, ἡ εὐβουλία εἰπ' ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ 
τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὐ 
ἡ φρονήσεις ἀληθὴς ὑπόλογης ἐστὶν.

"Εστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' 
ἀς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνετοὺς, οὐδ' ὁλως 
τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη (ἡ δόξῃ—πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν 
συνετοῖ) οὔτε τὰς μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμων, 
ολον ἱερωνη ἑπὶ υγείαν ἡ ἱερωνη ἑπὶ 
2 μεγέθη οὔτε γὰρ ἑπὶ τῶν ἄει ὁντων καὶ ἱερωνη ἑπὶ

1 τις δὲ: ἡ δὲ τις Lb.
2 τὸ K: τι.
3 εὐσυνεσία H. Stephanus: ἄσυνεσία.
4 εὐσυνετοὺς H. Stephanus: ἄσυνετοὺς.
5 μεγέθους Lb.

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\(^{a}\) At the right time, because deliberation must neither be so prolonged as to miss the opportunity for action, nor so rapid as to be merely skilful conjecture; see § 2.

\(^{b}\) i.e., to be well-counsell'd, to know what steps to take:

\(^{c}\) The antecedent of 'which' is probably not 'the end' but 'what is expedient as a means to the end,' since it is indicated below that Prudence deals with means, not ends. The difference therefore between Deliberative Excellence and Prudence seems to be that the former is the intellectual quality displayed in the process of correctly investigating a problem of conduct, the latter the more permanent and fixed quality of the mind possessing and contemplating the results of such investigations. Or perhaps more strictly
then, which leads one to arrive at the right conclusion, but not on the right grounds, is still not Deliberative Excellence.

6 Again, one man may arrive at the right conclusion by prolonged deliberation, while another may do so quickly. The former case also then does not amount to Deliberative Excellence; this is correctness of deliberation as regards what is advantageous, arriving at the right conclusion on the right grounds at the right time.

7 Again, a man can be said to have deliberated well either generally, or in reference to a particular end. Deliberative Excellence in general is therefore that which leads to correct results with reference to the end in general, while correctness of deliberation with a view to some particular end is Deliberative Excellence of some special kind.

If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which constitutes Prudence.

x Understanding, or Good Understanding, the quality in virtue of which we call men 'persons of understanding' or 'of good understanding,' is not the same thing as Scientific Knowledge in general (nor yet is it the same as Opinion, for in that case everybody would have understanding), nor is it any one of the particular sciences, as medicine is the science of what pertains to health and geometry the science concerned with magnitudes. For Understanding does not deal with the things that exist

both these qualities are included in Prudence, of which Deliberative Excellence is therefore one aspect or species.

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ARISTOTLE

ἡ σύνεσις ἐστὶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γυγνωμένων ὅτουσιν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ δὲν ἀπορθήσειν ἃν τις καὶ βουλέσατο.
διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστὶν, οὕτως ἐστὶ
δὲ ταύτῳ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις
ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστὶν (τὰ γὰρ δὲι πράττειν ἡ μὴ, τὸ
tέλος αὐτῆς ἐστὶν), ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον.
(ταύτῳ γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὔσυνεσια καὶ συνετοί
καὶ εὐσύνετοι.) ἐστὶ δὴ οὔτε τὸ ἐχεῖν τὴν
φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις, ἀλλ’
ὡσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται ἐξουνεῖν ὅταν χρη-
tαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρὴσθαι τῇ ὅσο
ἐπὶ τὸ κρῖνει περὶ τοῦτων περὶ δὲν ἡ φρόνησις
ἐστιν, ἀλλοῦ λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλὸς (τὸ
γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῷς ταύτῳ). καὶ ἐνεχθὲν ἐλθὴν
tοῦνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ’ ἡν εὐσύνετοι, εκ τῆς ἐν
τῷ μανθάνειν. λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνεῖναι
πολλάκις.

xiv Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ’ ἡν εὐγνώμονας
καὶ ἐχεῖν φαμέν <συγ>γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς
ἐστὶ κρῖσις ὥρθη. σημείων δὲ τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴ
μάλιστα φαμέν εἶναι συγγνώμονικον, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς

1 καὶ γὰρ οἶ Λb, 2 δὴ Susenmihl: δὲ.
3 ὅπειρα secl. Thurot. 4 εὐγνώμονας Λb: συγγνώμονας Κb.
5 συγγνώμην Richards: γνώμην.

a This parenthesis would come better in the first section,
after the words 'of good understanding.' It merely points
out that the qualification 'good' need not be repeated.

b μανθάνειν is idiomatically used of understanding what
another person says.

c The writer here strains the meaning of words by con-
necting under one sense (1) γνώμη, judgement in general
or good judgement in particular, and its derivatives (2)
eυγνώμων, 'well-judging' in the sense of considerate and

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for ever and are immutable, nor yet with all of
the things that come into existence, but with
those about which one may be in doubt and may
deliberate. Hence it is concerned with the same
objects as Prudence. Understanding is not however
the same thing as Prudence; for Prudence issues
commands, since its end is a statement of what we
ought to do or not to do, whereas Understanding
merely makes judgements. (For Understanding is
the same as Good Understanding; a ‘man of under-
standing’ means a man of good understanding.)

Thus Understanding does not mean either the
possession or the acquisition of Prudence; but when
we employ the faculty of Opinion to judge what
another person says about matters that are in the
sphere of Prudence, we are said to understand (that
is, to judge rightly, for right judgement is the same
as good understanding), in the same way as learning
a thing is termed understanding it when it means
employing the faculty of Scientific Knowledge. In
fact, the use of the term Understanding to denote
the quality that makes men ‘persons of good under-
standing’ is derived from understanding as shown in
learning; in fact we often use ‘to learn’ in the
sense of ‘to understand.’

The quality termed Consideration,\(^\text{c}\) in virtue of (3) Consideration of
which men are said to be considerate, or to show
consideration for others (forgiveness), is the faculty
of judging correctly what is equitable. This is
indicated by our saying that the equitable man is
specially considerate for others (forgiving), and that
it is equitable to show consideration for others
kindly, and (3) \textit{συγγυμων}, literally ‘judgement with’ or on
the side of others, and hence, sympathy, lenience, forgiveness.
τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἑνα συγγνώμην· ἢ δὲ συγγνώμην
γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθῆ. ὀρθὴ δὲ
ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

2 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐξεις εἰς ταῦτα 25
teinoussai· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ
φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες
γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἡδῆ, καὶ φρονίμους καὶ
συνετοὺς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ τῶν
ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν, καὶ ἐν μὲν
τῷ κριτικῷ εἶναι περὶ ὁ δὲ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς 30
καὶ εὐγνώμων ἡ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ
κοινὰ τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἑστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς
3 ἄλλον, ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
ἀπαντα τὰ πρακτά (καὶ γὰρ τῶν φρονίμων δεῖ γνι-
νώσκειν αὐτά), καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ
4 τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δὲ ἐσχάτα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν 35
ἐσχάτων ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρῶτων
ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἑστὶ καὶ οὗ λόγος· 1143 b
καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκοπῆτων
ὄρων καὶ πρῶτων, ὁ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοὺς

¹ ἐξεις αὐταὶ Αρ.
(forgiveness) in certain cases; but consideration for others is that consideration which judges rightly what is equitable judging rightly meaning judging what is truly equitable.

2 All these qualities, it is reasonable to say, refer to the same thing: indeed we attribute Considerateness, Understanding, Prudence, and Intelligence to the same persons when we say of people that they are old enough to show consideration and intelligence, and are prudent and understanding persons. For all these faculties deal with ultimate and particular things; and a man has understanding and is considerate, or considerate for others, when he is a good judge of the matters in regard to which Prudence is displayed; because equitable actions are common to all good men in their behaviour towards others, while on the other hand all matters of conduct belong to the class of particular and ultimate things (since the prudent man admittedly has to take cognizance of these things), and Understanding and Consideration deal with matters of conduct, which are ultimate. Also Intelligence apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary definitions are grasped by Intelligence and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations Intelligence apprehends the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences it apprehends but to the establishment of ethical ἀρετή by induction, which is the proper method of Ethics (v. iv. 5-7). This induction is conceived as a syllogism (cf. An. Pr. ii. xxiii.): Actions A, B, C . . . are desirable; Actions A, B, C . . . possess the quality Z; therefore all actions possessing the quality Z are desirable. Here both the major and the minor premise are sets of particular propositions intuitively seen to be true: νοῦς is τῶν ἀληθῶν ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα.
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ἔσχάτων καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἐνεκα αὐταί· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα γὰρ τὰ· καθὸλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν;
5 δὲι αἰσθήσῃ, αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ
dοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδὲς,
6 γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. οὕτως
δ' ὅτι καὶ τάς ἡλικίας οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ
ηὗρ ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως
αὐτῶς οὖσα. [διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τῶ
τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.]
7 ἄοστε δὲι προσεχεῖν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἡ προνήμων
ταῖς ἀναποδείκτος φάσει καὶ δόξας συν ἠττὸν τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ
tὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὥμοια ὀρθῶν ὀρθῶς.  

xii Διαπορήσει τὸν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τὶ χρήσιμοι
8 eἰσίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ εἰς ὅν ἐσται
εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἐστὶ γενέσεως), ὡς
ἡ δὲ προνήσεως τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐνεκα δει
αὐτῆς; εἰπερ ἡ μὲν προνήσεως ἔστων περὶ τὰ

1 τὸ LbΓ.  
2 ἡ προνήμων secl. Burnet.  
3 ὁ ορθῶς Lb: ἀρχάς ΚbΓ.  
4 περὶ Lp: ἡ περὶ.

Here the intuitive element in Prudence, as well as in
Wisdom (cc. v., vi.), is termed Intelligence; at c. viii. 9 it
was called merely Prudence, in contrast with Intelligence,
which was limited to intuition of the first principles of
science. Here then νοῦς approximates to its popular sense
(see p. 383, note a).

b This sentence seems irrelevant here. It might come in
after § 4.
the ultimate and contingent fact, and the minor premise, since these are the first principles from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence.ª

5 This is why it is thought that these qualities are a natural gift, and that a man is considerate, understanding and intelligent by nature, though no one is a wise man by nature. That this is so is indicated by our thinking of them as going with certain ages: we say that at such and such an age a man must have got intelligence and considerateness, which implies that they come by nature.

[Hence Intelligence is both a beginning and an end, for these things are both the starting-point and the subject matter of demonstration.] b

Consequently the unproved assertions and opinions of experienced and elderly people, or of prudent men, c are as much deserving of attention as those which they support by proof; for experience has given them an eye for things, and so they see correctly.

7 We have now discussed the nature and respective spheres of Prudence and Wisdom, and have shown that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

xii But the further question may be raised, What is the use of these intellectual virtues? Wisdom does not consider the means to human happiness at all, for it does not ask how anything comes into existence. Prudence, it must be granted, does do this; but what do we need it for? seeing that it studies that

ª This addition is suspicious: no one can become prudent merely by getting old (Burnet).
δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπων, ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικήτερον τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ ἐσμέν, εἰπὲν ἐξεῖς αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνῳ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐνεκτικά, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὥσπερ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ ἂν ἐν τῇ ἐξέσω ἐλήμενα λέγεται. οὐδὲν γὰρ πρακτικήτερον τῷ ἐχεῖν τῇ ἱατρικῇ καὶ γυναικείᾳ.

2 ἐσμέν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν χρήσιμον ὑπότεν ἀλλὰ τοῦ διαφωνοῦν τοῖς οὕσα σπονδαίνησιν οὐδὲν ἢ εἰς χρήσιμον ἐτί δ' οὔδέ τοῖς μὴ [ἐχω]οδεῖν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίκησιν αὐτοὺς ἐχεῖν ἢ ἀλλοὶς ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἤκανδος τὸ ἐχοῦν ἢ ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγείαν. διέξαλλον γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν οὕσα ἢ μυθάν τοῖς ἱατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τούτων ἀτομον ἢ εἰναι δέχεσθαι, εἰ κειρῶν τῆς σοφίας οὕσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἐσταῖ. οὔ τι γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἀρχεῖ καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἐκαστον. περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτοῖν. ἢν μὲν γὰρ ἡπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνων.

3 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἄναγ-1144 καὶ οἵν τεταρτὰς αὐτὰς εἰναι, ἄρετας γ' οὕσα κατέρχεσκατερῶν τοῖς μορίοις, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσιν μὴν μηδέν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἐπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἱατρικὴ δὲ ὑγείαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγεία, οὕτως ἢ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς ἰ

1 <τῷ> τὰ Ramsauer.  2 χρήσιμον Richards: φρήσιμον.  
3 θετέον LbG.  4 οὕσα Argyropylus: ἔχουσιν.  
5 λέγομεν K lobbyist: λέγομεν.

* See c. xiii. 8, where it is implied that Prudence stands in the same relation to Wisdom as medicine to health: it provides the conditions for its development.
which is just and noble and good for man, but these are the things that a good man does by nature. Knowing about them does not make us any more capable of doing them, since the virtues are qualities of character; just as is the case with the knowledge of what is healthy and vigorous—using these words to mean not productive of health and vigour but resulting from them: we are not rendered any more capable of healthy and vigorous action by knowing the science of medicine or of physical training.

2 If on the other hand we are to say that Prudence is useful not in helping us to act virtuously but in helping us to become virtuous, then it is of no use to those who are virtuous already. Nor is it of any use either to those who are not, since we may just as well take the advice of others who possess Prudence as possess Prudence ourselves. We may be content to do as we do in regard to our health; we want to be healthy, yet we do not learn medicine.

3 Moreover it would seem strange if Prudence, which is inferior to Wisdom, is nevertheless to have greater authority than Wisdom: yet the faculty that creates a thing a governs and gives orders to it.

Let us now therefore discuss these difficulties, which so far have only been stated.

4 First then let us assert that Wisdom and Prudence, being as they are the virtues of the two parts of the intellect respectively, are necessarily desirable in themselves, even if neither produces any effect.

5 Secondly, they do in fact produce an effect: Wisdom produces Happiness, not in the sense in which medicine produces health, but in the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health. For
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δολής ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεί καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν ἐυδαιμόνα. ἢ τὸ έργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἥθικὴν ἀρετὴν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τῶν σκοπῶν ποιεῖ ὁρθῶν, ἢ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. (τοῦ δὲ τεταρτοῦ μορίον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστων ἀρετῆς τουλάχιστον, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ. οὔθεν 10

7 γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῶ πράττειν ἡ μὴ πράττειν.) περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἀνωθεν ἀρκτέων, λαβόντας ἄρχην παύνην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δικαίως εἶναι (οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα 15 πουσόντας ἡ ἀκούντας ἡ δι’ ἄγνωσιν ἡ δι’ ἐτέρων τι καὶ μὴ δι’ αὐτά, καίτων πράττουσί γε ἀ δεῖ καὶ ὧν χρή τὸν σπουδαίου), οὔτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἐκαστα ὡστ’ ἐλθεῖ ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ’ οἶον διὰ προσίσχεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν

8 ἐνεκα τῶν πραττομένων τὴν μὲν οὖν προσίσχεσιν 20 ὁρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ’ ὧν ἐκείνης ἐνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι 2 πράττειν ὡστ’ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ’ ἐτέρας δυνάμεις. λεκτεν δ’ ἐπὶ-

9 στῆσαι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τῆς δύναμις ἡν καλουσὶ δεινότητα. αὐτὴ δ’ ἔστι τουλάχιστον ὡστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν 25

1 πῶς: οὕτως vel obtw ὅπωs Richards.
2 πράττεσθαι πέφυκε Λb.
3 <πράττειν> ed.

a The other three are the scientific, calculative, and appetitive parts, see e. i. 6, 6, whose virtues have now been considered in Books II.-VI. Sensation is here omitted, since it is not peculiar to man: cf. i. vii. 12.

b Digestion and growth function automatically, not voluntarily; so they form no part of conduct.

c i.e., Moral Virtue.
Wisdom is a part of Virtue as a whole, and therefore by its possession, or rather by its exercise, renders a man happy.

6 Also Prudence as well as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of man’s proper function: Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end.

(The fourth part of the soul on the other hand, the nutritive faculty, has no virtue contributing to the proper function of man, since it has no power to act or not to act.)

7 But we must go a little deeper into the objection that Prudence does not render men more capable of performing noble and just actions. Let us start with the following consideration. As some people, we maintain, perform just acts and yet are not just men (for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in ignorance, or for some ulterior object, and not for the sake of the actions themselves, although they are as a matter of fact doing what they ought to do and all that a good man should), on the other hand, it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man: I mean when he does them from choice, and for the sake of the acts themselves. Now rightness in our choice of an end is secured by Virtue; but to do the actions that must in the nature of things be done in order to attain the end we have chosen, is not a matter for Virtue but for a different faculty.

We must dwell on this point to make it more clear.

8 There is a certain faculty called Cleverness, which is the capacity for doing the things aforesaid that con-
οὐντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυχαίων αὐτῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἡ καλὸς, ἐπαινετὴ ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ φιλός, πανουργία: διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ <τοὺς> ἐπούργους

10 φαμέν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἐξή τῷ ὁμματὶ τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἀνευ ἀρετῆς, ὥστε εἰρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δήλω· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες εἶναι, ἔπειδη τοιοῦτο τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον (οτιδήποτε οὖν· ἐστι γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν). τούτῳ δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μορφή καὶ διαμεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχὰς. ἦστε φανερῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μη ὂντα ἀγαθόν.

iii Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἂν ἂρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα· οὐ ταῦτω μὲν, ὅμως ὁ δ' οὖτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πάσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐκαστὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δι-καιος καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τάλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἦττομεν ἐτερὸν τὶ τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν· καὶ γὰρ παιδὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν εξεῖς, ἀλλ' ἀνευ νοῦ βλαβερὰ φαίνονται

1 αὐτῶν Bywater: αὑτῶν. 2 <τοὺς> Klein. 3 δύναμις: δεινότης Μb, δύναμις <αὐτῆ> Ρ ed. (αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις, ἡ δεινότης Hel.). 4 ἐσμεν Ρ ed. 5 ἤγομεθ Rassow.

See c. xi. 6 and cf. i. vi. 12.

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duce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is noble, this is a praiseworthy faculty; if base, it is mere knavery; this is how we come to speak of both prudent men and knaves as clever.

10 Now this faculty is not identical with Prudence, but Prudence implies it. But that eye of the soul of which we spoke cannot acquire the quality of Prudence without possessing Virtue. This we have said before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct always have a major premise of the form 'Since the End or Supreme Good is so and so' (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for the sake of the argument); but the Supreme Good only appears good to the good man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good.

xiii We have therefore also to reconsider the nature of Virtue. The fact is that the case of Virtue is closely analogous to that of Prudence in relation to Cleverness. Prudence and Cleverness are not the same, but they are similar; and natural virtue is related in the same way to Virtue in the true sense. All are agreed that the various moral qualities are in a sense bestowed by nature: we are just, and capable of temperance, and brave, and possessed of the other virtues from the moment of our birth. But nevertheless we expect to find that true goodness is something different, and that the virtues in the true sense come to belong to us in another way. For even children and wild animals possess the natural dispositions, yet without Intelligence these may manifestly be harmful. This at all events
οὖσαί. πλήν τοσοῦτον ἐουευν ὃρᾶσθαι, ὦτι ὡσπέρ 10
σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἀνευ ὁψεως κινούμενῳ συμβαίνει
cφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μῆ ἔχειν ὀψιν,1 οὖτω
καὶ ἐνταῦθα· εάν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν
διαφέρει, ἣ δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὖσα τὸτ' ἐσται κυρίως
ἀρετῆ. ὡστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο
ἐστὶν εὐδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ 15
τοῦ ἡμικοῦ δύο ἑστὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῆ φυσικῆ τὸ δ' 20
ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ
3 φρονήσεως. διόσπερ τινὲς φασὶν πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετὰς
φρονήσεως εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὁρθῶς
ἐξῆτε τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεως
ὑπὸ τὴν πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' 25
οὔταν φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δὲ·
καὶ γὰρ τῶν πάντως, ὅταν ὄρξωνται τὴν ἀρετήν,
προστιθέασιν, τὴν ἔξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστιν,
τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον· ὁρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν
φρόνησιν. ἐσικασὶ δὴ μαντεύεσθαι πῶς ἀπαντῆ
ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετῆ ἐστὶν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν 30
5 φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. οὐ γὰρ
μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ
ὁρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρετῆ ἐστιν· ὁρθὸς δὲ λόγος
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστιν. Σωκράτης
μὲν οὖν λόγος τὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπὸ τὸ ἐκνομεῖν
21 21 di.a . . . ψίν see col. Ramsauer.
22 μεταβῆναι Coraes.

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2 νοὺς here means φρόνησις as a whole: see xi. 4, note a.
3 See note a on c. v. 8.
4 i.e., that it is a ἔξις προαρπητική: see the definition of Moral Virtue, π. vi. 15.
5 i.e., prudence is the knowledge of right principle, the presence of the ὁρθὸς λόγος in the ψυχή of the φρόνιμος (see π. ii. 2, vi. 15).

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appears to be a matter of observation, that just as a man of powerful frame who has lost his sight meets with heavy falls when he moves about, because he cannot see, so it also happens in the moral sphere; whereas if a man of good natural disposition acquires Intelligence,\(^a\) then he excels in conduct, and the disposition which previously only resembled Virtue, will now be Virtue in the true sense. Hence just as with the faculty of forming opinions \(^b\) there are two qualities, Cleverness and Prudence, so also in the moral part of the soul there are two qualities, natural virtue and true Virtue; and true Virtue cannot exist without Prudence. Hence some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of Prudence; and Socrates’ line of enquiry was right in one way, though wrong in another; he was mistaken in thinking that all the virtues are forms of Prudence, but right in saying that they cannot exist without Prudence. A proof of this is that everyone, even at the present day, in defining Virtue, after saying what disposition it is \(^c\) and specifying the things with which it is concerned, adds that it is a disposition determined by the right principle; and the right principle is the principle determined by Prudence. It appears therefore that everybody in some sense divides that Virtue is a disposition of this nature, namely regulated by Prudence. This formula however requires a slight modification. Virtue is not merely a disposition conforming to right principle, but one co-operating with right principle; and Prudence is right principle \(^d\) in matters of conduct. Socrates then thought that the virtues are principles, for he said that they are all of them forms of know-
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6 γὰρ εἶναι πάσας, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δὴ λογοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν εἰρήμενων ὅτι οὐχ ὁ λόγος τὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἀνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνισμον ἀνευ τῆς ήθικῆς ἀρετῆς. (Ἅλλα καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτη λύουτ’ ἄν, ὥς διαλεξεῖν τὸν ἀντὶ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταῖ, οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυεστάτος πρὸς ἀπάσας, ὅστε τὴν μὲν ἄρδη τὴν δὲ οὕτω εἰληφὼς ἐσται. τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὸς φυσικὸς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ’ ἂς δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, ὅ νοικ ἐνδέχεται ΄ἀμα γὰρ τῇ φρονίσει μιᾷ ὑπ’ ἀρχονθῇ πάσαι ὑπάρξουσι.) δὴ λογοὺς δή, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτική ἄν, ὅτι ἐδεί ἂν αὐτής διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐσται ἡ προαιρεσις ὅρθῃ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὖδ’ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἄν δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν.

8 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ’ ἔστι τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίστου μορίου, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγίειας ἡ ναυτική. οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅρα ὅπως γενηθείσα ἐκείνης οὖν ἐνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνη, ἐς ὅμοιον κἂν εἰ τῆς τῆς πολιτικῆς φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

1 oths Lb.
2 dh ed.: ἐτέ.
3 τοῦ ἐτέρου Spengel.

The writer recapitulates the solution reached in the last two chapters of the difficulty stated in c. xii. 1.

b The text should probably be emended ' of one of the two parts of the intellect': see c. xii. 4.

c At c. xii. 6 Aristotle says more precisely that Virtue 'makes the End right,' i.e., makes us choose the right End; strictly speaking, to achieve the End requires also Prudence in the choice of the right means.

d This is the solution of the difficulty stated in c. xii. 8.

e Including religious observances.
Nicomachean Ethics, VI. xiii. 5-8

We on the other hand say that the virtues co-operate with principle.

6 These considerations therefore show that it is not possible to be good in the true sense without Prudence, nor to be prudent without Moral Virtue.

(Moreover, this might supply an answer to the dialectical argument that might be put forward to prove that the virtues can exist in isolation from each other, on the ground that the same man does not possess the greatest natural capacity for all of them, so that he may have already attained one when he has not yet attained another. In regard to the natural virtues this is possible; but it is not possible in regard to those virtues which entitle a man to be called good without qualification. For if a man have the one virtue of Prudence he will also have all the Moral Virtues together with it.)

7 It is therefore clear that, even if Prudence had no bearing on conduct, it would still be needed, because it is the virtue of that part of the intellect to which it belongs; and also that our choice of actions will not be right without Prudence any more than without Moral Virtue, since, while Moral Virtue enables us to achieve the end, Prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end.

8 But nevertheless it is not really the case that Prudence is in authority over Wisdom, or over the higher part of the intellect, any more than medical science is in authority over health. Medical science does not control health, but studies how to procure it; hence it issues orders in the interests of health, but not to health. And again, one might as well say that Political Science governs the gods, because it gives orders about everything in the State.

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1 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἀλλήν ποιησαμένους ἠ ἀρχὴν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἡθή, φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἰδὴ, κακία ἀκρασία θηριώτης. τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετήν τὸ δὲ ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν: πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριώτητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἤρωικὴν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Ὀμήρος περὶ 20 <τοῦ>1 Ἐκτόρος πεποίηκε λέγοντα2 τὸν Πρίαμον, ὧτι σφόδρα ἢν ἀγαθός,

οὐδὲ εἰώκει
ἀνδρός γε θυητοῦ πάσης ἔμμεναι ἄλλα θεοῖ.

2 ὥστε εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολὴν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δήλον ὅτι η ὑπὸ θηριώδει3 ἀντιτιθεμένη ἐξίσι: καὶ 25 γὰρ ὡσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίον ἕστι κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή' οὔτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν τιμιωτέρον ἀρετῆς,

3 ἢ δ' ἔτερον τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν4 ἀγαθῶδος σφόδρα

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1 Bywater.  
2 λέγοντα <θεύν> ? ed.  
3 θηριώδει (i.e. -ιά) LbG.  
4 <οἴ> ὅταν Bywater.

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* Or Brutality: the two English words have acquired slightly different shades of meaning, which are combined in the Greek.

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BOOK VII

1 Let us next begin a fresh part of the subject by laying down that the states of moral character to be avoided are of three kinds—Vice, Unrestraint, and Bestiality. The opposite dispositions in the case of two of the three are obvious: one we call Virtue, the other Self-restraint. As the opposite of Bestiality it will be most suitable to speak of Superhuman Virtue, or goodness on a heroic or divine scale; just as Homer has represented Priam as saying of Hector, on account of his surpassing valour—

nor seemed to be

The son of mortal man, but of a god.

2 Hence if, as men say, surpassing virtue changes men into gods, the disposition opposed to Bestiality will clearly be some quality more than human; for there is no such thing as Virtue in the case of a god, any more than there is Vice or Virtue in the case of a beast: divine goodness is something more exalted than Virtue, and bestial badness is different in kind from Vice. And inasmuch as it is rare for a man to be divine, in the sense in which that word is commonly used by the Lacedaemonians as a term of extreme

b L. xxiv. 258. The preceding words are, ‘Hector, who was a god.’
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tou (seiose anhri fasou), ouw kaì o themiadhe 80 ein tois anagwpois spainos maistata di' en tois borbairois estin, ginetai di' einai kai dia nosous kai trewseis. kai tous dia kai kan an avoiwn uperballoynas ouwes epivusoskymoymen.

4 alala peri men tis toiauthis diatheseis uesteron pougeteon twa meniaan, peri de kaiías eirhetai proteron peri de akrasias kai malakias kai truphis leiteou, kai peri egikrateias kai karterias ouste gar ws peri tww autwv exeun tis arethi kai tis mokathria ekateras' autwv upo-

5 lhetou, outh ws uesteron genos. dei de, wosper epi twv allwv, tithentes ta faivomena kai prwton diaporhsonantas ouw deikvnai malista men panata ta enodoa peri tauta ta pahi, ei de me, ta 8 pleista kai kuriwta: ean gar lhythai te ta duzechi kai kathaleiphtai ta enodoa, dedeugmenon an eis ikanwv.

6 Dokei de h te egikrateia kai karteria twv spoudaiwn kai [twv]3 epainetwv einai, h di' akrasia te kai malakia twv faivwn te kai 10 psykatwn.—kai o autos egikrathe kai emmenetikos tis logismou, kai akrathe kai ekostatikos tov logismou.—kai o mev akarathe eivwos oti faula4

1 fasou odoos Coraes (sic Plato, Meno 99 d): seio... fasow seel. Stahr.
2 ekateras Richards: ekateran.
4 faula faula Rouse.

—Lit. 'for those who surpass (the rest of) men in Vice' (i.e., human, not bestial wickedness).

—Aristotle holds (r. viii. 7) that the opinions of the mass of mankind, and of philosophers, on matters of conduct are likely to be substantially true; although being stated from different points of view, and sometimes in ambiguous
admiration—'Yon mon's divine,' they say—, so a bestial character is rare among human beings; it is found most frequently among barbarians, and some cases also occur as a result of disease or arrested development. We sometimes also use 'bestial' as a term of opprobrium for a surpassing degree of human vice.\(^a\)

4 But the nature of the bestial disposition will have to be touched on later; and of Vice we have spoken already. We must however discuss Unrestraint and Softness or Luxury, and also Self-restraint and Endurance. Neither of these two classes of character is to be conceived as identical with Virtue and Vice, nor yet as different in kind from them.

5 Our proper course with this subject as with others will be to present the various views about it, and then, after first reviewing the difficulties they involve, finally to establish if possible all or, if not all, the greater part and the most important of the opinions generally held with respect to these states of mind; since if the discrepancies can be solved, and a residuum of current opinion left standing, the true view will have been sufficiently established.\(^b\)

6 Now the following opinions are held: (\(a\)) that Self-restraint and Endurance are good and praiseworthy dispositions, Unrestraint and Softness bad and blameworthy; (\(b\)) that the self-restrained man is the man who abides by the results of his calculations, the unrestrained, one who readily abandons the conclusion he has reached; (\(c\)) that the un-language, they often seem mutually contradictory. The business of Ethics is to state them clearly, examine their apparent contradictions, discard such parts of them as really refute each other, and elicit the common residuum of truth: see infra, c. ii. 12.
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πράττειν¹ διὰ πάθος, οὗ δ' ἐγκρατίας εἰδὼς οτι
φαύλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὸν
λόγον.—καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατὴ καὶ καρ- 18
περικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα
οἱ δ' οὖ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατὴ καὶ τὸν
ἀκρατὴ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἐτέρους
7 εἰναι φασιν.—τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν
ἐνδέχεσθαι εἰναι ἀκρατή, ὅτε δ' ἐνίοις φρονίμους
ἀντα καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἰναι.—ἐτι ἀκρατεῖς
λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ 20
μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν.

11 Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ἥρωι
ἀκρατεῖται τις. ἐπιστάμενοι μὲν⁴ οὐν οὐ φασὶ
τινὲς οἷον τε εἰναι δεινον γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης,
ὡς φίλον Σωκράτης, ἀλλὸ τι κρατεῖν καὶ 'περιελ-
κεῖν' αὐτὴν⁴ ἀνατρέποντο. Σωκράτης μὲν 25
γὰρ ὅλως ἔμαχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὅς οὐκ οὕσης
ἀκρασίας. οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν
2 παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν
οὗν τὸ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φανομένοις ἐναργῶς,
καὶ δεόντω λητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν,
tὸ τὸ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἄγνοιας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ὅσον
οἶται γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει

¹ πράττειν Richards: πράττει.
² ἀκολουθεῖν Richards: ἀκολουθεῖ.
³ μὲν om. K.
⁴ αὐτὴν K: αὐτῷ.
⁵ δεόν γίνεται et τρόπος [γίνεται] P Bywater.

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⁶ A quotation from Plato, Protagoras 352 β.
⁷ Viz., that a man may know the right and do the wrong.

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restrained man does things that he knows to be evil, under the influence of passion, whereas the self-restrained man, knowing that his desires are evil, refuses to follow them on principle; (d) that the temperate man is always self-restrained and enduring; but that the converse is invariably the case some deny, although others affirm it: the latter identify the unrestrained with the profligate and the profligate with the unrestrained promiscuously, the former distinguish between them. (e) Sometimes it is said that the prudent man cannot be unrestrained, sometimes that some prudent and clever men are unrestrained. (f) Again, men are spoken of as unrestrained in anger, and in the pursuit of honour and of gain. These then are the opinions advanced.

The difficulties that may be raised are the following. (c) How can a man fail in self-restraint when believing correctly that what he does is wrong? Some people say that he cannot do so when he knows the act to be wrong; since, as Socrates held, it would be strange if, when a man possessed knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and 'drag it about like a slave.' a In fact Socrates used to combat the view b altogether, implying that there is no such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts contrary to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only through ignorance.

Now this theory is manifestly at variance with plain facts; and we ought to investigate the state of mind in question more closely. If failure of self-restraint is caused by ignorance, we must examine what sort of ignorance it is. For it is clear that the man who fails in self-restraint does not think the action right before he comes under the influence of
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8 γενέσθαι, φανερών.—εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οί τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δὲ οὐ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθέν εἶναι κρείττον ὀμολογοῦσι, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὀμολογοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τούτο τὸν ἀκρατή φασίν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα. ⁸⁵

4 κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἥδων ἄλλα δόξαν. ἄλλα μὴν εἰγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μὴ ἱσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἄλλη ἤρεμαια, καθάπερ ι 1148 a ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι, συγγνώμῃ τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἱσχυρᾶς. τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγκεκριμένη, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὐθενὶ τῶν ψευδών.

5 —φρονῆσεως ἄρα ἀντιτείνουσῃς; αὕτη γὰρ ἱσχυρὸς ῥότατον. ἄλλῃ ἄτοπων ἔσται γὰρ ὁ ἄτοτος ἁμαρφόνυμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσεις δὲ οὔ. οὐ δέν εἰς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτων διδεικται πρὸτερον ὅτι πρακτικὸς τε ὁ φρόνυμος (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐχῶν ἀρετάς.—ἐτί εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἐχειν ἱσχυρᾶς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκράτης, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκράτης οὔ, ὁ ἐγκράτης σώφρων. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἁγαν σώφρωνος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἐχειν. ἄλλα μὴν δὲι γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταί αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἢ κωλύουσα ἔξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀμφότερος ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πάσα σπουδαῖα· εἰ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ¹⁵ καὶ μὴ φαύλαι, οὔθεν σεμνὸν, οὐδὲ εἰ φαύλαι καὶ

¹ τε Μ: γε.
² τις: ἔστιν? Susemihl, τις <ἴσις> vel ἡ ἔσις Richards.

⁸⁵ Cf. vi. vii. 7, xii. 10.

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3 passion.—But some thinkers accept the doctrine in a modified form. They allow that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, but they do not allow that no one acts contrary to what he opines to be the better course; and they therefore maintain that the unrestrained man when he succumbs to the temptations of pleasure possesses not Knowledge but only Opinion. And yet if it is really Opinion and not Knowledge—not a strong belief that offers resistance but only a weak one (like that of persons in two minds about something)—, we could forgive a man for not keeping to his opinions in opposition to strong desires; but we do not forgive vice, nor any other blameworthy quality.—(e) Is it then when desire is opposed by Prudence that we blame a man for yielding? for Prudence is extremely strong. But this is strange, for it means that the same person can be at once prudent and unrestrained; yet no one could possibly maintain that the prudent man is capable of doing voluntarily the basest actions. And furthermore it has already been shown that Prudence displays itself in action (for it is concerned with ultimate particulars), and implies the possession of the other Virtues as well.

6 Again (d) if Self-restraint implies having strong and evil desires, the temperate man cannot be self-restrained, nor the self-restrained man temperate; for the temperate man does not have excessive or evil desires. But a self-restrained man must necessarily have strong and evil desires; since if a man’s desires are good, the disposition that prevents him from obeying them will be evil, and so Self-restraint will not always be good; while if his desires are weak and not evil, there is nothing to be proud of
Τάσθενες, ουθέν μεγα—ετι ει πάση δόξη ἐμ-
mενετικὸν ποιεὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἰον εἰ καὶ
tῇ ψευδεὶ. καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκ-
στατικῶν, ἦσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἰον ὁ Σοφο-
κλέους Νεοπόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ. ἐπαινετὸς 20
γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ 'Οδυσσέως
8 διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.—ἐτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς
λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία (διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα
βουλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν, ὅταν ἐπι-
τύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται:
δεδει γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ βουληται 25
διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερασθὲν, προϊέναι
dὲ μὴ δυνήται διὰ τὸ λύσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον).
9 συμβαίνει δὴ ἐκ τινὸς λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ
ἀκρασίας ἀρετῆς: τάναντια γὰρ πράττει ὃν ὑπο-
λαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ
tάγαθά κακά εἶναι καὶ οὐ δειν πράττειν, ὡστε 80
10 τάγαθα καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει.—ἐτι ὁ τῶν πεπεισθαί
πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἵδεα καὶ προαιρούμενος
βελτίων ἃν δόξειν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ
dι' ἀκρασίαν· εὑριστότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπειθῆναι
ἀν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παρομία ἐν ἦ ἑαυτὲν 55

1 Cornes.
2 ἐντύχωσι ο Burnet.
3 dē Bywater; δὲ.

2 l. 895-916. See further, c. ix. 4.
4 ἡ, because he is foolish.
5 i.e., a profligate. This is another sophistic paradox
based on the contradiction between (1) the identification of
the unrestrained man with the profligate, and (2) the view
§ 6) that the former acts contrary to his deliberate conviction
(so Burnet).
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in resisting them; nor is it anything remarkable if they are evil and weak.

7 Again (a, b) if Self-restraint makes a man steadfast in all his opinions, it may be bad, namely, if it makes him persist even in a false opinion. And if Unrestraint makes him liable to abandon any opinion, in some cases Unrestraint will be good. Take the instance of Neoptolemus in the Philocles of Sophocles. Neoptolemus abandons a resolution that he has been persuaded by Odysseus to adopt, because of the pain that it gives him to tell a lie: in this case inconstancy is praiseworthy.

8 Again (a, c) there is the difficulty raised by the argument of the sophists. The sophists wish to show their cleverness by entrapping their adversary into a paradox, and when they are successful, the resultant chain of reasoning ends in a deadlock: the mind is fettered, being unwilling to stand still because it cannot approve the conclusion reached, yet unable to go forward because it cannot untie the knot of the argument. Now one of their arguments proves that Folly combined with Unrestraint is a virtue. It runs as follows: if a man is foolish and also unrestrained, owing to his unrestraint he does the opposite of what he believes that he ought to do; but he believes that good things are bad, and that he ought not to do them; therefore he will do good things and not bad ones.

9 Again (b, d) one who does and pursues what is pleasant from conviction and choice, might be held to be a better man than one who acts in the same way not from calculation but from unrestraint, because he is more easy to cure, since he may be persuaded to alter his conviction; whereas the unrestrained man
"οταν τὸ ύδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεὶ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἶ μὲν γὰρ ἔπεπειστὸν ἀ πράττει, μεταπειθεῖς ἀν 1146 b ἐπαύσατο. νῦν δὲ2 πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἄλλα.

11 πράττει.—ἐτι εἴ περὶ πάντα ἄκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τὸς δὲ ἀπλῶς ἄκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἄκρασιας, φαμεν δὲ εἶναι τινάς 5 ἀπλῶς.

12 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦται τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελείν δεὶ τὰ δὲ καταλυεῖν· ή γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὑρεσίς ἐστιν.

iii Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκέπτεσθαι πότερον εἰδότες ἡ σοῦ, καὶ τῶς εἰδότες· εἶτα περὶ πολύ τὸν ἄκρατή καὶ τὸν ἐγκράτηθατεν, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ 10 πάσαν ἴδιαν καὶ λύπην ἡ περὶ τινάς ἀφρωσιμένας· καὶ τὸν ἐγκράτηθα καὶ τὸν κάρτερικον, πότερον δὲ αὐτὸς ἡ ἐτερός ἐστιν· ὁμολογοῦ τέκα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκα ὑγγενεῖ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστί 2 ταύτης. ἐστὶ δ’ ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον δὲ ἐγκράτηθα καὶ δ’ ἄκρατης εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἡ τῷ 18 πῶς4 ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταῦτα εἶναι μόνον ἄκρατής ὁ ἄκρατής, ἡ σοῦ

1 μὴ ἔπεπειστο Ι.β.
2 δὲ οὗ (λει ὡς) Γ, δὲ ἄλλα Ramsauer, Bywater.
3 ἄλλα secl. Bywater.
4 ὡς Bywater.

a A variant οὐ πεπεισμένοι . . . [ἄλλα] gives 'but as it is he is convinced it is wrong but nevertheless does it.'

b See c. i. 5, note.

c This question is not pursued below; indeed the contents of the following chapters are correctly outlined in § 1, and § 2 is superfluous.

d Not the difference between the two, since of course they are concerned with the same objects, but the difference between both of them and other similar characters; see c. i. 4. 384
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comes under the proverb that says 'when water chokes you, what are you to drink to wash it down?'. Had he been convinced that what he does is right, a change of conviction might have caused him to desist; but as it is he is convinced that he ought to do one thing and nevertheless does another thing.\(^a\)

11 Again \((f)\) if Self-restraint and Unrestraint can be displayed with reference to anything, what is the meaning of the epithet 'unrestrained' without qualification? No one has every form of unrestraint, yet we speak of some men as simply 'unrestrained.'

12 Such, more or less, are the difficulties that arise. Part of the conflicting opinions we have to clear out of the way, but part to leave standing; for to solve a difficulty is to find the answer to a problem.\(^b\)

iii We have then to consider, first \((i)\) whether men fail in self-restraint knowing what they do is wrong, or not knowing, and if knowing, knowing in what sense; and next \((ii)\) what are to be set down as the objects with which Self-restraint and Unrestraint are concerned: I mean, are they concerned with pleasure and pain of all sorts, or only with certain special pleasures and pains? and \((iii)\) is Self-restraint the same as Endurance or distinct from it? and so on with \((iv)\) the other questions akin to this subject.

2 A starting-point for our investigation is to ask whether the differentia\(^d\) of the self-restrained man and the unrestrained is constituted by their objects, or by their dispositions: I mean, whether a man is called unrestrained solely because he fails to restrain himself with reference to certain things, or rather because he has a certain disposition, or rather
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άλλα τῷ ὦς, ἦ οὖ ἄλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπευτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἧ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἦ ἐγκράτεια ἦ οὖν οὔτε γὰρ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἐχεῖν (ταῦτο γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἐχεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἃ εἰ δεῖν τὸ παρόν ἢ δὲ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἀφεται μὲν, διώκει δέ.

8 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπι- στήμην εἶναι παρ' ἦν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐθὲν διαφέρει ἐς πρὸς τὸν λόγον. ἔνοι γὰρ τῶν δοξάζοντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι· εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξοντοι, οὐθέν διωίσει ἐπιστήμην δόξης· ἔνοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἢττον οἷς δοξάζοντος ἢ ἔτεροι οἷς ἐπιστάνται· δῆλοι δ' Ἡράκλειτος. ἀλλ' ἔπει διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐχὼν μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διωίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα· ὁ μὴ δὲι πράττειν

1 καὶ τὰ θεωροῦντα om. ΓΜβ.

This seems to refer to the dogmatic tone of Heracleitus's teaching in general.

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for both reasons combined. A second question is, can Self-restraint and Unrestraint be displayed in regard to everything, or not? When a man is said to be 'unrestrained' without further qualification, it does not mean that he is so in relation to everything, but to those things in regard to which a man can be profligate; and also it does not mean merely that he is concerned with these things (for in that case Unrestraint would be the same thing as Profligacy), but that he is concerned with them in a particular manner. The profligate yields to his appetites from choice, considering it right always to pursue the pleasure that offers, whereas the man of defective self-restraint does not think so, but pursues it all the same.

3 (i) Now the suggestion that it is not Knowledge, but True Opinion, against which unrestrained men act, is of no importance for our argument. Some men hold their opinions with absolute certainty, and take them for positive knowledge; so that if weakness of conviction be the criterion for deciding that men who act against their conception of what is right must be said to opine rather than to know the right, there will really be no difference in this respect between Opinion and Knowledge; since some men are just as firmly convinced of what they opine as others are of what they know: witness Heracleitus.¹

4 (1) But the word know is used in two senses. A man who has knowledge but is not exercising it is said to know, and so is a man who is actually exercising his knowledge. It will make a difference whether a man does wrong having the knowledge that it is wrong but not consciously thinking of his knowledge, or with the knowledge consciously present to his mind. The latter

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6 ἐὰν οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. — ἐτι ἔπει δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλά μὴ τῇ καθὰ μέρος. πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστά. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῦ τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐστὶν, οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπων συμφέρει τὰ ἑγρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπος, ἢ ὅτι ἤδη τὸ ποιόνδε. ἀλλ’ εἰ τόδε ποιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ γε’ δὴ τούτων διοίκει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὡστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηθεὶν ἀτοπον, ἀλλάς δὲ θαυμαστόν.— 10
7 ἐτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὀργεῖν τὴν ἔξω, ὡστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μανώμενον καὶ οἵωμενον. ἀλλὰ

1 Bywater.
2 αὐτὸς Rassow: δ αὐτὸς ἱερ. ἱερός αὐτὸς στὸς ἱερὸς Λb.
3 γε Coraes: τε.

The major premise of a practical syllogism is universal, a general rule; the minor is particular, the application of the rule to the case in hand. The next sentence points out that this application really requires two syllogisms: in the first, the personal term of the major premise is predicated in the minor of the particular person concerned (Dry food is good for all men: I am a man: therefore dry food is good for me); in the second, the other universal term is predicated in the minor of a particular thing about which the person is deliberating (Dry food is good for me: this stale loaf is dry food: therefore this stale loaf is good for me). It is the minor premise of the second syllogism, viz. the application of the general rule not to himself but to the
would be felt to be surprising; but it is not surprising that a man should do what he knows to be wrong if he is not conscious of the knowledge at the time.

6 (2) Again, reasoning on matters of conduct employs premises of two forms. Now it is quite possible for a man to act against knowledge when he knows both premises but is only exercising his knowledge of the universal premise and not of the particular; for action has to do with particular things. Moreover, there is a distinction as regards the universal term: one universal is predicated of the man himself, the other of the thing; for example, he may know and be conscious of the knowledge that dry food is good for every man and that he himself is a man, or even that food of a certain kind is dry, but either not possess or not be actualizing the knowledge whether the particular food before him is food of that kind. Now clearly the distinction between these two ways of knowing will make all the difference in the world. It will not seem at all strange that the unrestrained man should 'know' in one way, but it would be astonishing if he knew in another way.

7 (3) Again, it is possible for men to 'have knowledge' in yet another way besides those just discussed; for even in the state of having knowledge without exercising it we can observe a distinction: a man may in a sense both have it and not have it; for instance, when he is asleep, or mad, or drunk.

thing in question, that the unrestrained man seems not to know, or not to think of, at the time.

This illustration is confused in the text by the insertion of another minor premise ἡ δὲ τὸ ξηρὸν τὸ τούπαξ, 'or that food of a certain kind [e.g. stale bread] is dry.' It would have been enough to write ἄλλα ἐφ' τόδε ξηρῶν, 'but whether this [stale loaf] is dry.'
μὴν οὖν διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες. 15 
θυμωλ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ άφροδισίων καὶ ἕνα
τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθυστάσιν,
ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι
8 δομοῖς ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τοῦτοις. 
τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τοῦτοις
ὀντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἑτη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους,
καὶ οἱ πρώτοι μαθόντες1 συνελρούσι μὲν τοὺς
λόγους, ἔπειτα δὲ οὕτω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυγῆναι, τούτῳ
δὲ χρόνου δεῖται.2 ὡστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους,
οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς
9 ἀκρατευομένους.—ἔτι καὶ ὅδε φυσικῶς ἃν τις
ἐπιβλέψει τὴν αὑτήν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα,
26 ἢ δὲ ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστά ἑστιν, ὡς αὑσθεῖσι
ηὐδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται εἰς αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη
tὸ συμπεραθὲν ἐνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν
dὲ τοῖς πρακτικαῖς4 πράττειν εὐθὺς, οἷον, εἰ
παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δει, τούτῳ δὲ γλυκῷ ὡς
ἐν τί τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον 30
καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἀμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν.
10 ὅταν οὖν ἢ μὲν καθόλου ἐνη κωλύομαι γεύεσθαι,
ἢ δὲ, οὕτω πάντως γλυκὺ ἤδυ, τούτῳ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὑτὴ

1 μαθάνερτες ? Thurot. 2 τοὺς Lb. 3 δεῖται I. δει. 4 Coraces: ποιητικαῖς. 5 πάν το Lb.

a The reference is to persons of weak will uttering sound moral maxims almost at the very moment of yielding to temptation.
6 Viz., asleep or drunk. It may have been some Falstaff of Attic comedy that quoted the moral maxims of Empedocles in his cups.
7 i.e., in this case, psychologically: lit. 'with reference to its nature.' Cf. viii. i. 6, ix. vii. 2, ix. 7.
But persons under the influence of passion are in the same condition; for it is evident that anger, sexual desire, and certain other passions, actually alter the state of the body, and in some cases even cause madness. It is clear therefore that we must pronounce the unrestrained to ‘have knowledge’ only in the same way as men who are asleep or mad or drunk. Their using the language of knowledge is no proof that they possess it. Persons in the states mentioned repeat propositions of geometry and verses of Empedocles; students who have just begun a subject reel off its formulae, though they do not yet know their meaning, for knowledge has to become part of the tissue of the mind, and this takes time. Hence we must conceive that men who fail in self-restraint talk in the same way as actors speaking a part.

(4) Again, one may also study the cause of Unrestraint scientifically, thus: In a practical syllogism, the major premise is an opinion, while the minor premise deals with particular things, which are the province of perception. Now when the two premises are combined, just as in theoretic reasoning the mind is compelled to affirm the resulting conclusion, so in the case of practical premises you are forced at once to do it. For example, given the premises ‘All sweet things ought to be tasted’ and ‘Yonder thing is sweet’—a particular instance of the general class—you are bound, if able and not prevented, immediately to taste the thing. When therefore there is present in the mind on the one hand a universal judgement forbidding you to taste and on the other hand a universal judgement saying ‘All sweet things are pleasant,’ and a minor premise ‘Yonder thing is
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dē énergētē, tukhē ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνοδείγμα, ἥ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τούτῳ, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει (κινεῖν γὰρ ἐκαστὸν δύναται τῶν μορίων), ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἔναντιας δὲ καθ' αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς

11 (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἔναντια, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα) τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τούτῳ τὰ θερία οὐκ ἀκρατὴς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.—πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἀγνοία καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἰδιὸς τούτου τοῦ πάθους,

12 δὲι παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἁκοίνει.—ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἄν <δὲ> ἡ οὖκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὁμών, ἡ οὕτως ἔχει ὅσοι οὖκ ἢν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπισταθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὡσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηθ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὀμολογεῖ διόκειν τῷ καθόλου τῶν ἐσχατῶν ὀρόν, καὶ ἑυκεκριμένος ἐξήτει Σωκράτης 15

14 συμβαίνειν· οὗ γὰρ τῆς κυρίας ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παροῦσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὐτὴ

1 οὖν om. Lb. 2 <δὲ> Ramsauer.

a i.e., determines action (Ross). b Cf. c. ii. 1.

a Here τὸ πάθος means ἀκρατεύεσθαι, cf. ii. 2, iii. 12, iv. 6; but in the following line (cf. c. ii. 1) it probably means ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, as iii. 7, v. 5, vii. 8.

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sweet' (and it is this minor premise that is active), and when desire is present at the same time, then, though the former universal judgement says 'Avoid that thing,' the desire leads you to it (since desire can put the various parts of the body in motion). Thus it comes about that when men fail in self-restraint, they act in a sense under the influence of a principle or opinion, but an opinion not in itself but only accidentally opposed to the right principle (for it is the desire, and not the opinion, that is really opposed). Hence the lower animals cannot be called unrestrained, if only for the reason that they have no power of forming universal concepts, but only mental images and memories of particular things.

12 If we ask how the unrestrained man's ignorance is dissipated and he returns to a state of knowledge, the explanation is the same as in the case of drunkenness and sleep, and is not peculiar to failure of self-restraint. We must go for it to physiology.

13 But inasmuch as the last premise, which originates action, is an opinion as to some object of sense, and it is this opinion which the unrestrained man when under the influence of passion either does not possess, or only possesses in a way which as we saw does not amount to knowing it but only makes him repeat it as the drunken man repeats the maxims of Empedocles, and since the ultimate term is not a universal, and is not deemed to be an object of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term is, we do seem to be led to the conclusion which Socrates sought to establish. For the knowledge which is present when failure of self-restraint occurs is not what is held to be Knowledge in the true sense, nor is it true Knowledge which is
periełketai dia to pados, allà tis aisthetaikês. peri mèn oûn toû eïdota kai μή, kai πῶς eïdota ēndéxetai àkratêessthai, tosaúta eïrîsthôw.

iv Pôteron δ' èstî tis áplwz àkratêis ἡ pántes 20 kattâ méros, kai ei èstî, peri poiâ èstî, lektéon ephexhîs. òti mèn oûn peri ÷ôdonas kai lýpas eîwv ou t' éykrateîs kai karterikoi kai ou àkrateîs 2 kai malakoi, faneorîn. èpeî δ' èstî tâ mèn ánanýkaïa tîn poioûntwn ÷ôdonh, tâ δ' aîretâ mèn kath' aúta ëxontâ δ' ûperbôlhî, ánagnakea 25 mèn tâ sswmatikâ (léwv de tâ toiaúta, tâ te peri tîn trophîn kai tîn tîn ãfrwswsîn xrelâv, kai tâ toiaúta tîn sswmatikôn peri a tîn ãkolaßan ðèmemen kai tîn swwfrosûnh), tâ δ' ánagnakea mèn ouêî, aîretâ de kath' aúta (léwv δ' oîon níkèn tîmîn plouton kai tâ toiaúta tîn 30 ãgathôn kai ÷ôdôn). tous mèn oûn proû tawta parâ tîn ðrdon lógou ûperbâllontas tîn èn aïtoûs áplwos mèn ou légoûmen àkrateîs, prospôthêtes δ' tî 1 ðrhmatôn àkrateîs kai kêrdous kai tîmîs kai ðymiôû, áplwos δ' ou, ðs ètrèous kai kath' ðmioûtînà lêgoûmenous—ôùper "Ànthrwpos 35 ð tâ 'Olymopia nîkôn, 3 èkeînîg γâp ð koinôs lógos 1143 a

1 tò secl. ? Bywater. 2 νîkôn Kò: νενικηκώς.

—a See § d note. —b See pi. x. —c Cf. c. i. 7: ðwûbs, 'spirit,' aims at victory, and so is brought into this discussion of 'pleasures and desires' (§ d); but in c. vi. it is contrasted with desire, and its indulgence in the form of anger is seen to be painful rather than pleasant (vi. 4).
—d This seems to be the meaning of the imperfect tenses. An inscription records that a boxer named "Ànthrwpos won at Olympia in 456 B.C. and the Greek commentators say 394
dragged about by passion, but knowledge derived from sense-perception.
So much for the question whether failure of self-restraint can go with knowledge or not, and with knowledge in what sense.

(iv) (ii) We must next discuss whether any man can be called 'unrestrained' without qualification, or whether it must always be in relation to certain particular things, and if so, to what sort of things.

Now it is plain that men are self-restrained and enduring, unrestrained and soft, in regard to Pleasures and Pains. But the things that give pleasure are of two kinds: some are necessary, others are desirable in themselves but admit of excess. The necessary sources of pleasures are those connected with the body: I mean such as the functions of nutrition and sex, in fact those bodily functions which we have indicated as the sphere of Profligacy and Temperance. The other sources of pleasure are not necessary, but are desirable in themselves: I mean for example victory, honour, wealth, and the other good and pleasant things of the same sort. Now those who against the right principle within them exceed in regard to the latter class of pleasant things, we do not call unrestrained simply, but with a qualification—unrestrained as to money, gain, honour or anger—not merely 'un-restrained'; because we regard them as distinct from the unrestrained in the strict sense, and only so called by analogy, like our familiar example of Man the Olympic winner, whose special definition that he is referred to here. His name would appear to have been used in the Peripatetic school as an example of the analogical use of words.
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τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῶ διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐτερος ἦν—
(σημεῖον δὲ ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς
ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις, ἡ ἀπλώς
3 οὖσα ἡ κατὰ τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐθεὶς). τῶν δὲ
περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ δὲ λέγομεν ἐν
τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὡς τῇ προαιρέσθαι
tῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν
λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δύσης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ
ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἀθάνατι καὶ γενόμεν,
ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν,
ἀκρατῆς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ἄτι περὶ
4 τάδε, καθάπερ ἄργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλώς μόνον (σημεῖον
δὲ καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ
ἐκείνων δ' οὐθεὶς). καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταύτα
τὸν ἀκρατὴ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ
ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὔδεὶς,
διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πως ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας
eἰναι: οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταύτα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαυτὸς
εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦν-
tαι. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἃν εὑρομεν ὁστὶς
μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἡ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
1 καὶ <τὰ μέτρα> Rassow.
2 καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα secludenda ? ed.
3 ὑπερβολᾶς <τῶν ἡδέων> Rassow.

* i.e., it only requires the addition of three words. Strictly
speaking, however, it is impossible to define an individual;
moreover, the Olympic victor (a) was a man not merely by
analogy but as a member of the species, and (b) was named
Man not even by analogy but only homonymously. But
a humorous illustration need not be precise.
* Perhaps Man had some personal peculiarity which
somewhat belied his name.
* Probably this should be amended to 'moderate bodily
pains,' cf. § 4.
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is not very different \(^a\) from the general definition of 'man,' though nevertheless he is really quite distinct from men in general.\(^b\) (That such persons are only called unrestrained by analogy is proved by our blaming unrestraint, whether unqualified or with reference to some particular bodily pleasure, as a vice and not merely an error, whereas we do not regard those unrestrained in regard to money, etc. as guilty of vice.) But of those who exceed in relation to the bodily enjoyments with regard to which we speak of men as temperate or profligate, he who pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids the extremes of bodily pains such as hunger, heat, cold, and the various pains of touch and taste, not from choice but against his own choice and reason, is described as unrestrained not with a qualification — unrestrained as regards these pleasures and pains— as is one who yields to anger, but just simply as unrestrained. (A proof that 'unrestrained' unqualified denotes unrestraint as regards bodily pleasures and pains, is that we speak of men as 'soft' who yield to these, but not those who yield to anger or the like.) And hence we class the unrestrained man with the profligate (and the self-restrained with the temperate)\(^d\), but not those who yield to anger or the like, because Unrestraint and Profligacy are related to the same pleasures and pains. But as a matter of fact, although they are related to the same things, they are not related to them in the same way; the profligate acts from choice, the unrestrained man does not. Hence we should pronounce a man who pursues excessive pleasures and avoids moderate pains when he feels

\(^a\) This parenthesis may be an interpolation.
καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἡ τοῦτον ὡστὶς διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἀν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσεις, 20 εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανίκη καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἐνδεῖας λύπη ἱσχύρα·

5 'Εσπεῖ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰς τῶν1 γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ ἡδῶν ἐνα φύσει αἱρετᾶ, τὰ δ' ἑναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξῦ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρό- 25 τερον) οἷον κρῆματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ ἐκκη καὶ τιμῆ, πρὸς ἀπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῶν πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ἰσχύονται ἀλλὰ τῶ πῶς καὶ2 ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσι μὲν παρὰ τῶν λόγων ἡ κρατοῦντα ἡ διώκονσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ 30 τιμῆς μᾶλλον ἡ δει σπουδᾶξοντες, ἡ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδᾶξοντες, ἀλλὰ ὅμως ἐστὶ τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις, εἰ τις ὡσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοντο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἡ ὡσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενον περὶ τὸν πατέρα, λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραῖνεν)—μοχ- 398

1 τῶν Wilson: τψ.
2 καὶ om. Kb.

a See § 2: a third class is now added, pleasures bad in themselves and not only in excess; and the ‘necessary’ pleasures are now classed as ‘intermediate,’ neither good nor bad in themselves, though good as a means to life, and bad in excess.

b This subject is left without its verb, which apparently would be ‘are not wicked, nor yet unrestrained in the proper sense.’ Though this clause here begins as a parenthesis, it is resumed below at ‘well then’ as a fresh sentence, which really, however, constitutes the apodosis of the protasis that began at the beginning of the section, ‘And inasmuch.’
only weak desires or none at all, to be more profligate than one who does so owing to intense desires; for what would the former do if he possessed the ardent desires of youth, and felt violent pain when debarred from the 'necessary' pleasures?

And inasmuch as some desires and pleasures relate to things that are noble and good in kind (for some pleasant things are desirable by nature, others the opposite, while others again are neutral—compare the classification we gave above⁵): for instance money, gain, victory, honour: and inasmuch as in relation to all these naturally desirable things, as well as to the neutral ones, men are not blamed merely for regarding or desiring or liking them, but for doing so in a certain way, namely to excess (hence those⁶ who yield to or pursue, contrary to principle, anything naturally noble and good, for example those who care too much for honour, or for their children and their parents—for parents and children are good things and people are praised who care for them, but nevertheless it is possible even in their case to go to excess, by vying even with the gods like Niobe,⁷ or as Satyrus did,⁸ who was nicknamed the filial for his devotion to his father, for he was thought to carry it to the point of infatuation—): well then, there cannot be any actual Vice in relation to these things, because, as

⁵ Niobe vaunted her children as more beautiful than those of Leto.
⁶ The Greek commentators tell stories of a certain Satyrus who, when his father died, committed suicide for grief. But Heliodorus appears to have read ἐπικαλούμενος τὸν πατέρα without περί, 'or like Satyrus the Filial invoking his father as a god': there were kings of Bosphorus named Satyrus in the 4th c., and one may have borne the surname Philopator.
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εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἐκαστοῦ ἐστὶ δι’ αὐτὸ· φαίλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταί αὐτῶν εἰσίν αἱ ὑπερβολαί· ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία· ἥ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτόν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψευκτῶν ἐστὶν· δι’ ὅμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἐκαστοῦ λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν, δὴ ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἄν εἴποιεν κακὸν. ὡσπερ οὖν οὖθε ἔνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὅμως, οὕτω δήλον ὅτι κάκει ὑπολήπτεον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἄτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταύτα τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολογίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθ’ ὅμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προσεπτιθέντες ἀκρατῆθεν θυμοῦ ὡσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

v Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τοῦτων ἰδίᾳ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ξών καὶ ἄνθρωπων, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι’ ἐθή γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρᾶς φύσεις, ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τοῦτων ἐκαστα παραπληρίας ἰδεῖν ἔξεις· λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἀνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυνόσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἡ οἷος χαίρειν φασίν ενίος τῶν ἀπηγγειμένων περὶ τῶν Ποντοῦ, τοὺς μὲν

1 θυμοῦ Κb: θυμόν.

So Peters. Perhaps there is a reference to the Lamia of folk-lore.

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has been said, each of them is in itself desirable by
nature, although excessive devotion to them is bad
and to be avoided. And similarly there cannot be
Unrestraint either, since that is not merely to be
avoided, but actually blameworthy; though people
do use the term in these matters with a qualification
—' unrestraint in ' whatever it may be—because
the affection does resemble Unrestraint proper; just
as they speak of someone as a bad doctor or bad
actor whom they would not call simply 'bad.' As
therefore we do not call bad doctors and actors bad
men, because neither kind of incapacity is actually
a vice, but only resembles Vice by analogy, so in the
former case it is clear that only self-restraint and
lack of restraint in regard to the same things as are
the objects of Temperance and Profligacy are to be
deemed Self-restraint and Unrestraint proper, and
that these terms are applied to anger only by
analogy; and so we add a qualification, ' unrestrained
in anger,' just as we say ' unrestrained in the pursuit
of honour' or 'gain.'

Besides those things however which are naturally
pleasant, of which some are pleasant generally and
others pleasant to particular races of animals and
of men, there are other things, not naturally pleasant,
which become pleasant either as a result of arrested
development or from habit, or in some cases owing
to natural depravity. Now corresponding to each of
these kinds of unnatural pleasures we may observe

a related disposition of character. I mean bestial
characters, like the creature in woman's form a
that is said to rip up pregnant females and devour
their offspring, or certain savage tribes on the coasts
of the Black Sea, who are alleged to delight in raw
ἀμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανεῖζεν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἦ τὸ
3 περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὔται μὲν θηριώδεις, αἰ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοτε, 28 ὀστέρῳ οὐ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγόν, καὶ οὐ τοῦ συνδούλιον τὸ ἠπαρ), αἰ δὲ νοσηματώδεις [ἡ] ἐξ ἐθούς, οἱ οὖν τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀφθάλμων τρώξεις, ἐτί δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων ὁ τοῖς ἀρρηστοι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἐθούς ἑμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς 80
4 ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παιδιών. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσει αὐτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδὲν οὐκ ἔστειλεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὀστέρῳ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας ὅτι οὐκ ὑπνούουσιν ἄλλα ὑπνοῦν-
5 ται· ὃσαντος δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματωδῶς ἔχουσι
δι' ἐθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐχεῖν ἑκαστα τούτων ἑξώ τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης. 1149 τὸ δ' ἑχοντα κρατεῖν ἡ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλὴ ἀκρασία ἄλλη ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν
περὶ τοὺς θυμούς ἑχοντα τούτων τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατή δ' οὐ λεκτέον. (πάσα γὰρ ὑπερ-5βάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ καλεστότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματω-
6 δεὶς εἰσίν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τουτοῦτος οἷος δεδείναι πάντα, καὶ ψοφὴς μὺς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός,

1 τοὺς δὲ secl. Oncken.
2 sic Kb, ἄλλοις δανεῖζεν Lb, καὶ ἐσαῦν καὶ δανεῖζεν ἀλλήλοις
3 διὰ τὴν ἐνὶ, καὶ διὰ μανίαν Kb.
5 ἀφροδισίων ἀμιλίαν όσοι νοσηματωδῶς Rich.
6 δοσι: Bywater: τοῖς. 7 τοῦ K b. 8 ἡ κρατεῖν Richards.

a The version follows Williams, and seems to require the emendation given in the critical note. The ἁπλὰ give 'who lend their children to each other for feasting.'
meat or in human flesh, and others among whom each in turn provides a child for the common banquet; or the reported depravity of Phalaris. These are instances of Bestiality. Other unnatural propensities are due to disease, and sometimes to insanity, as in the case of the madman that offered up his mother to the gods and partook of the sacrifice, or the one that ate his fellow slave’s liver. Other morbid propensities are acquired by habit, for instance, plucking out the hair, biting the nails, eating cinders and earth, and also sexual perversion. These practices result in some cases from natural disposition, and in others from habit, as with those who have been abused from childhood. When nature is responsible, no one would describe such persons as showing Unrestraint, any more than one would apply that term to women because they are passive and not active in sexual intercourse; nor should we class as Unrestraint a morbid state brought about by habitual indulgence.

Now these various morbid dispositions in themselves do not fall within the limits of Vice, nor yet does Bestiality; and to conquer or yield to them does not constitute Unrestraint in the strict sense, but only the state so called by analogy; just as a man who cannot control his anger must be described as ‘unrestrained in’ that passion, not ‘unrestrained.’

(Indeed folly, cowardice, profligacy, and ill-temper, whenever they run to excess, are either bestial or morbid conditions. One so constituted by nature as to be frightened by everything, even the sound

\textsuperscript{b} See below, § 7, note.
\textsuperscript{c} We must understand ‘does not constitute restraint or unrestraint’ unless we amend ‘and to fail to conquer, or to be conquered by, them does not constitute unrestraint.’
ο δὲ τὴν γαλήνην ἐδεδείει διὰ νόσου καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων
οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει
ζώντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἐνια γένη τῶν πόρρω
βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἱ οὖν τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς,
7 ἡ μανίας νοσηματώδεις.) τούτων δ’ ἔστι μὲν
ἐχειν μὲν τινα ἐνίοτε τοῦ μόνου, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δὲ,
λέγω δὲ οἰον εἴ Φάλαρις κατείχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου
φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἠδονήν· ἔστι 15
8 δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν ὡσπερ οὖν
καὶ μοχθηρία ἡ μὲν κατ’ ἀνθρωπον ἀπλῶς λέγεται
μοχθηρία, ἡ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ὡστὶ θηριώδης ἡ
νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ’ οὖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν θηριώδης ἡ
8 δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης
ἀκολούθιαν μόνη.
9 "Οτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἑγκράτεια ἐστὶ μόνον
περὶ ἄπερ ἀκολούθια καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ
tά ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἴδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον
κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον.
vi "Οτι δὲ καὶ ἤττου αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἡ 25
ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔσοχε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
ἀκολεῖ μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακολούθησε δὲ, καθάπερ
οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων [οἱ] 2 πρὶν ἄκοισαι πᾶν
tὸ λεγόμενον ἑκθέοις, εἶτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς

1 μὲν τινα ἐνίοτε ed.: μὲν post ἐνίοτε Κ b, om. vulg.
2 Jackson.

a No such stories about Phalaris are alluded to elsewhere; so Burnet here brackets the name, supposing the subject of κατείχεν to be unexpressed, and taking § 2 to refer to Phalaris’s well-known practice of burning human victims in a bronze bull. But that was hardly an instance of Bestiality.

b i.e., inhuman vice.

c ‘Lack of control of the spirit’: see c. iv. 2 note e.
of a mouse, shows the cowardice of a lower animal; the man who was afraid of a weasel was a case of disease. So with folly: people irrational by nature and living solely by sensation, like certain remote tribes of barbarians, belong to the bestial class; those who lose their reason owing to some disease, such as epilepsy, or through insanity, to the morbid.)

7 With these unnatural propensities it is possible in some cases merely to have the disposition and not to yield to it: I mean, for instance, Phalaris\(^a\) might have had the desire to eat a child, or to practise unnatural vice, and refrained; or it is possible not merely to possess but to yield to the propensity.

8 As therefore with Vice, that natural to man is called simply vice, whereas the other kind\(^b\) is termed not simply vice, but vice with the qualifying epithet bestial or morbid, similarly with Unrestraint, it is clear that the bestial and morbid kinds are distinct from unrestraint proper, and that the name without qualification belongs only to that kind of unrestraint which is co-extensive with Profligacy of the human sort.

9 It is clear then that Self-restraint and Unrestraint relate only to the objects to which Temperance and Profligacy are related, and that unrestraint in relation to anything else is of another kind, which is only so called metaphorically and with a qualification.

vi Let us now consider the point that Unrestraint in anger\(^c\) is less disgraceful than Unrestraint in the desires.

Now it appears that anger does to some extent bear reason, but hears it wrong, just as hasty servants hurry out of the room before they have heard the whole of what you are saying, and so mistake
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προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κόνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὅλακτονσιν. οὐτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτίτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, ὡς ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὀρμᾶ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἡ ἡ φαντασία ὡτὶ ὑπὲρ ἡ ὀλυγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὦτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθὺς. ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἰπῇ ἢ ὡτὶ ἢ [ὁ λόγος ἡ]¹ ἡ αὐθεσθείς, ὀρμᾶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ἀφθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ 1149 ἂν πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὖν. αἰσχίον οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς τοῦ λόγου πως ἤττάται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. ἐτὶ ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὁρέξεωι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοσαύταις μᾶλλον ὀδοι κοιναὶ πάσιν, καὶ ἐφ' ὀσον κοιναῖ· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικότερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότητα τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ἀφθ' ὁ ἀπολογοῦμενος ὦτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι· "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἐφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, κάκεινος τὸν ἀνωθέν", καὶ τὸ ᾅ παιδίον δεῖξας "καὶ οὗτος ἐμὲ" ἐφη, "ὅταν ἄνηρ γένηται· συγγνώμη γὰρ ἡμῖν," καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νυσί παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύσα τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. 3 ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι· ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμῶ·

¹ Garvius.
² aἰσχίον Κ: aἰσχλων.

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* These words are surely an interpolation.
* Viz., the man who is 'unrestrained' in the strict sense, *i.e.*, cannot restrain his desires.
* This story is developed in Robert Browning's poem.
your order, and as watch-dogs bark at a mere knock at the door, without waiting to see if it is a friend. Similarly anger, owing to the heat and swiftness of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given, and rushes off to take vengeance. When reason or imagination suggests that an insult or slight has been received, anger flares up at once, but after reasoning as it were that you ought to make war on anybody who insults you. Desire on the other hand, at a mere hint from [the reason or a] the senses that a thing is pleasant, rushes off to enjoy it. Hence anger follows reason in a manner, but desire does not. Therefore yielding to desire is more disgraceful than yielding to anger, for he that fails to restrain his anger is in a way controlled by reason, but the other b is controlled not by reason but by desire.

2 Again, when impulses are natural, it is more excusable to follow them, since even with the desires it is more excusable to follow those that are common to all men, and in so far as they are common. But anger and bad temper are more natural than desire for excessive and unnecessary pleasures; witness the man who was had up for beating his father and who said in his defence, "Well, my father used to beat his father, and he used to beat his, and (pointing to his little boy) so will my son here beat me when he grows up; it runs in our family"; and the man who, when his son was throwing him out of the house, used to beg him to stop when he got to the door, 'because he only used to drag his father as far as that.'

Again, the craftier men are, the more unjust

'Halbert and Hob'; it is said also to occur in a German Volkslied.

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δὴς οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἂν ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασί.

δολοπλόκας τ' ἦρετην Κυπρογενοῦς:
καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἐμάντα Ὀμηρὸς:

πάρφασις ἦ τ' ἐκλεψε νόον πῦκα περὶ φρονέοντος.

ἐντὸς εἴτερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχῶν ἡ ἀκρασία αὐτὴ τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἔστι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία
καὶ κακία πως. Ἐτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὃ
δ' ὅργῃ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὃ δ' ὑβρίζων
μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ἐὰν οὖν οὐς ὑγιέσθαι μάλιστα
dίκαιον, παῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ δι'

ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ γάρ ἔστων ἐν θυμῷ ὑβρις.—ὡς μὲν
tοιῶν αἰσχῶν ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ
tὸν θυμὸν, καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἑγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς,

δὴλον. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον.

ἐν θυμῷ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν ἄθρωπικαί

1 δολοπλόκας Λ ᾗ (v. Edmonds, Lyra Graeca, Sappho 134):

dooliploikov.

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The line seems to have ended Κυπρογένεος πρόπολον (Bergk, cf. Hesych., Κ. π. προάγωγον), 'for the servant of the wile-weaving Cyprus-born,' viz., Peitho, Persuasion. It is ascribed by Wilamowitz to Sappho, and the same epithet is applied to Aphrodite in Sappho, i. 2.

One of the emblematic figures embroidered on the girdle of Aphrodite, Iliad, xiv. 217.

ὑβρις means any injury that is insulting to the victim, but here the writer is thinking specially of outrage prompted by lust. The argument is based on the feelings of both agent and victim. Anger, being a painful feeling, does not show wantonness or insolence, for wanton acts are pleasant to the doer. An injury done in anger therefore arouses less anger in return, less resentment in the victim, than does

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they are. Now the hot-tempered man is not crafty, nor is anger, but open; whereas desire is crafty, as they say of Aphrodite:

Weaver of wiles in Cyprus born *

and Homer writes of her 'broidered girdle *

Cajolery b that cheats the wisest wits.

As therefore unrestraint in desire is more unjust as well as more disgraceful than unrestraint as regards anger, unrestraint in desire is Unrestraint in the strict sense, and is even in a certain sense Vice.

4 Again, a wanton outrage c gives pleasure to the doer, never pain, whereas an act done in anger always causes him a feeling of pain. If then things are unjust in proportion to the justice of the anger they arouse in the victim, unrestraint arising from desire is more unjust than that arising from anger; for anger contains no element of wanton insolence.

5 It is clear therefore that unrestraint in one's desires is more disgraceful than unrestraint in anger, and that it is in relation to bodily desires and pleasures that Self-restraint and Unrestraint are really manifested.

6 But we must distinguish among the bodily desires and pleasures themselves. As was said at the beginning, d some of these are human and natural wanton outrage due to unrestrained desire. Therefore it is less 'unjust,' less of an injury. Cf. Rhetoric, ii. iii. 1380 a 34 (anger is not so much resented, because it does not show contempt for its victim).

* See c. v. 1, and also c. i. 3.
Aristotle

eἰσι καὶ φυσικαί καὶ τῶν γένει καὶ τῶ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. 30 τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολο-
σία μόνον ἑστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σωφρονα
οὐτ' ἀκολοῦτα λέγομεν ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν
καὶ εἰ τι ὅλως ἀλλῷ πρὸς ἀλλὸ διαφέρει γένος τῶν
ζώων ὑπερ καὶ συναμφία καὶ τῶ παμφάγον
ἐναν' οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προϊστον οὐδε λογισμὸν, ἄλλ' 88
ἐξέστικε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μανύμενοι τῶν 1150 a
7 ἀνθρώπων. Ἐλαττὼν δὲ θηριότης κακίας,² φοβερώ-
τερον δὲ οὐ γὰρ διεφθάρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ
ἐν τῶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὁμοίων οὖν
ὧσπερ ἄφυξαν συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἐμψυχον, πότερον
κάκιον· ἀνωστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μῆ
ἐχόντος ἀρχήν, δ' ἐν νοῦς ἀρχήν. (παραπλήσιον
οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἀνθρωπον ἀδικον·
ἑστὶ γὰρ ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον.) μυριόπλασια γὰρ
ἄν κακά ποιήσειν ἀνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίον.

vii Περὶ δὲ τὰς δὲ ἅφης καὶ γεύσεως ἅδους καὶ
λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἡ τε 10
ἀκολοεια καὶ η σωφροσύνη διωρίοθη πρότερον,

1 τι ? Bywater: τιν.
3 τὸ ? Richards.

² kakis <kakon> Rassow.

The writer here seems to regard all animals as unnatural, in
the sense of imperfectly developed, because irrational.
The order precludes our taking this clause of the exceptional
species (asses, wild boars, and pigs according to Greek
zoology) just alluded to; moreover, as the excessive appetites
of these are analogous to Profligacy in men, they are not
aberrations from animal nature any more than profligates
are from human nature.

² No two commentators read the same sense into this
section, which is 'little more than a series of jottings.'
(Burnet). The version given largely follows Peters. The
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both in kind and degree, some bestial, and some due to arrested development or disease. Now it is only with the first class that Temperance and Profligacy are concerned; hence we do not use the terms temperate or profligate of the lower animals, except metaphorically, of certain entire species distinguished from the rest by their exceptionally lascivious, mischievous, or omnivorous habits; for animals have neither the faculty of choice nor of calculation: they are aberrations from nature, like 7 men who are insane. Bestiality $b$ is less <evil> than vice, though more horrible: for <in a bestial man as in an animal> the highest part <i.e. the intellect> is not corrupted, as it is in a man <who is wicked in a human way>, but entirely lacking. So that it is like comparing an inanimate with an animate thing, and asking which is the more evil; for the badness of a thing which has no originating principle—and intelligence is such a principle—is always less capable of mischief. $c$ (It is therefore like comparing Injustice with an unjust man: one is worse in one way and the other in another). For a bad man can do ten thousand times more harm than an animal <or a bestial man>.

vii (iii) But in relation to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste, and the corresponding desires and acts of avoidance, which have already$^d$ been defined as the sphere in which Profligacy and

insertions in brackets indicate what may possibly have been in the writer’s mind.

$^c$ The relevance of this parenthesis is obscure; its meaning, in the light of other passages in Aristotle, may be that injustice is worse in the sense that it is evil per se (whereas the unjust man is evil per accidens), but the unjust man is worse in the sense that he is productive of evil. $^d$ III. X.
ARISTOTLE

ἐστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὡστε ἦττᾶσθαι καὶ ὅν ὦ οἱ πολλοὶ κρατεῖν, ἐστὶ δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὅν ὦ οἱ πολλοὶ ἦττους. τούτων δ᾽ ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονᾶς ἀκρατὴς ὁ δὲ ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρπερικὸς. μεταξὺ δ᾽ ἦ τῶν πλείστων ἔξις, καὶ εἰ 15 ἔστω οἷς μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖα εἰσιν αἰ δ᾽ οὐ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἰ δ᾽ ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ᾽ αἰ ἡλλεῖψεις, ὅμως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἠδέων ἦ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ διὰ προαιρέσειν, δι᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ 20 μηδὲν δι᾽ ἐτερον ἀποβαίνων, ἀκόλαστος: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τούτων μὴ ἐναι μεταμελητικόν, ὡστε ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμελήτους ἀνίατος. ὁ δ᾽ ἡλλεῖπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σῶφρων. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι᾽ ἦτταν 3 ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρέσειν.—τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων 25 ὁ μὲν ἀγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. ὡστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· παντὶ δ᾽ αὐν δόξει χεῖρων εἰναι, εἰ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἦ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι

1 Mb: ὑπερβολὰς ἦ.

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a This addition is illogically expressed, but it is a reminder that to take too little of certain 'necessary' pleasures is as wrong as to take too much: see c. iv. 5 note a.

b i.e., necessary things; see the tripartite classification of c. iv. 5.

c Incurable, and therefore profligate, ἀκόλαστος, which means literally either 'incurrigible' or 'unchastized': see note on tr. xii. 5.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VII. vii. 1-3

Temperance are displayed, it is possible on the one hand to have such a disposition as to succumb even to those temptations to which most men are superior, or on the other hand to conquer even those to which most men succumb. These two dispositions, when manifested in relation to pleasure, constitute Unrestraint and Restraint respectively; when in relation to pain, Softness and Endurance. The disposition of the great majority of men lies between the two, though they incline rather to the worse extremes.

2 And inasmuch as some pleasures are necessary and others not, and the former are only necessary within certain limits, excessive indulgence in them not being necessary, nor yet deficient indulgence either, and inasmuch as the same holds good also of desires and of pains, one who pursues excessive pleasures, or pursues things to excess and from choice, for their own sakes and not for the sake of some ulterior consequence, is a profligate; for a man of this character is certain to feel no regret for his excesses afterwards, and this being so, he is incurable, since there is no cure for one who does not regret his error. The man deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures is the opposite of the profligate; and the middle character is the temperate man. And similarly, he who avoids bodily pains not because his will is overpowered but of deliberate choice, is also profligate. (Those on the other hand who yield not from choice, are prompted either by the pleasure of indulgence, or by the impulse to avoid the pain of unsatisfied desire. Hence there is a difference between deliberate and non-deliberate indulgence. Everyone would think a man worse if he did something disgraceful when he felt only a
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αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὁμ; διὸ δὲ ἄκολαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ;) —τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον,

4 δὲ ἄκολαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεί ὃ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικὸς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἄντέχει, ἡ δὲ ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ ἄντεχει καὶ κρατείν, ἃς περ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἠττᾶσθαι τοῦ μικᾶν· διὸ καὶ

5 αἱρετῶσερν ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὃ δὲ ἐλλεῖπων πρὸς δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὕτως μαλακός καὶ τρυφῶν (καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακταί τίς ἐστίν), ὅτι ἐλέει τὸ ἰμάτιον ἦν μὴ πονηρὴ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἱρείν λύτην, καὶ μυστικοὶ τοῦ κάμινον ὑπὲρ οἷον οἶεται άθλιος εἶναι,

6 ἀθλιῶν ὁμοίως ὁμ. δημοκρ. δὴ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν· οὐ γὰρ εῖ τις ἴσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλούσων ἧδονῶν ἠττᾶται ἢ λυτῶν, θαυμαστῶν· ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικῶν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ἃς περ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ Καρκίνων ἐν τῇ Ἄλοπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ἃς περ αἱ κατέχειν πειράματος τῶν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάλουσον, ὅλον ὑπέπεσε Ξενοφάντω—ἀλλ' εἰ τις πρὸς δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἄντεχειν, τοῦτων ἠττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν

1 δύναται ἄντεχειν> Richards.

a Not Softness strictly, which ranges with Unrestraint and is not deliberate.

b Seneca, De ira, ii. 2, says that Xenophantus’s martial music made Alexander put out his hand to grasp his weapons (the story is told by Suidas of a Theban flute-player Timotheus, cf. Dryden, Alexander’s Feast); apparently Alexander’s music had a different effect on Xenophantus 1

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slight desire, or none at all, than if he acted from a strong desire, or if he struck another in cold blood than if he did so in anger; for what would he have done had his passions been aroused? Hence the profligate man is worse than the unrestrained.)

Of the dispositions described above, the deliberate avoidance of pain is rather a kind * of Softness; the deliberate pursuit of pleasure is Profligacy in the strict sense.

4 Self-restraint is the opposite of Unrestraint, Endurance of Softness; for Endurance means only successful resistance, whereas Restraint implies mastery, which is a different matter: victory is more glorious than the mere avoidance of defeat. Hence self-restraint is a more valuable quality than Endurance. One who is deficient in resistance to pains that most men withstand with success, is soft or luxurious (for Luxury is a kind of Softness): such a man lets his cloak trail on the ground to escape the fatigue and trouble of lifting it, or feigns sickness, not seeing that to counterfeit misery is to be miserable. The same holds good of Self-restraint and Unrestraint. It is not surprising that a man should be overcome by violent and excessive pleasures or pains: indeed it is excusable if he succumbs after a struggle, like Philoctetes in Theodectes when bitten by the viper, or Kerkyon in the Alope of Karkinos, or as men who try to restrain their laughter explode in one great guffaw, as happened to Xenophon. But we are surprised when a man is overcome by pleasures and pains which most men are able to withstand, except when his failure to resist is due to some innate tendency, or to disease.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

tοῦ γένους ἦ διὰ νόσου, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεύσαι ἦ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ως τὸ θῆλυ ἐπὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακὸς· ἢ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἀνεσίς ἐστιν, εἰπὲν ἀνάπαυσις, τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστιν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προσέπεια τὸ δὲ ἀσθένεια· οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλευσάσθαι ἀγόνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἐνοι γὰρ, ὡστερ προγαργαλισθέντες ὁς γαρ αὐτὰς, οὕτω καὶ προαιρέσθαι καὶ προκοῦνται καὶ προεξεράνται ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἠττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὕτ' ἄν ὡδῇ ἢ οὕτ' ἄν λυπηρῷ. μάλιστα δ' οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετη ἀκρασίαν ἐσών ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτητά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολούθητικοί εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

viii Ἕστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὡστερ ἐλέεσθαι, οὐ μεταμελητικός (ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει·) δὲ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικός πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὡστερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἄνιατος,

1 προγαργαλισθέντες Lb: -λισαντες vulg., προαιρέσθαιναι vel προαιρόντες Richards.

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a Herodotus, i. 105, says that certain Scythians who robbed the temple of Uranian Aphrodite at Askalon were smitten with the 'feminine disease,' which affected their descendants ever after; but Hippocrates, Ἱπποκράτης, περὶ ἄρων 22, describes effeminate symptoms prevalent among wealthy and high-born Scythians, due to being too much on horseback.

b i.e., it is not an excessive proneness to pursue pleasure, and therefore is not profligacy.

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instances of the former being the hereditary effeminacy a of the royal family of Scythia, and the inferior endurance of the female sex as compared with the male.

7 People too fond of amusement are thought to be profligate, but really they are soft; for amusement is rest, and therefore a slackening of effort, and addiction to amusement is a form of excessive slackness.b

8 But there are two forms of Unrestraint, Impetuosity and Weakness. The weak deliberate, but then are prevented by passion from keeping to their resolution; the impetuous are led by passion because they do not stop to deliberate: since some people withstand the attacks of passion, whether pleasant or painful, by feeling or seeing them coming, and rousing themselves, that is, their reasoning faculty, in advance, just as one is proof against tickling if one has just been tickled already.c It is the quick and the excitable who are most liable to the impetuous form of Unrestraint, because the former are too hasty and the latter too vehement to wait for reason, being prone to follow their imagination.

viii The profligate, as we said, d does not feel remorse, for he abides by his choice; the unrestrained man on the other hand invariably repents his excesses afterwards. Hence the objection that we stated e does not hold good; on the contrary, it is the profligacy.

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a The variant 'can avoid being tickled by tickling the other person first' seems less likely, but either reading may be doubted; see critical note. Aristotle elsewhere (Prob. 965 a 11) remarks that one is less sensitive to tickling if one is not taken unawares, and that is why one cannot tickle oneself. 
b c. vii. 2. 
c d c. vii. 2. 
c e c. ii. 10.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΗΣ

δ' δ' ἑπιτάξον· ἔσοικε γὰρ ἢ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νο- σμάτων οἰον ὑθέρω καὶ φθίσει, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἢ μὲν γὰρ συνεχῆς, ἢ δ' οὐ συνεχῆς πονηρία.1 καὶ ὅλως δ' ἐτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας 2 καὶ κακίας· ἢ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.—αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίως 1151 οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δὲ· ὑπ' ἐλάττωνος γὰρ πάθους ἠττώνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβολευτοὶ ὦσπερ ἄτερον· ὦμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκράτης ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ἐλάττωνος ὄνομα καὶ ἐλάττωνος ἢ ὃς οἱ πόλλοι. οὕτω μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἐστὶ, φανερὸν (ἄλλα πη ἰσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαιρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαιρεσίν ἐστιν· οὐ μὴν ἂλ' ομοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὦσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλήσιους

Μιλήσιοι ἀξίωντοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν, δρῶσι τ' οἰάπερ ἀξίωντοι—

καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἄδικοι3

4 δὲ.—ἐπει δ' ο μὲν τοιοῦτος οἰος μὴ διὰ τὸ πε-

πεισθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν

ὄρθον λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς, ο δὲ πεπεισται

διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οὶς διώκειν αὐτὰς, ἐκεῖνος

1 πονηρά secl. Scaliger.
3 ἄδικοι K².

α ἐκστατικὸς is here used as equivalent to προπετῆς, 'impetuous,' in c. vii. 8; whereas below, § 5, as in c. i. 6 and c. ii. 7, it denotes the quality with which it is here contrasted.

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gate who cannot be cured, whereas the unrestrained man can; for Vice resembles diseases like dropsy and consumption, whereas Unrestraint is like epilepsy, Vice being a chronic, Unrestraint an intermittent evil. Indeed Unrestraint and Vice are entirely different in kind, for Vice is unconscious, whereas the unrestrained man is aware of his infirmity.

2 Among the unrestrained themselves, the impulsive sort are better than those who know the right principle but do not keep to it; for these succumb to smaller temptations, and they do not yield without deliberation, as do the impulsive; the unrestrained man is like people who get drunk quickly, and with a small amount of wine, or with less than most men.

3 That Unrestraint is not strictly a vice (though it is perhaps vice in a sense), is clear; for Unrestraint acts against deliberate choice, Vice in accordance with it. But nevertheless in the actions that result from it it resembles Vice: just as Demodocus wrote of the people of Miletus—

Mileians are no fools, 'tis true,
But yet they act as fools would do.

Similarly the unrestrained are not unjust, but they do unjust things.

4 Again, the unrestrained man is so constituted as to pursue bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to right principle without any belief that he ought to do so, whereas the profligate, because he is so constituted as to pursue them, is convinced that he ought to pursue them. Therefore the former

b i.e., the feeble sort who stop to think and yet succumb; the impulsive man is not the typical unrestrained man.

o The argument is here resumed from § 1.
ARISTOTLE

μὲν ὁδὲ μετατάπευστος, οὗτος δ' οὐ. ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ 18
καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ δὲ
σώζει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράξεσι τὸ ὁδὸν ἐνεκα ἀρχὴν,
ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις; οὕτε
ὅτι ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὕτε
ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἡ φυσική ἡ ἐθικὴ τοῦ
ὀρθοδοξείν περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ
τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δὲ τοὺς 20
diὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον, ὃν
ὡστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον
κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὡστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον
πεπείσθαι διόκειν ἀνέδην δείν τὸς τοιαύτας ἡδο-
νᾶς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὕτος ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατῆς, βελτίων
ὡν τοῦ ἀκόλαστον, οὔδ' ἰαίλος ἀπλῶς· σαζεῖται 25
γὰρ τὸ βελτιστὸν, ἡ ἀρχὴ. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ
ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διὰ γε τὸ πάθος.
φαινεῖν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἢ μὲν ὁποιαδήποτε ἐξεῖς,
ἢ δὲ φαίλῃ.

ix Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατῆς ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιοὶ ὁ λόγῳ
καὶ ὁποιοὶ προαιρέσει ἐμμένις ἢ ὁ τῇ ὁρθῇ, 30
καὶ ἀκρατῆς δὲ ὁ ὁποιοὶ μὴ ἐμμένις προαιρέσει
καὶ ὁποιοὶ ὁ λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεὶς λόγῳ καὶ

1 οὐ add. Ald. 2 μὴ ψευδεῖς μὴ add. Lb, ἄψευδει Coraes.

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a i.e., to change his conduct. The unrestrained man's belief is right already and he needs only to be induced to act up to it; whereas the profligate must be persuaded to change his belief before he will alter his conduct.

b Of. vi. v. 6.

c The context might indicate that the definitions are meant, which, themselves apprehended intuitively, are the starting-points of mathematical deductions. But these are ordinarily distinguished by Aristotle from hypotheses, which are assertions of the existence of things, not of their nature.
can easily be persuaded to change, but the latter cannot. For virtue preserves the fundamental principle, vice destroys it, and the first principle or starting-point in matters of conduct is the end proposed, which corresponds to the hypotheses of mathematics; hence no more in ethics than in mathematics are the first principles imparted by process of reasoning, but by virtue, whether natural or acquired by training in right opinion as to the first principle. The man of principle therefore is temperate, the man who has lost all principle, profligate. But there is a person who abandons his choice, against right principle, under the influence of passion, who is mastered by passion sufficiently for him not to act in accordance with right principle, but not so completely as to be of such a character as to believe that the reckless pursuit of pleasure is right. This is the unrestrained man: he is better than the profligate, and not absolutely bad, for in him the highest part of man, the fundamental principle, is still preserved. Opposed to the unrestrained man is another, who stands firm by his choice, and does not abandon it under the mere impulse of passion.

It is clear then from these considerations that Self-restraint is a good quality and Unrestraint a bad one.

Is then a man self-restrained if he stands by a principle or choice of any sort, or must it be the right choice? and is a man unrestrained if he fails to stand by a choice or principle of any sort, or only

It is therefore suggested that the term here means the propositions of mathematics, which are assumed as the starting-point of the analytical process by which a proof of a theorem or solution of a problem may be discovered; cf. III. iii. 12.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕΣ

τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον; ἡ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκός ὁποιαδήν, καθ' αυτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθείς λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοῦτο διὰ τοῦτο ΐσωτεὶ καὶ Αἱδίκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ Αἱδίκει, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὡς τε ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ὁποιαδήν δόξη ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει 2 ὃ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἁλθεὶ.—εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς καὶ ἐμμενεντικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ, οὗς καλοῦσιν ίσχυρογνώμονας, ὁλον δύσπευστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι: οἱ ἄμοιοι μὲν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεί ὡσπερ ὃ ἄσωτος τῷ ἔλευθερῳ καὶ ὃ θραύσι τῷ βαρβαλέω, εἰσὶ δ' ἐτεροὶ κατὰ πολλά. ὃ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἐγκρατῆς], ἐπεὶ εὐπειστός, ὅταν τὺχη, ἔσται [ὁ έγκρατῆς] 3 οἱ δ' οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν 3 ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονας οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ ἱλιμόρφων γὰρ νικῶντες, εἰπὶ μή μεταπείπουσι, καὶ λυποῦσιν ἐὰν ἄκυρα 15 τὰ αὐτῶν ὃ ὡσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὃςτε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐσύκοσιν τῷ ἐγκρατεί.—εἰσί δὲ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασι σὐκὲ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἰον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὃ Νεο-

1 ὀρθῇ Lb: μὴ ὀρθῇ.
3 Scaliger.
4 οἱ Τ: ὃ.

α c. ii. 7.
β Cf. ii. 7.
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if he fails to stand by the true principle and the right choice? This difficulty was raised before. Perhaps the answer is, that though accidentally it may be any principle or choice, essentially it is the true principle and the right choice that the one stands by and the other does not; in the sense that if a man chooses or pursues $b$ as a means to $a$, $a$ is essentially, $b$ only accidentally, his object and his choice. And by 'essentially' we mean 'absolutely'; hence while in a sense it is any sort of opinion, speaking absolutely it is the true opinion that the one stands by and the other abandons.

2 But there are some persons who stand by their opinion whom we call 'obstinate,' meaning that they are hard to convince, and not easily persuaded to change their convictions. These bear some resemblance to the self-restrained man, as the prodigal does to the liberal, and the reckless to the brave; but they are really different in many respects. The self-restrained man stands firm against passion and desire: he will be ready on occasion to yield to persuasion; but the obstinate stand firm against reason: they are not proof against desire, and are often led by pleasure. Types of obstinacy are the opinionated, the stupid, and the boorish. The motives of the opinionated are pleasure and pain: the agreeable sense of victory in not being persuaded to change their minds, and the annoyance of having the decrees of their sovereign will and pleasure annulled. Hence they really resemble the unrestrained more than the restrained.

3 And there are some who fail to abide by their resolves from some other cause than lack of self-restraint, for instance, Neoptolemus $^b$ in the *Philo-
πτάλεμος. καίτοι δι' ἡδονήν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλῶν τὸ γὰρ ἀληθείαν αὐτῷ ἦδυ' ἤν, ἐπείσθη 20 δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὄδυσσεα ψεῦδεσθαι. οὔ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαύλος οὔτε ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.

5 Ἑπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τίς καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοὺς σωματικοὺς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ τοιοῦτος, τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς 25 μέσος ὁ ἑγκρατής. οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατής οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μάλλον τι, οὔτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἢττον τι. δ' ἑγκράτης ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἐτερον μεταβάλλει. δεῖ δὲ, εἴπερ ἡ ἑγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἔξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνονται. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐτέραν ἐν ὅλος καὶ ὀλγάκις εἶναι φανερὰν, ὡσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῆς ἀκολασίας δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὔτω καὶ ἡ ἑγκράτεια τῆ ἀκρασία. ἑπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὑμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἑγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σωφρονός καθ' ὑμοιότητα ἱκολογοῦσθηκεν. δ' τε γὰρ ἑγκρατής οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σωφρόνων, 1152 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἑπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἠδεσθαί παρὰ τὸν

1 ἦδυ Richards: καλῶν.
2 χαίρειν Asp.: χαίρων.
3 ἐμμένειν Muretus.
4 ὁ Vulg.: ο [τοιοῦτος] Bywater.

a The mss., instead of 'pleasant,' repeat 'noble' by a slip.
b Cf. iii. xi. 7.
c Though he conquers them.
ctetes of Sophocles. It is true that his motive for changing was pleasure, though a noble pleasure, since it was pleasant for him to speak the truth, and he had only told a lie at the instigation of Odysseus. In fact, not everyone whose conduct is guided by pleasure is either profligate and base, or unrestrained, but only those who yield to disgraceful pleasures.

5 There is also a character that takes less than the proper amount of pleasure in the things of the body, and that fails to stand by principle in that sense. The self-restrained man therefore is really intermediate between the unrestrained man and the type described. The unrestrained man departs from principle because he enjoys bodily pleasures too much, the person described does so because he enjoys them too little; while the self-restrained man stands by principle and does not change from either cause. And inasmuch as Self-restraint is good, it follows that both the dispositions opposed to it are bad, as indeed they appear to be; but because one of the two is found only in a few people, and is rarely displayed, Unrestraint is thought to be the sole opposite of Self-restraint, just as Profligacy is thought to be the sole opposite of Temperance.

6 Many terms are used in an analogical sense, and so we have come to speak by analogy of the ‘self-restraint’ of the temperate man, because the temperate man, as well as the self-restrained, is so constituted as never to be led by the pleasures of the body to act against principle. But whereas the self-restrained man has evil desires, the temperate man has none; he is so constituted as to take no pleasure in things that are contrary to principle,
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tὰ δἐοντά καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ
οὐδὲν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλει ἐβούλεθ', ἢ νόμων οὐδέν μέλεν·

4 δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς
dὲ χρωμένη. ἔστι δ’ ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ ἀ
τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἐξεως· ὃ μὲν
γὰρ ἐμένει μᾶλλον ὃ δ’ ἦττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων
dυνάμεως. εὐπάτοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασίων ἢν οἱ
μελαγχολικοὶ ἄκρατεύονται τῶν βουλευομένων
μὲν μὴ ἐμενοῦντων δὲ· καὶ οἱ δὲ ἐθισμοῦ ἄκρατεῖς
tῶν φυσικῶν,1 ράν γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως·

διὰ γὰρ τότῳ καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει
ἐσικεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἑὔηνος λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἐμεναί, φίλε, καὶ δὴ
ταύτην ἀνθρώποις τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

5 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τὰ ἀκρασία καὶ
τὰ καρπερία καὶ τὰ μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ
ἐξεις αὕται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἐφηται.

1145 Πρὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης δεσμάσαι τοῦ τῆς
πολιτικῆς φιλοσοφούντος· οὕτως γὰρ τοῦ τέλους
ἀρχιτέκτων πρὸς ὥς βλέποντες έκαστον τὸ μὲν
κάκον τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς λέγομεν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ
τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τῆς

1 φύσει Ramsauer.

— i.e., 'habit is': the subject of ἐμεναί seems to have
been ἔθος in the preceding verse.

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enactments, and has good laws, but which never keeps its laws: the condition of things satirized by Anaxandrides—

The state, that recks not of the laws, would fain... whereas the bad man is like a state which keeps its laws but whose laws are bad.

Both Self-restraint and Unrestraint are a matter of extremes as compared with the character of the mass of mankind; the restrained man shows more and the unrestrained man less steadfastness than most men are capable of.

Reformation is more possible with that type of Unrestraint which is displayed by persons of an excitable temperament than it is with those who deliberate as to what they ought to do, but do not keep to the resolution they form. And those who have become unrestrained through habit are more easily cured than those who are unrestrained by nature, since habit is easier to change than nature; for even habit is hard to change, precisely because it is a sort of nature, as Epheusus says:

Mark me, my friend, 'tis a long-continued training,
And training in the end becomes men's nature.

We have now discussed the nature of Self-restraint and Unrestraint, and of Endurance and Softness, and have shown how these dispositions are related to one another.

It is also the business of the political philosopher to examine the nature of Pleasure and Pain; for he is the master-craftsman, and lays down the standard which is the standard whereby we pronounce things good or bad in the absolute sense. Moreover this investigation is fundamental for our study, because
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τε γὰρ ἀρετήν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἥθικὴν περὶ
λύτας καὶ ἡδονᾶς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
οἱ πλείστοι μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς εἰναι φασίν, διὸ καὶ

8 τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοὺς
μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμιὰ ἡδονὴ εἰναι ἄγαθὸν, οὔτε
καθ᾽ αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἰναι
tαύτὸν τὸ1 ἄγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν. τοὺς δὲ ἐναι μὲν 10
εἰναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαίλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον,
εἰ καὶ πᾶσα ἄγαθὸν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνθέχεσθαι εἰναι

4 τὸ ἀριστον ἡδονῆν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄγαθὸν,
ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητὴν,2
οὐδεμιὰ δὲ γένεσις συγγενής τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον
οὐδεμιὰ οἰκοδομήσις οἰκία. ἔτι δὲ σώφρων φεύγει 15
τὰς ἡδονὰς. ἔτι δὲ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυτον διώκει, οὐ
tὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναὶ, καὶ
ὅσω μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφρο-
diσίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἃν δύνασθαι νοῆσαι τι ἐν
αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμιὰ ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν
ἄγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία 20

1 τὸ add. ᾿Κβ.
2 αἰσθητὴν ᾿Κβ.

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a π. iii. 1.
b μακάριος from μάλα χαίρειν; cf. ν. iv. 9.
* Of these three views, the first is that of Speusippus,
Plato's successor as head of the Academy; the second is
that of Plato's *Philebus*; the third, which appears at the
end of the *Philebus*, is that of Aristotle in Book X. below.
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we have established that Moral Virtue and Vice are concerned with pleasures and pains, and most people hold that pleasure is a necessary adjunct of Happiness, which is why the word denoting ‘supreme bliss’ is derived from the verb meaning ‘to enjoy.’

3 Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether essentially or accidentally. They argue that Good and Pleasure are two distinct things.

(2) Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.

(3) There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless pleasure cannot be the Supreme Good.

4 (1) To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that

(a) Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but a process can in no case belong to the same order of things as its end; for example, the process of building cannot be a thing of the same sort as the house built.

(b) The temperate man avoids pleasures.

(c) The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure.

(d) Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so the more enjoyable they are; for instance, sexual pleasure: no one could think of anything while indulging in it.

(e) There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an art which produces it.

(f) Children and animals pursue pleasures.
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διώκει τὰς ἡδονὰς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαλας, ὃτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραὶ, νοσώδη γὰρ ἕνα τῶν ἡδεὼν. ὅτι δὲ οὐ τάριστον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἄλλα γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταύτ' ἐστίν.

xii "Ὅτι δὲ οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἁγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἀριστον, ἐκ τῶν δὲ δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπλως τὸ δὲ τινὶ), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὡστέ καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις· καὶ αἱ φαύλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἄπλως φαύλαι τινὶ δὲ οὖ ἄλλη αἱρεταὶ τῷ δὲ ἕνα ὅποτε καὶ ὅλιγον χρόνον, αἱρεταὶ δὲ οὖ· αἱ δὲ οὖδὲ ἡδοναί, ἄλλα φαύλονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἑαυτεῖς ἔνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν κακίαντων.—

ἔτη ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δὲ ἔξεις, κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἱ καθιστάσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν ἡδεῖαν εἰσιν· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπὶ- 85

1 ἐπὶ Λb. 2 οὐ τάριστον Spengel: οὐκ ἀριστον.
3 ἄπλως φαύλαι <αι δὲ τινὶ μὲν φαύλαι> Rassow.
4 <ἀπλῶς> δὲ οὖ Ασπ., <αἰ> δὲ οὖ Rassow.

a Certain 'felt processes towards a natural state' (c. xi. 4), which are obviously not good, are not really pleasant either.
5 (2) To prove that not all pleasures are good, it is argued that
   (a) Some pleasures are disgraceful, and discredit the man who indulges in them.
   (b) Some pleasures are harmful, for certain pleasant things cause disease.

(3) To prove that pleasure is not the Supreme Good, it is argued that it is not an end but a process.

These then, more or less, are the current views.

xii But the following considerations will show that these arguments are not conclusive to prove (1) that pleasure is not a good at all, nor (3) that it is not the Supreme Good.

(1) (a) In the first place (i.) ‘the good’ has two meanings: it means both that which is good absolutely, and that which is good for somebody, or relatively. Consequently the term ‘good’ has the same double meaning when applied to men’s natures and dispositions; and therefore also when applied to movements and to processes. Also those processes which are thought to be bad will in some cases, though bad absolutely, be not bad relatively, but in fact desirable for a particular person, or in other cases, though not even desirable generally for the particular person, nevertheless desirable for him in particular circumstances and for a short time, although not really desirable. And some such processes are not really pleasures at all, but only seem to be so: I mean the painful processes that are undergone for their curative effects, for instance, treatment applied to the sick.

2 Again (ii.), the good is either an activity or a state. Now the pleasures that restore us to our natural state are only accidentally pleasant; while
Aristotle

θυμίασ τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἠδοναῖ (οἶνον 1153α ἡ τοῦ θεωρείν ἐνεργεία) τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεχούσι σῶσι. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ [ἡδη]3 χαίροντων ἀναπληρομένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ <ἡδη>3 καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἦδεσιν, ἀναπληρομένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ γὰρ δέξει καὶ πικρῶς χαίροντων, οὐν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἦδυ οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἦδυ. οὕτ' οὔθ' <αί>3 ἠδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἠδέα πρὸς ἅλληλα διέστηκεν, οὔτω καὶ αἱ ἠδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων.—3 ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἠδονής, ὡσπερ τινές φασί τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσίν, οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' 10 ἐνέργεια καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γυνομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἐτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέσειν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἰναι τὴν ἠδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνεργεῖαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἂν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τισιν9 εἶναι ὅτι

1 Burnet.
2 [ἡδη] ed.: ἢδει Μb et (post χαίρουσιν) Lb.
3 ed. ἀγομένων ? Richards.
4 διέστηκεν Bonitz: συμβαίνουσιν.
5 τισιν Rassow (et fort. Asp.): τισ.

a Cf. c. xiv. 7.
the activity of desire is the activity of that part of us which has remained in the natural state: for that matter, there are some pleasures which do not involve pain or desire at all (for instance, the pleasure of contemplation), being experienced without any deficiency from the normal having occurred. That restorative pleasures are only accidentally pleasant is indicated by the fact that we do not enjoy the same things while the natural state is being replenished as we do after it has been restored to the normal; in the normal state we enjoy things that are absolutely pleasant, but during the process of replenishment we enjoy even their opposites; for instance, sour and bitter things, none of which are naturally or absolutely pleasant, so that the pleasures we get from them are not naturally or absolutely pleasant either, since there is the same distinction between various pleasures as there is between the pleasant things from which they arise.

Again (iii.), it does not follow, as some argue, that as the end is better than the process towards it, so there must be something better than pleasure. For pleasures are not really processes, nor are they all incidental to a process: they are activities, and therefore an end; nor do they result from the process of acquiring our faculties, but from their exercise; nor have they all of them some end other than themselves: this is only true of the pleasures of progress towards the perfection of our nature. Hence it is not correct to define pleasure as a 'conscious process'; the term should rather be 'activity of our natural state,' and for 'conscious' we must substitute 'unimpeded.' Some thinkers hold that pleasure is a process on the ground that it is good
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κυρίως ἄγαθόν, τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οίνονται 4 εἶναι; έστι δ’ ἐπερον.—τὸ δ’ εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι
νοσώδην ἐνια ἴδεα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι υγιεινὰ ἐνια
φαύλα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν. ταύτη οὖν φαύλα ἀμφω, ἀλλ’ οὐ φαύλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, ἐπει καὶ τὸ 20
θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς υγιειν.—ἐμποδίζει δὲ
οὕτε φρονήσει οὖθ’ ἐξει οὐδεμίᾳ ἡ ἀφ’ ἐκάστης
ἡδονῆ, ἀλλ’ αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπει αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν
καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ
6 μανθάνειν.—τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονήν
μηδεμίαν’ εὐλόγως συμβεβηκεν. οὔδε γὰρ ἄλλης 25
ἐνεργείας οὐδεμίας τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνά-
μεως’ καὶ τῇ μυρεψικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τῇ ὁψο-
7 ποιητικῇ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι.—τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα
φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον
βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τὸ
αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπει γὰρ εἰρηται πῶς
ἀγαθοὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ
ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία 30
διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἄλυπαν ὃ φρόνιμον, τὰς
μετ’ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς
(τοιαύται γὰρ αὐταὶ) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολὰς,

1 μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν LbΤ, fort. μηδεμίας ἡδονῆν ed.
2 καὶ add. K°.

a i.e., the pleasures arising from the exercise of other
qualities.
 b Cf. c. iv. 5.
 c i.e., not good absolutely or in themselves, though good
(in moderation) as means to life: the ‘necessary’ and
‘neutral’ pleasures of c. iv. 2, 5.
 d i.e., the prudent man both satisfies his natural desire
for the bodily pleasures in moderation, and trains himself
not to mind their absence; but does both not for the sake
of pleasure, but to avoid the disturbance of pain.
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in the fullest sense, because in their view an activity is a process; but really an activity is different from a process.

4. To argue (2) (b) that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are detrimental to health is the same as to argue that health is bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things and healthy things can be bad in a relative sense, but that does not make them really bad; even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to health.

5. (1) (d) Neither prudence nor any other quality is hampered by its own pleasure, but only by alien pleasures; the pleasures of contemplation and study will enable us to contemplate and study better.

6. (1) (e) That there should be no art devoted to the production of any form of pleasure is only natural; an art never produces an activity, but the capacity for an activity. Though in point of fact the arts of perfumery and cookery are generally considered to be arts of pleasure.

7. The arguments (1) (b) that the temperate man avoids pleasure, and (1) (e) that the prudent man pursues freedom from pain, and (1) (f) that animals and children pursue pleasure, are all met by the same reply. It has been explained how some pleasures are absolutely good, and how not all pleasures are good. Now it is those pleasures which are not absolutely good that both animals and children pursue, and it is freedom from pain arising from the want of those pleasures that the prudent man pursues: that is, the pleasures that involve desire and pain, namely the bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature), or their excessive forms.
καθ' ἂς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων
φεύγει ταύτας, ἔπει εἰς ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονοι. 88

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακῶν, ὀμολογεῖται, 1153 b
καὶ φευκτῷ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακῶν, ἡ δὲ τῷ
πῇ ἐμποδιστικῆ. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἡ
φευκτῷ τῷ καὶ κακῶν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τῇ
ἡδονῇ ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, τῷ
οὗ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάτ-
τον καὶ τῷ ἴσω ἐναντίον· οὗ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὥσπερ
κακῶν τι εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ.—τάριστον 2 δὲ οὐδὲν
κωλύει ἡδονήν τυχα εἶναι, εἰ ἐναι φαίλαι ἡδοναῖ,
ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τυχα ἔναιν φαίλων ὀυσῶν.
ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰσπερ ἐκάστης ἔξεστιν ἐ
εἰων ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴη ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργεια
ἔστιν εὐδαιμονία εἰτε ἡ των αὐτῶν, ἃν ἡ ἀνεμ-
πόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ ἔστιν ἡδονή·
ὡςτε εἰη ἄν τις ἡδονη τὸ ἀριστον, τῶν πολλῶν
ἡδονῶν φαίλων ὀυσῶν, εἰ ἐτυχέναι, ἀπλῶς. καὶ
diā τοῦτο πάντες τῶν εὐδαιμονία ἡδονον οἴονται
βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονήν εἰς τὴν 18
εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέ-
λειας ἐμποδιστήνῃ, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελεῖων·

1 τε Λb.
2 τάριστον Spengel : ἀριστον.

See more fully, x. ii. 5.

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in regard to which Profligacy is displayed. That is why the temperate man avoids excessive bodily pleasures: for even the temperate man has pleasures.

That pain moreover is an evil and to be avoided is admitted; since all pain is either absolutely evil, or evil as being in some way an impediment to activity. But that which is the opposite of something to be avoided—opposed to it as a thing to be avoided and evil—must be good. It follows therefore that pleasure is a good. Speusippus attempted to refute this argument by saying that, as the greater is opposed to the equal as well as to the less, so pleasure is opposed to a neutral state of feeling as well as to pain. But this refutation does not hold good; for Speusippus would not maintain that pleasure is essentially evil.

But granting (2) that some pleasures are bad, it does not therefore follow (3) that a certain pleasure may not nevertheless be the Supreme Good; just as a certain form of knowledge may be supremely good, although some forms of knowledge are bad. On the contrary (i) since every faculty has its unimpeded activity, the activity of all the faculties, or of one of them (whichever constitutes Happiness), when unimpeded, must probably be the most desirable thing there is; but an unimpeded activity is a pleasure; so that on this showing the Supreme Good will be a particular kind of pleasure, even though most pleasures are bad, and, it may be, bad absolutely. This is why everybody thinks that the happy life must be a pleasant life, and regards pleasure as a necessary ingredient of happiness; and with good reason, since no impeded activity is perfect, whereas Happiness is essentially perfect; so that the happy
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did prosothetai o eudaimon twn en somatite agathouv kai twn ektois kai tis tychis, opws mi empodotheai. 3 <dia>1 tautos. (o di mi ton prochiomemon kai ton
dustukias megala periptonteta eudaimona fa 20 skontes einai evan hi agathos, hi ekontes hi akontes
4 oudeven legousin.) dia de to prosothei tis tychis
dokei tisi tauto einai h eutuxia tis eudaimonia,
ouk ousta, etpei kai auti 3 uperballassa empodiado
estin, kai 4ouws oukei eutuxian kalein diakain.
5 prois gur ton eudaimonian o oros autihs. — kai 26
to diakosin de aptanta kai tetria kai andreption
ton 5douin smeneion ti to ei evai pws to 5riston
autin.

phi 5ihi de outhis4 paman apollutai, ein tonal
polloi . . .

6 alli etei ouk h auti outhe fairos outh 5 egeihi h 5risti
outhe estin outhe dokei, outh 5douin diwukousi th
autin pantes, 5douin maneoi pantes. isous de 50
kai diwukousin ouk h 5i ouiouvntai outh h in 5aiven,
alli ton autin pantan gar fousi exein tis theian.
alli eilbhsai ton tov onomatos kleronomian ai
swmatikai 5douiai dia to pleistakis te para-
ballev ein autas kai pantas metexein auton 85
dia to monas ouv gnavrimous einai tautas monas 1154.1
7 ouiouvntai einai. faneroun de kai 6ti, ei mi hi

1 Coraes.
2 dh ed.: de.
3 auti Lb.
4 outhis Kb: ou ti ge.
5 h add. Mb Asp.

* Probably the Cynics.
5 Hesiod, Works and Days, 763; the couplet ends,
pollloi phulizouiv: theis nu tis esti kal auti (vox populi vox dei).
6 Cf. x. ii. 4.

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man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them. (Consequently those who say* that, if a man be good, he will be happy even when on the rack, or when fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking nonsense.)

But because Happiness requires the gifts of fortune in addition, some people think that it is the same thing as good fortune; but this is not so, since even good fortune itself when excessive is an impediment to activity, and perhaps indeed no longer deserves to be called good fortune, since good fortune can only be defined in relation to Happiness.

(ii.) Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure is some indication that it is in a sense the Supreme Good:

No rumour noised abroad by many peoples
Comes utterly to naught."

But they do not all pursue the same pleasure, since the natural state and the best state neither is nor seems to be the same for them all; yet still they all pursue pleasure. Indeed it is possible that in reality they do not pursue the pleasure which they think and would say they do, but all the same pleasure; for nature has implanted in all things something divine." But as the pleasures of the body are the ones which we most often meet with, and as all men are capable of these, these have usurped the family title; and so men think these are the only pleasures that exist, because they are the only ones which they know.

(iii.) Moreover, it is clear that if pleasure is not
ARISTOTLE

hiroũ̃̄ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια <hiroũ̃̄>, 1 οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἄδεως τὸν εὐδαιμόνα· τίνος γὰρ ἐνεκα δέοι ἄν αὐτῆς, εἰτερ µή ἀγαθῶν; ἄλλα καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν· οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἰτερ µήδε hiroũ̃̄, ὥστε διὰ τὶ ἁν φεύγοι; 8 οὔτε δὴ ἥδιων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ µή καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

xiv  Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἥδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέων πῶς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐναι γε ἥδοναί ἀἱρεται σφόδρα, ὅλον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλὰ οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ 10 ἂς ἄ ἄκολαστος. διὰ τὶ οὐν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦται µοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν ἐναντίων. ἡ οὔτως ἀγαθαί αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ µὴ κακὸν ἀγαθὸν ἔστων; ἡ µέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθαί; τῶν µὲν γὰρ ἐξεων καὶ κυνήσεων ὅσων µὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίωνος 2 ὑπερβολῆ, οὔτε τῆς ἥδονῆς, ὅσων δὲ ἔστι, καὶ τῆς 15 ἥδονῆς. ἔστων δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν 5 ὑπερβολῆ, καὶ ὁ φαύλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἔστω, ἄλλον γὰρ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσιν πως καὶ οἴσους καὶ οὐνοῖς καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἄλλο οὖς ὅσ δεῖ. ἐναντίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολήν φεύγει, ἄλλον ἀλώς· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τῇ ὑπερβολῆ λύπη ἐναντία ἄλλο· ἣ τῷ διώκοντι τῇ ὑπερβολῆν.

8 Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ µόνον δεῖ τάληθες εἰπεῖν ἄλλα καὶ

1 Richards. 2 τῶν Coraes: τοῦ.
3 τοῦ beltianos Scicl. Chandler.
4 δὲ τῶν K: τῶν δὲ.
5 ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν Lb.

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a The ass. give 'if pleasure and activity are not good.'
b Whereas bodily pleasure is good in moderation and bad only in excess, all pain is bad; but this does not mean

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VII. xiii. 7—xiv. 3

good and activity is not pleasure, the life of the happy man will not necessarily be pleasant. For why should he need pleasure if it is not good? On the contrary, his life may even be painful; for if pleasure is neither good nor evil, no more is pain either, so why should he avoid it? And if the good man's activities are not pleasanter than those of others, his life will not be pleasanter either.

xiv  On the subject of the bodily pleasures, we must examine the view of those who say that though it is true that some pleasures, which they call the noble pleasures, are highly desirable, yet bodily pleasures and those which are the objects of the profligate are not desirable. If so, why are the pains opposed to them evil? since the opposite of evil is good. Perhaps the true view is, that the necessary pleasures are good in the sense that what is not evil is good; or that they are good up to a point: for though you cannot have excessive pleasure from states and movements which cannot themselves be in excess of what is good, you can have excessive pleasure from those which themselves admit of excess. Now you can have an excess of the bodily goods; and it is pursuing this excess that makes a bad man, not pursuing the necessary pleasures, for everybody enjoys savoury food, wine, and sexual pleasure in some degree, though not everybody to the right degree. With pain it is the other way about: one avoids not merely excessive pain, but all pain; for the opposite of excessive pleasure is not pain at all, except to the man who pursues excessive pleasure.

3  We ought however not only to state the true that the absence of excessive pleasure is bad, for it is not painful to the good man.
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to auton tov theous—tovto gar sumballeTai
pros tivn pístin: ótan gar evlogon1 fañi' to dia
' tì faínetai áltheìs ouk òn áltheìs, pisteuwei pon ei 25
tiv álthei múllon—óste lektéon dia tì faínetai
4 ai swmatikai ãdouai aíretwtetai. prwton men
ouden dé òti ekkrwsei tivn lýptin: kai dia tás úper-
bolas tivs lýptas, òs ouvsi iatreías, tivn ãdouh
diwkousi tivn úperballoousan kai ólws tivn sw-
matikh. sfróbrai dé gínontai ai iatreías, did 30
diai diwkoountai, dia to para to énantion fainontai.
(kai ou spoudaiou òti dokhe ò ãdouh dia dvo
tauta, wóper eírheTai, óti ai ménon faiúlus fúsewos
eis práxeis, ò ek genvetìs, wóper thriou, ò di'
èdos, ouv ai tivn faiúlwn andróptaw, ai ò iatreias
[òti]2 eÝdeous, kai échein bèlton ò gíneothai. ai 1154
dè sumbaíounou telesoumènov, kata sumbebhikos
5 ouv spoudaiou.) ëti diwkoountai dia to sfróbrai
énavi upo tivn allas mh dunamevn xairewn
(aiotoi goûn aiotois ðíhas tivès3 paraskevázououv). 
ótan ménon ouv áblabeis, ánepitímtw, òtan dé 5
blaberaí,4 faiúlon. ouste gar ékousin étera ef'
os xairouvs, to te meðeteron pollois lýptro
dia tov fúson (adèi gar ponei to ðíov, wóper


a The reference is presumably to c. xii. 1, but the two
passages do not correspond very closely.
b Cf. c. vi. 6, note a.
c Or possibly 'that the restorative pleasures imply a
defective state.'
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view, but also to account for the false one, since to do so helps to confirm the true; for when we have found a probable explanation why something appears to be true though it is not true, this increases our belief in the truth.

We have then to explain why it is that bodily pleasures appear to be more desirable than others.

4 (1) Now the first reason is that pleasure drives out pain; and excessive pain leads men to seek excessive pleasure, and bodily pleasure generally, as a restorative. And these restorative pleasures are intense, and therefore sought for, because they are seen in contrast with their opposite. (The view that pleasure is not a good at all is also due to these two facts, as has been said,\(^a\) (a) that some pleasures are actions indicative of an evil nature, whether it be depraved from birth, like the nature of an animal,\(^b\) or corrupted by habit, as is the case with evil men, and (b) that others are restoratives of a defective state,\(^c\) and to be in the natural state is better than to be in process of returning to it. But as a matter of fact the latter sort of pleasures accompany a process towards perfection, so that accidentally they are good.)

5 (2) Another reason is that bodily pleasures are sought for, just because of their intensity, by people who are incapable of enjoying others (for instance, some deliberately take steps to make themselves thirsty): not that there is any objection to this if the pleasures are innocuous, but it is bad if they are productive of harmful results. The fact is that some men have no other sources of enjoyment; and also many are so constituted that a neutral state of feeling is to them positively painful. (This is because
καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι ἐμπερτυροῦσι, τὸ ὅραν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἄλλ᾿ ἦδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φαινόμενον. ὅμως δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ νεοτητὶ διὰ τὴν αὐξησιν ὁσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἦδυ Ἑ νεοτητὶ: οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔχουν δέονται ιατρεῖας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δαιμόνεον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κράσιν, καὶ οἱ ὄρεξις σφοδρὰ εἰσίν· ἐξελάνυε δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἡ τ᾿ ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, εἰαν ἦ ἴσχυρα. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλουθοι καὶ φαίλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ᾿ ἄνευ λυπῆς οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολὴν· αὐταὶ δὲ τῶν φύσει ἔδεων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἢδεα τὰ ιατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ιατρεύεσθαι τοιοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγίους πράττοντος τι, διὰ τούτο ἦδυ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ᾿ ἢδεα, ἀ ποιεῖ 20 πράξειν τῆς τοιάσκε φύσεως.

8. Οὐκ ἂν δ᾿ ὄμου ἦδυ τὸ αὐτὸ, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐνεναι τι καὶ έτερον (καθό φθαρτοὶ), ὅστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ έτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ᾿ ἱσαξή, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὕθ᾿ ἦδυ τὸ πραττόμενον. ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦ ἕνως ἀπλῆς εἶνη, ἂεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πράξεις 25 ἡδίστη ἐσται· διὰ δ᾿ θεός ἂεὶ μιᾶν καὶ ἀπλῆν

1 φυσιολόγοι Asp.: φυσικοὶ K², φυσικοὶ λόγοι vulg.
2 δὲ K²: δὲ al.
3 φθαρτοὶ Asp.: φθάρτα.

It is this which is really pleasant: see c. xii. 2.
5 i.e., which stimulate the activity of any ἐξις, disposition or faculty, which is in its natural state, in contrast with those pleasures which stimulate the restoration of a faculty to its natural state.

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a state of strain is the normal condition of an animal organism, as physiology testifies; it tells us that sight and hearing are in fact painful, but we have got used to them in course of time—such is the theory.) Similarly the young are in a condition resembling intoxication, because they are growing, and youth is pleasant in itself; but persons of an excitable nature need a restorative perpetually, because their temperament keeps their bodies in a constant state of irritation, and their appetites are continually active; and any pleasure, if strong, drives out pain, not only the opposite pleasure. This is why excitable men become profligate and vicious.

7 Pleasures unaccompanied by pain, on the other hand—and these are those derived from things naturally and not accidentally pleasant—do not admit of excess. By things accidentally pleasant I mean things taken as restoratives; really their restorative effect is produced by the operation of that part of the system which has remained sound, and hence the remedy itself is thought to be pleasant. Those things on the contrary are naturally pleasant which stimulate the activity of a given nature.  

8 Nothing however can continue to give us pleasure always, because our nature is not simple, but contains a second element (which is what makes us perishable beings), and consequently, whenever one of these two elements is active, its activity runs counter to the nature of the other, while when the two are balanced, their action feels neither painful nor pleasant. Since if any man had a simple nature, the same activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enjoys a single simple pleasure.
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χαίρει ἡδονήν: οὐ γάρ μόνον κινήσεως ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ήρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ[τατον],¹ κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινὰ: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος 30 ὃς πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς: οὐ γάρ ἀπλὴ oὐδ' ἐπιεικὴς.

3 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγκρατειας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τὸ ἐκαστὸν καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά: λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐρούμεν.

¹ γλυκύ Asp. ² Spengel.
perpetually. For there is not only an activity of motion, but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in motion. But change in all things is sweet, as the poet says, owing to some badness in us; since just as a changeable man is bad, so also is a nature that needs change; for it is not simple nor good.

9 We have now discussed the nature of Self-restraint and Unrestraint, and of Pleasure and Pain, and have shown in either case in what sense one of the two is good and the other evil. It remains for us to speak of Friendship.

* Euripides, Orestes, 234.
Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἐποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις η'/ μετ' ἀρετῆς' ἐτὶ δ' ἀναγκαίοτατον εἰς τὸν βίον. ἂνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἐλούτ' ἂν ζῆν ἔχων τὰ λοιπά ἀγαθὰ πάντα. καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἄρχον καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρείας τῇ γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐεργεσίας ἀφαίρεσιν εὐεργεσίας, η' γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; η' πώς ἄν τηρήθηκαί καὶ σφόντ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσον γὰρ πλεῖων, τοσούτω ἐπισόφα-

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2 λεοτέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέρους πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἔλεηπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοήθειαν, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς ἑκάτερα πράξεις—σὺν τε δ' ἐρχομένω—καὶ γὰρ 3 νοήσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐν-υπάρχων ἐοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγενημένον τῷ γεν-

1 βοήθεια Μᵇ: βοῆθειας (βοηθεὶ Par. 1417).
2 πρὸς... καὶ οἷς. Κᵇ.

ἀφελεία, 'friendship,' sometimes rises to the meaning of affection or love, but also includes any sort of kindly feeling, even that existing between business associates, or fellow-citizens. The corresponding verb means both 'to like' and 'to love'; the adjective is generally passive, 'loved,'
BOOK VIII

1. Our next business after this will be to discuss Friendship. For friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue; and also it is one of the most indispensable requirements of life. For no one would choose to live without friends, but possessing all other good things. In fact rich men, rulers and potentates are thought especially to require friends, since what would be the good of their prosperity without an outlet for beneficence, which is displayed in its fullest and most praiseworthy form towards friends? and how could such prosperity be safeguarded and preserved without friends? for the greater it is, the greater is its insecurity. And in poverty or any other misfortune men think friends are their only resource. Friends are an aid to the young, to guard them from error; to the elderly, to tend them, and to supplement their failing powers of action; to those in the prime of life, to assist them in noble deeds—

When twain together go —

2. And the affection of parent for offspring and of as natural,

liked,' dear,' but sometimes active 'loving,' 'liking,' and so on, as a noun 'a friend.'

That is, the social grace of friendliness described in τυ. vi. ; it is there said to be nameless, but it is called φιλία at τυ. viii. 18.

* Homer, Iliad, x. 224.
νήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἄλλα καὶ ἐν οἴρωι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὀμοεμίτει πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὀθεν 20 τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἵδοι δὲ ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οὐκείοι ἄπασι ἀνθρώποις ἄνθρωπως καὶ φίλοις. ἔσωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχεις ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτῆς σπουδάζειν ἡ τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ἡ γὰρ ὀμοιὸν ὀμοίον τῷ τῇ φιλίᾳ ἐσώκει εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ 26 μάλιστα ἐφίλεται καὶ τῆς στάσεις ἐχθράν ὀδον μάλιστα ἐξελαύνονσιν. καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων ὀνδέν δεὶ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δὲ ὀντες προσδέονται φιλίαι καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα

5 φιλικῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα καὶ καλῶν τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφιλοὺς ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἢ τῇ πολυφιλίᾳ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τῷ εἶναι καὶ ἑκατοντάς τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴκονται ἀνθρώπων άνθρωπος εἶναι καὶ φίλοις.

6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὀμοιότητα τινα τυθήσαν αὐτῆς καὶ τοὺς ὀμοίους φίλους, ὀθεν τὸν ὀμοίον φασιν ὡς τὸν ὀμοίον, καὶ κολονὸν ποτὶ κολονόν, καὶ τὰ 36 τοιαύτα. οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἑναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς 1155 ἄλληλοις φασίν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν

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1 πρὸς τὸ γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι: om. Lb.
2 ἑπὶ: Molución: ἑτε.
3 τὰ: ὀποια Mborough.

a φιλανθρωπός means 'humane,' 'kindly.'
b Or possibly, 'And the just are thought to possess friendliness in its highest form.'
c Literally 'Jackdaw to jackdaw.'
offspring for parent seems to be a natural instinct, not only in man but also in birds and in most animals; as also is friendship between members of the same species; and this is especially strong in the human race; for which reason we praise those who love their fellow men. Even when travelling abroad one can observe that a natural affinity and friendship exist between man and man universally. Moreover, friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem to set more store by it than they do by justice, for to promote concord, which seems akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while faction, which is enmity, is what they are most anxious to banish. And if men are friends, there is no need of justice between them; whereas merely to be just is not enough—a feeling of friendship also is necessary. Indeed the highest form of justice seems to have an element of friendly feeling in it.

And friendship is not only indispensable as a means, it is also noble in itself. We praise those who love their friends, and it is counted a noble thing to have many friends; and some people think that a true friend must be a good man.

But there is much difference of opinion as to the nature of friendship. Some define it as a matter of similarity; they say that we love those who are like ourselves: whence the proverbs ‘Like finds his like,’ ‘Birds of a feather flock together,’ and so on. Others on the contrary say that with men who are alike it is always a case of ‘two of a trade.’ Some

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\[ka\i\ ker\alpha\mu\varepsilon\i\ ker\alpha\mu\varepsilon\ k\o\tau\varepsilon\i\ k\a\i\ \tau\varepsilon\ktau\u03b1\i\ \tau\varepsilon\ktau\u03b1\i--\]

‘Potter with potter contends, and joiner quarrels with joiner.’

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\[\textit{Three Difficulties:}\]

1. Does attraction depend on likeness or unlikeness? 

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\[\textit{453}\]
τούτων ἄνωτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικῶτερον, Ἔμπροῦκας μὲν φάσκως "ἐραί μὲν ὀμβρον γαίαν" ἐξηραθεῖσαν, "ἐραν δὲ σεμινδ ὕλειν ὀμβρον πληροῦμενον ὀμβρον πεπείν ἐς γαίαν," καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ "ἀντίςουν συμφέρον" καὶ "ἐκ τῶν διαφερῶν τῶν καλλιστὴν ἀρμονίαν" καὶ "πάντα καὶ ἐρι γίνεσθαι". ἔς ἐναντίας δὲ τούτως ἄλλω τε καὶ Ἑμπνεοκλῆς: τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου 7 ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὐν φυσικα τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφελθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία τῆς παροῦσης σκέψεως); ὃσα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικά καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τά ἤθη 10 καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτα ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πάσι γίνεται φίλα ἡ οὓς οἴον τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν ἐιδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἡ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδείκται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἔθτον, οὐχ ἰκανῷ πεπιστεύκασι σημεῖων δέχεται γὰρ τὸ 15 μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἔθτον καὶ τὰ ἔτερα τῷ εἰδεί. εὑρηται δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐμπροσθεν.

11 Τάχα δὲ ἄν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ: δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πάν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τούτο δὲ εἶναι <τὸ> ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἢδυ ἢ χρήσιμον. δοξεῖ δὲ ἄν χρήσιμον εἶναι δὲ 20 οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθὸν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὡστε φιλητα ἂν 2 εἰς τάγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἢδυ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τάγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτῶς ἀγαθὸν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνιοτε ταῦτα: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἢδυ. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ αὐτῶ  ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἐκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τάγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἐκαστῳ δὲ τὸ 25

1 Richards.  
2 δὴ Bywater: δὲ.

* Fr. 890 Dindorf, from an unknown play.  
* No passage in the Ethics answers exactly to this reference.  
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try to find a more profound and scientific explanation of the nature of affection. Euripides\(^a\) writes that 'Earth yearneth for the rain' when dried up, 'And the majestic Heaven when filled with rain Yearneth to fall to Earth.' Heraclitus says, 'Opposition unites,' and 'The fairest harmony springs from difference,' and 'Tis strife that makes the world go on.' Others maintain the opposite view, notably Empedocles, who declares that 'Like seeks after like.'

Dismissing then these scientific speculations as not germane to our present enquiry, let us investigate the human aspect of the matter, and examine the questions that relate to man's character and emotions: for instance, whether all men are capable of friendship, or bad men cannot be friends; and whether there is only one sort of friendship or several. Those who hold that all friendship is of the same kind because friendship admits of degree, are relying on an insufficient proof, for things of different kinds also can differ in degree. But this has been discussed before.\(^b\)

Perhaps the answer to these questions will appear if we ascertain what sort of things arouse liking or love. It seems that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable, and that this is either what is good, or pleasant, or useful. But useful may be taken to mean productive of some good or of pleasure, so that the class of things lovable as ends is reduced to the good and the pleasant. Then, do men like what is really good, or what is good for them? for sometimes the two may be at variance; and the same with what is pleasant. Now it appears that each person loves what is good for himself, and that while what is really good is lovable absolutely, what is good for a particular person is lovable for that

\(\text{Solution of 2nd and 3rd Difficulties (cc. II-IV)}\)

Three objects of liking: the good, the pleasant, the useful.
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ἐκάστω. φιλεῖ δ' ἐκαστος ὁ τὸ ἄν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον· διὸ ἐστὶ δ' οὐδέν· ἐστιν γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δὴ ὀντῶν δι' α ἐκεῖνων, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἄφικτων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀντιφήλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκεῖνως ἀγαθῶ (γελοῖον γὰρ ἰσως τῷ οὖν βούλεσθαι τάγαθα, ἀλλ' εἰπερ, σφεζεθαί 20 βούλεται αὐτὸν ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ). τῷ δὲ φιλῳ δεὶν βούλεσθαι τάγαθα ἐκεῖνον ἱνακα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὗτω τάγαθα εὖνου λέγουσιν, εάν μὴ ταῦτο καὶ παρ' ἐκεῖνον γίγνεται· εὔνουαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαι εὖνοι. ἤ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν εὖνοι ὁι 30 ὑπεράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἔπιεικεῖς εἰναι ἤ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτον καὶ ἐκεῖνων τις 115b-116a πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον· εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὕτω φαίνονται ἄλληλοισι, φίλους δὲ πῶς ἀν τις εὗτοι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἐαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἄλληλοισι καὶ βούλεσθαι τάγαθα μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἐν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

iii Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἀρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας

1 δὴ Spengel: δὲ.
2 δὲ om. K
3 ἐκεῖνῳ Bywater: ἐκεῖνων.
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person. Further, each person loves not what is really good for himself, but what appears to him to be so; however, this will not affect our argument, for 'lovable' will mean 'what appears lovable.'

3 There being then three motives of love, the term Friendship is not applied to love for inanimate objects, since here there is no return of affection, and also no wish for the good of the object—for instance, it would be ridiculous to wish well to a bottle of wine: at the most one wishes that it may keep well in order that one may have it oneself; whereas we are told that we ought to wish our friend well for his own sake. But persons who wish another good for his own sake, if the feeling is not reciprocated, are merely said to feel goodwill for him: only when mutual is such goodwill termed friendship. And perhaps we should also add the qualification that the feeling of goodwill must be known to its object. For a man often feels goodwill towards persons whom he has never seen, but whom he believes to be good or useful, and one of these persons may also entertain the same feeling towards him. Here then we have a case of two people mutually well-disposed, whom nevertheless we cannot speak of as friends, because they are not aware of each other's regard. To be friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for each other, that is, wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, and (3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned above.

iii Now these qualities differ in kind; hence the affection or friendship they occasion may differ in kind also. There are accordingly three kinds of friendship, corresponding in number to the three (Definition of Friendship.)

Three species of friendship corresponding.
eídhē, ἵσαριθμα τοῖς φιλήτοις· καθ’ ἐκαστόν γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλης· οὐ λαυθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἄλληλους βούλονται τάγαθα ἄλληλους ταύτη ἤ φιλοῦν· οἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἄλληλους οὐ καθ’ αὐτούς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἤ γίγνεται τι αὐτοῖς παρ’ ἄλληλων ἁγαθόν. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι’ ἦδονήν· οὐ γάρ τῷ ποιοῦς τινας εἶναι ἄγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἦδεις αὐτοῖς. οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἁγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι’ ἦδονήν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἦδον, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὅ φιλοῦμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἦδος. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γάρ ἢ ἐστίν οἰόσπερ ἐστιν ὁ φιλοῦμενος, ταύτη φιλεῖται, ἀλλ’ ὃς πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἁγαθὸν τι οἱ δ’ ἦδονήν. εὐνιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαύταται εἰσιν, μὴ διαμελοῦντων αὐτῶν ὅμοιων· ἐὰν γάρ μηκέτι ἦδεις ἡ χρήσιμοι οὖν, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ’ ἄλλοι ἄλλο γίγνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι’ ὁ φιλοὶ ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς ὁ ὤν τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνο. μάλιστα δ’ εἰς τοὺς προσβύτας ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεται (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἦδον οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἄλλα τὸ ὁφέλειμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἄκμην καὶ νέων ὁσοὶ τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὔτε συζώσι μετ’ ἄλληλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ’

1 ὃ <ποίς τις> vel. <ποιοῦτος> vel <ἄγαθος> Richards; sed cf. E.E. 1237 b 1 (Ross).
2 οἴσπερ Richards: οἴσπερ. 3 οὔδ’ om. LbΓ.

a i.e., they wish each other to become more virtuous, pleasant, or useful as the case may be; so that there is a different species of well-wishing in each case.

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lovable qualities; since a reciprocal affection, known to either party, can be based on each of the three, and when men love each other, they wish each other well in respect of the quality which is the ground of their friendship. Thus friends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so far as some benefit accrues to them from each other. And similarly with those whose friendship is based on pleasure: for instance, we enjoy the society of witty people not because of what they are in themselves, but because they are agreeable to us. Hence in a friendship based on utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as useful or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on an accident, since the friend is not loved for being what he is, but as affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be. Consequently friendships of this kind are easily broken off, in the event of the parties themselves changing, for if no longer pleasant or useful to each other, they cease to love each other. And utility is not a permanent quality; it differs at different times. Hence when the motive of the friendship has passed away, the friendship itself is dissolved, having existed merely as a means to that end.

Friendships of Utility seem to occur most frequently between the old, as in old age men do not pursue pleasure but profit; and between those persons in the prime of life and young people whose object in life is gain. Friends of this kind do not indeed frequent each other’s company much, for in some cases they are not even pleasing to each other,
eἰσον ἦδεις· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὀμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ἀφελμοὶ ὀσιν. ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον ἡγὰρ εἰσον ἦδεις ἐφ’ ὄσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἁγαθοῦ.

δ γὰρ ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐξευκήν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι’ ἡδονῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδῶν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν. τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπτιτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἔτερα· διὸ ταχέως γίγνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἀμα γὰρ τῶ ηδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡ ἡδονής ταχεία ἡ μεταβολή· καὶ ἔρωτικοι δ’ οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι’ ἡδονήν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἕρωτικῆς. διόπερ φιλοῦσι ταχέως καὶ παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἰμέρας μεταπτιτούστης, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οὕς ὑπὸ βουλοῦνται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.

θ Τελεία δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἁγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ’ ἁρετὴν ὅμοιων. οὕτοι γὰρ τάγαθα ὅμοιώς βουλοῦνται ἀλλήλοις, ἡ ἁγαθοὶ, ἁγαθοὶ δ’ εἰσὶ καθ’ αὐτοὺς· οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τάγαθα τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἐνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι, δι’ αὐτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἐως ἃν ἁγαθοὶ ὀσιν, ἡ δ’ ἁρετὴ μόνην. καὶ έστων ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἁγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἁγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθοὶ καὶ

1 ὅ’ om. Kb.
2 τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς Mb.
3 ed.
4 τάχεως καὶ Ὁ Bywater.

* See § 1 above, and note.
* i.e., for some accidental, i.e. temporary or not essential, quality: cf. §§ 2, 3.

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and therefore have no use for friendly intercourse unless they are mutually profitable; since their pleasure in each other goes no further than their expectations of advantage.

With these friendships are classed family ties of hospitality with foreigners.

5 With the young on the other hand the motive of friendship appears to be pleasure, since the young guide their lives by emotion, and for the most part pursue what is pleasant to themselves, and the object of the moment. And the things that please them change as their age alters; hence they both form friendships and drop them quickly, since their affections alter with what gives them pleasure, and the tastes of youth change quickly. Also the young are prone to fall in love, as love is chiefly guided by emotion, and grounded on pleasure; hence they form attachments quickly and give them up quickly, often changing before the day is out.

The young do desire to pass their time in their friend’s company, for that is how they get the enjoyment of their friendship.

6 The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue. For these friends wish each alike the other’s good in respect of their goodness, and they are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of their friends for their friends’ sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves and not accidentally. Hence the friendship of these lasts as long as they continue to be good; and virtue is a permanent quality. And each is good relatively to his friend as well as absolutely, since the good are both good absolutely and profitable.
ALLÈLÔUS ÍPHÈLIMÔI. ÓMOIÔS Ì BÀI ÍHDEISI KAI YAR 16
ÂPŁÔS ÔI ÁGAÔHÔI ÍHDEIS KAI ALLÈLÔS: ÈKÁSTÔW
YAR KAD' ÍHDOHÔN ÊVÔN ÌI ÓIÎKÊCÀI PRÁXÈS, KAI ÌI
TOUÍÔTÀI, TÁN ÔGÀHÀN Ì BÀI ÌI AUTÀI Ì ÓMOIÔI.—
7 ÌI TOUÍÔTÀI DÈ FÎLÌA MÔNÌMOS ÈVLÖGWÈS ÈSTÎN,
SUNÀPTEI YAR ÈN AUTÈH PÁNÒ ÌSÀ TÔIS FÎLOIS DÈI
ÙPÀRGÈN. PÅÓA YAR FÎLÌA DI' ÔGÀHÀN ÈSTÎN Ì 20
DI' ÍHDOHÔN, ÌI ÆPŁÔS Ì TÔF FÎLOÚNTI, KAI KAD'
ÔMÔIÔTÔTÀ TÎNA: TAÚTÈ DÈ PÀNÒ ÙPÀRGHI TÀ
EÌRÒNÈVÀ KAD' ÌIÔTOÛS, TAÚTÈ YAR ÔMÔIOI1 KAI TÀ
LOUSÌÀ. TÔ TÈ ÆPŁÔS ÔGÀHÀN KAI ÌDÌ ÆPŁÔS
ÈSTÎN: MÀLÎSTA DÈ TAÚTÀ FÎLÌTÀ: KAI TÒ FÎLÈV
ÒH2 KAI ÌI FÎLÌA ÈN TÔÚTÒS MÀLÎSTA KAI ÔRÌSTÒI.—
8 SÎPÀNÌAS DÌ ÈIKÔS TÀS TOUÍÔTÀS ÈÌNAV: ÌLÌGOI YAR 25
ÒI TOUÍÔTOI. ÊTÌ DÈ PÒRÒDÈÎTÀI XHÒÔN KAI SÎN-
ÎÒEIAI: KATÀ TÈN PÀRÔÌÌÀN YAR ÔUK ÈSTÔN ÊÌDHÊSÀ
ALLÈLÔS PÒÎN TÒUS LÊGOÛÌÌVÀS ÌLÀS SÎVÀNÀLÔSÀI:
ÒDÌ ÌPÒDÈKÈXAI ÌDÈ PÒÔTERÔN ÔUDÈ ÈÌNAV FÎLOUS,
PÒÎN ÔN ÈKÀTERÔS ÈKÀTERÔF FÀNÈH FÎLÌTÔS KAI
9 PÎSÎTEVHÌ. ÔI DÌ TÀXÉWÒS TÀ FÎLIKÀ PÒÒS ALLÈLÔS 30
PÒIÌÔÎTÀI ÐOYÌÌÔÎTÀI MÈN FÎLOUS ÈÌNAV, ÔUK ÈÌSÌ DÈ,

1 ÌMÔA L.3. 2 ÌH Ramsauer: DÈ.

a There is some uncertainty here and elsewhere in these
chapters whether 'similarity' refers to resemblance between
the friends (as § 6, and cf. 1139 a 10, kàth òmòîçtòtà tîna),
or between the different forms of friendship (as kàth òmòîçtòtà,
1157 a 32, 1158 b 6), friendships based on pleasure or profit
being only so called 'by way of resemblance,' i.e. in an
analogical and secondary sense. But the latter considera-
tion seems irrelevant here, and is first developed in the
next chapter (§§ 1, 4). It is true that whether similarity
between the parties is an element in all friendship (although
this is implied by the words 'who resemble each other in
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to each other. And each is pleasant in both ways also, since good men are pleasant both absolutely and to each other; for everyone is pleased by his own actions, and therefore by actions that resemble his own, and the actions of all good men are the same or similar.—Such friendship is naturally permanent, since it combines in itself all the attributes that friends ought to possess. All affection is based on good or on pleasure, either absolute or relative to the person who feels it, and is prompted by similarity of some sort; but this friendship possesses all these attributes in the friends themselves, for they are alike, et cetera, in that way. Also the absolutely good is pleasant absolutely as well; but the absolutely good and pleasant are the chief objects of affection; therefore it is between good men that affection and friendship exist in their fullest and best form.

Such friendships are of course rare, because such men are few. Moreover they require time and intimacy: as the saying goes, you cannot get to know a man till you have consumed the proverbial amount of salt in his company; and so you cannot admit him to friendship or really be friends, before each has shown the other that he is worthy of friendship and has won his confidence. People who enter into friendly relations quickly have the wish to be friends, but cannot really be friends without being virtue' in § 6) is nowhere clearly decided, and it can hardly be predicated of some friendships considered below.

i.e., absolutely and relatively good and pleasant: cf. c. iv. 1.

i.e., in themselves, and not accidentally.

d Cf. Eudemian Ethics, 1233 a 2, διὸ τὸς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὅ μεθόμος τῶν ἀλών, 'hence "the peck of salt" has passed into a proverb.'
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ei μή καὶ φιλητοὶ καὶ τούτ' ἵσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὖ.

iv Αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τελεῖα ἐστὶ, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὁμοία ἐκατέρω παρ' ἐκατέρω, ὡς ἔσει τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἢδυ ὁμοίωμα 1157 a ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἢδεῖς ἀλλήλως· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλως οἱ ἁγαθοὶ. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι διαμένουσιν ὅταν τὸ αὕτω γίγνεται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἤδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤδονται οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὅρων ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίστε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκέτι ἢδεῖα ἡ ὁμις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία). 10 πολλοὶ δ' αὐτ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς κυνηθείας

2 τὰ ἤθη στέρησον, ὁμοθέτες οὖντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἢδυ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἤττον φίλοι καὶ δια- μένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὖντες φίλοι ἀμα τῷ συμφέροντι2 διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἢ σαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἤδονήν μὲν

1 οὐκέτι Ramsauer: οὐκ ἐστιν.
2 συμφέροντι (ληγοντι) vel (ταυμάργφ) Richards.

a Cf. c. iii. 7.

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worthy of friendship, and also knowing each other to be so; the wish to be friends is a quick growth, but friendship is not.

iv This form of friendship is perfect both in point of duration and of the other attributes * of friendship; and in all respects either party receives from the other the same or similar benefits, as it is proper that friends should do.

Friendship based on pleasure has a similarity to friendship based on virtue, for good men are pleasant to one another; and the same is true of friendship based on utility, for good men are useful to each other. In these cases also the friendship is most lasting when each friend derives the same benefit, for instance pleasure, from the other, and not only so, but derives it from the same thing, as in a friendship between two witty people, and not as in one between a lover and his beloved. These do not find their pleasure in the same things: the lover's pleasure is in gazing at his beloved, the loved one's pleasure is in receiving the attentions of the lover; and when the loved one's beauty fades, the friendship sometimes fades too, as the lover no longer finds pleasure in the sight of his beloved, and the loved one no longer receives the attentions of the lover; though on the other hand many do remain friends if as a result of their intimacy they have come to love each other's characters, both being alike in character. But when a pair of lovers exchange not pleasure for pleasure but pleasure for gain, the friendship is less intense and less lasting.

A friendship based on utility dissolves as soon as its profit ceases; for the friends did not love each other, but what they got out of each other.
οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐιδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἑπιεικεῖς φαύλους καὶ μηδέτερον ὅπωρόν, δι' αὐτοῦ δὲ δὴ λόγον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς: οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν

3 ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τις ὁφέλεια γίγνοιτο. καὶ μόνη 

δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητος ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ βάδιον οὔτεν πιστεύσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὡς αὐτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἢν ἀδίκησαι, καὶ δὸς ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλία ἄξιονται.

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις οὔδεν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα

4 γίνεσθαι. ἢπει δὲ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὡσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκούσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἑνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δὲ ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλοις στέργοντας, ὡσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἵσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιοῦτοις,

5 εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλεῖω, καὶ πρῶτους μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἡ ἁγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοίωτητα· ἡ γὰρ ἁγαθὸν τι καὶ ὁμοιὸν τι, ταύτη τοις, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἁγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέον. οὐ πάνω δ' αὖται συνάπτουσιν, οὔτε γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ

1 δὲ Mb: γὰρ.

2 ἁγαθῷ τινὶ [kal] Coraes.


a Literally, 'by way of resemblance to true friendship' ; see c. iii. 7, note.

b Perhaps the words 'and of likeness' are interpolated; the following clause explains 'goodness' only. That utility is 'a sort of goodness' is assumed.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VIII. iv. 2-5

Friendships therefore based on pleasure and on utility can exist between two bad men, between one bad man and one good, and between a man neither good nor bad and another either good, bad, or neither. But clearly only good men can be friends for what they are in themselves; since bad men do not take pleasure in each other, save as they get some advantage from each other.

3 Also friendship between good men alone is proof against calumny; for a man is slow to believe anybody’s word about a friend whom he has himself tried and tested for many years, and with them there is the mutual confidence, the incapacity ever to do each other wrong, and all the other characteristics that are required in true friendship. Whereas the other forms of friendship are liable to be dissolved by calumny and suspicion.

4 But since people do apply the term ‘friends’ to persons whose regard for each other is based on utility, just as states can be ‘friends’ (since expediency is generally recognized as the motive of international alliances), or on pleasure, as children make friends, perhaps we too must call such relationships friendships; but then we must say that there are several sorts of friendship, that between good men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper meaning of the term, while the other kinds are friendships in an analogical sense, since such friends are friends in virtue of a sort of goodness and of likeness in them: insomuch as pleasure is good in the eyes of pleasure-lovers. But these two secondary forms of friendship are not very likely to coincide: men do not make friends with each other both for utility and for pleasure at the same time,
to ἦδυ: οὐ γὰρ πάνω συνδυάζειται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

6 Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν φαύλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἣδονήν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ ὁμοιοὶ ὄντες, οἳ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ. οὕτωι μὲν ὦν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ τῷ ὁμοιώσθαι τούτωι.

7 Ὄσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' εἴην οἳ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἳ μὲν γὰρ συζώντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλους καὶ πορίζουσι τάγαθα, οἳ δὲ καθεύδουντες ἡ κεχυρωμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἐχουσιν ὡστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικὸς· οἳ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

2 οὐ φαῦνονται δ' οὐθ' οἳ πρεσβύται οὐθ' οἳ στρυψεινοι φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἤδονής, συνεῖς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἤδει· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαῦνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίλεσθαι δὲ τῷ ἤδεις.

3 οἳ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἄλληλους, μὴ συζώντες δὲ, εὔνους ἐσικασῖ μᾶλλον ἡ φιλίας. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζύγιον· ὑφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἳ ἰδεῖ.
since accidental qualities are rarely found in combination.

Friendship then being divided into these species, inferior people will make friends for pleasure or for use, if they are alike in that respect,\(^a\) while good men will be friends for each other's own sake, since they are alike in being good.\(^b\) The latter therefore are friends in an absolute sense, the former accidentally, and through their similarity to the latter.

It is with friendship as it is with the virtues; men are called good in two senses, either as having a virtuous disposition or as realizing virtue in action, and similarly friends when in each other's company derive pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, whereas friends who are asleep or parted are not actively friendly, yet have the disposition to be so. For separation does not destroy friendship absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise. If however the absence be prolonged, it seems to cause the friendly feeling itself to be forgotten: hence the poet's remark:  

\begin{quote}
Full many a man finds friendship end
For lack of converse with his friend.
\end{quote}

The old and the morose do not appear to be much given to friendship, for their capacity to please is small, and nobody can pass his days in the company of one who is distasteful to him, or not pleasing, since it seems to be one of the strongest instincts of nature to shun what is painful and seek what is pleasant. And when persons approve of each other without seeking such other's society, this seems to be goodwill rather than friendship. Nothing is more characteristic of friends than that they seek each other's society: poor men desire their friends'
4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ πλῆθος τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐκ ἐκάθεν πολλάκις εἶρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἄπλώς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἂν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ποιεῖται· δὲ δὲ ἄγαθος τῷ ἀγαθῷ δὲ ἂμφοτερα. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὲν φιλητὸς πάθει, η δὲ φιλία ἐξεῖ· ἡ γὰρ φιλητία ὁμίχλων πρὸς τὰ ἄνθρωπα ἐστὶ, ἀντιφωνούσαι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἢ δὲ προαιρέσεις ἢ ἂν ἐξεῖ. καὶ τἀγαθά ἁπλωσταὶ τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκεῖνων ἐνεχθοῦν τὰς πᾶρα ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἐξων. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· δὲ γὰρ ἄγαθος φίλος γνώμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὁ φίλος. ἐκάτερος δὲν φιλεῖ τε ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἐξεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης [ἡ] ἰσότης, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταὐτῷ ὑπε- 1158 a ἀρχεῖ.

1 γὰρ Kβ: μὲν γὰρ.  2 αἰρετῶν <ἀπλῶς> Asp. (Richards).
3 ἢδει: εἴδει Π, pr. Lβ, ἢδει Zeller.
5 δὲ Asp.:  δὴ.

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a The ἑταρείαι, or Comradeships, at Athens were associations of men of the same age and social standing. In the fifth century they had a political character, and were oligarchical in tendency, but in Aristotle’s day they seem to have been no more than social clubs, whose members were united by personal regard, and were felt to have claims on each other’s resources. See ee. ix. 2, xi. 5, xii. 4, 6, ix. ii. 1, 3, 9, x. 6.

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assistance, and even the most prosperous wish for their companionship (indeed they are the last people to adopt the life of a recluse); but it is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they give each other pleasure, or have common tastes. The latter seems to be the bond between the members of a comradeship.\(^a\)

4 Friendship between good men then is the truest friendship, as has been said several times before. For it is agreed that what is good and pleasant absolutely is lovable and desirable strictly, while what is good and pleasant for a particular person is lovable and desirable relatively to that person; but the friendship of good men for each other rests on both these grounds.\(^b\)

5 Liking\(^c\) seems to be an emotion, friendship a fixed disposition, for liking can be felt even for inanimate things, but reciprocal liking\(^d\) involves deliberate choice, and this springs from a fixed disposition. Also, when men wish the good of those they love for their own sakes, their goodwill does not depend on emotion but on a fixed disposition. And in loving their friend they love their own good, for the good man in becoming dear to another becomes that other's good. Each party therefore both loves his own good and also makes an equivalent return by wishing the other's good, and by affording him pleasure; for there is a saying, 'Amity is equality,' and this is most fully realized in the friendships of the good.

\(^a\) i.e., good men love each other because they are both good and pleasant absolutely and good and pleasant for each other.

\(^b\) This sentence would come better after the following one.

\(^c\) Cf. c. ii. 3.
AEISTOTLE

4vi Ἕν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἦττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, δόσω δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἦττον ταῖς ὁμολίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικά καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίασ. διὸ δὲ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχὺ, πρεσβύται δ' οὖ. οὐ γὰρ γίγνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὖν ὁί στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶναι μὲν εἰσιν ἄλληλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τάγαθα καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὖ πάνω εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερευέναι μηδὲ χαίρειν ἄλληλοις.

2 ἀ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δ' εἴναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν οὖν (ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς έναν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοῖς δ' άμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἄρέσκειν σφόδρα οὖ βέβαιον,

3 ἵππως δ' οὖν ἄγαθοις εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν ἐμ ἱλατεῖν καὶ ἐν συνθεῖα γενέσθαι, δ' παγχαλητον. διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ήδυ πολλοὺς ἄρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ

4 χρόνῳ αἱ υπηρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον έοικε φιλία· ή διὰ τὸ ήδυ, ὅταν ταῦτα ἄπ' ἀμφοῖν γίγνεται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἄλληλοις ἥ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, 2οι τῶν νέων εἰσίν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν

1 πολλοὺς Ramsauer: πολλοῖς. 2 φιλία Asp. : φιλία.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VIII. vi. 1-4

vi Morose and elderly people rarely make friends, as they are inclined to be surly, and do not take much pleasure in society; good temper and sociability appear to be the chief constituents or causes of friendship. Hence the young make friends quickly, but the old do not, since they do not make friends with people if they do not enjoy their company; and the same applies to persons of a morose temper. It is true that the old or morose may feel goodwill for each other, since they may wish each other well and help each other in case of need; but they cannot properly be called friends, as they do not seek each other's society nor enjoy it, and these are thought to be the chief marks of friendship.

2 It is not possible to have many friends in the full meaning of the word friendship, any more than it is to be in love with many people at once (love indeed seems to be an excessive state of emotion, such as is naturally felt towards one person only); and it is not easy for the same person to like a number of people at once, nor indeed perhaps can good men be found in large numbers. Also for perfect friendship you must get to know a man thoroughly, and become intimate with him, which is a very difficult thing to do. But it is possible to like a number of persons for their utility and pleasantness, for useful and pleasant people are plentiful, and the benefits they confer can be enjoyed at once.

3 Of these two inferior kinds of friendship, the one that more closely resembles true friendship is that based on pleasure, in which the same benefit is conferred by both parties, and they enjoy each other's company, or have common tastes; as is the case with the friendships of young people. For
ταῦτας τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραῖον. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἤδεών δὲ· οὐκ ἦν γὰρ βούλονται τίσι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὕτως ἄν υπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἥδεις ξητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἵσως καὶ ἄγαθον τοιούτους οὖντας, καὶ ἕτι αὐτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει
5 αὐτοῖς ὡσα δεὶ τοὺς φίλους. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοις φαίνονται χρήσιμαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρησίμοι καὶ ἑτέροι ἥδεις, ἄμφως δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ· οὕτε γὰρ ἥδεις μετ' ἄρετῆς 30 ξητοῦσιν οὕτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά, ἄλλα τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῖς ἥδεος ἐφιέμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πράξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθὲν ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ
6 γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἤδεις δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἄμα εἰρηταί δι' ὧ σπουδαῖος· ἄλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἃν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἄρετῇ 35 ὑπερέχειται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἵσαζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερ- εχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰσόθαι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.
7 Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἱσότητι· τὰ 1158 b γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἅμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἡ ἑτέρον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἄντικαταλλάτ-

*a For this 'proportional equalization' of the parties to an unequal friendship see c. vii. 2, c. xiii. 1. It would appear that the meaning here is, that unless the great man is also better than the good man, the good man cannot give more love or respect to the great man than the great man gives to him, which is the only way in which the good man can compensate the great man for giving more benefits than he gets, and so be put on an equality; see further on rx. i. 1.*

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in these there is more generosity of feeling, whereas the friendship of utility is a thing for sordid souls. Also those blessed with great prosperity have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant ones, since they desire some society; and though they may put up with what is unpleasant for a short time, no one would stand it continually: you could not endure even the Absolute Good itself for ever, if it bored you; and therefore the rich seek for friends who will be pleasant. No doubt they ought to require them to be good as well as pleasant, and also good for them, since then they would possess all the proper qualifications for friendship. But princes and rulers appear to keep their friends in separate compartments: they have some that are useful, and some that are pleasant, but rarely any that are both at once. For they do not seek for friends who are pleasant because they are good, or are useful for noble purposes, but look for witty people when they desire pleasure, and for the other sort seek men who are clever at executing their commissions; and these two qualities are rarely found in the same person. The good man, as we have said, is both useful and pleasant, but the good man does not become the friend of a superior, unless his superior in rank be also his superior in virtue; otherwise the good man as the inferior party cannot make matters proportionally equal. But potentates of such superior excellence are scarcely common.

But to resume: the forms of friendship of which we have spoken are friendships of equality, for both parties render the same benefit and wish the same good to each other, or else exchange \(^b\) two different

\(^b\) i.e., equivalent amounts of two different things.

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τονται, οινον ἡδονήν ἄντ' ὀφελείας. (ὁτι δ' ἦττον' εἰσίν αὐταὶ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἰρηται. δοκοῦσι δὲ δι' ὀμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταύτων εἰναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἰναι φιλίαι. καθ' ὀμοιότητα γάρ τῆς κατ' ἁρετήν φαίνονται φιλίαι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἤδιν ἔχει ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κάκεινη. τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἰναι, ταῦτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν, ἄλλως τε 10 διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι δι' ἀν- ὀμοιότητα εἴκεινς.)

vii "Ετέρον δ' εστὶ φιλίας εἰδῶς τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἰνον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἄνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἀρ- χοντὶ πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἄλλας; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή γονεῖσι πρὸς τέκνα 15 καὶ ἀρχούσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδὲ ἄνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. Ετέρα γὰρ ἐκάστου τούτων <ἡ> 2 ἁρετή καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἐτέρα δὲ καὶ δι' ἀριθμὸν. ἐτέραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις 2 καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτε γλύνεται 20 ἐκατέρω παρὰ βατέρου οὕτε δεῖ ζητεῖν. ὅταν δὲ γονεῖσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμει δ' δεὶ τοῖς γεννη- σαίς, γονεῖς δ' υἱῶν 3 δ' δεὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος

1 δὲ καὶ ἦττον Λ. 2 δ' ἦττον καὶ π. ed. 3 υἱῶν om. Κ. 

* ι.ε., friendships based on pleasure or utility or both, in contrast to those based on virtue; although the latter also are, of course, 'friendships of equality.' The parenthesis breaks the flow of the argument.

b They are not only different in kind but unequal in value.
benefits, for instance pleasure and profit. (These are less truly friendships, and less permanent, as we have said; and opinions differ as to whether they are really friendships at all, owing to their being both like and unlike the same thing. In view of their likeness to friendship based on virtue they do appear to be friendships, for the one contains pleasure and the other utility, and these are attributes of that form of friendship too; but in that friendship based on virtue is proof against calumny, and permanent, while the others quickly change, besides differing in many other respects, they appear not to be real friendships, owing to their unlikeness to it.)

But there is a different kind of friendship, which involves superiority of one party over the other, for example, the friendship between father and son, and generally between an older person and a younger, and that between husband and wife, and between any ruler and the persons ruled. These friendships also vary among themselves. The friendship between parents and children is not the same as that between ruler and ruled, nor indeed is the friendship of father for son the same as that of son for father, nor that of husband for wife as that of wife for husband; for each of these persons has a different excellence and function, and also different motives for their regard, and so the affection and friendship they feel are different. Now in these unequal friendships the benefits that one party receives and is entitled to claim from the other are not the same on either side; but the friendship between parents and children will be enduring and equitable, when the children render to the parents the services due to the authors of one's being, and the parents to the
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΩΣ

η τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δὲ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαι φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τῶν ἀμείωτων μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἡ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν ὦμελεμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐκαστὸν ὁμολογὸς. ὅταν γὰρ κατ᾽ ἄξιαν ἡ φίλησις γίγνηται, τότε γίγνεται πως ἴσοτης, δὲ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

3 Οὐχ ὁμολογὸς δὲ τὸ ἦνον ἐν τε τοῖς δυκαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δυκαίοις ἦνον πρῶτος τὸ κατ᾽ ἄξιαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτος τὸ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄξιαν δευτέρως. δῆλον δ᾽, ἐὰν πολὺ διάστημα γίγνηται ἀρετῆς ἡ κακίας ἡ εὐπορίας ἡ τυχός ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ φιλοὶ εἰσίν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἄξιοσων. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τούτ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν, πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πάσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων. 1159 ἂν οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἄξιοσων εἶναι φιλοὶ οἱ πολὺ καταδεύστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀριστοῖς ἡ σοφώτατοι ὁι μηδενῶς ἄξιοι. ἄκριτης μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕς ἐστὶν ὁρισμὸς, ἐως τίνος ὁι φιλοὶ, πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρομένων ἐτί μὲνει. πολὺ δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἥξωρισθέντως, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. οὔθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μὴ ποτ᾽ οὐ βούλονται οἱ φιλοὶ τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοῦς εἶναι.


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2 a i.e., unequal, and proportionate to the benefits received.
2 b Lit. 'though many things are taken away, (friendship) still remains'; apparently an allusion to the Sorites fallacy (ratio ruentis acervi, Hor. Ep. 111. 1. 47), How many grains can be taken from a heap of corn for it still to be a heap? 478
children those due to one's offspring. The affection rendered in these various unequal friendships should also be proportionate: the better of the two parties, for instance, or the more useful or otherwise superior as the case may be, should receive more affection than he bestows; since when the affection rendered is proportionate to desert, this produces equality in a sense between the parties, and equality is felt to be an essential element of friendship.

3 Equality in friendship, however, does not seem to be like equality in matters of justice. In the sphere of justice, 'equal' (fair) means primarily proportionate to desert, and 'equal in quantity' is only a secondary sense; whereas in friendship 'equal in quantity' is the primary meaning, and 'proportionate to desert' only secondary. This is clearly seen when a wide disparity arises between two friends in point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else; they no longer remain nor indeed expect to remain friends. This is most manifest in the case of the gods, whose superiority in every good attribute is pre-eminent; but it is also seen with princes: in their case also men much below them in station do not expect to be their friends, nor do persons of no particular merit expect to be the friends of men of distinguished excellence or wisdom. It is true that we cannot fix a precise limit in such cases, up to which two men can still be friends; the gap may go on widening and the friendship still remain; but when one becomes very remote from the other, as God is remote from man, it can continue no longer. This gives rise to the question, is it not after all untrue that we wish our friends the greatest of goods? For instance, can we
Aristotle

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά·
οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. εἰ δὴ καλῶς ἔφηται ὦτι ὁ
φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τάγαθα ἐκείνου ἑνέκα, 10
μένειν ἂν δεόι οἶδο ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπων δὴ
οὖν βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἵσως δὲ
οὔ πάντα· αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλιστα ἐκακο̄ς βούλεται
tάγαθα.

viii Οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βουλεσθαι
φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ φιλεῖν. διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ
πολλοὶ· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἡ προσ-
15 ποιεῖται τοιοῦτος ἐλναι, καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἡ
φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς ἐλναι δοκεῖ
2 τοῖς τιμῶσαι, οὐ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφιένται. οὐ δὲ
αὐτὸ δ’ ἐσίκκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός· χαίροντι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ
tῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἑλπίδα· 20
οὖνται γὰρ τεῦξεσθαι παρ’ αὐτῶν, ἂν του δεῖσται·
άς δὴ σημεῖα τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίροντι τῇ τιμῇ.
οἱ δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδῶν ἀρεγόμενοι
τιμῆς βεβαιώσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφιένται περὶ
αὐτῶν· χαίροντι δὴ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες
τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ’
25 αὐτῷ χαίροντι· διὸ δόξειν ἂν κρείττον ἐλναι τοῦ
tιμῶσαι, καὶ ἡ φίλια καθ’ αὐτῆν αἱρετὴ ἐλναι.

1 ὅ ᾧ Zwinger: δὲ.
2 Sylburg.

a It is a contradiction in terms to wish a friend a good
that involves a loss of good.

b c. ii. 3.

c i.e., the party to the friendship who gets more than
he gives, and redresses the balance by repaying more
affection or esteem than he receives.

d Or possibly ‘so what they really enjoy is being assured,’
etc.

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wish them to become gods? For then they will lose us as friends, and therefore lose certain goods, for friends are goods. If then it was rightly said above that a true friend wishes his friend’s good for that friend’s own sake, the friend would have to remain himself, whatever that may be; so that he will really wish him only the greatest goods compatible with his remaining a human being. And perhaps not all of these, for everybody wishes good things for himself most of all.

Most men however, because they love honour, seem to be more desirous of receiving than of bestowing affection. Hence most men like flattery, for a flatterer is a friend who is your inferior, or pretends to be so, and to love you more than you love him; but to be loved is felt to be nearly the same as to be honoured, which most people covet. They do not however appear to value honour for its own sake, but for something incidental to it. Most people like receiving honour from men of high station, because they hope for something from them: they think that if they want something, the great man will be able to give it them; so they enjoy being honoured by him as a token of benefits to come. Those on the other hand who covet being honoured by good men, and by persons who know them, do so from a desire to confirm their own opinion of themselves; so these like honour because they are assured of their worth by their confidence in the judgement of those who assert it. Affection on the other hand men like for its own sake; from which we infer that it is more valuable than honour, and that friendship is desirable in itself.
ARISTOTLE

3 δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλείν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἐναι γὰρ ἐκ διδασκαλίας τὰ ἐαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδούς, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ξητούσιν, εὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἵκανὸν αὐταῖς ἐοικεν εἶναι, εὰν ὀρθῶς εὖ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτούς, κἂν ἔκεινοι μηδὲν ἄν
4 μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἀγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἑπανομένων, φιλίων ἀρετῆ τὸ 96 φιλεῖν ἐοικεν· ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τούτῳ γίνεται κατ' ἄξιαν, οὕτω μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. 115
5 οὕτω δ' ἄν καὶ οἱ ἄνωθεν μᾶλιστ' εἰεν φίλοι· ἱσαξούντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἱσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετῆν ὁμοιότησ· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων· οὐθ' ὑπηρετοῦσιν τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μὴτ' αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μὴτι τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδ' ἐπ' ὁλόγον δὲ χρόνον γίγνονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων 10
6 μοχθηρία. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἢδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσι· ἐώς γὰρ ἐὰν πορίζωσιν ἦδονάς ἡ ὄφελείας ἀλλήλοις. έξ' ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίγνεσθαι φιλία, οἶον

1 <ἐκ> διδάσκαλι (vel <ἀλλας> διδάσκαλι Asp., Par.) Richards.

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3 But in its essence friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection: witness the pleasure that mothers take in loving their children. Some mothers put their infants out to nurse, and though knowing and loving them, do not ask to be loved by them in return, if it be impossible to have this as well, but are content if they see them prospering; they retain their own love for them even though the children, not knowing them, cannot render them any part of what is due to a mother. As then friendship consists more especially in bestowing affection, and as we praise men for loving their friends, affection seems to be the mark of a good friend. Hence it is friends that love each other as each deserves who continue friends and whose friendship is lasting.

4 Also it is by rendering affection in proportion to desert that friends who are not equals may approach most nearly to true friendship, since this will make them equal. Amity consists in equality and similarity, especially the similarity of those who are alike in virtue; for being true to themselves, these also remain true to one another, and neither request nor render services that are morally degrading. Indeed they may be said actually to restrain each other from evil: since good men neither err themselves nor permit their friends to err. Bad men on the other hand have no constancy in friendship, for they do not even remain true to their own characters; but they can be friends for a short time, while they take pleasure in each other’s wickedness. The friendships of useful and pleasant people last longer, in fact as long as they give each other pleasure or benefit. It is friendship based on utility that seems most frequently to spring from opposites, for
πένης πλουσίω, ἀμαθῆς εἰδότι, οὐ γὰρ τυχάνει τις ἐνδεής ἵν, τοῦτον ἐφιέμενον ἀντιδωρείται ἃλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ’ ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραιτήν καὶ ἐραμένον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ενίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοῖως δὴ φιλητοῦς ὄντας ἰσως ἄξωτέον, μηδέν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον.

7 ἰσως δὲ οὖν ἐφίλεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου 20 καθ’ αὐτό, ἄλλα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἥ δ’ ὀρείς τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν), ὦν τῷ ἕηρῳ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἂλλ’ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἔλθείν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφειόθων καὶ γὰρ ἐστίν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

ix. "Εοικε δὲ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶρηται, περὶ ταῦτα 25 καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἀπάθῃ γὰρ κοινωνία δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δὲ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ’ ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσι, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐστὶ φιλία· 30 καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παρομία "κοινὰ τὰ 2 φίλων," ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἐστι δ’ ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταῖροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς

1 δὴ: δὲ ΓΟβ, γὰρ Ηελ. Ακ.

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instance a friendship between a poor man and a rich one, or between an ignorant man and a learned; for a person desiring something which he happens to lack will give something else in return for it. One may bring under this class the friendship between a lover and the object of his affections, or between a plain person and a handsome one. This is why lovers sometimes appear ridiculous when they claim that their love should be equally reciprocated; no doubt if they are equally lovable this is a reasonable demand, but it is ridiculous if they have nothing attractive about them.

7 But perhaps there is no real attraction between opposites as such, but only accidentally, and what they actually desire is the mean between them (since this is the Good); the dry for instance striving not to become wet, but to reach an intermediate state, and so with the hot, and everything else. Let us however dismiss this question, as being indeed somewhat foreign to our subject.

ix The objects and the personal relationships with which friendship is concerned appear, as was said at the outset, to be the same as those which are the sphere of justice. For in every partnership we find mutual rights of some sort, and also friendly feeling: one notes that shipmates and fellow-soldiers speak of each other as 'my friend,' and so in fact do the partners in any joint undertaking. But their friendship is limited to the extent of their association in their common business, for so also are their mutual rights as associates. Again, the proverb says 'Friends' goods are common property,' and this is correct, since community is the essence of friendship. Brothers have all things in common, and
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5' ἀλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλεῖω τοῖς 5' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον 33 αἵ δὲ ἤττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια: οὐ γὰρ ταύτα γονεύου πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὔτε ἔταρχον καὶ πολίταις, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ᾠδικα πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὔξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρηματα 3 ἀποστερήσας ἔταραν δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθήσας ἄδελφῳ ἢ ἄθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντων ἄλλον. αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἀμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τῷ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς 4 ὄντα καὶ ἐπὶ ἰσον διήκοντα, αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίου εἴκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ πορίζο- 10 μενοὶ τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάρων δοκεῖ καὶ εὗ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν τούτων γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιον φασιν 5 εἶναι τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφιένται, 15 οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστατιζόταται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε

* See c. v. 3, note.
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so do members of a comradeship; other friends hold special possessions in common, more or fewer in different cases, inasmuch as friendships vary in degree. The claims of justice also differ in different relationships. The mutual rights of parents and children are not the same as those between brothers; the obligations of members of a comradeship not the same as those of fellow-citizens; and similarly with the other forms of friendship. Injustice therefore also is differently constituted in each of these relationships: wrong is increasingly serious in proportion as it is done to a nearer friend. For example, it is more shocking to defraud a comrade of money than a fellow-citizen; or to refuse aid to a brother than to do so to a stranger; or to strike one's father than to strike anybody else. Similarly it is natural that the claims of justice also should increase with the nearness of the friendship, since friendship and justice exist between the same persons and are co-extensive in range.

But all associations are parts as it were of the association of the State. Travellers for instance associate together for some advantage, namely to procure some of their necessary supplies. But the political association too, it is believed, was originally formed, and continues to be maintained, for the advantage of its members: the aim of lawgivers is the good of the community, and justice is sometimes defined as that which is to the common advantage.

Thus the other associations aim at some particular advantage; for example sailors combine to seek the profits of seafaring in the way of trade or the like, comrades in arms the gains of warfare, their aim being either plunder, or victory over the
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νίκης ἡ πόλεως ὁρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
φυλέται καὶ δημόται, [ἔναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν
dι' ἡδονῆς δοκοῦσί γιγνεσθαί, ὦ οἷον] θειασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν. αὕτη γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ 
συνοισίας, πάσαι δὲ αὐται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν
ἐσίκασιν εἶναι, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος
ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφιέται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀπαντα τῶν βιον.
θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταῦτα συνόδους,
timás τε ἀπονεμοῦντες τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς
ἀναπαύσει πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρ
χαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ
tὸς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδάς, οἶων ἀπαρχαίο
μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καρποῖς.
πάσαι δὴ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς
πολιτικῆς εἶναι ἅκολουθησοῦν δὲ αἱ τοιαύται
φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

X. Πολιτείας δὲ ἑστὶν εἰδή τρία, ἵσαι δὲ καὶ
παρέκβασεις, οὖν φθοραλ τούτων. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ
μὲν πολιτείαι βασιλεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία,
τρίτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἢ τιμοκρατικὴν
λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δὲ αὐτὴν εἰσίν-
2 θαυμαν οἱ πλείστοι καλείν. τοῖς δὲ βελτίστῃ
μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίσσῃ δὲ ἡ τιμοκρατία.
παρ-

έκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν πολλάκις ἃ μὲν γὰρ καὶ

1 πόλεως <σωτηρίας> Richards.
3 Richards.
4 τε add. Γ.'

Lit. 'plunder or victory or a city'; the last words may refer either to colonists or exiles who obtain a new abode by conquest, or to civil war; but the expression is improbable, and perhaps should be emended to 'or to defend the city.'
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VIII. ix. 5—x. 2

enemy or the capture of a city; and similarly the members of a tribe or parish [And some associations appear to be formed for the sake of pleasure, for example religious guilds and dining-clubs, which are unions for sacrifice and social intercourse. But all these associations seem to be subordinate to the association of the State, which aims not at a temporary advantage but at one covering the whole of life.] combine to perform sacrifices and hold festivals in connexion with them, thereby both paying honour to the gods and providing pleasant holidays for themselves. For it may be noticed that the sacrifices and festivals of ancient origin take place after harvest, being in fact harvest-festivals; this is because that was the season of the year at which people had most leisure. All these associations then appear to be parts of the association of the State; and the limited friendships which we reviewed will correspond to the limited associations from which they spring.

Now there are three forms of constitution, and also an equal number of perversions or corruptions of those forms. The constitutions are Kingship, Aristocracy, and thirdly, a constitution based on a property classification, which it seems appropriate to describe as timocratic, although most people are accustomed to speak of it merely as a constitutional government or Republic. The best of these constitutions is Kingship, and the worst Timocracy. The perversion of Kingship is Tyranny. Both are monarchies, but there is a very wide difference between them: a tyrant studies his own advantage.

The bracketed sentences, as Cook Wilson points out, look like an interpolated fragment of a parallel version.
τύραννος τὸ ἐαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδειται, τὰ ὕφελμα ὁνὸς αὐτῶ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις (ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἰς βασιλεύς); ἡ δὲ τυραννίς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταὐτης, τὸ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει, καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτις ὅτι χειράσθη· κάκιστον γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν βελτίστων, μεταβαίνει δὲ ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίαν νῦν: φαντάσθη γὰρ ἐστὶ μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς· ὃ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ ἄμεσοι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἡ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄλλα τοὺς αὐτοῖς, περὶ τῶν πλείστων ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν ὀλίγοι δὴ ἀρχουοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνεργοι γὰρ εἰσιν αὐτῶν· πλῆθος γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἰναι, καὶ ὅσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι· ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρῶν ἱστιν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτείαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾴστα μετα-

1 οὖδε? Richards.  
2 γὰρ Hel. Ar.: δὲ.

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*Probably the text should read 'a king is not a king at all unless—'

*b Literally 'a king elected by lot,' like the annual archon at Athens, who had the title of king, but retained only certain religious functions from the primitive monarchy.

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a king that of his subjects. For a monarch is not a
king if he does not possess independent resources,
and is not better supplied with goods of every kind
than his subjects; but a ruler so situated lacks
nothing, and therefore will not study his own
interests but those of his subjects. (A king who is
not independent of his subjects will be merely a sort
of titular king.) Tyranny is the exact opposite in
this respect, for the tyrant pursues his own good.
The inferiority of Tyranny among the perversions is
more evident than that of Timocracy among the con-
stitutions, for the opposite of the best must be the
worst.

3 When a change of constitution takes place, King-
ship passes into Tyranny, because Tyranny is the bad
form of monarchy, so that a bad king becomes a
tyrant. Aristocracy passes into Oligarchy owing to
badness in the rulers, who do not distribute what the
State has to offer according to desert, but give all or
most of its benefits to themselves, and always assign
the offices to the same persons, because they set
supreme value upon riches; thus power is in the
hands of a few bad men, instead of being in the hands
of the best men. Timocracy passes into Democracy,
there being an affinity between them, inasmuch as
the ideal of Timocracy also is government by the
mass of the citizens, and within the property qualifica-
tion all are equal. Democracy is the least bad of
the perversions, for it is only a very small deviation
from the constitutional form of government. These
are the commonest ways in which revolutions occur
in states, since they involve the smallest change, and
come about most easily.

* i.e., Timocracy: see § 1 fin.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

4 φαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παρα-
δείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ
μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὲς κοινωνία βασιλείας 25
ἐχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει.
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὁμήρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προ-
αγορεύει. πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία
eιναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ
χρώνται γὰρ ὡς δούλους τοὺς υἱῶν. τυραννικὴ
δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ 30
δεσποτοῦ συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὐτὴ
μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη.

5 τῶν διαφέροντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς
δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ'
ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἄνηρ ἀρχει, καὶ περὶ ταύτα δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἀνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικί ἀρμόζει, ἢκείνῃ ἀποδίδοσιν. 35
ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἄνηρ εἰς ὀλυγαρχίαν
μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ
οὐχ ἢ ἀρμόζει. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες 1101
ἐπίκληροι οὕτω· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἄρετην αἱ
ἀρχαί· ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ

6 ἐν ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις. ἡμικρατικὴ δ' ἔσχεν ἡ
τῶν ἄδελφων ἱσοί γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς 5
ἡλικίαις διαλαττοῦσι· διόπερ ἀν πολὺ ταῖς
ἡλικίαις διαφέρουσιν, οὐκέτι ἄδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ
φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς
δεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες
ἐξ ἴσου), γίνεται δὲ 1 καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ
ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐκάστω ἔξοψια.

xi Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, 10

1 γίνεται δὲ Par. (Richards).

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4 One may find likenesses and so to speak models of these various forms of constitution in the household. The relationship of father to sons is regal in type, since a father’s first care is for his children’s welfare. This is why Homer styles Zeus ‘father,’ for the ideal of kingship is paternal government. Among the Persians paternal rule is tyrannical, for the Persians use their sons as slaves. The relation of master to slaves is also tyrannic, since in it the master’s interest is aimed at. The autocracy of a master appears to be right, that of the Persian father wrong; for different subjects should be under different forms of rule. The relation of husband to wife seems to be in the nature of an aristocracy: the husband rules in virtue of fitness, and in matters that belong to a man’s sphere; matters suited to a woman he hands over to his wife. When the husband controls everything, he transforms the relationship into an oligarchy, for he governs in violation of fitness, and not in virtue of superiority. And sometimes when the wife is an heiress it is she who rules. In these cases then authority goes not by virtue but by wealth and power, as in an oligarchy. The relation between brothers constitutes a sort of timocracy; they are equals, save in so far as they differ in age; hence, if the divergence in age be great, the friendship between them cannot be of the fraternal type. Democracy appears most fully in households without a master, for in them all the members are equal; but it also prevails where the ruler of the house is weak, and everyone is allowed to do what he likes.

xi Under each of these forms of government we find friendship existing between ruler and ruled, to the
ARISTOTLE

ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς
βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἐνεργεῖας· εὖ γὰρ
ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὅν
ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν ὦ, εὖ πράττωσι, ὡσπερ
νομέως προβάτων· ὃθεν καὶ ὁΜήρος τὸν Ἄγα.-

2 μέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν: τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ
πατρικὴ (διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἐνεργετη-
μάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγάλου,
καὶ τρόφης καὶ παιδείας· καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ
tαύτα· ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε γὰρ ἀρχικὸν πατήρ
νῦν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλεύ-

3 μένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταί, διὸ καὶ
tιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τοῖς
οὐ ταύτῳ ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἄξιον, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ

4 φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτῇ φιλία
καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ
ἀμείνου πλέον [ἀγαθόν], καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκά-

5 στώ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀθήλφων
τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ἔουσεν· ἵσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικίωτα, οἱ
τοιούτω δὲ ὀμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὀμοθεῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.
ἔουσα δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατίαν·

1 εἶπεν om. Κ b. 2 ταύτα ? Richards: ταῦτα. 3 ed.

a Sc., because their children cannot fully repay their services in kind.
b The word 'good' looks like an interpolation. The sense seems to require 'a larger share of affection' (φιλίας, or φιλήσεως, understood); it is clear throughout that in an unequal friendship the superior party receives not more but less benefit (though more affection) than the inferior. In c. x. 5 the conjugal association is compared to the aristocratic polity in virtue of the fact that the superior party has more power, not more benefit; and from c. x. 3 it appears that when the ruling class takes all or most of 494
same extent as justice. The friendship of a king for his subjects is one of superiority in beneficence; for a king does good to his subjects, inasmuch as being good he studies to promote their welfare, as a shepherd studies the welfare of his sheep; hence Homer called Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the people.’

2 The friendship of a father for his child is of the same kind (only here the benefits bestowed are greater, for the father is the source of the child’s existence, which seems to be the greatest of all boons, and of its nurture and education; and we also ascribe the same benefits to our forefathers). For it is as natural for a father to rule his children, and forefathers those descended from them, as for a king to rule his subjects. These friendships then involve a superiority of benefits on one side, which is why parents receive honour as well as service. The claims of justice also, therefore, in these relations are not the same on both sides, but proportionate to desert, as is the affection bestowed.

4 The friendship between husband and wife again is the same as that which prevails between rulers and subjects in an aristocracy; for it is in proportion to excellence, and the better party receives the larger share [of good], whilst each party receives what is appropriate to each; and the same is true of the claims of justice on either side.

5 Friendship between brothers is like that between members of a comradeship: the two parties are equal in station and age, and this usually implies identity of feelings and of character. The counterpart of fraternal friendship is that which exists under the benefits for itself, the government is no longer an aristocracy but an oligarchy.
ARISTOTLE

ξυλι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βουλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ εἰς ἵσον· οὕτω δὴ καὶ 80 ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεικβάσεσιν, οὕστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐστὶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινὸν ἐστὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὕδε γὰρ δίκαιον ἀλλ᾽ οἶον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὀργανὸν καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα [καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δούλον]. ὁφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ᾽ οὐκ ἕστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δούλον ἢ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ἐστὶν· ο γὰρ δοῦλος ἐμψυχὸν ὀργανὸν, τὸ δ᾽ ὀργανὸν ἄψυχος δοῦλος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἕστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τῷ δίκαιῳ πάντα τὰ ἄνθρωπων πρὸς πάντα τῶν δυνάμεων κοινωνής νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δῆ, καθ᾽ ὁσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσσων αἰ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλείστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἐστὶν οὕτων.

xii Ἐν κοινωνία μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστὶν, καθάπερ εἰρηται· ἀφορίσεις δ᾽ ἄν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν

1 φιλία Kβ: φιλία ἐστὶ.
2 ἀλλ᾽ om. Kβ.
3 Ramsauer.
4 φιλία Ar.: φιλίας.

a These words are better omitted, as they anticipate what comes below.
b c. ix. 1.

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the timocratic form of constitution; since the ideal of Timocracy is that all citizens shall be equal and shall be good, so that they all rule in turn, and all have an equal share of power; and therefore the friendship between them is also one of equality.

6 Under the perverted forms of constitution friendship like justice can have but little scope, and least of all in the worst: there is little or no friendship between ruler and subjects in a tyranny. For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there can be no friendship between them either, any more than there can be justice. It is like the relation between a craftsman and his tool, or between the soul and the body [or between master and slave]: all these instruments it is true are benefited by the persons who use them, but there can be no friendship, nor justice, towards inanimate things; indeed not even towards a horse or an ox, nor yet towards a slave as slave. For master and slave have nothing in common: 'a slave is a living tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave. Therefore there can be no friendship with a slave as slave, though there can be as human being: for there seems to be some room for justice in the relations of every human being with every other that is capable of participating in law and contract, and hence friendship also is possible with everyone so far as he is a human being. Hence even in tyrannies there is but little scope for friendship and justice between ruler and subjects; but there is most room for them in democracies, where the citizens being equal have many things in common.

xii All friendship, as we have said, involves community; but the friendship between relatives and
καὶ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαὶ, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦτα, κοινωνικὰς ἐσκασαὶ μᾶλλον; οἶον γὰρ καθ᾿ ὁμολογίαν τινὰ 15 φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τάξειεν ἀν τις 2 καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυειδῆς εἶναι, ἡρτῆθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς. οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἐαυτῶν τὰ ὅντα, 1 τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνων [τὶ]. 2 ὅντα. μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἵσασιν οἱ 20 γονεῖς τὰ ἔξ ἄυτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκεῖονται τὸ ἀφ᾿ οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι, τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἄυτων οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ᾿ οὗ, οἷον ὃδοις ἡ θρίζῃ ἢ ὀτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, 3 ἐκείνω δ᾿ οὕθεν τὸ ἀφ᾿ οὗ, ἡ ἤτοι. καὶ τῷ πλῆθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὖθυς 25 γενόμενα στέργουσι, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος 4 χρόνου 3 τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἡ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι᾿ ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὐν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἐαυτοὺς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἄυτῶν οἶον ἐτεροι αὐτοῖ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἄδελφοι δ᾿ ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν ἀυτῶν 80 πεφυκέναι; ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταυτότητα ἀλλήλους ταυτοποιεῖ· οἴδεν φασί ταύτων αἰμα καὶ ρίζαν

3 τῷ ἔχοντι om. pr. Kb.
4 προελθόντος χρόνου Kb: προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις.

α Cf. vi. xi. 2 and note.
β That is, greater certainty of parentage, closer affinity and earlier commencement of affection.
γ Or 'a second self produced by separation from oneself.'
between members of a comradeship may be set apart as being less in the nature of partnerships than are the friendships between fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, shipmates, and the like; since these seem to be founded as it were on a definite compact. With the latter friendships may be classed family ties of hospitality between foreigners.

2. Friendship between relatives itself seems to include a variety of species, but all appear to derive from the affection of parent for child. For parents love their children as part of themselves, whereas children love their parents as the source of their being. Also parents know their offspring with more certainty than children know their parentage; and progenitor is more attached to progeny than progeny to progenitor, since that which springs from a thing belongs to the thing from which it springs—for instance, a tooth or hair or what not to its owner—whereas the thing it springs from does not belong to it at all, or only in a less degree. The affection of the parent exceeds that of the child in duration also; parents love their children as soon as they are born, children their parents only when time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding, or at least perception. These considerations also explain why parental affection is stronger in the mother. Parents then love their children as themselves (one’s offspring being as it were another self—other because separate); children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers love each other as being from the same source, since the identity of their relations to that source identifies them with one another, which is why we speak of ‘being of the same blood’ or ‘of the same stock’ or the like;
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰσὶ δὴ ταῦτα πως καὶ ἐν δυνητισμόις· μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἂλλιξ γὰρ ἡλικία, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἐταίροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἄδελφικη τῇ ἑταίρικῃ ὑμοίωται. ἀνεφιάλετα· δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων συνωκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι· γίγνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκείοτεροι οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύννεφῳ ἡ πόρρω τῶν ἀρχηγῶν εἶναι. ἦστι δ' η̄ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνων, καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς θεοὺς· ὡς πρὸς ἄγαθον καὶ ὑπερέχου· εὖ γὰρ πεποικασί τὰ μέγιστα· τοῖς γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γενομένως ἡ τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ήδύ καὶ τὸ κρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθυνείων, ὅσω καὶ κοινώτερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. ἦστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄδελφικῇ ἀπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταίρικῇ, καὶ ἀλλοθρείας· εὖ γὰρ πεποικασί τὰ μέγιστα· τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφον καὶ παιδευθῆναι ὑμοίωσι καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείοντα

1 καὶ... θεοὺς secl. Ramsauer.

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* ἂλλιξ ἡλικία sc. τέρτη, Rhet. i. xi. 1371 b 15. 'Crabbed age and youth cannot live together.' In its fuller form the proverb continues, 'the old get on with the old,' ἂλλιξ ἡλικία τέρτη, γέρων δὲ τε τέρτη γέρωνα σχολ. ad Plat. Phaedr. 214 c. The next phrase appears to be a proverb as well.
brothers are therefore in a manner the same being, though embodied in separate persons. But friendship between brothers is also greatly fostered by their common upbringing and similarity of age; 'two of an age agree,' and 'familiarity breeds fellowship,' which is why the friendship between brothers resembles that between members of a comradeship. Cousins and other relatives derive their attachment from the fraternal relationship, since it is due to their descent from the same ancestor; and their sense of attachment is greater or less, according as the common ancestor is nearer or more remote.

The affection of children for their parents, like that of men for the gods, is the affection for what is good, and superior to oneself; for their parents have bestowed on them the greatest benefits in being the cause of their existence and rearing, and later of their education. Also the friendship between parents and children affords a greater degree both of pleasure and of utility than that between persons unrelated to each other, inasmuch as they have more in common in their lives.

Friendship between brothers has the same characteristics as that between members of a comradeship, and has them in a greater degree, provided they are virtuous, or resemble one another in any way; inasmuch as brothers belong more closely to each other, and have loved each other from birth, and inasmuch as children of the same parents, who have been brought up together and educated alike, are more alike in character; also with brothers the test of time has been longest and most reliable.

* Sc. not only when they are alike in virtue.
καὶ βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἀνθρωπὸς γὰρ τῇ φύσις συνδυαστικόν μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτικὴ, ὡς πρῶτον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοὺς ζῷους. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἔστιν, οἳ δὲ ἀνθρώποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συν- οικοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον. εὐθὺς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστων ἔτερα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἄλληλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἓδη. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἦδυ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἄν καὶ διὰ ἄρετήν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰέν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκατέρω ἄρετή, καὶ χαίροντες ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι, διὸ θάττων οἳ ἅτεκνοι διαλύονται: τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινὸν. τὸ δὲ πῶς συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναίκα καὶ ὅλως φιλίῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον, οὐδὲν ἔτερον φαίνεται ἡ ζητείσθαι ἡ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦταν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν οἴκειον καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητὴν.

* * *

a i.e., in proportion to the closeness of the relationship: cf. § 4 fin.
b See i. vii. 6, note.
*c More universal than the gregarious instinct, which finds its highest expression in the state.

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The degrees of friendship between other relatives vary correspondingly.\textsuperscript{a}

The friendship between husband and wife appears to be a natural instinct; since man is by nature a pairing creature even more than he is a political creature,\textsuperscript{b} inasmuch as the family is an earlier and more fundamental institution than the State, and the procreation of offspring a more general characteristic of the animal creation. So whereas with the other animals the association of the sexes aims only at continuing the species, human beings cohabit not only for the sake of begetting children but also to provide the needs of life; for with the human race division of labour begins at the outset, and man and woman have different functions; thus they supply each other’s wants, putting their special capacities into the common stock. Hence the friendship of man and wife seems to be one of utility and pleasure combined. But it may also be based on virtue, if the partners be of high moral character; for either sex has its special virtue, and this may be the ground of attraction. Children, too, seem to be a bond of union, and therefore childless marriages are more easily dissolved; for children are a good possessed by both parents in common, and common property holds people together.

The question what rules of conduct should govern the relations between husband and wife, and generally between friend and friend, seems to be ultimately a question of justice. There are different claims of justice between friends and strangers, between members of a comradeship and schoolfellows.

There are then, as we said at the outset, three kinds of friendship, and in each kind there are both
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φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ’ ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὀμοιώσ ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρον, ὀμοιώσ δὲ καὶ ἤδεις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἴσαξοντες ταῖς ὑφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἱσούσαις μὲν κατ’ ἱσότητα δεὶ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἱσάζειν, τοὺς δ’ ἄνισους τῷ τὸν ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. γίγνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἤντες εὑρίσκονται καὶ ἄλλης προδύναμις (τούτῳ γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τούτῳ δ’ ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχας τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὗρεν ὑποπάντα οὓδεις δυσχεραίνεις, ἀλλ’ ἕαν ἡ χαρίες, ἀμῖνεται εὑρίσκεται καὶ ἄρον. δ’ ὑπερβάλλον, τυγχάνων οὖθεν ἠφίεται, οὐκ ἄν ἐγκαλοῖ τῷ φίλῳ, ἐκαστὸς γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἠφίεται. οὐ πάνυ δ’ οὖθ’ ἐν τοῖς δι’ ἱδονῶν. ἢμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὁρείγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγεν χαίρουσιν γελοῖος δ’ ἄν φαίνεται καὶ δ’ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνήπτερεν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκλήματική ἐπ’ ὑφελείᾳ γὰρ χρῷμενοι ἄλλης ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ

1 τῷ τὸ Coraes: τῷ (τῷ corr. Par. 1417), κατὰ τὸ Γ.
2 ἐκάστης Λ’ Μ’, ἐκαστὸς . . . ἠφίεται secl. Ramsauer.
4 τοῦ secludendum ? ed.

a i.e., the pleasure or utility as the case may be.
b i.e., 'and by being good or pleasant or useful.'
c The one who is less good or pleasant or useful must give more affection: see c. vi. 6, note, vii. 2.
d The last clause is suspected as an interpolation.

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friends who are on an equal footing and friends on a footing of disparity; for two equally good men may be friends, or one better man and one worse; and similarly with pleasant friends and with those who are friends for the sake of utility, who may be equal or may differ in the amount of the benefits which they confer. Those who are equils must make matters equal by loving each other, etc., equally; those who are unequal by making a return proportionate to the superiority of whatever kind on the one side.

2 Complaints and recriminations occur solely or chiefly in friendships of utility, as is to be expected. In a friendship based on virtue each party is eager to benefit the other, for this is characteristic of virtue and of friendship; and as they vie with each other in giving and not in getting benefit, no complaints nor quarrels can arise, since nobody is angry with one who loves him and benefits him, but on the contrary, if a person of good feeling, requites him with service in return; and the one who outdoes the other in beneficence will not have any complaint against his friend, since he gets what he desires, and what each man desires is the good. Nor again are complaints likely to occur between friends whose motive is pleasure either; for if they enjoy each other’s company, both alike get what they wish for; and indeed it would seem ridiculous to find fault with somebody for not being agreeable to you, when you need not associate with him if you do not want to do so. But a friendship whose motive is utility is liable to give rise to complaints. For here the friends associate with each other for profit, and so each always wants more, and thinks he is getting
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6 τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δὲ

8 ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ρήτορις, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία

10 ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χειρὰ, ἡ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρα εἰς

χρόνον, καθ’ ὄμολογιαν δὲ τὶ ἀντὶ τίνος: ἡ το

12 ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφιλογοῦν, φιλοκῦ

14 δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει: διὸ παρ’ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ
tοῦτων δίκαι, ἀλλ’ ὁλονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς

κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. ἡ δ’ ἡθικὴ οὐκ

ἐπὶ ρήτορις, ἀλλ’ ὡς φίλως διωρεῖται ἡ ὀτιδῆποτε

ἀλλ’ κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἄξιοὶ τὸ ἢσον ἡ πλέον, ὡς

δὲ ἑδώκως ἀλλὰ χρήσας: οὐχ ὄμοιως δὲ συν-

8 αλλάξας καὶ διαλύωμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τούτο δὲ

συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἡ τοὺς

πλεῖστοις τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὕφελμα:

καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὐ ποιεῖν μὴ ἣνα ἀντιπάθη, ὕφελμον

δὲ τὸ εὐργετείσθαι. δυναμένω δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον

tὴν αξίαν ὅν ἐπαθεῖν, καὶ έκόντει: έκοντα γὰρ

1 δὲ Lb, δ’ η Μb.  2 η ομ Mb.  3 καὶ έκόντε ωμ. Kb.
less than his due; and they make it a grievance that they do not get as much as they want and deserve; and the one who is doing a service can never supply all that the one receiving it wants.

It appears that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other defined by law, so the friendship based on utility may be either moral or legal. Hence occasions for complaint chiefly occur when the type of friendship in view at the conclusion of the transaction is not the same as when the relationship was formed. Such a connexion when on stated terms is one of the legal type, whether it be a purely business matter of exchange on the spot, or a more liberal accommodation for future repayment, though still with an agreement as to the *quid pro quo*; and in the latter case the obligation is clear and cannot cause dispute, though there is an element of friendliness in the delay allowed, for which reason in some states there is no action at law in these cases, it being held that the party to a contract involving credit must abide by the consequences. The moral type on the other hand is not based on stated terms, but the gift or other service is given as to a friend, although the giver expects to receive an equivalent or greater return, as though it had not been a free gift but a loan; and as he ends the relationship in a different spirit from that in which he began it, he will complain.

The reason of this is that all men, or most men, wish what is noble but choose what is profitable; and while it is noble to render a service not with an eye to receiving one in return, it is profitable to receive one. One ought therefore, if one can, to return the equivalent of services received, and to
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φιλον ου ποιητεόν· ώς δη διαμαρτόντα εν τη ἀρχῇ καὶ εἰ παθόντα υφ' οδ' οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φιλου, οὔδε δι' αὐτὸν τούτο δρῶντος—καθ- ἀπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥήτοις εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν (ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδοὺς ἡξίωσεν ἂν): ὥστ' εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. εν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον υφ' οδ' εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὡπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένῃ ἡ μὴ. ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει πότερα δεί τη τοῦ παθόντος ὑφελεία μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἡ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσία. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαύτα φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἀ μικρὰ ἢ ἢ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ ἐξήν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασκηρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἀ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἢ, καὶ ἐν κυνδύνοις ἡ τοιαύτας χρειάσι. ἃρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας σύσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὑφελεία μέτρον ἐστίν; οὕτως γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τῇ ἑσπρ. τοσαύτη ὄγον γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὁσον οὕτως ὑφελήται, καὶ ἀποδοτεόν

1 αὐτὸν 2 Richards. 3 ὁμολογήσει Vict. Muretus. 4 δυνατόν Kb: δυνατός.

a Lit. 'was not doing the service for its own sake,' or perhaps 'for the sake of friendship.' But probably the text should be corrected to read 'was not doing the service for one's own sake': cf. ix. i. 7, x. 6 fn.

b i.e., in any case of the sort, if at the outset the question of repayment were raised.

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do so willingly; for one ought not to make a man one's friend if one is unwilling to return his favours. Recognizing therefore that one has made a mistake at the beginning and accepted a service from a wrong person—that is, a person who was not a friend, and was not acting disinterestedly—a one should accordingly end the transaction as if one had accepted the service on stated terms. Also, one would agree to repay a service if able to do so (and if one were not able, the giver on his side too would not have expected repayment); hence, if possible, one ought to make a return. But one ought to consider at the beginning from whom one is receiving the service, and on what terms, so that one may accept it on those terms or else decline it.

10 Dispute may arise however as to the value of the service rendered. Is it to be measured by the benefit to the recipient, and the return made on that basis, or by the cost to the doer? The recipient will say that what he received was only a trifle to his benefactor, or that he could have got it from someone else: he beats down the value. The other on the contrary will protest that it was the most valuable thing he had to give, or that it could not have been obtained from anybody else, or that it was bestowed at a time of danger or in some similar emergency. Perhaps then we may say that, when the friendship is one of utility, the measure of the service should be its value to the recipient, since it is he who wants it, and the other comes to his aid in the expectation of an equivalent return; therefore the degree of assistance rendered has been the amount to which the recipient has benefited, and
Διαφέρονται δε και εν ταις καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν φιλιάς: ἄξιοι γὰρ ἐκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, διότι δὲ 25 τὰ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλέον ἔχειν, τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὦφελωμέτερος, ἄχρειον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἰσον ἔχειν, λειτουργῶν τε [τε]¹ γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλῶν, εἰ μὴ κατ’ ἄξιον τῶν ἑργῶν ἐσται 50 τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. οἴονται γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλείον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι² πλείον, οὕτω δὲν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. δ’ ἐνδεής καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπταλυν φίλον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν. τι γὰρ, φασίν, ὀφελος σπουδαῖος ἡ δυνάστη φιλῶν εἶναι, 35 μηθέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἐοικε δ’ οὖν 1163 b ἐκάτερος ὅρθως ἄξιοι, καὶ δεῖν ἐκατέρω πλέουν νέμειν εκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς, τῷ δ’ ἐνδεέι κέρδους. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὔεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ’ ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ’ ἐξείν τούτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται: οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται δ’ μηθέν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων

¹ [τε] om. Π.
² συμβαλλόμενοi ? Richards.
³ οὖν add. Kb.

* Lit. 'choice' in Aristotle's technical sense.
* Cf. v. ii. 12, iv. 2.

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so he ought to pay back as much as he has got out of it; or even more, for that will be more noble.

In friendships based on virtue, complaints do not arise, but the measure of the benefit seems to be the intention of the giver; for intention is the predominant factor in virtue and in character.

Differences also arise in friendships where there is disparity between the parties. Each claims to get more than the other, and this inevitably leads to a rupture. If one is a better man than the other, he thinks he has a right to more, for goodness deserves the larger share. And similarly when one is more useful than the other: if a man is of no use, they say, he ought not to have an equal share, for it becomes a charity and not a friendship at all, if what one gets out of it is not enough to repay one's trouble. For men think that it ought to be in a friendship as it is in a business partnership, where those who contribute more capital take more of the profits. On the other hand the needy or inferior person takes the opposite view: he maintains that it is the part of a good friend to assist those in need; what is the use (he argues) of being friends with the good and great if one is to get nothing out of it?

Now it appears that each of these rival claims is right. Both parties should receive a larger share from the friendship, but not a larger share of the same thing: the superior should receive the larger share of honour, the needy one the larger share of profit; for honour is the due reward of virtue and beneficence, while need obtains the aid it requires in pecuniary gain.

The same principle is seen to obtain in public life. A citizen who contributes nothing of value to the
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τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἢ τιμῇ δὲ κοινὸν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστων ἄμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἐλαττομένῳ οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὲ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττομένῳ τιμῆν ἀπονέμομεν καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα. τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῦ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὔτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέοιν, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὑφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμῆν ἀνταποδοτεύον, ἀποδιδόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἢ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλεις ἐπιζήτει, οὐ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀνέφερε γὰρ ἔστων ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ τὴν ἁξίαν ἀποδοθῇ, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπευόν ἐπικείμης εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν δόξης ὅτι ἐξείναι νῦν πατέρα ἀπειπασθαι, πατρὶ δὲ νῦν ὁφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὕθεν δὲ ποιήσας ἁξίων τῶν ὑπηργοῦντος δέδρακεν, ὡστε δὲ ὁφείλει. οἶς δὲ ὁφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δῆ. ἀμα δὲ ἵσως οὐδεὶς ποτὲ ἂν ἀποστήμην δοκεῖ μὴ ἑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ. χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς

1 τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν... εἴρηται secludendum ? ed.
2 καὶ ἐν φιλίᾳ Ramsauer.
3 ἀποδιδόντα Κb: ἀνταποδιδόντα.

a This explains why a benefactor of the commonwealth must receive a reward in the shape of honour.

b i.e., the friendly feeling between the citizens as such, see c. xi. 1. But that this is maintained by τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν has not been said before: indeed the phrase is an odd description of what precedes, and its applicability to private
common stock is not held in honour, for the common property is given to those who benefit the community, and honour is a part of the common property. For a man cannot expect to make money out of the community and to receive honour as well. For nobody is content to have the smaller share all round, and so we pay honour to the man who suffers money loss by holding office, and give money to the one who takes bribes; since requital in accordance with desert restores equality, and is the preservative of friendship, as has been said above.

This principle therefore should also regulate the intercourse of friends who are unequal: the one who is benefited in purse or character must repay what he can, namely honour. For friendship exacts what is possible, not what is due; requital in accordance with desert is in fact sometimes impossible, for instance in honouring the gods, or one's parents: no one could ever render them the honour they deserve, and a man is deemed virtuous if he pays them all the regard that he can. Hence it would appear that a son never ought to disown his father, although a father may disown his son; for a debtor ought to pay what he owes, but nothing that a son can do comes up to the benefits he has received, so that a son is always in his father's debt. But a creditor may discharge his debtor, and therefore a father may disown his son. At the same time, no doubt it is unlikely that a father ever would abandon a son unless the son were excessively vicious; for natural affection apart, it is not in human nature to friendship is denied just below. Perhaps 'since requital ... above' is an interpolation.
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φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὡντι· εὐ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VIII. xiv. 4

reject the assistance that a son will be able to render. Whereas a bad son will look on the duty of supporting his father as one to be avoided, or at all events not eagerly undertaken; for most people wish to receive benefits, but avoid bestowing them as unprofitable.

So much then for a discussion of these subjects.
1 Ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἵσαζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβή γίνεται κατ' ἄξιαν, 35καὶ τῷ ύφαντῇ καὶ τοῖς λουποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὁ ὁποῖος τοῦτον μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τούτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτω μετρεῖται: ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δὲ ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρώτου ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα 3νῦν οὐθὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα,

1 ἀνομοειδέσι Λb: ἀνομοειδέσι.

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a Or ‘heterogeneous,’ i.e. friendships between dissimilar people, e.g. one pleasant and the other useful, so that the benefits they confer on each other are different in kind. This class of friendship has not been named before, though it has been recognized, e.g. viii. iv. 1, 2. It is however incorrectly stated here that the notion of proportion has been applied to it; for the benefits exchanged in such friendships, though different in kind, are not ‘proportional,’ but actually equal in amount or value, just as much as in the friendships where they are the same in kind; see viii. vi. 7. The term ‘proportion’ has lietherto been used of ‘unequal’ friendships, where the superior party bestows more benefit (of whatever kind) than he receives, and 516
BOOK IX

In all dissimilar friendships, it is proportion, as has been said, that establishes equality and preserves the friendship; just as, in the relations between fellow-citizens, the shoemaker receives payment for his shoes, and the weaver and the other craftsmen for their products, according to value rendered. In these business relationships then a common measure has been devised, namely money, and this is a standard to which all things are referred and by which they are measured. But in sentimental friendships, the lover sometimes complains that his warmest affection meets with no affection in return, it may be because there is nothing in him to arouse affection; while the person loved frequently complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now fulfills none of his promises. Such disputes occur when equality is only restored by his receiving more affection than he bestows: see viii. vii. 2, xiii. 1 (and also xiv. 8, to which at first sight this passage might be taken to refer). No doubt a friendship might be both "dissimilar" and "unequal." That between a good man and a superior in rank who also surpasses him in goodness, which seems to be contemplated at viii. vi. 6, is a complex example of this nature; the great man confers both material benefit and moral edification, the good man returns moral edification only, but makes up the deficit by the greater regard which the great man's superior goodness enables him to feel.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

ἐπειδήν δὲ μὲν δι’ ἥδονην τῶν ἑρώμενοι φιλῆ, δὲ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τῶν ἑραστῆς, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἁμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας σοῦ ἡ διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνεται ὅπως ἔνεκα 10 ἐφήλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐστεργοῦν ἄλλα τὰ ὑπο- ἀρχοντα, οὐ μόνον ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἦ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ’ αὐτῆς οὕτως μένει, καθ’ ἀπέρ εἰρηται. διαφέρονται δ’ 15 ὅταν ἑτερα γίνεται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ἤν ὑπερονται· ὅμοιοι γὰρ τῶν μὴ θεῶν γίγνεσθαι ὅταν οὐ ἐφελεται μὴ τυχάνη, οἷον καὶ τῷ κηθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ἀλλ’ ἁμείνον ἄνειεῖν, τοσοῦτω πλείω· εἰς ἐω δ’ ἀπαιτοῦνται τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀμβ’ ἥδονης ἥδονην ἀποδεδωκέναι ἐφ’ ἐμ’ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἔβουλε, ἰκανῶς ἄν εἴχεν· εἰ δ’ ὁ μὲν τέρμιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει ὁ δὲ μη, οὐκ ἄν εἴη τὰ 20 κατὰ τὴν κοινήν καλώς· ὅτι γὰρ δεόμενος τυχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου γε κχάρων ταῦτα3 δώσει· τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξιν ἐστὶ, τοῦ προεκεῖνον ἡ τοῦ προλαμβάνοντος4· ὁ γὰρ προεκεῖμενος ἐστὶ ἐπιτρέπειν εἰκείνω· ὀπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειν 25

1 δ’ Κβ: δὲ καλ.
2 ἐπαγγελλόμενος Corneas.
3 ταῦτα: τὰ αὐτὰ ὁβ, τὰ αὐτοῦ Muretus.
4 προλαμβάνοντος C. Bywater: προλαβάνοντος.

a viii. iii. 7.
b Plutarch, De Alexandri fortuna, ii. 1, tells the story of the tyrant Dionysius, who promised the musician a talent (there seems no particular point in the sliding scale of payment which Aristotle's version introduces), but next day told him that he had already been sufficiently paid by the pleasure of anticipation.
c Lit. 'the one who receives first,' and now has to give a service in return.
d Cf. Plato, Protagoras 323 b.
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pleasure is the motive of the friendship on the lover’s side and profit on the side of the beloved, and when they no longer each possess the desired attribute. For in a friendship based on these motives, a rupture occurs as soon as the parties cease to obtain the things for the sake of which they were friends; seeing that neither loved the other in himself, but some attribute he possessed that was not permanent; so that these friendships are not permanent either. But friendship based on character is disinterested, and therefore lasting, as has been said.a

4 Differences arise when the friends do not obtain what they desire, but something else; for not to get what you want is almost the same as not to get anything at all. For instance, there is the story of the man who hired a harper, and promised that the better he played the more he would pay him; but next morning, when the harper asked him to fulfil his promise, he said that he had already paid for the pleasure he had received by the pleasure he had given.b This would have been all right if both had wanted pleasure; but when one wants amusement and the other gain, and one gets what he wants and the other does not, it would not be a fair bargain; for it is the thing that a man happens to need that he sets his heart on, and only to get that is he ready to give what he does.

5 Which party’s business is it to decide the amount of the return due? Should it be assessed by the one who proffers the initial service? Or rather by the one who receives it, since the other by proffering it seems to leave the matter to him? This we are told was the practice of Protagoras; when he gave
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αδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευς διὸν δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον.

6 εὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις δὲ εὖ εἰσίς ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δὲ ἄνδρὶ." οἱ δὲ προλαμβάνουτες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηθὲν ποιοῦντες ὃν ἐφασαν διὰ τὸς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι 80 γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἄδικολογήσαν.

7 τούτῳ δὲ ἵσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηθένα ἄν δοῦναι ἀργύριον διὰ ἐπίστανται. οὕτως μὲν οὖν, ὅων ἔλαβον τὸν μισθὸν μὴ ποιοῦντες, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσὶν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διόμοιλον καὶ ὑπορρίας, οἱ μὲν δὲ αὐτοὶ προϊέμενοι ἐφηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι (τοιαύτης χαρὴ καὶ ἄρετής φιλία), τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέων 11641 κατὰ τὴν προάρεσιν (αὐτῇ γὰρ τοῦ φιλίου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)· οὕτω δὲ ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς ϕιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσωσιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμα ἡ ἄξια μετρεῖται, τιμή τὸ ἀφόροφος οὐκ ἄν χένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἵσως ἰκανόν, καθόπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ

8 πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δὲ οὕσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν, μᾶλλον μὲν ἵσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίγνεσθαι τῇ ὑπερβολὴν· δοκοῦσαν ἄμφοῖν κατ' ἄξιαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τούτῳ

1 προλαμβάνεις Μβ. 2 Richards.

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α Hesiod, Works and Days, 370, μισθὸς δ' ἄνδρι φιλίω εἰρημένος ἄριστος ἔστω, 'let the wage stated to a friend stand good.'

β i.e., after he has found out in the course of the lessons what that knowledge amounts to. ὁ Cf. viii. xiii. 2.

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lessons in any subject, he used to tell his pupil to estimate the value he set upon his knowledge, and accepted a fee of that amount. In such matters however some people prefer the principle of 'the wage stated.' But people who take the money in advance, and then, having made extravagant professions, fail to perform what they undertook, naturally meet with complaints because they have not fulfilled their bargain. Perhaps however the sophists are bound to demand their fees in advance, since nobody would pay money for the knowledge which they possess. Persons paid in advance then naturally meet with complaints if they do not perform the service for which they have taken the pay.

But in cases where no agreement is come to as to the value of the service, if it is proffered for the recipient's own sake, as has been said above, no complaint arises, for a friendship based on virtue does not give rise to quarrels; and the return made should be in proportion to the intention of the benefactor, since intention is the measure of a friend, and of virtue. This is the principle on which it would seem that payment ought to be made to those who have imparted instruction in philosophy; for the value of their service is not measurable in money, and no honour paid them could be an equivalent, but no doubt all that can be expected is that to them, as to the gods and to our parents, we should make such return as is in our power.

When on the other hand the gift is not disinterested but made with a view to a recompense, it is no doubt the best thing that a return should be made such as both parties concur in thinking to be what is due. But failing such concurrence, it would
ARISTOTLE

μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ ἰστὸς ὑφεληθῇ ἢ ἀνθοῦ ὅσον τὴν ὁδον δεῖ εἰλετ' ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβῶν ἐξεὶ τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀνίκους οὕτω φαίνεται γνώμενον· ἐναχρὰ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἴναι, ὡς δέον, ὥς ἐπιστεύει, διαλυθήναι πρὸς τούτων καθὰ πέρ ἐκουσίων ἐναι τάξαι τού ἐπιπρᾶσκοντος.  

15 ὥ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τούτων οἴεται δικαιότερον εἴναι πάξαι τοῦ ἐπιπρᾶσκοντος ἐναι πάξαι τοῦ ἐπιπρᾶσκοντος.  

1 τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ ὅτι τοῦ ἴσου τιμᾶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ θυγατρίων λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἶκεία καὶ ἀ διδάσκων ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῖς ἀξία. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβή γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ  

20 λαμβάνοντες.  

3 δὲ δ' ἰσως οὐ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν ὅσον ἔχοντες φαίνεται ἀξίαν, ἀλλ' ὅσον πρὶν ἔχειν ἑτέρα.  

4 Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οὗν πότερα δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰαπρῶν πιστεύειν, ἢ στρατηγοῦν δὲ χειροτονητέον τῶν πολεμικῶν ὁμολογίων, ἢ δὲ φίλων  

25 μάλλον ἡ σπουδαίων υπηρετητέον, καὶ ἐνεργεῖται ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μάλλον ἡ ἐταίρῃ προσετέον,  

2 ἐὰν ἀμφότεροι ὑπ' ἐνδεχῆται. ἀρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ  

1 ὥ γὰρ . . . ἐπιπρᾶσκοντος secl. Ramsauer.  

2 τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ . . . λαβεῖν infra post ἑτέρα tr. Ramsauer.  

3 τὰ γὰρ οἶκεία . . . λαμβάνοντες secl. Ramsauer.  

4 πιστεύειν LB, πιστεύειν KB, πιεστεύειν MB.  

5 προσετέον KB; ὁπέτερον.  

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* The price is fixed by what the buyer is willing to pay.
* Cf. viii. xiii. 6. The phrase occurs in Plato, Republic, 556 a: of the 'voluntary private transactions' of v. ii. 13.
* This sentence seems to come in better at the end of 522
seem to be not only inevitable but just that the amount of the return should be fixed by the party that received the initial service, since the donor will have recovered what the recipient really owes when he has been paid the value of the service to him, or the sum that he would have been willing to pay as the price of the pleasure. For in buying and selling also this seems to be the practice a; and in some countries the law does not allow actions for the enforcement of voluntary covenants, b on the ground that when you have trusted a man you ought to conclude the transaction as you began it. For it is thought fairer for the price to be fixed by the person who received credit than by the one who gave credit. c For as a rule those who have a thing value it differently from those who want to get it. For one’s own possessions and gifts always seem to one worth a great deal; but nevertheless the repayment is actually determined by the valuation of the recipient. But he ought no doubt to estimate the gift not at what it seems to him to be worth now that he has received it, but at the value he put on it before he received it.

ii Other questions that may be raised are such as these: Does a man owe his father unlimited respect and obedience, or ought he when ill to take the advice of a physician, and when electing a general to vote for the best soldier? and similarly, ought he to do a service to a friend rather than to a virtuous man, and ought he to repay his obligation to a benefactor rather than make a present to a comrade, when he is not in a position to do both?

the chapter. The sentences immediately preceding and following have been plausibly rejected as interpolations.
τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ δύναιν; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοῖας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγάλες καὶ μικρόττιτε καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαῖῳ. ὅτι δὲ ὅπως ὁ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἀδηλον. καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἔπι τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταῖρους, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ὃ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταῖρῳ δοτέον. ἦσως δὲ οὐδὲ τούτ' ἄει, οἶου τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερον τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντὶ λυτρωτέον, κἂν ὅστισον ἢ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐαλωκότι ἀπαντοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθὸλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, εἰδ' ὑπερτείη ἢ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἔστιν ὅσον τὸ τῆς προὐπαρχῆς ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ μὲν σπουδαίον εἶδος εὐ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνεται, δὴ οἶεται μοχθηρῶν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανείστενον. δὲ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιείσθαι ἔδανενεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὅντι, δὲ οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιείσθαι παρὰ τὸ πονηρόν. εἴτε τοῖνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα. εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἰόνται δὲ, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ

1 ὥσπερ καὶ Αργυρόπυλος: ὥσπερ Κ, καὶ ὥσπερ.
3 οἴεται ? ed.
5 ὥσπερ Μ: δόξειεν.

4 Perhaps the text should be emended to 'but B thinks he is.'
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, IX. 11. 2–5

2 Now perhaps with all these matters it is not easy to lay down an exact rule, because the cases vary indefinitely in importance or unimportance, and in nobility or urgency. But it is quite clear that no one person is entitled to unlimited consideration. As a general rule one ought to return services rendered rather than do favours to one’s comrades, just as one ought to pay back a loan to a creditor rather than give the money to a friend. Yet perhaps even this rule is not without exceptions. For example, (a) suppose one has been ransomed from brigands; ought one to ransom one’s ransomer in turn, whoever he may be—or even if he has not been captured himself but asks for his money back, ought one to repay him—or ought one to ransom one’s own father? for it might be thought to be a man’s duty to ransom his father even before himself. As a general rule then, as has been said, one ought to pay back a debt, but if the balance of nobility or urgency is on the side of employing the money for a gift, then one ought to decide in favour of the gift. For (b) there are occasions when it would be actually unfair to return the original service; as for instance when A has done B a service knowing him to be a good man, and B is called upon to return the service to A whom he believes to be a bad man. For even when A has lent B a loan, B is not always bound to lend A a loan in turn: A may have lent money to B, who is an honest man, expecting to get his money back, while B would have no hope of recovering from A, who is a rascal. If A is really a rascal, the return he asks for is not a fair one; and even if A is not a rascal, but people think he is, it would not be deemed unreasonable for B to refuse.
οὐν πολλάκις εὑρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὧμοιος ἔχουσι τὸ ὀρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἀ εἰσιν.—ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ διὰ πάσην ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῶν πατρῶν πάντα, καθάπερ οὔδὲ τῷ Διῷ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἔπει δ’ ἐτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ εὐεργεταῖς, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὔτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαύνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς, τούτως γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἑτέρα κήδη δὲ μάλιστ’ οὖνται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντῶν διὰ ταύτο. δόξει δ’ ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ’ ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αὐτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὅν ἦ ἐαυτῶι εἰς ταύτ’ ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πάσαν δὲ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ, οὔτ’ αὕτη τῆν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἤ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικῆν, ὧμοιος δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικῆν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμήν τῆν καθ’ ἀπαντάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. πρὸς ἑταῖροι δ’ αὕτη καὶ ἀδελφοῖς παρρησίαν καὶ ἀπαντῶν κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι 80 δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀπασών ἄει πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ

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1 τὴν ὀμ. Kb.

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* See i. iii. 4, ii. ii. 3.

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Hence, as has been frequently remarked already, discussions about our emotions and actions only admit of such degree of definiteness as belongs to the matters with which they deal.

It is quite clear therefore that all people have not the same claim upon us, and that even a father's claim is not unlimited, just as Zeus does not have all the sacrifices. Since the claims of parents and brothers, comrades and benefactors, are different, we ought to render to each that which is proper and suitable to each. Thus is in fact the principle on which men are observed to act. They invite their relatives to a wedding, because they are members of the family, and therefore concerned in the family's affairs; also it is thought to be specially incumbent on relations to attend funerals, for the same reason.

It would be felt that our parents have the first claim on us for maintenance, since we owe it to them as a debt, and to support the authors of our being stands before self-preservation in moral nobility. Honour also is due to parents, as it is to the gods, though not indiscriminate honour: one does not owe to one's father the same honour as to one's mother, nor yet the honour due to a great philosopher or general, but one owes to one's father the honour appropriate to a father, and to one's mother that appropriate to her. Again, we should pay to all our seniors the honour due to their age, by rising when they enter, offering them a seat, and so on. Towards comrades and brothers on the other hand we should use frankness of speech, and share all our possessions with them. Kinsmen also, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and the rest—to all we must always endeavour to render their due, comparing
συγκρίνειν τά ἐκάστοις ύπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκείοτητα
10 καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρήσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ράων ἢ σύγκρισις,1 τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργω-
δεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ γε τούτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' 35
ός ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.

iii Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς
φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἡ πρὸς 1186 b
μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἣδυ φίλους οὖνας,
ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον δια-
λύεσθαι: ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι. οὐ ἀπολιπόντων
εὑλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλεσεὶ δ' ἂν τις, εἰ διὰ οὐ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἦδυ ἄγατῶν προσεποίητο
διὰ τὸ θῆσι. δ' γὰρ ἐν ἄρχῃ εἰπομεν, πλείοται
diaforai γίγνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως
2 οὖνται καὶ ὁσι φίλοι. οὐταν μὲν οὖν διαφευγοθῇ
τις, καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ θῆσι μηθὲν
toioûton ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἐαυτὸν αἰτιῶτ' ἂν 10
ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ,
δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύσουσιν, ὡσι περὶ τι-
3 μιστὲρον ἡ κακουργία. ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχηται2 ὃς
ἀγαθῶν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς <ἡ>3 καὶ δοκῆι.

1 σύγκρισις Ruelle: κρίσις.
2 ἀποδέχηται ????? Richards: ἀποδέχηται.
3 <ἡ> add. Ald.

-o Cf. viii. xiii. 5.
5 At Athens the penalty for coining was death.
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, IX. ii. 9—iii. 3

their several claims in respect of relationship and of virtue or utility. Between persons of the same kind discrimination is comparatively easy; but it is a harder matter when they are differently related to us. Nevertheless we must not shirk the task on that account, but must decide their claims as well as we are able.

iii Another question is, whether a friendship should or should not be broken off when the friends do not remain the same.

It may be said that where the motive of the friendship is utility or pleasure, it is not unnatural that it should be broken off when our friends no longer possess the attribute of being useful or agreeable. It was those attributes that we loved, and when they have failed it is reasonable that love should cease. But a man might well complain, if, though we really liked him for the profit or pleasure he afforded, we had pretended to love him for his character. As was said at the outset, differences between friends most frequently arise when the nature of their friendship is not what they think it is. When therefore a man has made a mistake, and has fancied that he was loved for his character, without there having been anything in his friend’s behaviour to warrant the assumption, he has only himself to blame. But when he has been deceived by his friend’s pretence, there is ground for complaint against the deceiver: in fact he is a worse malefactor than those who counterfeit the coinage, inasmuch as his offence touches something more precious than money.

3 Again, supposing we have admitted a person to our friendship as a good man, and he becomes, or we
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ

ἀρ' ἐτ' φιλητέων; ἦ οὗ δυνατόν, εἰπερ μὴ πάν
φιλητῶν ἄλλα τάγαθον, [οὔτε δὲ φιλητέων ποιηρὸν] 16
οὐδὲ δὲ; φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲ
ὀμοιοῦσθαι φαύλως· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ
ὀμοῖο φίλον. ἄρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον; ἦ οὗ
πάσων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἁνάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ
ἡδὸς ἢ τὴν υόσιαν, ὀσὶ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας 20
οἰκείοτερον. δόξειε δ' ἣν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν
ἀτοπον ποιεῖν οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν·
ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασώσαι αἵφισταται.

4 εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γένοιτο
καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἄρετῇ, ἄρα χρητέον
φίλως· ἦ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει 25
μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἶνον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς
φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς
ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἶπ' οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶπεν φίλοι
μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες
καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ'
ὑπάρξῃ αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τοῦτω οὐκ ἦν φίλοις 80
ἐἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἶνον τε. εἴρηται δὲ 4 περὶ
τοῦτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὐδέν ἀλλοίοτερον πρὸς αὐτὸν

1 [οὔτε . . . ποιηρῷ] om. Ι': φιλητῶν τοῦ Stahr.
2 οὐδὲ Ramsauer: οὔτε.
3 τοιοῦτῳ ἦ Κ.".
4 δὲ ἢθη? ed.

* Cf. vii. i. 6.
5 Cf. vii. v. 3.

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think he has become, a bad man: are we still bound to love him? Perhaps it is impossible to do so, since only what is good is lovable; and also wrong, for we ought not to be lovers of evil, nor let ourselves become like what is worthless; and, as has been said above, a like is the friend of like. Should we therefore break off the friendship at once? Perhaps not in every case, but only when our friends have become incurably bad; for so long as they are capable of reform we are even more bound to help them morally than we should be to assist them financially, since character is a more valuable thing than wealth and has more to do with friendship. However, one could not be held to be doing anything unnatural if one broke off the friendship; for it was not a man of that sort that one loved: he has altered, and if one cannot restore him, one gives him up.

4 On the other hand, suppose one friend to have remained the same while the other has improved, and become greatly the superior in virtue: ought the latter to keep up the friendship? Perhaps it is out of the question; and this becomes especially clear when the gap between them is a wide one, as may happen with two people who were friends in boyhood. One may have remained a boy in mind, while the other is a man of the highest ability; how can they be friends, when they have different tastes and different likes and dislikes? They will no longer even enjoy each other's society; but without this, intercourse and therefore friendship are, as we saw, impossible. But this has been discussed already.

5 Are we then to behave towards a former friend
ΕΚΤΕΟΝ ᾧ ἐὼ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ᾧ δὲν μνείαν ἐχει τῆς γενομένης συμπεπειάς, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ᾧ ὀθνείας οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζομαι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς γενομένους ἀπονεμήτεον τι διὰ τῆς προγεγευμένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δὲ ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ᾧ διάλυσις γένηται;

Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἳς αἱ φιλίαι ὀρίζονται, ἐσόντα τίλ ὑπὲρ τῶν πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐλπισθέναι, τιθέομεν γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγάθα ᾧ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκεῖνον ἔσχεν. ᾧ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ καὶ τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθαι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκροκότες, οἵ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτα αἰροῦμεν. ᾧ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τὸν φίλον, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τῶν μητέρας συμβαίνει.

Στὸι τῶν δὲ τινὶ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἐαυτὸν δὲ τοὺς ἐκάστου τῶν ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾧ τοιούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντο εἶναι ἐσόντας δὲ, καθάπερ ἐφηταί, μέτρον εἴκαστον τῶν ἀρετὴν καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι). οὗτοι γὰρ ὀμογνωμονεῖ ἐαυτῷ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρέγονται κατὰ πάσαν τὴν ψυχήν. καὶ βούλεται δὲ ἐαυτῷ τἀγάθα καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει τοὺς γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ

1 πέλας Bywater: φίλοις πέλας Kb, φιλίαι.
2 καὶ τῶν...προσκεκροκότες secl. Ramsauer, <καὶ> οἱ προσκ. ? Susemihl.
3 ἐκάστου ed.: ἐκάστων Kb, τῷ vulg.
4 δέ: γάρ Lb.
5 ᾧ Ramsauer: δη.
in exactly the same way as if he had never been our friend at all? Perhaps we ought to remember our past intimacy, and just as we think it right to show more kindness to friends than to strangers, so likewise some attention should be paid, for the sake of old times, to those who were our friends in the past, that is, if the rupture was not caused by extreme wickedness on their part.

iv The forms which friendly feeling for our neighbours takes, and the marks by which the different forms of friendship are defined, seem to be derived from the feelings of regard which we entertain for ourselves. A friend is defined as (a) one who wishes, and promotes by action, the real or apparent good of another for that other’s sake; or (b) one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend’s sake. (This is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of former friends who have quarrelled.\(^a\)) Others say that a friend is (c) one who frequents another’s society, and (d) who desires the same things as he does, or (e) one who shares his friend’s joys and sorrows. (This too is very characteristic of mothers.) Friendship also is defined by one or other of these marks.\(^b\) But each of them is also found in a good man’s feelings towards himself (and in those of all other men as well, in so far as they believe themselves to be good; but, as has been said, virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything). For (d) the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with every part of his nature. Also (a) he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by action (for it is a mark of a good man to exert himself actively for the good);
τάγαθόν διαπονεῖν, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνείκα (τοῦ γὰρ
dιανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὡπερ ἐκαστὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ). καὶ ἡν ἔν
dὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ συζεσθαι, καὶ
μάλιστα τοῦτο ὑ φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπονδαίῳ
τὸ εἶναι ἐκαστὸς δὲ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τάγαθα, 20
γενόμενος δὲ ἀλλὸς οὐδεὶς αἱρείται πάντ᾽ ἔχειν
[ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον] ¹ (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς
tάγαθον), ἀλλ᾽ ὃν ὁ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν. ² δόξει δ᾽ ἂν
5 τὸ νοοῦν ἐκαστὸς εἶναι, ἡ μάλιστα. συνδιάγεω
τὸ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται ἡδὲ ἐστὶν γὰρ αὐτὸ
ποιεῖ. τῶν τέ γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ ²⁵
μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων <αἰ>² ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαὶ,
αἱ τοιαῦτα δὴ ἡδείαι καὶ θεωρηματῶν δ᾽ εὐπορεῖ
tῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνηδεῖ σύμβολο
ἑαυτῷ πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρὸν τε καὶ
ἥδυ, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοτ' ἀλλο' ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς
eιπέων. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκαστὰ τοῦτων ὑπὲρ
ἀρχεὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὡσπερ
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτὸς), καὶ
ἡ φιλία τοῦτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οίς ταῖθ᾽
6 ὑπάρχει.—πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερον ἐστὶν ὡς
οὐκ ἐστὶ φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. δόξει
δ᾽ ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ἥ ἐστὶ δύο ἡ πλείω [ἐκ 35

¹ Vermehren. ² ἐκαστὸς ... ἐστίν secl. Ramsauer. ³ ed.

¹ The parenthesis seems to mean that as no one gains by
God’s now having the good, he would not gain if a new
person which was no longer himself were to possess it (Ross).
But ‘and every one...whatever he may be’ should perhaps
be rejected as interpolated.

² The mss. give ‘in so far as two or more of the charac-
teristics specified are present,’ which hardly gives a sense.
and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a man’s real self). Also (b) he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his rational part. For existence is good for the virtuous man; and everyone wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the world on condition of becoming somebody else (for God possesses the good even as it is), but only while remaining himself, whatever he may be; and it would appear that the thinking part is the real self, or is so more than anything else. And (c) the good man desires his own company; for he enjoys being by himself, since he has agreeable memories of the past, and good hopes for the future, which are pleasant too; also his mind is stored with subjects for contemplation. And (e) he is keenly conscious of his own joys and sorrows; for the same things give him pleasure or pain at all times, and not different things at different times, since he is not apt to change his mind.

It is therefore because the good man has these various feelings towards himself, and because he feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself (for a friend is another self), that friendship also is thought to consist in one or other of these feelings, and the possession of them is thought to be the test of a friend.

Whether a man can be said actually to feel friendship for himself is a question that may be dismissed for the present; though it may be held that he can do so in so far as he is a dual or composite being,

The words ‘though it may be held ... self-regard,’ have been suspected as an interpolation.
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tων εἰρημένων], καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας 1166 β
7 τῆς πρὸς αὐτῶν ὁμοιοῦται. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίτερ οὗτοι φαύλοις. ἀρ' οὖν ἦ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικείς εἰναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῆς φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιούργων ὤθεν ἡ ταυθ' ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδόν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἄκρατεῖς· αἴρονται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκοῦντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἰναι τὰ ἤδεα βλαβερὰ ὄντα· οἳ ὁ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἀ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἰναι οἷος δὲ πολλά καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ 9 ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἵ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδημερεύοντος, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμμηνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἐτερα ἐλπίζουσι καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὤντες, μεθ' ἐτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλαμβάνονται. οὐθὲν τε φιλητῶν ἔχοντες οὐθέν φιλικῶν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὲν 20 διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν τὸ δ' ἦδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεύο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἐλκεῖ 10 ὡσπερ διασπώντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἶνον τε ἀμα λυ-

1 Bywater.  2 δοξεῖε . . ὁμοιοῦται secl. Ramsauer.  3 καὶ om. Lb.  4 μισοῦνται: μισοῦσι τε Lb.
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and because very intense friendship resembles self-regard.

7 As a matter of fact, the feelings of self-regard described appear to be found in most people, even though they are of inferior moral worth. Perhaps men share them in so far as they have their own approval and believe in their own virtue; since the utterly worthless and criminal never possess them, or even have the appearance of doing so. Indeed it may almost be said that no morally inferior persons possess them. For (d) such persons are at variance with themselves, desiring one thing and wishing another: this is the mark of the unrestrained, who choose what is pleasant but harmful instead of what they themselves think to be good. (a) Others again, out of cowardice and idleness, neglect to do what they think best for their own interests. And (b) men who have committed a number of crimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make away with themselves. Also (c) bad men constantly seek the society of others and shun their own company, because when they are by themselves they recall much that was unpleasant in the past and anticipate the same in the future, whereas with other people they can forget. Moreover they feel no affection for themselves, because they have no lovable qualities. Hence (e) such men do not enter into their own joys and sorrows, as there is civil war in their souls; one part of their nature, owing to depravity, is pained by abstinence from certain indulgences while another part is pleased by it; one part pulls them one way and another the other, as if dragging them asunder.

8 Or if it be impossible to feel pain and pleasure at the
πεῦσθαι καὶ ἠδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρὸν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἡθῆ, καὶ οὐκ ἄν ἐβούλετο ἦδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελεῖας γὰρ οἱ φαύλοι γέ- 25 μουσών. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαύλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακείσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὔτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὔτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

6 Ἡ δὲ εὐνοῖα φιλικῶς1 μὲν ἐοικεῖν, οὐ μὴν ἐστὶ γε 30 φιλία: γίνεται γὰρ εὐνοῖα καὶ πρὸς ἁγνώτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὐ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἰρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φιλησίς ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὀρεξίων, τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ.

2 καὶ ἡ μὲν φιλησίς μετὰ συνηθεῖας, ἡ δ' εὐνοῖα 35 καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἰνον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἁγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὐνοὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συν- 1167 ἡ θέλουσιν, συμπράζομεν δ' ἂν οὐθέν· ὀπερ γὰρ εἰσπομεν, προσπαίως εὐνοὶ γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαῖως 8 στέργουσιν. ἐοικε δὴ ἄρχη φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἑρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὁψεως ἡδονῆ· μὴ γὰρ προσθεις 5 τῇ ἱδέα οὐθεὶς ἑρᾶ, δ' ἂν χαίρων τῷ εἰδει οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἑρᾶ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῆ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῆ. οὔτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ

1 φιλικῶς Kb: φιλία.

* See VIII. ii. 3.

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same time, at all events after indulging in pleasure they regret it a little later, and wish they had never acquired a taste for such indulgences; since the bad are always changing their minds.

Thus a bad man appears to be devoid even of affection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature. If then such a state of mind is utterly miserable, we should do our utmost to shun wickedness and try to be virtuous. That is the way both to be friends with ourselves and to win the friendship of others.

5 Goodwill appears to be an element of friendly feeling, but it is not the same thing as friendship; for it can be felt towards strangers, and it can be unknown to its object, whereas friendship cannot. But that has been discussed already. 6

Neither is goodwill the same as affection. For it has no intensity, nor does it include desire, but these things are necessarily involved in affection.

2 Also affection requires intimate acquaintance, whereas goodwill may spring up all of a sudden, as happens for instance in regard to the competitors in a contest; the spectators conceive goodwill and sympathy for them, though they would not actively assist them, for as we said, their goodwill is a sudden growth, and the kindly feeling is only superficial.

3 Goodwill seems therefore to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. No one falls in love without first being charmed by beauty, but one may delight in another's beauty without necessarily being in love: one is in love only if one longs for the beloved when absent, and eagerly desires his presence. Similarly
οἶνον τ' εἶναι μὴ εύνους γενομένους, οἳ δ' εἴνοι oὐθὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τάγαθα οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξατεν δ' ἀν οὐθέν, ὁ oὐδ' ὁχληθεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαινή τις ἄν αὐτὴν ἁργὴν εἶναι φιλίαι, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαι, οὗ τῆς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τῇ διὰ τὸ ἴδιον οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοι ἐπὶ τούτως γίνεται. ὃ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεῖς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπουσθεν ἀπονέμει 15 τὴν εὐνοίαν τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· δ' ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος των εὐπραγείων ἐλπίδα ἐξων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκεῖνου, οὐκ ἐσικ' εὔνους ἐκεῖνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰσιντ' καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτόν 4 διὰ των ἁργησι. ὅλως δ' εὐνοία δι' ἄρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειαι των γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φαινῇ καλὸς τις ἥ ἄνδρεις ἢ τῷ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εὐπόμεν.

VI Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀμονοία φαίνεται· διάπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειν ἃν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὃτους ὀμογνωμονοῦντες ὀμονοεῖν φασίν, οἶνον τοὺς περὶ 25 τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὀμονοεῖν1). ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὀμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὀμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταύτα προαιρέσθηνται καὶ πράττοντι τὰ κοινῆ δόξαντα. 2 περὶ τὰ πρακταὶ δὴ ὀμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ

1 ὀμογνωμονοεῖν  ? ed.

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men cannot be friends without having conceived mutual goodwill, though well-wishers are not necessarily friends: they merely desire the good of those whose well-wishers they are, and would not actively assist them to attain it, nor be put to any trouble on their behalf. Hence extending the meaning of the term friendship we may say that goodwill is inoperative friendship, which when it continues and reaches the point of intimacy may become friendship proper—not the sort of friendship whose motive is utility or pleasure, for these do not arouse goodwill. Goodwill is indeed rendered in return for favours received, but this is merely the payment of a due; and that desire for another's welfare which springs from the anticipation of favours to come does not seem really to show goodwill for one's benefactor, but rather for oneself; just as to court a man for some interested motive is not friendship. Speaking generally, true goodwill is aroused by some kind of excellence or moral goodness: it springs up when one person thinks another beautiful or brave or the like, as in the case we mentioned of competitors in a contest.

Concord also seems to be a friendly feeling. Hence (iii) Concord, it is not merely agreement of opinion, for this might exist even between strangers. Nor yet is agreement in reasoned judgements about any subject whatever, for instance astronomy, termed concord; to agree about the facts of astronomy is not a bond of friendship. Concord is said to prevail in a state, when the citizens agree as to their interests, adopt the same policy, and carry their common resolves into execution. Concord then refers to practical
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tà en megéthei kai ta evdekómeva ámfoi òpárkein 80 ἡ πάσων oíon ai póleis, ótan pásis dokh tás árchas aírētás elnai, ἡ συμμαχεῖν Δακεδαμονίοις, ἡ árchein Pittakón (óte kai autós ἦθελεν). ótan δ' ékateros eautón vouληται, ὡσπερ oí en tais Φωκίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν οὐ γάρ ἐσθ᾽ ὀμονοεῖν τὸ <τὸ> καὶ diakonos ὡσπερ ὡσπερ πάσιν εὐγνωταί οὖν ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δή ψιλα φαινεται ἡ ὑμονοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται perὶ tā συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ tā eis tôn βιον ἀνηκοντα. 6

3 ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὑμονοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν 5 οὖτοι γάρ καὶ εαυτοῖς ὑμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μὲνει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὡσπερ εὐριτος, βουλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα,

4 τοῦτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἶδο τε ὑμονοεῖν πλην ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ 10 καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὑφελίμους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας. ἔαυτῷ δ' ἐκαστὸς βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει μὴ γὰρ τηροῦντων

1 Richards. 2 δὴ Ramsauer: δὲ.

a Pittacus was elected dictator of Mitylene early in the sixth century b.c.; he ruled for fourteen years, and then laid down his office. All the citizens wished him to continue, but this was not strictly unanimity or Concord, since there was one dissentient, Pittacus himself.

b Eteocles and Polynices.

c Euripides, Phoen., 588 f.
ends, and practical ends of importance, and able to be realized by both or all the parties: for instance, there is concord in the state when the citizens unanimously decree that the offices of state shall be elective, or that an alliance shall be made with Sparta, or that Pittacus shall be dictator (when Pittacus was himself willing to be dictator). When each of two persons wishes himself to rule, like the rivals in the Phoenissae, there is discord; since men are not of one mind merely when each thinks the same thing (whatever this may be), but when each thinks the same thing in relation to the same person: for instance, when both the common people and the upper classes wish that the best people shall rule; for only so can all parties get what they desire.

Concord appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens, which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life.

3 Now concord in this sense exists between good men, since these are of one mind both with themselves and with one another, as they always stand more or less on the same ground; for good men's wishes are steadfast, and do not ebb and flow like the tide, and they wish for just and expedient ends, which they strive to attain in common. The base on the other hand are incapable of concord, except in some small degree, as they are of friendship, since they try to get more than their share of advantages, and take less than their share of labours and public burdens. And while each desires this for himself, he spies on his neighbour to prevent him from doing likewise; for unless they keep watch over one
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tο κοινόν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς οὐσια-ζεω, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἑπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

vii Οἱ δ’ εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὐ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγων γινόμενον ἐπιξηγεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλεῖστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφειλεταῖς καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφειλοῦντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφειλοῦν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφει-λόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομμουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ’ οὖν εἶναι ἐπιμελεῖς τὸ ἀντ-αποδοῦναι. 'Επίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τὰχ’ ἀν ψαίνω ταύτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦθεωμένους· ἔοικε δ’ ἀνθρωπικῶς, ἀμήνημοι γὰρ οἰ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὗ πάρχειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἐφίκεται. δόξεις δ’ ἀν φυσικῶτερον εἶναι τὸ αὐτίον, καὶ οὐδ’ ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φιλήμις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δεύτερον βουλήσαι τῆς κομμοῦντας ἐνεκα· οἱ δ’ εὗ πεποιηκότες πιλούσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὕ πεποιηθῶσι, καὶ μὴθεν ὃς χρήσιμοι μηδ’ εἰς ὕστερον γένοιτ’ ἄν. ὡσ’ ὑπὲρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν συμβεβηκέν· πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ὀφείλειν ἐργον ἀγαπᾶ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀγαπηθείη ἀν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐργοῦ ἐμπίπτον γενομένου. μάλιστα δ’ 1168 a

1 φαίνεται <αὐτίον> ? Richards.
2 τὸ Bywater : τῷ.
3 εὗ add. Π.

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a This half-line of verse (Epicharmus doubtless wrote θαμένωσι) is otherwise unknown.
b Cf. vii. iii. 9.

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another, the common interests go to ruin. The result is discord, everybody trying to make others do their duty but refusing to do it themselves.

vii Benefactors seem to love those whom they benefit more than those who have received benefits love those who have conferred them; and it is asked why this is so, as it seems to be unreasonable. The view most generally taken is that it is because the one party is in the position of a debtor and the other of a creditor; just as therefore in the case of a loan, whereas the borrower would be glad to have his creditor out of the way, the lender actually watches over his debtor’s safety, so it is thought that the conferrer of a benefit wishes the recipient to live in order that he may receive a return, but the recipient is not particularly anxious to make a return. Epicharmus no doubt would say that people who give this explanation are ‘looking at the seamy side’ of life; but all the same it appears to be not untrue to human nature, for most men have short memories, and are more desirous of receiving benefits than of bestowing them.

2 But it might be held that the real reason lies deeper, and that the case of the creditor is not really a parallel. With him it is not a matter of affection, but only of wishing his debtor’s preservation for the sake of recovering his money; whereas a benefactor feels friendship and affection for the recipient of his bounty even though he is not getting anything out of him and is never likely to do so.

3 The same thing happens with the artist: every artist loves his own handiwork more than that handiwork if it were to come to life would love him. This
Aristotle

ζωσι τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὕτω τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες
4 ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιοῦτω δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἐδ πεπονθὸς ἐργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν·
touto de ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἐργον τὸν ποιήσας, τοῦτον ἤτο ἐργασιᾶς τὸ ἐργον ἐστὶ πως.
5 ὥσπερ στέργει δὴ τὸ ἐργον, διὸτι καὶ
toúto δὲ ψυχικόν· δὲ γὰρ ἐστὶ δυνάμει,
6 τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἐργον μηνύει.—ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργετῆ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν,
χαίρειν ἐν ὧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐθὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ’ εἶπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δὲ

6 ἤττον ἤδω καὶ φιλήτον. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι
μένει τὸ ἐργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ
dὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἤδεια δὲ
ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνεργεία, τοῦ δὲ μέλη
λοιπὸς ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μυθῆ.
7 ἤδωστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν, καὶ φιλήτον
ὀμολογ. ἢ τε μυθῆ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἤδεια, τῶν
dὲ χρήσιμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἤττον· ἡ προσδοκία δὲ
ἀνάπαλων ἐχειν ἐοικεν.—καὶ ἢ μὲν φίλησιν ποιήσει
eοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν. τοὺς ὑπὲρ-
8 ἔχουσι δὴ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ

1 δὴ ΚβΓ.
2 τῷ μὲν οὖν ... παροίχεται hic ed.: infra post ἤδεια . . .
3 ὀμολογ.

*In a sense he exists ‘actually’ as long as his work lasts, though strictly speaking he exists as an actual maker only while the act of making is going on. A possible variant rendering is ‘and in a sense the work is its maker actualized.’

* This sentence in the mss. follows the next.
Nicomachean Ethics, IX. vii. 3-6

is perhaps especially true of poets, who have an exaggerated affection for their own poems and love them as parents love their children. The position of the benefactor then resembles that of the artist; the recipient of his bounty is his handiwork, and he therefore loves him more than his handiwork loves its maker. The reason of this is that all things desire and love existence; but we exist in activity, since we exist by living and doing; and in a sense one who has made something exists actively, and so he loves his handiwork because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental principle of nature: what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality.

Moreover for the benefactor there is an element of nobility in the act, and so he feels pleased with the person who is its object; but there is nothing noble for the recipient of the benefit in his relation to his benefactor: at most, it is profitable; and what is profitable is not so pleasant or lovable as what is noble. The doer’s achievement therefore remains, for nobility or beauty is long-lived, but its utility to the recipient passes away. But while the actuality of the present, the hope of the future, and the memory of the past are all pleasant, actuality is the most pleasant of the three, and the most loved. Also whereas the memory of noble things is pleasant, that of useful ones is hardly at all so, or at least less so; although with anticipation the reverse seems to be the case.

Again, loving seems to be an active experience, being loved a passive one; hence affection and the various forms of friendly feeling are naturally found in the more active party to the relationship.
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7 tα φιλικά.—ἐτι δὲ τα ἐπιτόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τα χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποίεῖν ἑργῶνες. (διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι ὡς ἐπιπονοωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις [καὶ μᾶλλον ἰσασιν ὃτι αὐτῶν]. 2) δόξειε δὴ 2 ὃν καὶ τοῦτο 4 τοῖς εὐ- ἐργέταις οίκειον εἶναι.

viii Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἡ ἄλλον τινα: ἐπιτυμώσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ως ἐν αἰσχρῶ φιλούτων ἀποκαλοῦσι. δοκεῖ τε ὃ μὲν φαύλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν 90 πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσω ἂν μοχθηρότερος ἦ, τοσοῦ- τω μᾶλλον (ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἶνοι ὃτι οὐθὲν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει), ὃ ἐπιεικής διὰ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ὅσω ἂν βελτίων ἦ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ 2 φιλὸν ἔνεκα, τὸ δ’ αὐτοῦ παρᾶσην.—τοῖς λόγοις 36 δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἐργα διαφωνεῖ, σὺκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ 1168 b γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φιλὸν· φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ὃ μοῦσαν τάγαθα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεῖς εἶσεται, ταῦτα δ’ ὑπάρχει μάλιστ’ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ’ ὡς ὁ φίλος ἄριστος· εἰρηταὶ γὰρ ὃτι ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικά καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διτῆκει. καὶ αἱ παρομιῶσι δὲ πάσας ὁμογνώμονοισιν, οἷον τὸ “μία ψυχῇ” καὶ “κοινα 1 δὲ M b: δὴ. 2 Ramsauer. 3 ὃ K b: δὴ. 4 καὶ τοῦτο ed.: τοῦτο καλ. 5 οἶνον add. K b G. 6 οὐθὲν <οὖς> Imelmann. 7 ὃ ὃ K b: ἓν ὃ? Bywater.

a This seems an irrelevant insertion from viii. xii. 2 f. b See c. iv. c Euripides, Orestes 1046.
7 Again, everybody loves a thing more if it has cost him trouble; for instance those who have made money love money more than those who have inherited it. Now to receive a benefit seems to involve no labour, but to confer one is an effort. (This is why mothers love their children more than fathers, because parenthood costs the mother more trouble [and the mother is more certain that the child is her own].\(^a\)) This also then would seem to be a characteristic of benefactors.

viii The question is also raised whether one ought to love oneself or someone else most. We censure those who put themselves first, and ‘lover of self’ is used as a term of reproach. And it is thought that a bad man considers himself in all he does, and the more so the worse he is—so it is a complaint against him for instance that ‘he never does a thing unless you make him’—whereas a good man acts from a sense of what is noble, and the better he is the more he so acts, and he considers his friend’s interest, disregarding his own.

2 But the facts do not accord with these theories; nor is this surprising. For we admit that one should love one’s best friend most; but the best friend is he that, when he wishes a person’s good, wishes it for that person’s own sake, even though nobody will ever know of it. Now this condition is most fully realized in a man’s regard for himself, as indeed are all the other attributes that make up the definition of a friend; for it has been said already \(^b\) that all the feelings that constitute friendship for others are an extension of regard for self. Moreover, all the proverbs agree with this; for example, ‘Friends have one soul between them,’\(^c\) ‘Friends’ goods are
τὰ φίλων’ καὶ ‘ἰσότης φιλότης’ καὶ ‘γόνις κνῆμης ἔγγυον’. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστ’ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ. καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ’ ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δὴ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεών ἐπεσθαί, ἀμφοὶ ἐχόντων τὸ πιστὸν.

3 Ἡσυχ οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαρέιν καὶ διαρίζειν ἐφ’ ὅσοιν ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῆ ἄληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἐκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τὰς ἂν γένοιτο δὴλον. οἱ ἡμὲν οὖν εἰς ὁνείδος ἀγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήματι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἱδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅρεσχον, καὶ ἐσπονδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὃς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητα ἔστων. οἰ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζουσι ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοὺς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. τοιούτω δ’ εἰσίν οἱ πολλοὶ διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος. δυκαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτωι φιλαύτους ὁ ὅνειδιζόμενος, δὴ δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαύθ’ αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰς ὁδόσιν ὁι πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἀδηλίως εἰ γὰρ τις ἀεὶ σπόνδαξι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἡ τὰ σώφρονα ἡ ὅποιας ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως

1 δὴ Bywater: δὲ.
common property,' 'Amity is equality,' 'The knee is nearer than the shin.' All of these sayings will apply most fully to oneself; for a man is his own best friend. Therefore he ought to love himself most.

So it is naturally debated which of these two views we ought to adopt, since each of them has some plausibility.

3 Now where there is a conflict of opinion the proper course is doubtless to get the two views clearly distinguished, and to define how far and in what way each of them is true. So probably the matter may become clear if we ascertain what meaning each side attaches to the term 'self-love.'

4 Those then who make it a term of reproach call men lovers of self when they assign to themselves the larger share of money, honours, or bodily pleasures; since these are the things which most men desire and set their hearts on as being the greatest goods, and which accordingly they compete with each other to obtain. Now those who take more than their share of these things are men who indulge their appetites, and generally their passions and the irrational part of their souls. But most men are of this kind. Accordingly the use of the term 'lover of self' as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind is bad. Hence self-love is rightly censured in those who are lovers of self in this sense. And that it is those who take too large a share of things of this sort whom most people usually mean when they speak of lovers of self, is clear enough. For if a man were always bent on outdoing everybody else in acting justly or temperately or in displaying any other of the

\[a\] 'Charity begins at home' (Ross).
ἄεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐαυτῷ περιποιοῦτο, οὔθεις ἐρεῖ 6 τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξεις δ' ἂν ὁ τοιουτὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ καλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρί- 80 ζηταὶ ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριώτατῳ, καὶ πάντα τοῦτω πείθεται. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλει τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα δ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τοῦτω χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατῆς δὲ καὶ ἄκρατης λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ 95 μὴ, ὡς τοῦτον ἔκαστον ὄντος. καὶ πεπραγέναι 1169 1 δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐκαστὸς ἔστων ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐπεραν ἐίδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὃσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζην τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ἀρέγεσθαι τοῦτ' καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦτος 2 7 συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ 10

1 ἢ τοῦ Κβ.
virtues, and in general were always trying to secure for himself moral nobility, no one will charge him with love of self nor find any fault with him. Yet as a matter of fact such a man might be held to be a lover of self in an exceptional degree. At all events he takes for himself the things that are noblest and most truly good. Also it is the most dominant part of himself that he indulges and obeys in everything. But (a) as in the state it is the sovereign that is held in the fullest sense to be the state, and in any other composite whole it is the dominant part that is deemed especially to be that whole, so it is with man. He therefore who loves and indulges the dominant part of himself is a lover of self in the fullest degree. Again (b), the terms 'self-restrained' and 'unrestrained' denote being restrained or not by one’s intellect, and thus imply that the intellect is the man himself. Also (c) it is our reasoned acts that are felt to be in the fullest sense our own acts, voluntary acts. It is therefore clear that a man is or is chiefly the dominant part of himself, and that a good man values this part of himself most. Hence the good man will be a lover of self in the fullest degree, though in another sense than the lover of self so-called by way of reproach, from whom he differs as much as living by principle differs from living by passion, and aiming at what is noble from aiming at what seems expedient. Persons therefore who are exceptionally zealous in noble actions are universally approved and commended; and if all men vied with each other in moral nobility and strove to perform the noblest deeds, the common welfare would be fully realized, while individuals
τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτον ἐστιν. ὡστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φιλάντων εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὄνησται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει· τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ, βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλους.

8 πάθεσιν ἐπόμενοι. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἐν δὲ πράττειν καὶ ὃ πράττειν; ὃ ἐπιεικής, ὃ δὲ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἴρεται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὃ δὲ ἐπιεικής πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φιλῶν ἑνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δὲ ὑπεραποθήσεις, προήστεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιοῦμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλὸν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνων ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιπ' ἂν ἤ πολυν ἡρέμα, καὶ βιώσαι καλῶς ἑνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἐν τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πράξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικρὰς. τοῖς δὲ ὑπερ- 25 αποθήσεξος τούτοις ἰσῶς συμβαίνει· αἴρονται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοίτν' ἂν ἐφ' ὃ πλεῖονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίγνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φιλῷ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλὸν· τὸ δὲ 10 μεῖζὸν ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπνεύμει. καὶ περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ δ' αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φιλῷ ταῦτα προήστεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινεῖτον. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἴρομενος τὸ καλὸν. ἐνδέχεται

1 προοίτ' ed.: προοίτ'.
also could enjoy the greatest of goods, inasmuch as virtue is the greatest good.

Therefore the good man ought to be a lover of self, since he will then both benefit himself by acting nobly and aid his fellows; but the bad man ought not to be a lover of self, since he will follow his base passions, and so injure both himself and his neighbours. With the bad man therefore, what he does is not in accord with what he ought to do, but the good man does what he ought, since intelligence always chooses for itself that which is best, and the good man obeys his intelligence.

But it is also true that the virtuous man's conduct is often guided by the interests of his friends and of his country, and that he will if necessary lay down his life in their behalf. For he will surrender wealth and power and all the goods that men struggle to win, if he can secure nobility for himself; since he would prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of mild enjoyment, a year of noble life to many years of ordinary existence, one great and glorious exploit to many small successes. And this is doubtless the case with those who give their lives for others; thus they choose great nobility for themselves. Also the virtuous man is ready to forgo money if by that means his friends may gain more money; for thus, though his friend gets money, he himself achieves nobility, and so he assigns the greater good to his own share. And he behaves in the same manner as regards honours and offices also: all these things he will relinquish to his friend, for this is noble and praiseworthy for himself. He is naturally therefore thought to be virtuous, as he chooses moral nobility in preference to all other things. It may even
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de kai prágæis tòu filw próteíthai, kai éinai kállion tòu autón prágæi to áuton tòu filw
11 genésthai. ev pásì de tòis èpautetôs ò spou- õs daisos fainetai éautô toû kalou plêuon némuw. 1169b autw men ouv filauton éinai deî, katháper eîrhtai: óws dei oi polloi, ou chrh.

ix 'Amphibethetai de kai peri ton eidaímona, ei deîsetai filwv ò më. outhèn gar fasî deîn filwn toûs makarios kai autârkeias òupárxein: gar autois tâgathâ: autârkeias ouv òntas oudènos prosdeîsthai, ton de filon, èteron autôn ònta, porîzai ò di autôn ádonatei: òthen

otan ò daîmov ev didî, tî deî filwn;

2 èouke ò autôpov to pánt' aponeîmonas tâgathâ tòu eidaímon filous òmë apodidônai, ò dokheî tôn 10 ektoûs âgathôn mëgíston éinai.—ei te filon mallôn èste to ev poieîn ò pásochein, kai èstî toû âgathôn kai tôs ârîthûs to éuergeteîn, kállion ò di ev poieîn filous òdheîwv, tôwn ev peisoræn òn deî setai ò spoudaios. diô kai épìzhtetai pòteron en eûtukhias mallôn deî filon ò en âtukhias, òs 16 kai toû âtukhóntos deomênou tôwn éuergethstônÔn
3 kai tôw eûtukhóntow ouv ev poîhouswn.—autopov ò di isos kai to monôthn poieîn tôv makariow*

a Euripides, Orestes, 665.

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happen that he will surrender to his friend the performance of some achievement, and that it may be nobler for him to be the cause of his friend's performing it than to perform it himself.

11 Therefore in all spheres of praiseworthy conduct it is manifest that the good man takes the larger share of moral nobility for himself. In this sense then, as we said above, it is right to be a lover of self, though self-love of the ordinary sort is wrong.

ix Another debated question is whether friends are necessary or not for happiness. People say that the supremely happy are self-sufficing, and so have no need of friends: for they have the good things of life already, and therefore, being complete in themselves, require nothing further; whereas the function of a friend, who is a second self, is to supply things we cannot procure for ourselves. Hence the saying a

When fortune favours us, what need of friends?

2 But it seems strange that if we attribute all good things to the happy man we should not assign him friends, which we consider the greatest of external goods. Also if it be more the mark of a friend to give than to receive benefits, and if beneficence is a function of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will need friends as the objects of his beneficence.

Hence the further question is asked: Are friends more needed in prosperity or in adversity? It is argued that the unfortunate need people to be kind to them, but also that the prosperous need people to whom they may be kind.

3 Also perhaps it would be strange to represent the
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οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐλοιτ’ ἂν καθ’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ’ ἐχειν ἀγαθὰ, πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς καὶ σωζὴν περικός· καὶ τῷ εὐδαιμονίῳ δὴ τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχει, τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἐχειν δῆλον δ’ ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιευκών κρείττον ἢ μετ’ ὀθνεῖων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν. δεί ἂρα τῷ εὐδαιμονίῳ φίλων.

4 Τί οὖν λέγουσι οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ τῇ ἄληθευόν σιν; ἢ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησιμοὺς εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἐνετείρῃ ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τά γαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. οὐδὲ ἔτη τῶν διὰ τὸ ἤδυ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρὸν, ἤδυς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐθὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτοι ἴδονής. οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δείσθαι

5 φίλων.—τὸ δ’ οὖν ἐστὶς ἰσως ἄληθες: ἐν άρχή γὰρ εἰρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια τῆς ἐστιν, ἢ δ’ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὁσπερ κτῆμα τι. ἐν δὲ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ’ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνεργεία σπουδαία καὶ ἦδεια καθ’ αὐτὴν, καθάπερ ἐν άρχής εἰρηται, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ηδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἦ ἐαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκεῖνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκεῖας.

* See i. vii. 6, note.
* i. vii. 15. The argument for friendship from the definition of happiness as virtuous and therefore pleasant activity is threefold: (a) the virtuous actions of our friends give us (by sympathy) the same pleasure as our own; (b) good activities (e.g. study) can be carried on longer (because less liable to fatigue); (γ) virtuous friends increase our own virtue (as we unconsciously imitate their acts). Hence friends useful and pleasant because virtuous (though not useful or pleasant friends in the ordinary sense) are necessary adjuncts of happiness.

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supremely happy man as a recluse. Nobody would choose to have all possible good things on the condition that he must enjoy them alone; for man is a social being, and designed by nature to live with others; accordingly the happy man must have society, for he has everything that is naturally good. And it is obviously preferable to associate with friends and with good men than with strangers and chance companions. Therefore the happy man requires friends.

4 What then do the upholders of the former view mean, and in what sense is it true? Perhaps the explanation of it is that most men think of friends as being people who are useful to us. Now it is true that the supremely happy man will have no need of friends of that kind, inasmuch as he is supplied with good things already. Nor yet will he want friends of the pleasant sort, or only to a very small extent, for his life is intrinsically pleasant and has no need of adventitious pleasure. And as he does not need useful or pleasant friends, it is assumed that he does not require friends at all.

5 But perhaps this inference is really untrue. For as we said at the beginning, happiness is a form of activity, and an activity clearly is something that comes into being, not a thing that we possess all the time, like a piece of property. But if happiness consists in life and activity, and the activity of a good man, as was said at the beginning, is good and so pleasant in itself, and if the sense that a thing is our own is also pleasant, yet we are better able to contemplate our neighbours than ourselves, and their

\[\text{\textsuperscript{c} i. viii. 13.}\]
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αῖ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἦδειαι 1170a τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἀμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἦδεα). ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεῖσθαι, εἰπερ θεωρεῖν προαρείται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκεῖαις τοιαύται δ᾽ αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος.—οίνουται τε δεῖν ἢδεως ζήν τὸν εὐδαιμονα. μονωτὴ δὲ μὲν οὖν χαλέπος ὁ βίος τοῦ γὰρ ῥάζων καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνέργειν συνεχῶς, μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλούς ῥάζον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχοστέρα, ἦδεα οὕσα καθ᾽ αὐτὴν, δ᾽ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον ἔννοι. (ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἦ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ᾽ ἄρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ᾽ ἀπό κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθαπέρ ὁ μοισικός τοῖς καλοῖς 10 μέλεσιν ἦδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται.)

7 γνώστο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄσκησις τῷ τῆς ἄρετῆς ἔκ τοῦ συζήν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Θέον θυσίων. ὁ φυσικώτερον δὲ ἐπισκοπούσθη ἦσκεν οἱ σπουδαῖοι φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει ἀἱρετός ἔστη. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἰρηταὶ ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἰδόν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἦδον ἐστὶ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὅρλζεται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἄνθρωποι δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοῆσεως. ἦ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνήγατος, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ


a i.e., they are good, and they are their own, i.e. like their own.

b The last four words are implied by the context.

c This parenthesis comes better in § 5 above, after the words, ‘the activity of a good man ... is good and pleasant in itself.’

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actions than our own, and thus good men find pleasure in the actions of other good men who are their friends, since those actions possess both these essentially pleasant qualities, it therefore follows that the supremely happy man will require good friends, insomuch as he desires to contemplate actions that are good and that are his own, and the actions of a good man that is his friend are such. Also men think that the life of the happy man ought to be pleasant. Now a solitary man has a hard life, for it is not easy to keep up continuous activity by oneself; it is easier to do so with the aid of and in relation to other people. The good man’s activity therefore, which is pleasant in itself, will be more continuous if practised with friends; and the life of the supremely happy should be continuously pleasant (for a good man, in virtue of his goodness, enjoys actions that conform with virtue and dislikes those that spring from wickedness, just as a skilled musician is pleased by good music and pained by bad). Moreover the society of the good may supply a sort of training in goodness, as Theognis remarks.

Again, if we examine the matter more fundamentally, it appears that a virtuous friend is essentially desirable for a virtuous man. For as has been said above, that which is essentially good is good and pleasing in itself to the virtuous man. And life is defined, in the case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the capacity for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activity, and in this its full reality consists.

Theognis 35 ἔσθλων μὲν γὰρ πρὸ ἐσθλὰ μαθῆσαι.
ἈРИΣΤΟΤΛΕ

ἐνεργεία: ἐσικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰθάνεσθαι ἡ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἦδέων· ἄριστον γὰρ, τὸ δ' ἄριστον τῆς τάγαθος φύσεως, τὸ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἀγάθον καὶ τῶν ἑπιευκτικῶν, διόπερ ἐσικε πᾶσιν ἦδυ εἰναι. οὐ δὲ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ἡμῶν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. (ἐν τοῖς ἐξομένης δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἐσται φανερώτερον.)

Θ εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἦδυ (ἐσικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντοτε ὑπερεσθάναι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἑπιευκτικοὺς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτως γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετῶτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριστὰτη ἡμῶν), ὁ δ' ὅρων ὅτι ὅρῳ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων ὅμως ἐστιν τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἐν αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅτι ἀἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἡ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμεν (τὸ γὰρ εἰναι ἢν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡ νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων καθ' αὐτὸ (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωῆς, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχουν ἐν ἐαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἦδυ), αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, ὅτι τὸ εἰναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἦδυ (ἰσπν' αἰσθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἄγαθον ἦδονταί), ὅ τ' ὅτι πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐχει ὃ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς

1 καθ' αὐτὰ ? (et alibi) ed.
2 ἐν αἰσθανόμεθα Bywater: αἰσθανόμεθα ἐν Κβ, αἰσθανόμεθα ἐν Γ, αἰσθανόμεθα δ' ἐν Λβ.
3 καὶ νοοῦμεν Bywater: καὶ νοοῦμεν Κβ, καὶ νοοῖμεν vulg.
4 [ἰσπν'] αἰσθανόμενοι ed.

5 i.e., vice and pain. 6 Bk. X. cc. i.-v.
7 αἰσθάνεσθαι is used throughout to denote 'consciousness'
It appears therefore that life in the full sense is sensation or thought. But life is a thing good and pleasant in itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all men. We must not argue from a vicious and corrupt life, or one that is painful, for such a life is indefinite, like its attributes. (The point as to pain will be clearer in the sequel.) But if life itself is good and pleasant (as it appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and supremely happy men most of all, since their way of life is most desirable and their existence the most blissful); and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we saw, is sense-perception or thought); and if to be conscious one is alive is a pleasant thing in itself (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and especially so for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant (because they are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsically good); and if the virtuous man feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels (as well as, where needed, 'sensation'). At 1170 b 11 συν-αυτόνευάνθει expresses sympathetic consciousness of another's thoughts and feelings; it is probable therefore that in l. 4 the compound verb is a copyist's mistake.
τὸν φίλον (ἐτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστὶν). καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετὸν ἐστιν ἐκόστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἡ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἢν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ χαίρων ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἰσθήσεως ἡδεία καθ' ἐαυτήν. 

συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τὸν φίλον ὃτι ἐστιν, τούτο δὲ γίνοντ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συνήν καὶ κοινώνειν λόγων καὶ διανοίασι. οὕτω γὰρ ἃν δοξεῖ τὸ συνήν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὔχ ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τῷ μακρῷ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετὸν ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὃν καὶ ἦδον, παραπλησίων ἃς 

δὲ καὶ τὸν φίλον ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν ἃν εἰη. ὁ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετὸν, τούτῳ δὲι ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἡ τοιαύτη ἐνδείξῃ ἐστιν. δεῖσθαι ἢρα τῷ εὐδαιμονησοντι φίλων σπουδαίων. 

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελώς εἰρήσθαι δοκεῖ—

μήτε πολύζεινος μὴν ἄξεινος—

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μὴν ἄφιλον εἶναι

2 μὴν αὖ πολύφιλον καὶ ὑπερβολὴν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρήσων καὶ πάνω δοξεῖν ἃν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν (πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίτονον, καὶ 28

οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος [αὐτοῖς] τοῦτο πράττειν: οἱ


*Perhaps to be emended 'of its goodness,' cf. 1. 5 of the Greek. It is consciousness of life as good that makes it pleasant and desirable.

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towards himself (for his friend is a second self)—then, just as a man's own existence is desirable for him, so, or nearly so, is his friend's existence also desirable. But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this is attained by their living together and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to each other; for this is the meaning of living together as applied to human beings, it does not mean merely feeding in the same place, as it does when applied to cattle.

If then to the supremely happy man existence is desirable in itself, being good and pleasant essentially, and if his friend's existence is almost equally desirable to him, it follows that a friend is one of the things to be desired. But that which is desirable for him he is bound to have, or else his condition will be incomplete in that particular. Therefore to be happy a man needs virtuous friends.

X Ought we then to make as many friends as possible? or, just as it seems a wise saying about hospitality—

Neither with troops of guests nor yet with none—so also with friendship perhaps it will be fitting neither to be without friends nor yet to make friends in excessive numbers. This rule would certainly seem applicable to those friends whom we choose for their utility; for it is troublesome to have to repay the services of a large number of people, and life is not long enough for one to do it. Any more

* μετε το λύκειον μη τι έλευνον καλέσθαι (Hesiod, Works and Days, 715).
* But cf. viii. vi. 8.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ

πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οίκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὕτων οὖν δὲι αὐτῶν· καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκούσιν ὄλιγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἔδυσμα.

3 τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον ἦσσος πλείστους καὶ ἀριθμὸν, ἢ ἐστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικόν πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' Ἰν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἐτί πόλις ἐστίν· τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ὡσα ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πάν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὑμισμένων. καὶ φίλων δὴ ἐστι πλήθος ὑμισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἰ 1171 πλείστοι μεθ' ὅν ἂν δύνατο τις συζήν· τοῦτο

4 γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικότατον εἶναι· ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἴον τε πολλοῖς συζήν καὶ διανέμετι αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἀ- δηλον. ἐτί δὲ κάκεινος δὲῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἴ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν, 5 τοῦτο δ' ἐργώδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκεῖως πολλοῖς· εἰκός γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἀμα τῷ μὲν συνήθεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ξητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτος ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζήν ἔκανον. οὐδὲ γὰρ 10 ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειν ἄν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα, διόπερ οὐδ swear ἐρὰν πλείονοι· ύπερβολὴ γὰρ τις

1 ἦσσος | Richards,

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therefore than are sufficient for the requirements of one's own life will be superfluous, and a hindrance to noble living, so one is better without them. Of friends for pleasure also a few are enough, just as a small amount of sweets is enough in one's diet.

But should one have as many good friends as possible? or is there a limit of size for a circle of friends, as there is for the population of a state? Ten people would not make a city, and with a hundred thousand it is a city no longer; though perhaps the proper size is not one particular number, but any number between certain limits. So also the number of one friends must be limited, and should perhaps be the largest number with whom one can constantly associate; since, as we saw, to live together is the chief mark of friendship, but it is quite clear that it is not possible to live with and to share oneself among a large number of people. Another essential is that one's friends must also be the friends of one another, if they are all to pass the time in each other's company; but for a large number of people all to be friends is a difficult matter. Again, it is difficult to share intimately in the joys and sorrows of many people; for one may very likely be called upon to rejoice with one and to mourn with another at the same time.

Perhaps therefore it is a good rule not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but only as many as are enough to form a circle of associates. Indeed it would appear to be impossible to be very friendly with many people, for the same reason as it is impossible to be in love with several people. Love means friendship in the superlative degree, and

* Cf. viii. v. 1.*
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eίναι βούλεται φιλίας, τούτο δὲ πρὸς ἐναί καὶ
tὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὔτω δὲ ἔχειν ἔσικε
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ γίγνονται γὰρ φίλοι
πολλοί κατὰ τὴν ἑταυρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δὲ ὑμνοῦ-ις
μεναὶ ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ
πᾶσιν ὀικεῖσθαι ἑνυγχάνοντες οὐδὲι δοκοῦσιν
ἐίναι φίλοι (πλὴν πολιτικῶς). οὐσ καὶ καλοῦσιν
ἀρέσκουσ. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πολλοῖς είναι
φίλοι καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ἄντα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς
ἐπιεική. δι’ ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι’ αὐτοὺς ὡσ ἐστὶ
πρὸς πολλοὺς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρείν 20
τοιούτους.

xi Πότερον δ’ ἐν εὐτυχίας μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ὡ
ἐν δυστυχίας; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται. οἱ
tε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἱ τ’
eυτυχοῦντες συμβένων καὶ οὕς εὗ ποιήσουσιν,
βούλονται γὰρ εὗ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαίωτερον μὲν δὴ
ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, 23
κάλλιον δ’ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς
ζητοῦσιν τοιούτους γὰρ αἰρετῶτερον ἐυεργετεῖν
καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία
αὐτῆ τῶν φιλῶν ἤδεια καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις 2
καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κοινῆσονται γὰρ οἱ
λυπούμενοι συναλγοῦντων τῶν φιλῶν διὸ καὶ
ἀπορήσειν τις πότερον ὡσπερ βάρους μετα-
λαμβάνονσιν, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἡ παρουσία δ’

1 αὐτοὺς Bywater: αὐτοῦς. 2 καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις om. Kb.

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*a* See note on viii. v. 3.

*b* Such as Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Pirithous. It is not quite clear whether they are quoted as examples of comradeship or of friendship in general.

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that must be with one person only; so also warm friendship is only possible with a few.

6 This conclusion seems to be supported by experience. Friendships between comrades only include a few people, and the famous examples of poetry are pairs of friends. Persons of many friendships, who are hail-fellow-well-met with everybody, are thought to be real friends of nobody (otherwise than as fellow-citizens are friends): I mean the sort of people we call obsequious. It is true that one may be friendly with many fellow-citizens and not be obsequious, but a model of excellence; but it is not possible to have many friends whom we love for their virtue and for themselves. We may be glad to find even a few friends of this sort.

x1 But do we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity? As a matter of fact men seek friends in both. The unfortunate require assistance; the prosperous want companions, and recipients of their bounty, since they wish to practise beneficence. Hence friendship is more necessary in adversity, so then it is useful friends that are wanted; but it is nobler in prosperity, so the prosperous seek also for good men as friends, since these are preferable both as objects of beneficence and as associates.

2 Also the mere presence of friends is pleasant both in prosperity and adversity. Sorrow is lightened by the sympathy of friends. Hence the question may be raised whether friends actually share the burden of grief, or whether, without this being the case, the pain is nevertheless diminished by the

* This gives a further reason for the second sentence of the chapter, and adds the motive of pleasure to those of utility and virtue.
ARISTOTLE

αὐτῶν ἦδεια οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἐννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττων τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἦ δὲ ἄλλο τι κουφιζοῦνται, ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δὲ οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθὲν. ἐσικε δὲ ἡ παρουσία μικτῆ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅραν ἔτοι φίλους ἡδὺ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ 1171 ἡ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι· παραμυθητικόν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὀψεί καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ἡ ἐπιδεξία· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἔθος καὶ ἐφ' οῖς ἦδεται καὶ λυπεῖται. τὸ δὲ λυποῦμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπ' ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρῶν· πάς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αὐτίος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἄνδρῶδεσι τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτεῖν ἡ ἀλυπία, τὴν ἐκεῖνος γνωμένην λύπην οὖν ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθήκουσι οὐ προσέται διὰ τὸ μὴ δ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρωσιν, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντασ. μυριέσθαι δὲ ἐν ἀπασί δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τῆν τε διαγωγήν ἦδειαν ἐχεῖ καὶ τὴν ἐννοιαν ὧτι ἦδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. διὸ δόξειν ἄν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως (εὐεργετητικόν γὰρ εἶναι καλὸν), εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας

1 αὐτῶν <ἡδονή> ? ed.
pleasure of their company and by the consciousness of their sympathy. Whether one of these reasons or some other gives the true explanation of the consoling power of friendship need not now be considered, but in any case it appears to have the effect described.

3 Yet the pleasure that the company of friends affords seems to be of a mixed nature. It is true that the very sight of them is pleasant, especially in time of misfortune, and is a considerable help in assuaging sorrow; for a friend, if tactful, can comfort us with look and word, as he knows our characters and what things give us pleasure and pain. But on the other hand to see another pained by our own misfortunes is painful, as everyone is reluctant to be a cause of pain to his friends. Hence many natures shrink from making their friends share their pain, and unless a man is excessively insensitive, he cannot bear the pain that his pain gives to them; and he will not suffer others to lament with him, because he is not given to lamentation himself. But weak women and womanish men like those who mourn with them, and love them as true friends and sympathizers. However, it is clear that in everything we ought to copy the example of the man of nobler nature.

4 In prosperity again the company of friends sweetens our hours of leisure, and also affords the pleasure of being conscious of their pleasure in our welfare.

Hence it may be thought that we ought to be eager to invite our friends to share our good fortune (since it is noble to wish to bestow benefits), but reluctant to ask them to come to us in mis-
οικονύντα (μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεί τῶν κακῶν, ὥθεν τὸ ἡ ἐγὼ δυστυχών') μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον, ὡταν μέλλωσιν ολίγα ὁχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὧφελήσειν. ἵναι δὲ ἀνάπαυν ἵσως ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἄτυχούντας ξεκινήσαι καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ τὸ εὐ έντολετα, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρεία καὶ τὸ τὸ μὴ ἄξιωσαντας. ἀμφότερον γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἤδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων), πρὸς εὐπαθείαν δὲ σχολάζει (οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὧφελεῖσθαι). δὸξαν δὲ άγορας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἵσως εὐλαβητέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἀπασιν αἴρετη φαινείται.

xiv Ἀρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἔρωσι τὸ ὀρᾶν ἀγαπητότατον ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αὐξηθῆναι τὸ τὰς λουπᾶς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἐρωτος ὄντος καὶ γνωμένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετῶτατον ἐστὶ τὸ συζήν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον, περὶ αὐτῶν δ' ἡ αἰσθήσεις ὅτι ἐστιν αἴρετή, καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δὴ. δὴ ἐνεργεία γίνεται αὐτῆς εν τῷ συζήν, ὡστ' εἰκότως τούτου 1172 α

1 Bywater. 2 [τὸ] Bywater: τοῦ Τ, om. Μ. 3 διεσαυτοὺς Κ. 4 αὐτοὺς Αρ.

* Cf. viii. i. 1 fin., 2 fin.  
* See c. iv. and c. ix. 5.  
* Or possibly, 'and friendship is realized in intercourse,' a separate reason for the thesis of the first sentence.
fortune (since we should impart to others as little as possible of what is evil: whence the proverb 'My own misfortune is enough'). We should summon our friends to our aid chiefly when they will be of great service to us at the cost of little trouble to themselves.

So, conversely, it is perhaps fitting that we should go uninvited and readily to those in misfortune (for it is the part of a friend to render service, and especially to those in need, and without being asked, since assistance so rendered is more noble and more pleasant for both parties); but to the prosperous, though we should go readily to help them (for even prosperity needs the co-operation of friends), a we should be slow in going when it is a question of enjoying their good things (for it is not noble to be eager to receive benefits). But doubtless we should be careful to avoid seeming churlish in repulsing their advances, a thing that does sometimes occur.

It appears therefore that the company of friends is desirable in all circumstances.

As then lovers find their greatest delight in seeing those they love, and prefer the gratification of the sense of sight to that of all the other senses, that sense being the chief seat and source of love, so likewise for friends (may we not say?) the society of each other is the most desirable thing there is. For (1) friendship is essentially a partnership. And (2) a man stands in the same relation to a friend as to himself: but the consciousness of his own existence is a good; so also therefore is the consciousness of his friend's existence; but this consciousness is actualized in intercourse; hence friends naturally

V. Conclusion: the value of the society of friends.
2 ἔφευγεν ταῖς τε ποτ' ἔστων ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἣ σοῦ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν: διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνᾶσκονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἐκαστοὶ ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὃ τί περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ: συζήν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων 3 κοινωνοῦσιν ὡς οἶνον τε [συζήν]. 3 γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαίλων φιλία μοχθηρὰ (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαίλων [ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες], καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὄμοιούμενοι ἄλληλοι), ἢ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἔπεικης, συναισθανομένη ταῖς ὀμιλίαις: δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίως γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διωρθοῦντες ἄλληλους: ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἄλληλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν ἔσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλά.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθων ἐπόμενον δ' ἄν εἰπῇ διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

1 ὡς οἶνον τε Κb: οἷς οἴονται.  
2 Burnet (οἷς οἴονται εὗ ζῆν Bekker).  
3 ed.

* The text is doubtful; most mss. give, 'by which they think that they live in their society.'
2 desire each other's society. And (iii) whatever pursuit it is that constitutes existence for a man or that makes his life worth living, he desires to share that pursuit with his friends. Hence some friends drink or dice together, others practise athletic sports and hunt, or study philosophy, in each other's company; each sort spending their time together in the occupation that they love best of everything in life; for wishing to live in their friends' society, they pursue and take part with them in these occupations as best they can.\textsuperscript{a}

3 Thus the friendship of inferior people is evil, for they take part together in inferior pursuits [being unstable,]\textsuperscript{b} and by becoming like each other are made positively evil. But the friendship of the good is good, and grows with their intercourse. And they seem actually to become better by putting their friendship into practice,\textsuperscript{c} and because they correct each other's faults, for each takes the impress from the other of those traits in him that give him pleasure—whence the saying:

Noble deeds from noble men.\textsuperscript{d}

So much for our treatment of Friendship. Our next business will be to discuss Pleasure.

\textsuperscript{a} It seems best to excise these words as an inapposite reminiscence of c. iv. 10.

\textsuperscript{b} For ἑπεργεῖν (sc. φίλικες) = συγγενεῖς cf. viii. v. 1.

\textsuperscript{c} Cf. c. ix. 7.
Κ

1 Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἵσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνωκειώσθαι τῷ γένει 20 ἡμῶν· διὸ παιδεύοντι τοὺς νέους οἰκιζόντες ἡδονή καὶ λύπη. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡθούς ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τῷ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ· διατείνει γὰρ ταύτα διὰ πάντος τοῦ βίου, ῥοτήν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαιμονία βίου τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἦδεα πρὸ- 25 αἱροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὴ τῶν ταυτών ἡμιστ' ἂν δόξεω παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τάγαθόν ἡδονήν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαίλον, οἱ μὲν ἵσως πεπεισμένοι οὔτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν 30 βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονήν τῶν φαίλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· βέτευν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἄγειν· ἔλθειν γὰρ ἃν οὔτως ἐπὶ τὸ 3 μέσον. μὴ ποτὲ δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι 85 λόγοι ἦττόν εἰσιν πιστοί τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν

1 δὴ Μπ.: δὲ.
BOOK X

1. Our next business after this is doubtless to discuss Pleasure. For pleasure is thought to be especially congenial to mankind; and this is why pleasure and pain are employed in the education of the young, as means whereby to steer their course. Moreover, to like and to dislike the right things is thought to be a most important element in the formation of a virtuous character. For pleasure and pain extend throughout the whole of life, and are of great moment and influence for virtue and happiness; since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.

2. It would therefore seem by no means proper to omit so important a subject, especially as there is much difference of opinion about it. Some people maintain that pleasure is the Good. Others on the contrary say that it is altogether bad: some of them perhaps from a conviction that it is really so, but others because they think it to be in the interests of morality to make out that pleasure is bad, even if it is not, since most men (they argue) have a bias towards it, and are the slaves of their pleasures, so that they have to be driven in the opposite direction in order to arrive at the due mean.

3. Possibly however this view is mistaken. In matters of emotion and of action, words are less convincing than deeds; when therefore our theories
διαφωνώσαν τοὺς κατά τὴν αἰσθησιν, καταφρονοῦμενοι καὶ τάληθες προσαναρροῦσιν· δὲ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὥσθεις ποτ' ἐφιέμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἀπασαν· 4 τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρῆσιμότατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνώδοι γὰρ οὔτε τοὺς ἔργος πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ἐξυιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς· τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλλα, τὰ δὲ εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

11 Εὐδοκὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθν ὑπὲρ εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάντ' ὅραν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐλλογα καὶ ἀλογα· ἐν πάσι δὲ εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτ' φέρεσθαι μηνύει ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἀριστον' (ἐκαστὸν γὰρ τὸ αὐτῶ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφὴν), τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφιέται, τάγαθὸν εἶναι· ἐπιστεύοντο 15 δὲ οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθούς ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἦ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὲ ὡς φίλως τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχει κατ' ἀληθείαν.—οὐχ ἦττον δὲ ὑπὸ εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίοιν.
are at variance with palpable facts, they provoke contempt, and involve the truth in their own discredit. If one who censures pleasure is seen sometimes to desire it himself, his swerving towards it is thought to show that he really believes that all pleasure is desirable; for the mass of mankind cannot discriminate. Hence it appears that true theories are the most valuable for conduct as well as for science; harmonizing with the facts, they carry conviction, and so encourage those who understand them to guide their lives by them.

With so much by way of introduction, let us now review the theories about pleasure that have been advanced.

That pleasure is the Good was held by Eudoxus, on the following grounds. He saw that all creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it; but in every case (he argued) that which is desirable is good, and that which is most desirable is the best; therefore the fact that all creatures 'move in the direction of' a the same thing indicates that this thing is the Supreme Good for all (since everything finds its own particular good, just as it finds its own proper food); but that which is good for all, and which all seek to obtain, is the Good.

His arguments owed their acceptance however more to the excellence of his character than to their own merit. He had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding this view because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true.

He also held that the goodness of pleasure was equally manifest from the converse: pain is
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τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ’ αὐτὸ πάσι φευγκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοῦνατιῶν αἱρετῶν.—μάλιστα δὲ εἶναι αἱρετῶν ὁ μὴ δὲ ἑτερον μηδ’ ἑτερον χάριν αἰρούμεθα. τοιούτων δὲ ὁμολογομένως εἶναι τὴν Ἡδονῆν. οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶτα τίνος ἐνεκα ἤδεται, ὥς καθ’ αὐτὴν οὐδαν αἱρετὴν τὴν Ἡδονὴν.—

προστιθέμενη τε ὀτιών τῶν ἁγαθῶν αἱρετῶτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρο- νεῖν: αὐξεσθαι1 δὲ τὸ ἁγαθὸν αὐτὸ2 αὐτῷ. ἔσκε δὴ ὁ στός γε το λόγος τῶν ἁγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτερον: πᾶν γὰρ μεθ’ ἑτέρον ἁγαθον αἱρετῶτερον ἡ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναγεί τοι οὐκ ἔστων Ἡδονὴ τάγαθον: αἱρετῶτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Ἡδὸν βίον μετά φρονήσεως ἡ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μυκτὸν κρείττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν Ἡδονὴν τάγαθον. οὐδένος γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ4 τάγαθον αἱρετῶτερον γίνεσθαι. δὴλον δ’ ὡς οὐδ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τάγαθον ἂν εἴη, δ’ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ5 ἁγαθῶν αἱρετῶτερον γίνεσθαι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. 

Ὁ δ’ ἐνυστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἁγαθὸν οὐ πάντ’ ἐφίτεται, μὴ οὐθέν λέγουσιν.6 δ’ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, 1173: ταῦτ’ εἶναι φαμεν. δ’ δ’ ἀναίρων ταῦτη τὴν πίστιν


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* Viz., incapable of being improved by the addition of something else. But the sentence looks like an interpolation.

* Philebus 60 ν ff.

* These are the Speusippus and the Academics of Aristotle’s day; see vm. xi. 3, note.

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intrinsically an object of avoidance to all, therefore its opposite must be intrinsically an object of desire to all.

Again, he argued that that thing is most desirable which we choose not as a means to or for the sake of something else; but such admittedly is pleasure: we never ask a man for what purpose he indulges in pleasure—we assume it to be desirable in itself.

He also said that the addition of pleasure to any good—for instance, just or temperate conduct—makes that good more desirable; but only the good can enhance the good.

Now as for the last argument, it seems only to prove that pleasure is a good, and not that it is in any way better than any other good; for every good is more desirable when combined with some other good than in isolation. In fact, a similar argument is employed by Plato to refute the view that pleasure is the Good: the life of pleasure, he urges, is more desirable in combination with intelligence than without it; but if pleasure combined with something else is better than pleasure alone, it is not the Good, for the Good is not rendered more desirable by the addition of anything to it. And it is clear that nothing else either will be the Good if it becomes more desirable when combined with something good in itself. What thing is there then of this nature, which is attainable by us? for it is something of this nature that we are in search of.

Those on the other hand who deny that that which all creatures seek to obtain is good, are surely talking nonsense. For what all think to be good, that, we assert, is good; and he that subverts our belief in the opinion of all mankind, will hardly

The last argument proves it good but not the Good.

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οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἔρει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα μόνα ὥργητοι αὐτῶν, ἢν ἂν τι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοις ἂν τι; ἵππως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν [ἀγαθὸν] εἰς τὸν ἐντόχον ἢ καθ’ αὐτά, δὲ ἐφίεται τοῦ οὐκείου.

6 ἀγαθοῦ.—οὐκ ἔσκε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασίν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακοῦ ἐστιν, τὴν ἂδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακῶν κακῶ καὶ [ἄμφω] τῷ μηδετέρῳ—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἐγκυμένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἄμφως μὲν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ἀκακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἐδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδετέρου ἡ ὀμολογία νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φευγόντων ὡς κακοῦ, τὴν δὲ αἱροῦμενος ὡς ἄγαθον. οὔτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.

11 Οὐ μὴν οὖν εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἂδονή, διὰ τούτῳ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρέτης ἐνεργειῶν ποιητήτης εἰσιν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἂν

2 εὐδαιμονία.—λέγοντες δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, τὴν δ’ ἂδονὴν ἀοριστὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μάλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἢττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τούτῳ κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἀλλάς ἀρετάς, καθ’ ἀσ ἐναργῶς φασὶ μάλλον καὶ ἢττον [τοὺς] ποιοὺς ὑπάρ—20 χεῖν [καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς], ἐστὶ τῷ αὐτῷ (δίκαιοι γὰρ εἰσὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἐστὶ δὲ

1 μόνα add. codd. Lambini.
2 ὥργητο Lb: ὥργηται (ἡ μὲν . . . ὥργηται . . . ἢ δὲ?

Bywater).
5 Bywater: ὅτως Kb.
6 [τὸ] om. Lb. 7 ed.
8 καὶ . . . ἀρετάς ed.: καὶ om. Kb, καὶ κατ’ αὐτὰς Coraes, καὶ δ’ ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς Vahlen.

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persuade us to believe his own either. If only the irrational creatures strove to obtain what is pleasant, there would have been some sense in this contention; but inasmuch as beings endowed with intelligence do so too, how can it be right? And perhaps even the lower animals possess an instinct superior to their own natures, which seeks to obtain the good appropriate to their kind.

5 Again, these thinkers' refutation of the argument from the converse appears equally unsound. They say, if pain is bad, it does not follow therefore that pleasure is good: for an evil can also be opposed to an evil and to a thing that is neither good nor evil: a statement which is indeed sound enough, but which does not apply to the things in question. If both pleasure and pain were in the class of evils, both would be also of necessity things to be avoided, and if in the class of things neutral, neither ought to be avoided, or they ought to be avoided alike; but as it is we see men avoid pain as evil and choose pleasure as good; it is therefore as good and evil that they are opposed.

iii Nor yet does it follow that if pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good. Virtuous activities are not qualities either, nor is happiness.

2 Again they argue that good is definite, but that pleasure is indefinite, because it admits of degrees. Now (a) if they base this judgement on the fact that one can be more or less pleased, the same argument will apply to Justice and the other virtues, the possessors of which are clearly spoken of as being more or less virtuous; for example, A may be more just or brave, and may act more, or less, justly or

\[ \text{iii Pleasure is not a quality.} \]

\[ \text{iv Pleasure is indefinite.} \]

\[ \text{Philebus 24e, 31a.} \]
καὶ δικαιοπραγείν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον). εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μὴ ποτ' οὐ λέγοντι
τὸ αἰτίον, ἀν ὠσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμυγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί.

3 τι δὲ κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια υφισμενή οὖσα
δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ 
[τὸ] ἡττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν 25
ἡδονὴν; οὐ γὰρ ἢ αὐτὴ συμμετρίᾳ ἐν πάσιν
ἐστιν ὅπρυ 
οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἄδη, ἀλλ' ἀνεμένη
diaménei ἐως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον.
toiou'ton δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τήν ἡδονὴν

4 ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.—τελειῶν τὲ τάγαθον τιθέντες,
τὰς δὲ κινησεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν 30
ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρόμεναι.
οὐ καλῶς δ' ἐνκακὶ λέγειν, οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν;
πάση γὰρ ὁικεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής,
καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς
ἀλλο. τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτῳν οὐδέτερον ύπάρξειν
ἔστησαι μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ ταχεῖς ὁσπερ ὅργισθήσαι, 1173
ἡδοσθαι δ' οὖ, οὐδ' πρὸς ἐτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ
καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν
μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχεῖς καὶ βραδεῖς
ἐστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν οὔκ ἐστιν ταχεῖς,

5 λέγω δ' ἡδοσθαι. γένεσις τε πῶς ἄν εἴη; δοκεῖς

1 δὲ Ḫ: δ' ἦν.
2 τι δὲ κωλύει Γ: τι κωλύει δὲ ῳ, τι γὰρ κωλύει ῳ, καὶ τι
κωλύεται Ḫ.
3 [τὸ] om ῳ.
4 ἀνεμένη Ḫ.
5 κίνησις Richards: κινήσεις Ḫ, κίνησιν.

ἀ. i.e., when they attribute 'indefiniteness' to pleasure,
they are really thinking of the 'mixed' pleasures only; it
does not apply to the 'pure' pleasures, in which there is no
admixture of pain; and the distinction between these two
kinds of pleasure is Plato's own. 

b Philæbus 53 c–54 d.

c This motion being uniform, it can only be spoken of
as quick or slow in comparison with some other motion.

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temperately, than B. If on the other hand (b) they judge by the nature of the pleasures themselves, I am afraid they do not state the right ground for their conclusion, if it be true that there are two kinds of pleasures, unmixed as well as mixed.  

3. Again, (c) why should not pleasure be like health, which is definite although it admits of degrees? For health is not constituted by the same proportion of elements in all persons; nor yet by one particular proportion in the same person always, but when it is in process of dissolution it still lasts for a certain time, and therefore it varies in degree. It is possible therefore that the same may be the case with pleasure.  

4. Again, they postulate (v) that the Good is perfect, whereas a motion or process of generation is imperfect, and then they attempt to prove that pleasure is a motion or process. This appears to be a mistake. (a) It would seem that pleasure is not a motion; for we hold it to be a property of all motion to be quick or slow—if (as with the motion of the firmament) not absolutely, then relatively to some other moving body. But pleasure possesses neither absolute nor relative velocity. You can become pleased quickly, just as you can get angry quickly: but you cannot be pleased quickly, nor yet more quickly than somebody else, as you can walk, grow, etc., more quickly than somebody else. It is possible to pass into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly, but not to function in that state—i.e. to feel pleasure  

5—quickly. And (b) in what sense can pleasure be a process of generation? We do not think that not absolutely, i.e. in comparison with itself at some other time.
ARISTOTLE

γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχόν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά.—

καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἐνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστὶ τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ἦν ἦν ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ’ ἂν καὶ ἡδονή τὸ σῶμα ἄρα. οὐ δοκεῖ δε’ οὐκ ἐστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γνωρίζεις μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδονή ἂν τις, καὶ τεμνομένος λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ’ αὐτὴ δοκεῖ γεγενήθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεὶς γὰρ γεγομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἠδοσθαὶ.

τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ’ οὗ περὶ πάσος συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονὰς. ἀλλοι γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφυῆς, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ἄραμα πολλά, καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐπιθέσεις. τῶν οὗν αὐτῶν γενέσεως ἐστοῦται; οὔδενος γὰρ ἐνδεια γεγενήθαι. οὐ νέοντ’ ἂν ἁναπληρώσει. —πρός δὲ τοὺς προφέρουται τὰς ἐποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι ταῦτ’ ἢδεα. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακοιμενοῖς ἢδεα ἐστιν, οἰητέων αὐτὰ καὶ ἢδεα εἰναι πλὴν τοῦτους, καθάπερ οὔδε τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἡ γυλκεα ἡ πικρᾶ, οὐδ’ αὖ ἂν

1 ὅ ἦ Λβ: ὄ.
2 οὐκ Λβ: οὐδ’.
καὶ: ἰναστέρει καὶ vel potius λάρ Richards.

Philebus 31 r–32 u, 42 c.

i.e., we do not say a cut is a pain, but it is accompanied by pain.
any chance thing can be generated from any other chance thing, but that a thing at its dissolution is resolved into that from which it is generated; and if pleasure is the generation of something, pain is the destruction of that thing. Also \(c\) they say\(^a\) that pain is a deficiency of the natural state and pleasure is its replenishment. But these are bodily experiences. Now if pleasure is a replenishment of the natural state, the pleasure will be felt by the thing in which the replenishment takes place. Therefore it is the body that feels pleasure. But this does not seem to be the case. Therefore pleasure is not a process of replenishment, though while replenishment takes place, a feeling of pleasure may accompany it, just as a feeling of pain may accompany a surgical operation.\(^b\) The belief that pleasure is a replenishment seems to have arisen from the pains and pleasures connected with food: here the pleasure does arise from a replenishment, and is preceded by the pain of a want. But this is not the case with all pleasures: the pleasures of knowledge, for example, have no antecedent pain; nor have certain of the pleasures of sense, namely those whose medium is the sense of smell, as well as many sounds and sights; and also memories and hopes. If these are processes of generation, generation of what? No lack of anything has occurred that may be replenished.

In reply to those who bring forward the disreputable pleasures, one may \(a\) deny that these are really pleasant: for granted they are pleasant to ill-conditioned people, it cannot therefore be assumed that they are actually pleasant, except to them, any more than things healthy or sweet or bitter to
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9 λευκά τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν. ἦ σωτὸς λέγει τις ἀν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἦδοναι αἰρεταὶ εἰς, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τοῦτων, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ πλοῦτειν, προσδόντι δὲ οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὀτιοῦν 10 φαγόντι. ἦ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἦδοναι. ἔτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστω ἡσθήναι τὴν τοῦ δίκαιου μὴ ὀντα 90 μὴ ὀντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὀντα μουσικόν, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζεων δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἔτερος ὁν τοῦ κόλακον, οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὰν τὴν ἦδονὴν ἡ διαφόρους εἴδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τάγαθον ὁμλείν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἦδονὴν, καὶ τῷ 3 μὲν ὑνειδίζεται, τὸν 11 ἐπανοοῦσιν ὃς πρὸς ἐτερα ὀμιλοῦντα. οὐδεὶς 1174 ἐν ἐλοιο τῷ μπιν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἐχαὶ διά βίου, ἦδομενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἶον τε μάλιστα· οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλὰ τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἀν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρων ἦδονὴν, οἶον ὅρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τᾶς ἀρέτας ἑχεῖν. εἰ δὲ εἰς ἀνάγκης ἐπονταὶ τούτωι ἦδονα, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἀν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' 1 λέγοι τις Bywater: λέγοιτ'. 2 τῷ τὸ Ῥᾳ. 588
innovis are really so, or any more than things that seem white to people with a disease of the eyes are really white. Or (b) one may take the line that, though the pleasures themselves are desirable, they are not desirable when derived from those sources; just as wealth is desirable, but not if won by treachery, of health, but not at the cost of eating anything and everything. Or (c) we may say that pleasures differ in specific quality; since (a) those derived from noble sources are not the same as those derived from base sources, and it is impossible to feel the pleasures of a just man without being just, or the pleasures of a musician without being musical, and so on. And also (β) the distinction between a friend and a flatterer seems to show that pleasure is not a good, or else that pleasures are specifically different; since a friend is thought to aim at doing good to his companion, a flatterer at giving pleasure; to be a flatterer is a reproach, whereas a friend is praised because in his inter-

1 course he aims at other things. And (γ) no one would choose to retain the mind of a child throughout his life, even though he continued to enjoy the pleasures of childhood with undiminished zest; nor (δ) would anyone choose to find enjoyment in doing some extremely shameful act, although it would entail no painful consequences. Also (ε) there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are necessarily attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted from them.

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13 ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἱδονή.—ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτε τᾶγαθὸν ἢ ἱδονή οὕτε πᾶσα αἴρετή, δῆλον έοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰς τινὲς αἴρεται καθ' αὐτὰς, διαφέρουσα τῷ εἴδει ἡ ἄφ' ὄν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἱδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

14 Τι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποιῶν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὀρασίς καθ' ὄντυνοιν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδείης οὐδενός, ὃ εἰς ύστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἴδος. τοιοῦτω δ' ἐοικέ καὶ ἡ ἱδονή: ὁλος' γὰρ τι ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἱδονὴν ἢς ἐπὶ πλείω 2 χρόνον γνωμένης τελειωθῆσεται τὸ εἴδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστιν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία 2 ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται· ἢ ἐν ἀπαιτί δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἔτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὀλῆς καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κλώνος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὐτὰ τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως: καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεῖα (οὐδενὸς 25

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1 ἀγαθὸν KB, 2 τελείαν KB, 3 καλ ᾧ KB; οἰκοδομία καὶ ? St. 4 τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ KB, post εἴδει transponendum P Richards, καὶ [τῷ χρόνῳ] Burnet.

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α κίνησις here has its wider sense of any process of change that actualizes what is potentially; it includes generation, of which building is an instance. In its proper sense κίνησις is limited to change of quality, quantity, or place.

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13 It seems therefore that pleasure is not the Good, and that not every pleasure is desirable, but also that there are certain pleasures, superior in respect of their specific quality or their source, that are desirable in themselves. Let this suffice for a discussion of the current views about pleasure and pain.

iv We may ascertain the nature and quality of pleasure more clearly if we start again from the beginning.

Now the act of sight appears to be perfect at any moment of its duration; it does not require anything to supervene later in order to perfect its specific quality. But pleasure also appears to be a thing of this nature. For it is a whole, and one cannot at any moment put one's hand on a pleasure which will only exhibit its specific quality perfectly if its duration be prolonged.

2 It follows also that pleasure is not a form of motion. For every motion or process of change involves duration, and is a means to an end, for instance the process of building a house; and it is perfect when it has effected its end. Hence a motion is perfect either when viewed over the whole time of its duration, or at the moment when its end has been achieved. The several motions occupying portions of the time of the whole are imperfect, and different in kind from the whole and from each other. For instance, in building a temple the fitting together of the stones is a different process from the fluting of a column, and both are different from the construction of the temple as a whole; and whereas the building of the temple is a perfect process, for nothing more is required to
γὰρ ἐνδεής πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον, ή δὲ τῆς κρη-πίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελῆς (μέρους γὰρ ἐκατέρα)· τῷ εἰδεὶ οὐν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστων ἐν ὅτι οὖν ἁρώνων κάποιον κἀκεῖσαν τελείαν τῷ 3 εἰδεί, ἀλλ' εἰπερ, ἐν τῷ ἀπαντεί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λουπῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἔστων ή ἂν φορά κάποιον πόθεν ποί, καὶ ταῦτης διαφοράν κατ' εἰδῆ, πτῆσις βαδίσεως ἄλλοις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐ μόνον δ' οὔτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει (τὸ γάρ πόθεν ποί οὐ τοιοῦτον ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐτέρῳ, οὔτε τὸ διεξεῖναι τὴν γραμμὴν τὴνδὲ κἀκεῖνην· οὐ 1174 1 μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπερεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὕσαν, ἐν ἐτέρῳ δ' αὐτῇ ἐκείνης)—δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἰρηταί, ἐνεικε δ' οὐκ' ἐν ἀπαντεί χρόνων τελεία ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς, καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἰδεί, 4 εἰπερ τὸ πόθεν ποί ἐδοιποιῶν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτως χρόνω τελείαν τὸ εἴδος. δήλου οὖν ὡς ἐτεραὶ τ' ἐὰν εἰεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξει δ' ἐὰν τούτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κυνεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνω, ἡδονὴ

1 οὐκ: οὔτῃ Ἀρ.

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a The lecturer appears to draw a line representing a racecourse, and divide it into two parts, representing two sections of the course (not two lines across the course). The motion of traversing one section is not the same as that of traversing the others, if only because they are in different places.

b Physics, vi.-viii.

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achieve the end proposed, laying the foundation and constructing the triglyphs are imperfect processes, since each produces only a part of the design; they are therefore specifically different from the construction of the whole, and it is not possible to lay one's finger on a motion specifically perfect at any moment of the process of building, but only, if at all, in the whole of its duration.

3 And the same is true of walking and the other forms of locomotion. For if locomotion is motion from one point in space to another, and if this is of different kinds, flying, walking, leaping and the like, and not only so, but if there are also differences in walking itself (for the terminal points of a race-course are not the same as those of a portion of the course, nor are those of one portion the same as those of another; nor is traversing this line the same as traversing that one), for the runner does not merely travel along a certain line but travels along a line that is in a certain place, and this line is in a different place from that)—however, for a full treatment of the subject of motion I must refer to another work, but it appears that a motion is not perfect at every moment, but the many movements which make up the whole are imperfect; and different from each other in kind, inasmuch as the terminal points of a movement constitute a specific quality. The specific quality of pleasure on the contrary is perfect at any moment. It is clear therefore that pleasure is not the same as motion, and that it is a whole and something perfect.

This may also be inferred from the fact that a movement necessarily occupies a space of time, whereas a feeling of pleasure does not, for every
DE: TO GAR EN TΩV NΩN OΛON TI.—EK TOUΤΩN DE
ΔΗΛΟΥ KAI OTI OU KALÒS LÉGONSI KÍNΗΣIN Η GÉNEΣIN
EIΩN TΗΣ ΗΔΟΝΗΣ.1 OU GAR PΑΝΤΩΝ TAÚTA LÉGENAI,
ALLA TΩN MΕΡΙΣΤΩN KAI MΗ ΟΛΩΝ. OUDÉE GAR
DΡΑΣΕΩΣ ĖΣΤΙ GÉNEΣIS OUDÉE STIΓΜΗΣ OUDÉE MONΑ-
DOS (OUDÉE TOUΤΩN OUDHÉV2 KÍNΗΣΙΣ OUDÉE GÉNEΣIS).3
OUDÉE ΔΗ ΗΔΟΝΗΣ: OΛΟΥN GAR TI.

5 AİSTHΗΣΕΩΣ DE PΑΣΗΣ PRΩS TO AİΣΘΗΤΩΝ ĖN-
ERGOΥΣΗΣ, TELΕĪΩΣ DE TΗΣ EΠI DIAKEMΕΝΗΣ PRΩS TΩ
KΑLLΙΣΤΩN TΩN UPΌ TΗN AİΣΘΗΣΙΝ (TOIOUΤΩN GAR
MΑΛΙΣΤΩ EΙΝAI DOKEI ᾪ TELΕĪA ĖNΕΡΓΕΙΑ. AΥΤΗΝ DE
LÉGEIN ĖNΕΡΓΕΙΩΝ, ᾪ ĖN (Ρ ĖΣΤΙ, MΗΘΕΝ DIAΦΕΡΕΤΩΙ),
KAΘ ĖΚΑΣΤΗΝ4 ΔΗ5 BΕLTÍΣΤΗ ĖΣΤΙΝ ᾪ ĖNΕΡΓΕΙΑ TΟU
ΑΡΙΣΤΑ DIΑΚΕΜΕΝΟΥ PRΩS TΟ KΡΑΤΙΣΤΟΝ TΩN UP'
ΑΥΤΗΝ: AΥΤΗ D' ĖN TELΕΙΟΤΑΤΗ ĖΠΗ KAI ΗΔΙΩΤΗ.20
ΚΑΤΑ PΑΣΑΝ GAR AİΣΘΗΣΙΝ ĖΣΤΙΝ ΗΔΟΝΗ, ὈΜΟΙΩΣ
DΕ KAI DΙΑΝΟΙΑΝ KAI ΘΕΩΡΙΑΝ, ΗΔΙΩΤΗ D' ᾪ TΕ-
LΕΙΟΤΑΤΗ, TELΕΙΟΤΑΤΗ D' ᾪ TΟΥ EΠI ĖΧΟΝΤΟΣ PRΩS
TO ΟΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΝ TΩΝ UP' AΥΤΗΝ: TELΕΙΟΙ DΕ TΗΝ
6 ĖNΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ ᾪ ΗΔΟΝΗ. OU TΟΝ AΥΤΩΝ DΕ ΤΡΟΠΟΝ ᾪ TΕ
ΗΔΟΝΗ TELΕΙΟΙ KAI TΟ AİΣΘΗΤΩΝ TΕ KAI ᾪ AİΣΘΗΣΙΣ,25
ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΑ ΟΝΤΑ, ᾮΣΠΕΡ ΟΥΔΗ ᾪ ΨΥΧΗΑ KAI ᾪ ΙΑΤΡΩΣ
7 ὘ΜΟΙΩΣ AΥΤΙΑ ĖΣΤΙ TΟΥ ΨΥΧΑΙΝΕΙΝ. (ΚΑΘ ĖΚΑΣΤΗΝ

1 τΗΣ ΗΔΟΝΗΣ Ramsauer: τΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ.
2 ουδενος cod. Turnebi.
3 ουδε . . . γενεσις seclud. ? ed.
4 ĖΚΑΣΤΗΝ Alex.: ĖΚΑΣΤΟΝ.
5 ᾪ Lambinus: δέ.

* This parenthesis is perhaps an interpolation.

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moment of pleasurable consciousness is a perfect whole.

These considerations also show that it is a mistake to speak of pleasure as the result of a motion or of a process of generation. For we cannot so describe everything, but only such things as are divided into parts and are not wholes. Thus an act of sight, a geometrical point, an arithmetical unit are not the result of a process of generation (nor is any of them a motion or process). Pleasure therefore also is not the result of a motion or process; for pleasure is a whole.

5 Again, inasmuch as each of the senses acts in relation to its object, and acts perfectly when it is in good condition and directed to the finest of the objects that belong to it (for this seems to be the best description of perfect activity, it being assumed to make no difference whether it be the sense itself that acts or the organ in which the sense resides), it follows that the activity of any of the senses is at its best when the sense-organ being in the best condition is directed to the best of its objects; and this activity will be the most perfect and the pleasantest. For each sense has a corresponding pleasure, as also have thought and speculation, and its activity is pleasantest when it is most perfect, and most perfect when the organ is in good condition and when it is directed to the most excellent of its objects; and the pleasure perfects the activity.

6 The pleasure does not however perfect the activity in the same way as the object perceived and the sensory faculty, if good, perfect it; just as health and the physician are not in the same way the cause of being healthy.
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δ' αἰσθησιν ὧτι γίνεται ἴδωνή, δῆλον· φαμεν γὰρ ὀράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἴδεα· δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ἢ τε αἰσθήσις ἢ κρατίστῃ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργή· τοιοῦτων δ' ὀντων 80 τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἐσται ἴδωνή ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ τε1 ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου.) τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἴδωνή οὐχ ὡς ἢ2 εἶναι ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγυγνόμεναν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἄκμαιοις ἢ ἄφρα. ἐως ἂν οὖν τὸ τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἶον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρίνων ἢ θεωροῦν, ἐσται ἐν τῇ 1175 a ἐνεργεία ἢ3 ἴδωνή· ὀμοίων γὰρ ὀντων καὶ πρὸς ἀλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταύτο τέφυκε γίνεσθαι.

9 —πώς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἢδεται; ἢ4 κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργείμ. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἴδωνή, ἢ5 ἐπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνα δὲ τέρπει καὶ πάντα, ὑστερον δὲ οὖν ὄμοιως διὰ ταύτο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεί, ὑστερον κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπετα δ᾽ οὖ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρ- 10 ἡμελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἴδονή ἀμαυρωῦται.—ὁρέ- γεοσθαί δὲ τῆς ἴδονῆς οἰκθείη τις ἄν ἀπαντάς,

1 τε Bywater: γε Lb, om. vulg. 2 ἢ add. Kb.
3 ἢ secludendum ? Bywater.
4 ἢ ὧτι nescio quas ap. Wilkinson.
5 ἴδωνή <συνεχῶς> Rimsauer.

* As well as to tastes, scents, and contacts, which are more obviously pleasant.

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(It is clear that each of the senses is accompanied by pleasure, since we apply the term pleasant to sights and sounds; and it is also clear that the pleasure is greatest when the sensory faculty is both in the best condition and acting in relation to the best object; and given excellence in the perceived object and the perceptive organ, there will always be pleasure when an object to cause it and a subject to feel it are both present.)

But the pleasure perfects the activity, not as the fixed disposition does, by being already present in the agent, but as a supervening perfection, like the bloom of health in the young and vigorous.

So long therefore as both object thought of or perceived, and subject discerning or judging, are such as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity; since while both the passive and the active parties to a relationship remain the same in themselves and unaltered in their relation to one another, the same result is naturally produced.

How is it then that no one can feel pleasure continuously? Perhaps it is due to fatigue, since no human faculty is capable of uninterrupted activity, and therefore pleasure also is not continuous, because it accompanies the activity of the faculties. It is for the same reason that some things please us when new, but cease to give so much pleasure later; this is because at first the mind is stimulated, and acts vigorously in regard to the object, as in the case of sight when we look at something intently; but afterwards the activity is less vigorous and our attention relaxes, and consequently the pleasure also fades.

It might be held that all men seek to obtain
οτι και του ζην απαντες εφεινται. η δε ζωης ενεργεια της εστι, και έκαστος περι ταυτα και
tουτοις ενεργεις α και μαλιστα αγαπα, οιον ο μεν μουσικος τη ακοη περι τα μελη, ο
dε φιλομαθης τη διανοια περι τα θεωρηματα, ουτω δε 15
και των λοιπων έκαστος. η δ' ηδονη τελειοi
tας ενεργειας, και το ζην δη, ου ορεγονται.
11 ευλογως ουν και της ηδονης εφεινται τελειοι
γαρ εκαστω το ζην, αιρετον ουν. ποτερον δε
dia την ηδονη το ζην αιρομεθα η δια το
ζην την ηδονην, αφεισθω εν τω παροντι. συν
εξευθεια μεν γαρ ταυτα φανεται και χωρισμον
ου δεχεσθαι: Ανευ τε γαρ ενεργειας ου γινεται
ηδονη, πασαν τε ενεργειαν τελειοι η ηδονη.

v "Οθεν δοκουσι και τω ειδε διαφερουν τα γαρ
ετερα τω ειδε υπερ ηδονην αιρομεθα τελειουσθαι.
ουτω γαρ φαινεται και τα φυσικα και τα υπο
tεχνης, οιν ζωα και δεπερα και γραφη και
αγαλμα1 και οικεια και σκευος ομοιας δε και 25
τας ενεργειας τας διαφερουσας τω ειδε υπο
2 διαφεροντων ειδε τελειουσθαι. διαφεροντες δ' αι
tης διανοιας των κατα τοις αιςθησεις και αυται2
αλλαγων κατ' ειδος· και αι τελειουσθαι δη ηδοναι.
—φανει' δ' αν τουτο και ει του συνηκειωσθαι
tων' ηδονων εκαστην τη ενεργεια την τελειοι. 30
συναυξει γαρ την ενεργειαν η οικεια ηδονη·
μαλλον γαρ εκαστα κρινουσι και εξαιρετοισι
οι μεθ' ηδονης ενεργοιστε, οιν ευμετρικοι

1 αγαλμα κβ: αγαλματα. 2 αυταi λβ.

3 τη των κβ: τη των? bywater.

* A variant reading gives 'and these [sc. the activities of the senses] from one another.'

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pleasure, because all men desire life. Life is a form of activity, and each man exercises his activity upon those objects and with those faculties which he likes the most: for example, the musician exercises his sense of hearing upon musical tunes, the student his intellect upon problems of philosophy, and so on. And the pleasure of these activities perfects the activities, and therefore perfects life, which all men seek. Men have good reason therefore to pursue pleasure, since it perfects for each his life, which is a desirable thing. The question whether we desire life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life, need not be raised for the present. In any case they appear to be inseparably united; for there is no pleasure without activity, and also no perfect activity without its pleasure.

This moreover is the ground for believing that pleasures vary in specific quality. For we feel that different kinds of things must have a different sort of perfection. We see this to be so with natural organisms and the productions of art, such as animals, trees, a picture, a statue, a house, a piece of furniture. Similarly we think that that which perfects one kind of activity must differ in kind from that which perfects another kind. Now the activities of the intellect differ from those of the senses, and from one another, in kind: so also therefore do the pleasures that perfect them.

This may also be seen from the affinity which exists between the various pleasures and the activities which they perfect. For an activity is augmented by the pleasure that belongs to it; since those who work with pleasure always work with more discernment and with greater accuracy—for instance, students who
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γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατα-
νοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλο-
μουσι καὶ φιλουκοδομοι καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόσιν εἰς τὸ οἰκείον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῶ.
συναύξονται δὴ αἱ ήδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα
οἰκεία. τοῖς εὐεργεῖοι δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα 1175 b

3 ἐτερα τῷ εἴδει.—ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον τούτ᾽ ἄν φανείς
ἐκ τοῦ τόσο ἀρ' ἐτέρων ήδονας ἐμποδίους ταῖς
ἐνεργείαις εἴναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἄδυνατοι τοῖς
 λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλόντος,
μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητική τῆς παραώνης ἐνεργείας
ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὐν ήδονή τὴν περὶ τὸν

4 λόγον ἐνεργείαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ
tῶν ἀλλῶν συμβαίνει, όταν ἀμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργή-
ἡ γὰρ ήδίων τὴν ἐτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ δια-
φέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ήδονή, μᾶλλον, ὅτε μηδ' ἐν-
εργεῖαν κατὰ τὴν ἐτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὅτως οὐ
σφόδρα οὐ πάνω δρῶμεν ἐτερον' καὶ ἅλλα ποιοῦμεν
ἀλλοίς ἥξειμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἶνοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς
θεάτροις οἱ πραγματικοί, όταν φαίλοι οἱ
ἀγωνιζόμενοι ήσιν, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν.

5 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ήδονή ἐξακριβῶς τὰς ἐν-
ergeias καὶ χρονιστερὰς καὶ βελτίως ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δήλον ὡς πολὺ διεστάσων
σχέδον γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ήδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅτερ
αἱ οἰκείαι λυπαί: φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας
αἱ οἰκείαι λυπαί, οἶνοι εἰ τῷ τὸ γράφειν ἄγδεσ

1 δὴ corr. Par. 1417 : δὲ.
2 οἴνον om. Kb.

* i.e., the special pain accompanying a particular activity when it functions badly or in relation to a bad object.

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are fond of geometry become proficient in it, and grasp its various problems better, and similarly lovers of music, architecture or the other arts make progress in their favourite pursuit because they enjoy it. An activity then is augmented by its pleasure; and that which augments a thing must be akin to it. But things that are akin to things of different kinds must themselves differ in kind.

3 A still clearer proof may be drawn from the hindrance that activities receive from the pleasure derived from other activities. For instance, persons fond of the flute cannot give their attention to a philosophical discussion when they overhear someone playing the flute, because they enjoy music more than the activity in which they are engaged; therefore the pleasure afforded by the music of the flute impairs the activity of study. The same thing occurs in other cases when a man tries to do two things at once; the pleasanter activity drives out the other, the more so if it is much more pleasant, until the other activity ceases altogether. Hence, when we enjoy something very much, we can hardly do anything else; and when we find a thing only mildly agreeable, we turn to some other occupation; for instance, people who eat sweets at the theatre do so especially when the acting is bad. And since our activities are sharpened, prolonged and improved by their own pleasure, and impaired by the pleasures of other activities, it is clear that pleasures differ widely from each other. In fact alien pleasures have almost the same effect on the activities as their own pains; since, when an activity causes pain, this pain destroys it, for instance, if a person finds

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καὶ ἐπιλυποῦν ἡ τὸ λογίζεσθαι: ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ δὲ ὁ λογίζεται, λυπηρὰς οὕστις τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τουναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἣδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν. οἰκείαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ’ αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δὲ ἄλλοτριαι ἢδοναὶ εἰρηται διὶ παραπλησίον τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν. φθείρουσι γὰρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.

6 Διαφερούσων δὲ τῶν ἐνεργείων ἐπεικεία καὶ φαιλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ’ οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἢδοναὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνεργείαν οἰκεία ἢδονή ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαῖα οἰκεία ἐπεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρᾶ· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεῖται, τῶν δ’ αἰσχρῶν ἤκται· οἰκεῖστεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργεῖαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἢδοναὶ τῶν ὁρέξεων αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ᾣοτ’ ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτάν ἐστιν.

7 ἡ ἐνεργεία τῇ ἢδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἐοικε γε ἡ ἢδονή διάνοια εἴναι οὐδ’ αἰσθήσεως (ἀττοπον γὰρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χρώματος ψινεῖται τις ταῦταν. ὁσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι ἐτεραί, καὶ αἱ ἢδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὁψις ἁφῆς καθαρεύσις, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ σφρήσεις γεύσεως. ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἢδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τῇ διάνοιᾳ,
writing or doing sums unpleasant and irksome; for he stops writing or doing sums, because the activity is painful. Activities then are affected in opposite ways by the pleasures and the pains that belong to them, that is to say, those that are intrinsically due to their exercise. Alien pleasures, as has been said, have very much the same effect as pain, for they destroy an activity, only not to the same degree.

6 Again, since activities differ in moral value, and some are to be adopted, others to be avoided, and others again are neutral, the same is true also of their pleasures: for each activity has a pleasure of its own. Thus the pleasure of a good activity is morally good, that of a bad one morally bad; for even desires for noble things are praised and desires for base things blamed; but the pleasures contained in our activities are more intimately connected with them than the appetites which prompt them, for the appetite is both separate in time and distinct in its nature from the activity, whereas the pleasure is closely linked to the activity, indeed so inseparable from it as to raise a doubt whether the activity is not the same thing as the pleasure. However, we must not regard pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation—indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem to some people to be the same.

As then activities are diverse, so also are their pleasures. Sight excels touch in purity, and hearing and smell excel taste; and similarly the pleasures of the intellect excel in purity the pleasures of sensation, while the pleasures of either class differ among themselves in purity.
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8 καὶ ἐκάτερα ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ἥδιν καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὡσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τούτῳ ἄν φανεῖ προτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονή καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ Ἠράκλειτος φησὶν ὄνον σύμματ’ ἄν ἐλέεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ χρυσόν· ἡδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφῆ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρονσιν εἴδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν

9 ἀδιαφόρους εὑρογον εἶναι· διαλλάττουσι δ’ οὐ 10 μικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μεν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρά καὶ μυστά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αυτὰ1 δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ υγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν1 εἶναι τῷ ἄσθενει καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. 15 ὀμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ’ ἐτέρων συμβαίνει.

10 δοκεῖ δ’ ἐν ἀπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φανόμενον τῷ στοιχαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστων ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἄρετή καὶ ἀγαθὸς, 2 ἡ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναί εἶς ἐὰν αἱ τούτων φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἰς φωτὸς χαίρει. τὰ δὲ τούτων δυσχερή εἰ τῷ φαινέται ἡδέα, οὖδὲν 20 θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λύματεν ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ’ οὔτε ἔστων ἀλλ’ ἡ τοιοῦτος4

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1 τὸ αὐτὸ vel θερμά (vel τὸ αὐτὸ) θερμὸν) Richards.
2 ἀγαθός Bywater: ἀγαθὸς (ὁ ἀγ. Ald.).
3 ἀλλ’ ἡ Richards: ἀλλά.
4 τοιοῦτοι: τοῖς vel τοιούτοις? Bywater.
8 And it is thought that every animal has its own special pleasure, just as it has its own special function: namely, the pleasure of exercising that function. This will also appear if we consider the different animals one by one: the horse, the dog, man, have different pleasures—as Heracleitus says, an ass would prefer chaff to gold, since to asses food gives more pleasure than gold. Different species therefore have different kinds of pleasures. On the other hand it might be supposed that there is no variety among the pleasures of the same species. But as a matter of fact in the human species at all events there is a great diversity of pleasures. The same things delight some men and annoy others, and things painful and disgusting to some are pleasant and attractive to others. This also holds good of things sweet to the taste: the same things do not taste sweet to a man in a fever as to one in good health; nor does the same temperature feel warm to an invalid and to a person of robust constitution. The same holds good of other things as well.

9 But we hold that in all such cases the thing really is what it appears to be to the good man. And if this rule is sound, as it is generally held to be, and if the standard of everything is goodness, or the good man, qua good, then the things that seem to him to be pleasures are pleasures, and the things he enjoys are pleasant. Nor need it cause surprise that things disagreeable to the good man should seem pleasant to some men; for mankind is liable to many corruptions and diseases, and the things in question are not really pleasant, but only pleasant to these particular persons, who are in a condition to think them so.
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11 καὶ οὕτως διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τὸσ διεφθαρμένους. τῶν δὲ ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποιὰν ἡ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἄνθρωπου ἡ ἡδονή; ἡ ἕκ τῶν ἐνεργείων δῆλον; ταῦτας γὰρ ἔστοιται αἱ ἡδοναι. εἶτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἶτε πλεῖονας αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἄνδρος, αἱ ταῦτας τελειώσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγουσ᾽ ἀν ἄνθρωπον ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστώς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνεργείαι.

vi Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπῶν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἄνθρωπών. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ το προειρημένα συν-2 τομώτερος ἡν εἰ ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔξοι καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου υπάρχοι ἡν, φυτοῦς ζώντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυ-85 χωντι γὰρ μεγίστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκειν, ἄλλα μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνεργείαν τῶν θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εὑρηταί, τῶν δὲ ἐνεργείων αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δὴ ἐτερα ἀρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰς, δῆλον ὃτι τήν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς ἀρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὔ τῶν δι' ἀλλο. 5

1 καὶ τοῖς οὕτω Μβ. 2 δὲ ΛνΓ: ὅη. 3 ὅη Bywater: δ'. 4 φυτοῦ ΓΟβ: φυτῶν.

a See i. viii. 9.
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11 It is therefore clear that we must pronounce the admittedly disgraceful pleasures not to be pleasures at all, except to the depraved.

But among the pleasures considered respectable, which class of pleasures or which particular pleasure is to be deemed the distinctively human pleasure? Perhaps this will be clear from a consideration of man's activities. For pleasures correspond to the activities to which they belong; it is therefore that pleasure, or those pleasures, by which the activity, or the activities, of the perfect and supremely happy man are perfected, that must be pronounced human in the fullest sense. The other pleasures are so only in a secondary or some lower degree, like the activities to which they belong.

vi Having now discussed the various kinds of Virtue, of Friendship and of Pleasure, it remains for us to treat in outline of Happiness, inasmuch as we count this to be the End of human life. But it will shorten the discussion if we recapitulate what has been said already.

2 Now we stated that happiness is not a certain disposition of character; since if it were it might be possessed by a man who passed the whole of his life asleep, living the life of a vegetable, or by one who was plunged in the deepest misfortune. If then we reject this as unsatisfactory, and feel bound to class happiness rather as some form of activity, as has been said in the earlier part of this treatise, and if activities are of two kinds, some merely necessary means and desirable only for the sake of something else, others desirable in themselves, it is clear that happiness is to be classed among activities desirable in themselves, and not among those desir-
οὐδὲν δὲ γὰρ ἐνδείκτικα γενέματι ἢ εὐθαμμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτὰς δὲ εἰσίν αἱρεταὶ ἄφ' ὄν μηδὲν ἔπι-
ζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαύτα δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ
cαὶ σπουδαία πράττειν τῶν δὲ αὐτὰ αἱρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἰδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἔτερα 10
αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἄπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων
cαὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς
tοιαύτας διαγωγάς τῶν εὐθαμμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί,
dιὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐθαμμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς
tοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐθράπτειος. ὃν γὰρ ἐφιέν-
tαι, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσιν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖς, 15
dεόνται δὲ τοιοῦτοι. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐθαμμονικὰ
tαῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις
tὰ ἀντισχολάζειν. οὐδὲν δὲ ίσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοι
eἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἢ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὅνος,
ἄφ' ὄν αἱ σπουδαίαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ
ἀγενοστοι οὕτω αἴνει ηὐδοὴς εἰλικρινοὺς καὶ 20
ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν,
dιὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα οὐκετέοι αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι.
καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα
cράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι· εὐλογοῦν δή, ὥσπερ παισὶ
καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἔτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ
5 φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικεῖσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις 25
eἰρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἰδεὰ ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ

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able as a means to something else; since happiness lacks nothing, and is self-sufficient.

3. But those activities are desirable in themselves which do not aim at any result beyond the mere exercise of the activity. Now this is felt to be the nature of actions in conformity with virtue; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake.

But agreeable amusements also are desirable for their own sake; we do not pursue them as a means to something else, for as a matter of fact they are more often harmful than beneficial, causing men to neglect their health and their estates. Yet persons whom the world counts happy usually have recourse to such pastimes; and this is why adepts in such pastimes stand in high favour with princes, because they make themselves agreeable in supplying what their patrons desire, and what they want is amusement. So it is supposed that amusements are a component part of happiness, because princes and potentates devote their leisure to them.

4. But (i) perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue and intelligence, which are the sources of man's higher activities, do not depend on the possession of power; and if these persons, having no taste for pure and liberal pleasure, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, we must not on that account suppose that bodily pleasures are the more desirable. Children imagine that the things they themselves value are actually the best; it is not surprising therefore that, as children and grown men have different standards of value, so also should the worthless and the virtuous. Therefore, as has repeatedly been said, those things are actually valuable and
τοιαύτα ὄντα· ἐκάστως δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἐξιν αἰρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ ἀρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἰναι παιδίαν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἀπαντα τοῦ παιδείᾳ χάριν. ἀπαντα γὰρ ὃς εἰπεῖν ἔτερον ἕνεκα αἰροῦμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῆς σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδίας χάριν ἥλιθιον φαίνεται καὶ λιν παιδικὸν· παιδείᾳ δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρος, ὅρθως ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύει γὰρ ἐοικεν ἡ παιδία. ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύεσθαι δέονται· οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνέργειας. δοκεῖ δ' εὐδαιμονίων βίος δ' κατ' ἀρετὴν εἰναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ. βελτίων τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαία τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίωνος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου φιλοσοφοῦν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὴ τοῦ βελτίωνος κρείττων, καὶ εὐδαιμονικότερα ἡδη. ἀπολαύσειι τ' ἐν τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἡδονῶν ὅ τι τυχὼν καὶ ἀνθράποδον οὐχ ἢτον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδοσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐκ ἀρ' ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία,

1 δ' hic Richards: ante εὐδαιμονίων.
2 δὴ ed.: δὲ.
3 κατ' βίου: κατὰ βαίνειν Mulvany.
4 οὐκ ἀρ' Susemihl: οὐ γὰρ.

*Cf. Politics, πτ. ἅζ., 1280 a 32 'Slaves and lower animals are not members of the state, because they do not participate in happiness nor in purposeful life.'*
pleasant which appear so to the good man; but each man thinks that activity most desirable which suits his particular disposition, and therefore the good man thinks virtuous activity most desirable. It follows therefore that happiness is not to be found in amusements.

(ii) Indeed it would be strange that amusement should be our End—that we should toil and moil all our life long in order that we may amuse ourselves. For virtually every object we adopt is pursued as a means to something else, excepting happiness, which is an end in itself; to make amusement the object of our serious pursuits and our work seems foolish and childish to excess: Anacharsis’s motto, Play in order that you may work, is felt to be the right rule. For amusement is a form of rest; but we need rest because we are not able to go on working without a break, and therefore it is not an end, since we take it as a means to further activity.

(iii) And the life that conforms with virtue is thought to be a happy life; but virtuous life involves serious purpose, and does not consist in amusement.

(iv) Also we pronounce serious things to be superior to things that are funny and amusing; and the nobler a faculty or a person is, the more serious, we think, are their activities; therefore, the activity of the nobler faculty or person is itself superior, and therefore more productive of happiness.

(v) Also anybody can enjoy the pleasures of the body, a slave no less than the noblest of mankind; but no one allows a slave any measure of happiness, any more than a life of his own. Therefore happiness does not consist in pastimes and amusements.
άλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἑνεργεῖαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εὖρηται.

vii Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἑνεργεία, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην: αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου, εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τούτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὁ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἐννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὅν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἦμιν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἑνεργεία κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἰη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐ-
2 δαιμονία: ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν θεωρητική, εὐρηται. ὁμο-
λογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ. κρατίστῃ τε γὰρ αὐτὴ 
εἶναι ἡ ἑνεργεία (καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἦμιν, 
καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ὧν ὁ νοῦς): ἔτι δὲ συν-
εχεστάτη, θεωρεῖν [τε] γὰρ δυνάμειθα συνεχῶς 
3 μᾶλλον ἡ πράττειν ὅσιον. οἰόμεθα τε δεῖν ήδονὴν παραμεμικάθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ 
τῶν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἑνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογομένως ἓστιν: δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία ὡς 
θαυμαστὰς ἠδονὰς ἔχειν καθαρεύοντι καὶ τῷ 
βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδοῖ τῶν ζητοῦντων 
4 ἦδω τῇ διαγωγῇ εἶναι. ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια

1 [τε] om. Π.

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*a This does not appear to have been stated exactly, but in Book VI. (see esp. cc. v. 3, xiii. 8) it was shown that σοφία, the virtue of the higher part of the intellect, is the highest of the virtues.

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but in activities in accordance with virtue, as has been said already.

vii But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation.

2 And that happiness consists in contemplation may be accepted as agreeing both with the results already reached and with the truth. For contemplation is at once the highest form of activity (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects with which the intellect deals are the highest things that can be known), and also it is the most continuous, for we can reflect more continuously than we can carry on any form of action. And again we suppose that happiness must contain an element of pleasure; now activity in accordance with wisdom is admittedly the most pleasant of the activities in accordance with virtue: at all events it is held that philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom contains pleasures of marvellous purity and permanence, and it is reasonable to suppose that the enjoyment of knowledge is a still pleasanter occupation than the pursuit of it. Also the activity of contemplation will be found to possess in the highest degree the quality that

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περὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὔη: τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς σὺς δικαίουπραγῆσαι καὶ μεθ᾽ ἄν, ὅμως δέ καὶ ὁ σωφρόν καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ᾽ αὐτὸν ἢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσον ἂν σοφώτερος ἢ μάλλον βέλτιον δ᾽ ἵσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ᾽ ἁμιᾷς αὐταρκεστάτος. δόξαι 1177β τ᾽ ἂν αὐτῆς μόνη δι᾽ αὐτῆς ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐδεν γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν 'ἡ πλεῖον 'ἡ ἐλαττών περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξειν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐθαμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἢν σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνην ἀγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἄρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἢ ἐνέργεια· αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοῖ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολέμεων τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἐνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον. δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιῶσκε, ἢ μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνοντο). ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιομένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμᾶς ἢ τὴν γε εὐθαμονίαν αὐτῶ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἐτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἤν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δήλου ὡς ἐτέραν

1 πρακτικῶν Kβ: πρακτὸν. 2 δῆλον <ὁτῳ> Ramsauer.

* Probably the sentence should be curtailed to run 'or in fact the happiness of himself and his fellow-citizens; and happiness we are clearly investigating as something distinct from the art of politics (whose object it is).'

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is termed self-sufficiency; for while it is true that the wise man equally with the just man and the rest requires the necessaries of life, yet, these being adequately supplied, whereas the just man needs other persons towards whom or with whose aid he may act justly, and so likewise do the temperate man and the brave man and the others, the wise man on the contrary can also contemplate by himself, and the more so the wiser he is; no doubt he will study better with the aid of fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient of men. Also the activity of contemplation may be held to be the only activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result beyond the actual act of contemplation, whereas from practical pursuits we look to secure some advantage, greater or smaller, beyond the action itself. Also happiness is thought to involve leisure; for we do business in order that we may have leisure, and carry on war in order that we may have peace. Now the practical virtues are exercised in politics or in warfare; but the pursuits of politics and war seem to be unlesured—those of war indeed entirely so, for no one desires to be at war for the sake of being at war, nor deliberately takes steps to cause a war: a man would be thought an utterly blood-thirsty character if he declared war on a friendly state for the sake of causing battles and massacres. But the activity of the politician also is unlesured, and aims at securing something beyond the mere participation in politics—positions of authority and honour, or, if the happiness of the politician himself and of his fellow-citizens, this happiness conceived as something distinct from political activity (indeed we are clearly investigating it as so distinct). If
7 οὖσαν. ἐὰν δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὐτὶς δὲ ἀσχολοῦ καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίλεται καὶ οὐ δὲ αὐτὰς αἱρετάει εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδὴ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὐδα καὶ παρ’ αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονήν οἰκείαν (αὐτὴ δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄρτυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπως καὶ ὡς ἀλλα τῶ μακαρίως ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὁντας τὴν τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὐτὴ ἤν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μήκος βίου τελείου οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. οὐ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἄν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἡ κατ’ ἀνθρώπουν ὑπάρχῃ, ἀλλ’ ἡ θείων τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρειν τότε τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. εἰ δὴ τοιάδεν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ὡς κατὰ τούτων βίου θείων πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπουν βίου. οὐ χρῆ δὲ κατὰ τούς παραποιηθέντας ἀνθρώπων φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπου ὃντα οὔτε θνητόν τὸν θνητών, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὃσον ἐνδεχόμενοι ἄλλων εἰς τοῦ ποιοῦν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ἄγκῳ μικρῷ ἐστὶ, δυνάμει καὶ 1178 αὶ τιμότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε

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1 ἐτέραν... ἐτέραν οὖσαν corrupta: ἢν καὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ὡς ζητοῦμεν ἐτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς Richards.
2 σχολὴ Vermehren.
3 τῶ om. Lb.

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*This should almost certainly be emended to ‘excel in leisuredness.’

* A reminder of ch. v. § 2.

* This section and c. viii. §§ 7 and 13 interpret τ. ix. 3.

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then among practical pursuits displaying the virtues, politics and war stand out pre-eminent in nobility and grandeur, and yet they are unleisured, and directed to some further end, not chosen for their own sakes: whereas the activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in contemplation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and therefore augmenting its activity: and if accordingly the attributes of this activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other attributes of blessedness: it follows that it is the activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human happiness—provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete.

Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.

{\textsuperscript{d}} Euripides, fr. 1040.  \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{*} Pindar, Isthm. 4. 16.
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δ’ άν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τότο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἁμείνου ἀτοπον οὖν γίνοντ’ άν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἵρετο ἀλλὰ των ἄλλων. τὸ λεξένευ τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν τὸ γὰρ οἶκειον ἐκάστην τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡμιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστην καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νόημα βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος: οὗτος ἀρεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖστος.

viii  Δευτέρως δ’ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν. αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικά· διὰ καία ὁ γὰρ καὶ ἄνδρεια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἅρετας πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείας καὶ πράξεις παντοίαις ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦμεν τὸ πρέπον ἕκαστῳ, ταύτα δ’ εἶναι 2 φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἐναὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ ἐστὶ συνωστοθεῖν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ βίου ἄρετης.

3 συνεξευκτέα δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῆς τοῦ βίου ἄρετής, καὶ αὕτη τῆς φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως άρχαι κατὰ τὰς ἡθικὰς εἰσὶν ἅρετας, τὸ δ’ ὁρθὸν τῶν ἡθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρτημέναι δ’ αὕται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸν σύνθετον ἄν εἶλεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνηθετοῦ ἅρετα ἀνθρωπικά· καὶ δ’ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ’ αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη τοσοῦτον

1 καὶ <ταῦ> πράξει ἐπὶ post πάθεσι Rassow.


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It may even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and better part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of some other than himself.

Moreover, what was said before will apply here also: that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this life will be the happiest.

The life of moral virtue, on the other hand, is happy only in a secondary degree. For the moral activities are purely human: Justice, I mean, Courage and the other virtues we display in our intercourse with our fellows, when we observe what is due to each in contracts and services and in our various actions, and in our emotions also; and all of these things seem to be purely human affairs.

And some moral actions are thought to be the outcome of the physical constitution, and moral virtue is thought to have a close affinity in many respects with the passions. Moreover, Prudence is intimately connected with Moral Virtue, and this with Prudence, inasmuch as the first principles which Prudence employs are determined by the Moral Virtues, and the right standard for the Moral Virtues is determined by Prudence. But these being also connected with the passions are related to our composite nature; now the virtues of our composite nature are purely human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these virtues, and the happiness that belongs to it. Whereas the happiness that
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γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήθως· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μείζον
tοῦ προκειμένου ἔστιν. δόξεις δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἔκτος χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ᾿ ἐλαττον δεῖοθαι 25 
tῆς ἡθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν 
χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἱσοῦ ἔστω (εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαποιεῖ 
περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑποτικός, καὶ ὅσα τουανθά)· μικρὸν 
γὰρ ὑπὶ τὶ διαφέροι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ 
διοίκει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίᾳ δεῖσει χρημάτων 
πρὸς τὸ πρᾶττεν τὰ ἐλευθερία, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ 80
δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἰ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι,
προσποιούνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μῆ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι 
δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ δὲ δυνάμεις, εἴπερ 
ἐπιτελεῖ τὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρο 
ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν 
δ ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριώτε-
ρον τῆς ἄρετῆς ἢ προαιρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς 85
ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὐσίας. τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν 1178
ἀμφοῖν ἄν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν 
δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζον ὅσι καὶ καλλίστως,
τῇ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιοο-
τῶν πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνεργείαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἴπειν 
καὶ ἐμπόδια ἐστι πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ δ' 86
ἀνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείστου συζη, αἱρεῖται τὰ

&a In De anima, iii. v. Aristotle distinguishes the active 
from the passive intellect, and pronounces the former to be 
'separate or separable (from matter, or the body), unmixed 
and impassible.'
b Cf. viil. 4, viii. 9, 10, and r. viii. 15-17.

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belongs to the intellect is separate: so much may be said about it here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of our present purpose.

And such happiness would appear to need but little external equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both, it may be granted, require the mere necessaries of life, and that in an equal degree (though the politician does as a matter of fact take more trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the philosopher); for in this respect there may be little difference between them. But for the purpose of their special activities their requirements will differ widely. The liberal man will need wealth in order to do liberal actions, and so indeed will the just man in order to discharge his obligations (since mere intentions are invisible, and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need strength if he is to perform any action displaying his virtue; and the temperate man opportunity for indulgence: otherwise how can he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show that he is virtuous? It is disputed also whether purpose or performance is the more important factor in virtue, as it is alleged to depend on both; now the perfection of virtue will clearly consist in both; but the performance of virtuous actions requires much outward equipment, and the more so the greater and more noble the actions are. But the student, so far as the pursuit of his activity is concerned, needs no external apparatus: on the contrary, worldly goods may almost be said to be a hindrance to contemplation; though it is true that, being a man and living in the society of others, he chooses to
κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράττειν. δεῖσται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἄνθρωπον, ἦ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὑπειλήφθη μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμα πρὸς αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἡ γελοιοὶ φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὁσα τοιαύτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἄνδρείους, ὑπομείνουσα τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύουσαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καλοῦ; ἡ τὰς ἔλευθερίους; τινὶ δὲ διώσοιν; ἀτοπον δὲ εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἡ τι τοιοῦτον. αἰ δὲ σώφρωνες τὶ ἂν εἰς; ἡ φορτικὸς ὁ ἐπαινεῖ ὑπὸ οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοντ’ ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητή σὲ πάντες ὑπειλήφθησιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐνέργεια ἀρα’ οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύθεν ἀσπερ τὸν Ἐυδαιμῶνα. τῷ δὲ ἣς ἧπιν τοῦ πράττειν ἄφαρμομένου, ἢτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τὰ λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ἢστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαρίοτητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἢν εἰς. καὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν δὴ ἡ ταύτη 8 συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικώτατη.—οὐμεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ξῖα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς 25 τοιαύτης ἐνέργειας ἐστερημένα τελεῖσι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἀπάσα ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δὲ ἄνθρωποις ἐφ’ ὥσον δομοιῶμα τὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας

1 ἄνδρεῖοι ὑπομείνουσα. . . κινδυνεύοντος Bywater.
2 τὶ Coraes: τὲ KβLβ, om. Mβ.
3 δὲ Hel.: δὴ.

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engage in virtuous action, and so will need external goods to carry on his life as a human being.

7 The following considerations also will show that perfect happiness is some form of contemplative activity. The gods, as we conceive them, enjoy supreme felicity and happiness. But what sort of actions can we attribute to them? Just actions? but will it not seem ridiculous to think of them as making contracts, restoring deposits and the like? Then brave actions—enduring terrors and running risks for the nobility of so doing? Or liberal actions? but to whom will they give? Besides, it would be absurd to suppose that they actually have a coinage or currency of some sort! And temperate actions—what will these mean in their case? surely it would be derogatory to praise them for not having evil desires! If we go through the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods. Yet nevertheless they have always been conceived as, at all events, living, and therefore living actively, for we cannot suppose they are always asleep like Endymion. But for a living being, if we eliminate action, and a fortiori creative action, what remains save contemplation? It follows that the activity of God, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is most akin to the divine activity of contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness.

8 A further confirmation is that the lower animals cannot partake of happiness, because they are completely devoid of the contemplative activity. The whole of the life of the gods is blessed, and that of man is so in so far as it contains some likeness to
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υπάρχει τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ζώων οὐδέν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίᾳ. ἐφ’ ὅσον δὴ διατείνῃ η τεωρία, καὶ η εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον υπάρχει το θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὴν τυμία. ὥστε, εἰ ἦν η εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τίς.

9 Δεῖος δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐθεμερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὅντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἢ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἄλλα δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν υπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οὐρέων γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεδησθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ

10 τῷ αὐτάρκης οὐδ’ ἢ πριτέις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναι τὰ πράττειν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν (τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἐνάργως· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιώτα τῶν δυναστῶν οὐκ ἦσαν δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεκτή πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον). Ικανὸν δὴ τοσούτῳ υπάρχειν· ἐσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαιμῶν

11 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαιμονιστὰς ὑπὸς ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπόν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένοις, πε- πραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλιστ’, ὡς ἦν, καὶ βε-

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1 τὰ add. MβΟβ. 2 δή Berg: δὲ.
3 τὰ om. Kβ. 4 ὡς om. KβΓ.
5 ὡς ὕετο post ἐνδέχεται γὰρ Richards: ὡς add. τὸ Laminus.

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* Solon in his conversation with Croesus (Herodotus, i. 30-32, see i. ν. 1, note) says that Tellus the Athenian was the happiest man he ever knew. Tellus was well off, he 624
the divine activity; but none of the other animals possess happiness, because they are entirely incapable of contemplation. Happiness therefore is co-extensive in its range with contemplation: the more a class of beings possesses the faculty of contemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as an accidental concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in it, since contemplation is valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some form of contemplation.

9 But the philosopher being a man will also need external well-being, since man's nature is not self-sufficient for the activity of contemplation, but he must also have bodily health and a supply of food and other requirements. Yet if supreme blessedness is not possible without external goods, it must not be supposed that happiness will demand many or great possessions; for self-sufficiency does not depend on excessive abundance, nor does moral conduct, and it is possible to perform noble deeds even without being ruler of land and sea: one can do virtuous acts with quite moderate resources. This may be clearly observed in experience: private citizens do not seem to be less but more given to doing virtuous actions than princes and potentates. It is sufficient then if moderate resources are forthcoming; for a life of virtuous activity will be essentially a happy life.

10 Solon also doubtless gave a good description of happiness, when he said that in his opinion those men were happy who, being moderately equipped with external goods, had performed noble exploits lived to see his children's children, and he died gloriously in battle.
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βιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ὁ δὲ δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυναστὴν ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειν εἴ τις ἀτοποὶς φάνη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς 15 ἐκτὸς, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἰ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστων μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἄλλης ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτως γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν 30 δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρή ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνοῦντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον.— 13 ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τούτων θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἁριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἐοικεν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων 25 ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὡσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἰ ἂν ἐν ἐνεργοῦν χαίρειν τε αὐτοῦς τῷ ἁριστῶ καὶ τῷ συγκενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἰ ὅ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντάς ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελούμενος καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ 80 ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἀρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς

1 ἐπιφέροντας ΛΠΓ.

This section concludes the subject and prepares for the transition to politics in the next chapter; § 13 would come better after § 7: it looks back to i. ix. 1-3.

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and had lived temperately; for it is possible for a man of but moderate possessions to do what is right. Anaxagoras again does not seem to have conceived the happy man as rich or powerful, since he says that he would not be surprised if he were to appear a strange sort of person in the eyes of the many; for most men judge by externals, which are all that they can perceive. So our theories seem to be in agreement with the opinions of the wise.

Such arguments then carry some degree of conviction; but it is by the practical experience of life and conduct that the truth is really tested, since it is there that the final decision lies. We must therefore examine the conclusions we have advanced by bringing them to the test of the facts of life. If they are in harmony with the facts, we may accept them; if found to disagree, we must deem them mere theories.³

And it seems likely that the man who pursues intellectual activity, and who cultivates his intellect and keeps that in the best condition, is also the man most beloved of the gods. For if, as is generally believed, the gods exercise some superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that they take pleasure in that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely the intellect, and that they recompense with their favours those men who esteem and honour this most, because these care for the things dear to themselves, and act rightly and nobly. Now it is clear that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise man. He therefore is most beloved by the gods; and if so, he is naturally most happy.
καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὡστε καὶ οὕτως εἶνει ὁ σοφὸς μᾶλλον εὐδαιμών.

ix Ἔφεσθ᾽ οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν άρετῶν, ἦτο δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἰκανῶς ἔρημαι τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν ὑπῆρχον τὴν προσάρτειν, ἡ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ έστων ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρήσαι ἔκαστα καὶ γνώναι, ἀλλὰ 2 μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ άρετῆς ἰκανὸν τὸ εἶδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐχεῖν καὶ χρήσθαι πειρά- 

τέον, ἧ εἰ πως ἂλλως ἀγαθοὶ γνώμεθα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκειας πρὸς τὸ ποιήσαι ἐπιεικείας, "πολλοὺς ἀν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους" δικαίως ἐφερόν κατὰ τὸν Θεόννυ, καὶ ἔδει ἃν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προ- 

τρέβασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἔλευθεροὺς ἴσχυες, ἢθος τ᾽ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ὅς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἃν κατοικώχυμον εἰ 

τῆς άρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἄνυπαθεῖν πρὸς 10 

καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέβασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοὶ πειθαρχεῖν ἂλλὰ φόβων, οὐδὲ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἴσχρον ἂλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμω-

ρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζωντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώ-

κοῦσι καὶ δὴ ἃν αὐταὶ ἔστωσιν, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὅς ἀληθῶς 15 ἡδέος οὐδὲ ἐννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἀγενοστοὶ ὅντες. τοὺς

* Theognis, 432 ff.

el δ᾽ Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοθτὸ γ᾽ ἔδωκε θεός,

λάσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρᾶς φρέναν ἀνδρῶν,

πολλοὺς ἀν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἑφερόν.

If to physicians God had given

The power to cure mankind of sin,

Large fees and many would they win.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, X. viii. 13—ix. 5

Here is another proof that the wise man is the happiest.

ix If then we have sufficiently discussed in their outlines the subjects of Happiness and of Virtue in its various forms, and also Friendship and Pleasure, may we assume that the investigation we proposed is now complete? Perhaps however, as we maintain, in the practical sciences the end is not to attain a theoretic knowledge of the various subjects, but rather to carry out our theories in action. If so, to know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavour to possess and to practise it, or in some other manner actually ourselves to become good.

2 Now if discourses on ethics were sufficient in themselves to make men virtuous, 'large fees and many' (as Theognis says) 'would they win,' quite rightly, and to provide such discourses would be all that is wanted. But as it is, we see that although theories have power to stimulate and encourage generous youths, and, given an inborn nobility of character and a genuine love of what is noble, can make them susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to stimulate the mass of mankind to moral nobility. For it is the nature of the many to be amenable to fear but not to a sense of honour, and to abstain from evil not because of its baseness but because of the penalties it entails; since, living as they do by passion, they pursue the pleasures akin to their nature, and the things that will procure those pleasures, and avoid the opposite pains, but have not even a notion of what is noble and truly pleasant, having never tasted true pleasure. What
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dη τοιούτους τίς δὲν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι: οὐ γάρ οἶον τε ἡ οὐ ράδιον τά. ἑκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἣθεσιν κατειλημμένα λόγως μεταστήμασαν. ἀγαπητῶν δὲ ἑσσὶν ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὑπεικείς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβομεν 20 τῆς ἀρετῆς—γίνεσθαι δὴ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δὲ ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως θηλὼν ὡς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν [ὑπάρχει], ἀλλὰ διὰ τινας θείας αἰτίας τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχείσιν ὑπάρχει. δ’ ἐδ’ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴ ποτ’ οὐκ ἐν ἀπασίν ἱσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεὶ προδιειργάθαι τοῖς ἐθεσιν τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ὑψικῆν πρὸς τὸ 25 καλὸς χαίρειν καὶ μυστών, ὁσπερ γῆν τὴν θρε- 7 ψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄκουσει λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ’ ἂν συνεῖη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ξών- τον δ’ οὕτως έχοντα πῶς οἶον τε μεταπείναι; ὅλως τ’ οὐ δοκεί λόγῳ ὑπελεῖκεν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βια.

8 δεὶ δὴ τὸ ἡθος προὐπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραίνον τὸ ἀίσχρον. ἐκ νέου δ’ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτους τραφέντα νόμους· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερώς ξῆν οὐχ ἦδο τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμους δεὶ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεῖαί 30 ματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα. 5 1180 a

9 οὐχ ἔκανον δὲ ἑσσὶν νέους ὑπός τροφῆς καὶ ἔπι-

1 ἠθεσιν Γ. 2 Richards. 3 ἠθεσιν LB. 4 ἂν (vel δὴ) Richards: αὐ. 5 γενόμενα OB: γενόμενα.

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theory then can reform the natures of men like these? To dislodge by argument habits long firmly rooted in their characters is difficult if not impossible. We may doubtless think ourselves fortunate if we attain some measure of virtue when all the things believed to make men virtuous are ours.

6 Now some thinkers hold that virtue is a gift of nature; others think we become good by habit, others that we can be taught to be good. Natural endowment is obviously not under our control; it is bestowed on those who are fortunate, in the true sense, by some divine dispensation. Again, theory and teaching are not, I fear, equally efficacious in all cases: the soil must have been previously tilled if it is to foster the seed, the mind of the pupil must have been prepared by the cultivation of habits, so as to like and dislike aright. For he that lives at the dictates of passion will not hear nor understand the reasoning of one who tries to dissuade him; but if so, how can you change his mind by argument? And, speaking generally, passion seems not to be amenable to reason, but only to force.

7 We must therefore by some means secure that the character shall have at the outset a natural affinity for virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base. And it is difficult to obtain a right education in virtue from youth up without being brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardly is not pleasant to most men, especially when young; hence the nurture and exercises of the young should be regulated by law, since temperance and hardness will not be painful when they have become habitual. But doubtless it is not enough for people to receive the right nurture and

Teaching is powerless without a foundation of good habits.
καλήν. διόπερ οὖν τινες τοὺς νομοθέτουντας
dείν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προ-
tρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς υπακουομένων
tῶν ἑπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦν
dὲ καὶ ἀφυστέροις οὕσι κολάσεως τε καὶ τιμωρίας
ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἔξορίζειν. τὸν
μὲν γὰρ ἑπιεικῆ πρὸς¹ τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ
πειθαρχῆσεως, τὸν δὲ φαύλον ἡδονῆς ὀργομενον
λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι² όσπερ ὑποξύγουν. διὸ καὶ
φασὶ δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστ'
discipline in youth; they must also practise the lessons they have learnt, and confirm them by habit, when they are grown up. Accordingly we shall need laws to regulate the discipline of adults as well, and in fact the whole life of the people generally; for the many are more amenable to compulsion and punishment than to reason and to moral ideals.

Hence some persons hold, that while it is proper for the lawgiver to encourage and exhort men to virtue on moral grounds, in the expectation that those who have had a virtuous moral upbringing will respond, yet he is bound to impose chastisement and penalties on the disobedient and ill-conditioned, and to banish the incorrigible out of the state altogether. For (they argue) although the virtuous man, who guides his life by moral ideals, will be obedient to reason, the base, whose desires are fixed on pleasure, must be chastised by pain, like a beast of burden. This indeed is the ground for the view that the pains and penalties for transgressors should be such as are most opposed to their favourite pleasures.

But to resume: if, as has been said, in order to be good a man must have been properly educated and trained, and must subsequently continue to follow virtuous habits of life, and to do nothing base whether voluntarily or involuntarily, then this will be secured if men's lives are regulated by a certain intelligence, and by a right system, invested with adequate sanctions. Now paternal authority has not the power to compel obedience, nor indeed, speaking generally, has the authority of any individual unless he be a king or the like; but law on the other hand is a rule, emanating from a certain wisdom and intelligence, that has compulsory force. Men are
Aristotle

καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐκθαίροντι τοὺς ἐναντιομένους ταῖς ὀρμαίς, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρᾶσιν ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστω ἐπαχθῆς τάττων τῷ ἐπιεικέσι.

13 ἐν μονῇ δὲ τῇ Δακεδαμονίᾳ πόλει ἦ 1 μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιηθεῖσα τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείοντας τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἐκαστῶς ὡς βουλεύει, κυκλοπικῶς θεμι-στεύων "πάθων ἢ ἄλοχον." κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν κοινὴν 30 δὴ ἐξαμελουμένων ἐκάστω τὸν προσήκειν τοῖς σφητέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι, ἡ προ-αρέσθαι υε. μᾶλλον δὴ ἄν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δοξεῖν 3 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικῶς γενόμενον· αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ κοινὰ ἐπιμέλειαν δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων 35 γίγνονται, ἐπιπειρέεις δ’ αἰ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων γεγραμμένων δ’ ἡ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἀν δοξεῖ 1190 διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι’ ὧν εἰς τὴν πολλοῖς παθευθή-σονται, ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνιαχθεὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθη, 4 οὔτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, 5 καὶ ἐτὶ μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργουτες καὶ

1 Bywater.
2 καὶ . . . δύνασθαι hic ed. auctore Bywater (secl. Richards): supra ante κοινὴ δ’ ἐξαμελουμένων
3 δ’ ἄν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι δοξεῖν scripsit Richards.
4 ἔθη MP: ἔθη.
5 ἔθη LbP.

* Hume, Odyssey, ix. 114 ff., quoted in Politics, i. 1252 b 22.
* This clause, literally 'and to be able to do it,' Bywater.
hated when they thwart people's inclinations, even though they do so rightly, whereas law can enjoin virtuous conduct without being invidious. But Sparta appears to be the only or almost the only state in which the lawgiver has paid attention to the nurture and exercises of the citizens; in most states such matters have been entirely neglected, and every man lives as he likes, in Cyclops fashion 'laying down the law for children and for spouse.'

The best thing is then that there should be a proper system of public regulation; but when the matter is neglected by the community, it would seem to be the duty of the individual to assist his own children and friends to attain virtue, or even if not able to do so successfully, at all events to make thus his aim. But it would seem to follow from what has been said before, that he will be more likely to be successful in this if he has acquired the science of legislation. Public regulations in any case must clearly be established by law, and only good laws will produce good regulations; but it would not seem to make any difference whether these laws are written or unwritten, or whether they are to regulate the education of a single person or of a number of people, any more than in the case of music or athletics or any other form of training. Paternal exhortations and family habits have authority in the household, just as legal enactments and national customs have authority in the state, and the more so on account of the ties of relationship and of benefits conferred that unite the head of the household to its other members: he can count on their natural affection would place here; it comes in the mss. after 'public regulation' above.

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15 εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν παιδείαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὀπισπερ ἐπὶ λατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡ σωκλία καὶ Ἀσκία, τινὶ δ’ ἵσως οὐ, ὡ τέν πυκτίκως ἵσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθησιν. ἔξαιρικοισθαι δὴ δόξειν ἄν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἵδιας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γνωμονῆς· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ πρόσφορον τυγχάνει ἐκαστος. ἄλλ’ ἐπιμεληθεὶς ἄν’ ἄριστα καθ’ ἐν’ καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστής καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ καθόλου εἰδὼς τὶ πᾶσιν ἡ τοῖς τοιούθεν τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπὶ-
16 στήματα λέγονται τε καὶ εἰσίν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ ἐνὸς τινος οὐδὲν ἵσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων, ὅτα, τεθεαιμένων δ’ ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ’ ἐκαστῷ δι’ ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἱατροὶ ἐνοι δοκοῦσιν ἐναυτῶν ἄριστοι εἰναι, ἐτέρω οὐδέν ἄν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδέν δ’ ἡττον ἵσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἰναι δόξειν ἄν, κάκεινο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται·
17 εἴρηται γὰρ ὧτι περὶ τοῦ θ’ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι, τάχα δὴ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι’ ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἰτε πολλοὺς εἰτ’ ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἁγαθοὶ γενομέθ’ ἄν. ἀντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθέναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἄλλ’ εἰπερ τινος,

1 ἅν Richards: μὲν (μὲν ἂν Bekker).
2 ἄν Mich.: ἄν.
3 καθόλου ἄν: τὸ καθόλου.
4 τῇ ἄν: ἄν.
5 ἄλλ’ ἄν: ἄλλ’ καὶ.
6 ὁ Ramsauer: δε.

— a e.g., medicine is 'the science of healing,' not the 'science of healing Brown or Jones.'
and obedience at the outset. Moreover individual treatment is better than a common system, in education as in medicine. As a general rule rest and fasting are good for a fever, but they may not be best for a particular case; and presumably a professor of boxing does not impose the same style of fighting on all his pupils. It would appear then that private attention gives more accurate results in particular cases, for the particular subject is more likely to get the treatment that suits him. But a physician or trainer or any other director can best treat a particular person if he has a general knowledge of what is good for everybody, or for other people of the same kind: for the sciences deal with what is universal, as their names imply. Not but what it is possible no doubt for a particular individual to be successfully treated by someone who is not a scientific expert, but has an empirical knowledge based on careful observation of the effects of various forms of treatment upon the person in question; just as some people appear to be their own best doctors, though they could not do any good to someone else. But nevertheless it would doubtless be agreed that anyone who wishes to make himself a professional and a man of science must advance to general principles, and acquaint himself with these by the proper method: for science, as we said, deals with the universal. So presumably a man who wishes to make other people better (whether few or many) by discipline, must endeavour to acquire the science of legislation—assuming that it is possible to make us good by laws. For to mould aright the character of any and every person that presents himself is not a task that can be done by anybody,
ARISTOTLE

tou eidótos, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
18 ὁν ἐστὶν ἐπιμέλεια τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἀρ' οὖν
μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἦ πῶς νομοθετικὸς
γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν άλλων, παρὰ δὲ
τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς
εἶναι. ἢ οὖχ ᾧμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν
μὲν γὰρ ταῖς άλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε
dynámeis paradidóntes καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπὸ αὐτῶν,
oi̇n ἱατροὶ καὶ γραφέες: τὰ δὲ πολιτικά ἐπὶ
αγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττειν
δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δισεμεν
ἂν δυνάμει τοῖς τοῦτο πράττει ταῖς ἐμπειρίας
μᾶλλον ἡ διανοία: οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε
λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καί τοι
κάλλιον ὅν ἵσως ἡ λόγους δικαιουκός τε καὶ
dημηγορικός), οὔδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες
τοὺς σφητέρους καὶ ή τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων.
19 εὑλογον δ' ἦν, εἰπερ ἐδύναντο: οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς
πόλεσιν ἀμενον οὔδεν κατέληπον ἄν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς
ὑπάρξαν προέλθων' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης
dynámeos, οὔδε δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρὸν
gε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία. συμβάλλεσθαι οὔδὲ γὰρ
10 ἐγίγνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνθέσεως πολιτικοῖς
διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσ-

a See vi. viii. 2.

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but only (if at all) by the man with scientific knowledge, just as is the case in medicine and the other professions involving a system of treatment and the exercise of prudence.

18 Is not then the next question to consider from whom or how the science of legislation can be learnt? Perhaps, like other subjects, from the experts, namely the politicians; for we saw that legislation is a branch of political science. But possibly it may seem that political science is unlike the other sciences and faculties. In these the persons who impart a knowledge of the faculty are the same as those who practise it, for instance physicians and painters; but in politics the sophists, who profess to teach the science, never practise it. It is practised by the politicians, who would appear to rely more upon a sort of empirical skill than on the exercise of abstract intelligence; for we do not see them writing or lecturing about political principles (though this might be a more honourable employment than composing forensic and parliamentary speeches), nor yet do we notice that they have made their own sons or any others of their friends into statesmen.

19 Yet we should expect them to have done so had they been able, for they could have bequeathed no more valuable legacy to their countries, nor is there any quality they would choose for themselves, and therefore for those nearest to them, to possess, in preference to political capacity. Not that experience does not seem to contribute considerably to political success; otherwise men would never have become statesmen merely through practical association with politics; so it would appear that those who aspire to a scientific knowledge of politics
20 δεύν ἐσικεύν ἐπιειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαν: ὅλως γὰρ οὔδε ποίον τὴ ἐστιν ἡ περὶ ποια ἴσασιν οὐ γὰρ ἔν τινα αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ ὁ οὔδε χείρῳ ἐπίθεσιν, οὐδὲ ἄν ᾧοντο πρῶιν εἶναι τὸ νομοθετήσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων: ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἄριστους, ὡσπερ οὔδε τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὔσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μονοικήν: οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν 20 ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δὲ ὁν ἡ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνείδησιν, καὶ ποια ποίοις συνάδει: τοῖς δὲ ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλαμβάνειν εἰ ἐν ἡ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὡσπερ ἑπὶ γραφικής. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἑοίκασιν: πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ 21 τοὺς ἄριστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἱατρικῶς ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρώνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἄλλα καὶ ὃς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὃς δὲι θεραπεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἐξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ἠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἀν· ἐπιστήμους ἀξρεῖα. ἵσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων

1 τὸ om. Kb.

Isocrates, Antidosis § 80.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, X. ix. 20–21

20 require practical experience as well as study. On the other hand those sophists who profess to teach politics are found to be very far from doing so successfully. In fact they are absolutely ignorant of the very nature of the science and of the subjects with which it deals; otherwise they would not class it as identical with, or even inferior to, the art of rhetoric. Nor would they imagine that it is easy to frame a constitution by making a collection of such existing laws as are reputed to be good ones, on the assumption that one can then select the best among them; as if even this selection did not call for understanding, and as if to judge correctly were not a very difficult task, just as much as it is for instance in music. It is only the experts in an art who can judge correctly the productions of that art, and who understand the means and the method by which perfection is attained, and know which elements harmonize with which; amateurs may be content if they can discern whether the general result produced is good or bad, for example in the art of painting. Laws are the product, so to speak, of the art of politics; how then can a mere collection of laws teach a man the science of legislation, or make him able to judge which of them are the best?

21 We do not see men becoming expert physicians from a study of medical handbooks. Yet medical writers attempt to describe not only general courses of treatment, but also methods of cure and modes of treatment for particular sorts of patients, classified according to their various habits of body; and their treatises appear to be of value for men who have had practical experience, though they are useless for the novice. Very possibly therefore collections of laws
καὶ τῶν πολιτείων αἱ συναγωγαί τοῖς μὲν δυνα
μένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρῖναι τὶ καλὸς ἢ τούναντίον
καὶ ποιὰ ποῖοι ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστὸς ἄν εἰη τοῖς
δ’ ἀνευ ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν
καλὸς ὅπως ἢ ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτοῦτον,
εὐσυνετῶτεροι δ’ εἰς ταῦτα τάχ’ ἄν, γένοιτο.
22 παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνεπερήπητον
tὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι
μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἦσσως, καὶ ἄλλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας,1
ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων φιλό-
23 σοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ τι κατὰ
μέρος εἰρητὶ καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγεναστέρων
πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἰτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων
πολιτείων θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποιὰ σφίζει καὶ φθειρεῖ
tὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποιὰ ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτείων,
καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούναντιών
πολιτεύονται: θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ’ ἃν
μᾶλλον συνιδομεν καὶ ποιὰ πολιτεία ἀριστή,
καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ
ἐθεσὶ χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἄρξαμενοι.

1 πολιτικῆς Richards.

a This section roughly gives the contents of Aristotle’s
Politics, excepting Book I.; ‘a review,’ etc., is Book II.,
‘then,’ etc., Books III.-VI., ‘what is the best constitution,’
etc., Books VII. and VIII.

b Aristotle compiled, or caused to be compiled, descrip-
tions of the constitutions of 188 Greek states: of these the
Constitution of Athens alone survives.
and constitutions may be serviceable to students capable of studying them critically, and judging what measures are valuable or the reverse, and what kind of institutions are suited to what national characteristics. But those who peruse such compilations without possessing a trained faculty cannot be capable of judging them correctly, unless they do so by instinct, though they may very likely sharpen their political intelligence.

22 As then the question of legislation has been left uninvestigated by previous thinkers, it will perhaps be well if we consider it for ourselves, together with the whole question of the constitution of the State, in order to complete as far as possible our philosophy of human affairs.

23 a We will begin then by attempting a review of any pronouncements of value contributed by our predecessors in this or that branch of the subject; and then on the basis of our collection of constitutions b we will consider what institutions are preservative and what destructive of states in general, and of the different forms of constitution in particular, and what are the reasons which cause some states to be well governed and others the contrary. For after studying these questions we shall perhaps be in a better position to discern what is the best constitution absolutely, and what are the best regulations, laws, and customs for any given form of constitution. Let us then begin our discussion.
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